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Abstract

This research aims to address the rhetorical claims about transparency and access to
information (ATI) by asking questions like: Why they are important, and if they are, are they
worth of constitutional protection? The study engages in a doctrinal research with two
dimensions, a conceptual and a normative one. The conceptual dimension includes the
understanding of the meaning, perceptions, dynamics, tensions and values assigned to
transparency and ATI. This dimension is explored through the study of two main jurisdictions
(Canada and the EU) and two case studies (Ontario and Albania). The normative dimension in
concerned with how the conceptual grounds shape the legal status and protection of ATI, and
provides a framework that enables the recognition of ATI as a constitutional right. My analysis
focuses on the users of the ATI process, and their practices.
The conceptual dimension views transparency and access rights as political and societal
constructs. They heavily depend on the political system at place, and their analysis should not
start from expectations based on ideals, but potentials. The societal approach focuses on the
public space and looks at transparency and ATI as having multiple functions. The thesis provides
a set of standards against which the main rhetorical claims about transparency and the actual
practice of ATI can be measured.
The normative dimension takes a human rights perspective that focuses on the substance and
the form. From a substance approach ATI rights are considered necessary and important in
Canada. From a form approach Canada has a gap on how rights transform into positive law and
penetrate the constitutional structure. This thesis offers a bridge to reconcile the substance and
form approach. My argument points to a fundamental dichotomy of a human rights-based
approach as found in the difference between an instrumentalist and an intrinsic approach. It
argues that the right of ATI deserves recognition from both approaches. However, the thesis
argues for the value of the intrinsic approach because it lends itself to a discussion of rights that
have the potential to generate and shape ideas, create knowledge and enable engagement and
participation.
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PART I
BUILDING FUNDAMENTAL BLOCKS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND DISSERTATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction
In the literature, there is a conceptual and definitional muddle with respect to transparency
and its relationship with access to information (ATI). From a legal perspective transparency
manifests itself as a general principle of law and ATI as a right which enables disclosure of
government information to individuals and groups on the basis of request. Viewed in a simplified
way, there is clearly a principle-right relationship between transparency and ATI. However, the
nature and the dynamics of this relationship are informed by many legal, political, social,
historical and cultural factors.

This research aims to address the rhetorical claims about transparency and ATI by asking
questions like: Why they are important, and if they are, are they worth of constitutional
protection? To answer these questions this study engages in a doctrinal research with two
dimensions, a conceptual and a normative one. The conceptual dimension includes the
understanding of the meaning, perceptions, dynamics, tensions and values assigned to
transparency and ATI. To better understand what the terminology means and how the
transparency-ATI relationship develops conceptually and materializes in practice, this research
studied the situation in two main jurisdictions (Canada and the EU) and two case studies
(Ontario and Albania). The normative dimension in concerned with how the conceptual grounds
shape the legal status and protection of the two variables, and provides a framework that enables
the recognition of access to information as a constitutional right. My analysis emphasizes the
legal, political, and institutional framework in each case, and focuses on the users of the ATI
process, and their practices.
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The conceptual dimension views transparency and access rights as political and societal
constructs. From a political perspective this research demonstrates that transparency heavily
depends on the political system at place and its weaknesses are structural – transparency is a
recent introduction to most political systems that were not designed to be transparent from the
inception. The analysis of transparency should not start from expectations based on ideals, but
potentials that address the information and power asymmetry.

The societal approach focuses on the public space and looks at transparency and access as
having three functions. First, they bring issues to the public’s attention. Second, they enhance
public’s education, social learning, rational thinking, and political and social consciousness.
Third, they strengthen the idea of citizenship (especially in the EU). The thesis provides a set of
standards (using theories of Pateman and Habermas) against which the main rhetorical claims
about transparency and the actual practice of ATI can be measured.

The normative dimension is concerned with how the law is and how it ought to be.
Transparency often becomes a political tool, which in absence of pressure from civil society, will
stretch its applications to the extreme edges of its legal meaning, or will distort its system of
access rights by subjugating them to political will. The way transparency is perceived by the
government will dictate how it is engrained in the legal system of a country, and how access
rights are protected and implemented, in part through ATI. The normative dimension takes a
human rights perspective that focuses on the substance and the form which are distinct but also
dependent to one another. The substance approach deals with what rights are necessary and
important. There is a general agreement that ATI is an important right. The form approach deals
with how can rights transform into positive law and penetrate the constitutional structure. This is
where the Canadian experience lacks activism and success. This thesis offers a bridge to close
the gap between the substance and form approach. My argument points to a fundamental
dichotomy of a human rights-based approach as evidenced in the literature and in the practices in
various jurisdictions – as found in the difference between an instrumentalist and an intrinsic
approach. It argues that the right of ATI deserves recognition from both approaches. However,
the thesis argues for the value of the intrinsic approach because it lends itself to a discussion of
rights that comes closest to meeting the standards it has outlined. The value of an intrinsic
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approach (as explained by the Habermas’s discourse theory of law) lies with the potential of
access rights to generate and shape ideas, create knowledge and enable engagement and
participation, thereby meeting the standards identified above. This approach allows for
overcoming limitations of an instrumental recognition.

This research allows for an enrichment of the two dimensions it studied, conceptual and
normative. The thesis offers a definition and a conceptual framework that differentiates between
transparency and ATI. An essential part of this conceptual framework is a typology of
information access/delivery that helps explain the behavior of the actors involved in access to
information processes. In addition, the thesis offers models of transparency for each of the
jurisdictions in study, ones that are based on the value assigned to transparency processes.

Finally, an analysis of the grounds for and limitations of a rights-based approach is offered,
both in general and in terms of the various jurisdictions studied. Using the EU as an example of
how access rights have evolved over time and granted constitutional status, the thesis proposes a
recognition of such status in Canada. This recognition could be achieved through courts as a
venue to avoid at a certain extent the political and procedural hindrances. While courts are not
immune from political interference, they are in a much better position to make decisions that are
independent, innovative and reformative. The involvement of the courts would allow for an
interpretative stretching of access rights on the basis of their value and the place they deserve in
the constitutional structure.

1.2 Description and Dissertation Overview
1.2.1 Description
This research started as an investigation of the access rights that Canadians have in relation to
their government, mainly the federal government in this case. In trying to make sense of the legal
framework, I found myself immersed into a rich and diverse body of literature on ATI that was
closely related to transparency. Although there is some level of agreement in the literature that
transparency is important for the functioning of every democratic society, the terminology that is
used to describe the term is complex, if not frustrating. I noticed a conceptual muddle
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surrounding the notion of transparency. It was described variously as a process, as a principle, as
a goal, and so on. The difficulty in conceptualization made this research challenging, but at the
same time worth pursuing in an attempt to close the gap in the existing literature.

From a legal perspective, transparency is better understood as a general principle, which is
expressed in practice through access to information laws, among other things. Canada passed an
Access to Information Act (ATIA) in 1982, and many other countries in the world have done so as
well. These laws protect a right to access to information by individuals on information held by
their governments. When I compared the federal Canadian right to ATI with the same rights in
several other jurisdictions, I noticed differences. Hence, I decided to engage in a comparative
exercise, which could help explain these differences. I chose the European Union (EU) as a
jurisdiction for comparison because it represents interesting patterns of how transparency and
access to information have developed. I explain the reason for this choice in section 1.3 below. I
chose the Canadian federal level because that is the most problematic jurisdiction in Canada,
where the ATI law is in immediate need for reform, according to the literature. In addition,
studying all provinces would have been a difficult undertaking considering the limited time and
resources available for the completion of this thesis. Needless to say, there are political, legal and
institutional differences between the EU and Canada, but my comparison was apt because they
also share similarities.

The comparison between Canada and the EU offers interesting insights since they are
complex multilevel governance systems where authority is dispersed between different levels of
government - local, regional, provincial, national and supranational - as well as across spheres
and sectors including markets, and citizens. Both Canada and the EU, share some features of
federalism, where federalism has to be understood as a system which ensures a large measure of
self-rule for the constituent units. With a bit of attention in the political systems, one can find
similarity in the practices and conceptions of transparency and ATI rules in Canada and the EU.
As Hix argues “from the point of view of comparative politics, there are many things the EU
shares with other multi-level polities.”1 In the EU, member states jointly decide the common

1

Simon Hix, The political system of the European Union, 2nd ed (London: Palgrave MacMillan Press Ltd, 2005) at
574 [Hix, “The political system of the EU”].
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purposes of the Union. In Canada, with some important exceptions where the government of
Canada alone gets to define the common purposes of the federation, the same practice prevails
with the provinces.

In addition, in both jurisdictions the need for more transparency and ATI has originated from
the idea of a weak Parliament and democratic deficit. According to Birkinshaw “Transparency
…. gained popular appeal within the European Community from the early 1990s when it was
seen as a useful device to combat claims of democratic deficit and complexity in the operations
of the EC.”2 Both Canada and the EU are political systems with a very strong executive branch
which undermines legitimacy and popular vote. As such, in both Canada and the EU,
transparency has developed as a necessity to control the government and its bureaucracy and
protect the citizens from misuse of government power. Héritier argues that “transparency and
access to information play a straightforward supportive role. They function as a prerequisite for
exercising popular control over government activities.”3

The European Parliament has not been a strong legislature. Hix states that at the EU level
“Legislative power is shared between two institutions: the legislative meetings of the Council
and the EP.”4 Although the role of the European Parliament has increased with the introduction
of the so-called co-decision procedure, its role is still shadowed by that of the Council. In
Canada, the Westminster parliamentary system fuses the executive and legislature. In practice,
executives dominate parliaments and get them to do their bidding. The only time executives may
have to bargain with Canadian parliaments and accept a compromise on their legislative
proposals is in the event of a minority government. This is the reason Roberts argues that “The
urge to regulate the flow of information may be stronger in a governmental system such as
Canada’s, in which authority is already more highly concentrated within the executive branch.”5

Patrick Birkinshaw, “Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights?” (2006) 58:1
Administrative Law Review 177 at 189 [Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”].
3
Adrienne Héritier, “Composite democracy in Europe: the role of transparency and access to information” (2003)
10:5 Journal of European Public Policy 814 at 824 [Héritier, “Composite democracy in Europe”].
4
Hix, “The political system of the EU”, supra note 1 at 582.
5
Alasdair Roberts, “Administrative discretion and the Access to Information Act: An “internal law” on open
government?” (2002) 45:2 Canadian Public Administration 175 at 179 [Roberts, “Administrative discretion and
ATIA].
2
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I also looked at the situation in Albania (a country where I was a lawyer, and which is a
candidate country for membership in the EU) and in Ontario, with a more friendly access regime,
just to bet some perspective on the main comparison I was making. The research on the legal
framework in the two jurisdictions showed striking differences on how transparency and access
to information were viewed and protected. As a result, I decided to pay further attention to why
these differences existed, and factors to which they could be attributed.

1.2.2 Collection of data
I study transparency and access to information in Canada and the EU using two lenses, an
institutional and a user perspective. The institutional lens looks at four types of institutions, the
government (giving political directions), public administration (managing the everyday
administration of ATI system), oversight institutions (advocating for the right of ATI), and
courts (impartial decision-makers). Each of these types of institutions informs how access to
information is perceived by different actors and how their mindsets shapes the environment in
which ATI operates and the responses to public demands.

One of the main challenges on the institutional study is the role of bureaucratic discretion on
transparency and ATI. One of the central problems with the access laws is that many important
exemptions are discretionary. This means that the government ‘may’ disclose the information
that falls under such exemptions, but does not have to. In theory, this permits more disclosure
than mandatory exemptions, but the problem lies with who exercises the discretion to disclose.
Dealing with discretion will be a challenge in my research, and its study has limitations. To
address this challenge I will try to address questions like: What are the implications of a statutory
right being shaped through the exercise of administrative discretion and what can be a solution to
this problem? How can the ATI law work better in practice? Does this require a change of the
statutory law or even this intervention is not enough considering the inherited culture of
bureaucracy? To give answers to these questions I designed a questionnaire addressed to some of
the Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Coordinators in Canada and the main institutions
at the EU.
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In addition, I inspect the oversight institutions on ATI which include the Information
Commissioner/Ombudsman6 and the Courts. This dissertation compares the oversight institutions
in both jurisdictions and analyzes their role and influence in the ATI regime. It looks at their
status, competences, mandate and enforcement power to highlight the similarities and differences
among them. I complement the questionnaire used for the Information Coordinators with
exploratory interviews with some public officials from the Information Commissioners. These
interviews were conducted throughout a period of six months, from March to August 2015. The
purpose of the interviews was to understand the process in which ATI requests are made and
handled, the attitudes of the actors involved and the challenges they are confronted with. All the
participants were asked about the value of ATI and their approach to promote that value.

Furthermore, I look at how the courts interpret transparency and ATI provisions. I use case
law as a method to understand the approach of the courts focusing on the main cases from the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Justice of the EU. I also look at the contribution of
the Federal Court of Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights on transparency and ATI.
The case law offers an advantage on research because many court decisions are published, hence
it is very convenient to track them systematically.
From a user’s perspective, I examine how ATI users have adopted and benefited from its
provisions in their activities. I have chosen NGOs and media/journalists amongst many users
such as businesses, political parties, academics and individuals. My choice was based on two
reasons: first, a study of a wider user group was practically impossible for lack of funding, time
and other resources. Second, these are the groups of users who most work with ATI to protect
public interests, in many cases advancing human rights. I chose both groups since in many cases
organizations of journalists are considered to be NGOs, and many journalists also work for
NGOs. As such, in many cases it is hard to make a distinction between the two groups. The role
of the media in shaping transparency and access to information has close attention in my thesis.
There are claims that the information requested by the media may be used not in the interest of

6

Note that the federal institution in Canada with oversight on Access to Information Act is the Information
Commissioner, in Ontario is the Information Commissioner and Privacy of Ontario, in the EU is the European
Ombudsman, and in Albania is the Commissioner of the Right to Information and the Protection of Personal Data.
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the citizens, but that of mass media and interest groups. This could undermine the public interest
if it results in the latter exerting disproportional influence through selective use of governmental
material. In addition, I keep in mind that not all NGOs serve the public interest because some of
them are captured by political or business interests. This is a weakness I consider when I draw
conclusions based on the information and data gathered from NGOs and media.

This research employs qualitative (historical, legislative and case-law analysis, survey,
interviews,) and quantitative methods (data drawn from the Treasury Board Secretariat [TBS]
and Office of Information Commissioner [OIC] websites). I provide a preliminary historical
overview of the development of the access to information legislation in both Canada and in the
EU. This allows me to better understand what caused this development and what the
consequences were. Drawing on the insights of historical development, my dissertation aims to
explain why the ATI legislation was passed at a particular point in time and why it took the
particular form it did. The two case studies are introduced shortly for comparison. Furthermore,
this research makes an analysis of the ATI legislative framework in Canada and the EU. It
particularly focuses on the implications that derive from the place ATI acts hold in the hierarchy
of the legal framework and means by which it is implemented and becomes obligatory. I
investigate how and why Canada, the EU and the two cases studies have adopted their models. I
also examine their achievements, challenges, problems and their solutions. The Canadian and
the EU model are put in front of each other and are compared in search of differences and
similarities and the rationale for them. This comparison helps me to draw important conclusions
for my research.

My field qualitative methodology consists of two tools: questionnaires and interviews. The
questionnaire was sent via emails to 113 Access to Information and Privacy coordinators in
Canada. The questionnaires were sent in May with responses coming back throughout a period
of two months. All email contacts are provided by the Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada in
its website, together with the names and other contact information for these coordinators. There
are 260 institutions listed at the Treasury Board Secretariat webpage. I sent the questionnaire to
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1137, out of 260 contacts and made the choice based on the importance of the institutions. It was
very easy to access the contacts since they were all contained in one webpage and listed in
alphabetical order. Several reminders were sent via email waiting for a response. I had some
communication with some of them, and could really notice the frustration of completing the
questionnaire. Only a handful of coordinators showed interest in the research and only four of
them actually completed the questionnaire. My expectation was that I would get the response of
at least a quarter of the number (about thirty). However, the results were far more disappointing
than expected. Of course, this result is very limited to draw conclusions from. However, the
frustration showed by the ATIP coordinators was a sign of a centralized system that is politically
steered.

For the EU, the questionnaires were sent in June with responses coming back throughout a
period of two months. The questionnaire was the same as that sent in Canada. It was sent via
email to the three main EU institutions, the Parliament, the Commission and the Council, and I
only got completed questionnaires from two of them. Although several reminders were sent to
the EU Parliament I never had any response. I am not sure if the mail ever reached the EP, but I
assume the email was correct. I also sent the questionnaire via email to 23 out of the 40 EU
central agencies. This number choice was made on the email contacts I could find. It was very
difficult to find the contacts of the departments at the EU institutions, including the three main
ones (although it took less time to find their contact). The contacts could not be found in one
webpage as in Canada - they were scattered. It took me some time to track the contacts of the
offices or persons charged with handling access to documents (ATD) requests. The emails were
sent in July with answers coming till the end of August. The response rate was better than
Canada, but nonetheless low. Only 7 out of 26 responded. However, I had more communication
with people at the EU, and they seemed interested in the research. A handful of them wrote to
request time extensions due to lack of people because of the holiday season (August). However,
even with an extension to the first week of September, no one responded after August.

7

Note that the numbers of ATIP Coordinators is smaller than 260, which is the number of the institutions since in
many cases one coordinator covers more than one institution.
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The second tool of data collection are the interviews. I conducted a total of seventeen
interviews. Letters of invitation were sent to each of the persons who agreed to be interviewed in
advance, before the interview date. Informed consent was obtained by either signing the letter or
by email confirmation. Interviews were semi-structured, with an interview guide to ensure that
certain topics were covered. I chose this structure of interview because it was important that I
asked every interviewee about their approach to the value of transparency and ATI. Also, I asked
them to bring examples from their work that demonstrated this approach, especially focusing on
human rights. I had four interviews with people working at the Office of the Information
Commissioner and Privacy in Ontario, two interviews with people at the Office of the
Information Commissioner of Canada, one interview at the Information Commissioner and
Protection of Personal Data in Albania. These people volunteered to be interviewed after I sent a
formal request to their respective institutions. In addition, I had seven interviews with people
from NGOs and media in Canada (two of which are also academics) and three interviews in
Europe (two of which in Albania). These participants were chosen based of their significant
contribution or that of the organizations they worked for in the field of transparency. I have sent
requests to five more NGOs in Europe, but was not able to finalize an interview with them. I had
an excellent experience, especially with some of the interviewees, who found my research very
interesting, gave me their insights on the topic and even inspired me in furthering my arguments
for a human right claim on ATI. There were no financial incentives for any of the interviewees.

The qualitative research methods are very useful in identifying dominant themes occurring
repeatedly in the ATI environment. However, they do not provide a full picture of what happens
on the ground. Therefore, I use triangulation as a method of validating my findings because
multiple sources shed different light on the same phenomenon. To complement my qualitative
research I used data from the Treasury Board Secretariat website which contains plenty of
information over the years regarding the implementation of ATIA, such as the categories of
requesters with respective numbers of requests, including their percentages compared to the total
number, the number of requests made to each institution, the numbers completed and rejected,
the cost of processing requests and the money paid from requesters. Questions like: how many
requests were fully accepted, processed and replied by the specific institution and if they were
they handled on time (within 30 days legal limit); how many of the requests were delayed
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(beyond 30 days) and for how much time; what are the reasons for the delay (did the institution
give any reason or not); how many requests were accepted; how many were totally denied and on
what grounds – got answers from analyzing the Treasury Board Secretariat data. Moreover, this
data gives some information about the economic impact of the ATI regime, such as how much it
costs to the institution to handle information requests, and how much revenue the institution
collects from the information requests fees. Of course, I always considered the limitation of the
data on revealing the truth about the ATI administration. Access of that data was a good start and
was validated employing other methods.

In addition, the Office of the Information Commissioner produces statistical reports which
were used to assess government performance. They were a valuable source especially when
compared to other data using triangulation.

Further research evidenced that transparency and ATI have a close relationship, each
affecting the other in meaningful ways, depending on the value assigned to each of them. The
approach towards transparency and ATI is grounded on the perceptions of these variables as
social and political constructs. To understand the approach taken in each of the jurisdictions I
examined how transparency and ATI developed historically, how they were played politically,
how they were managed administratively, how they were used practically, how they were
supervised institutionally and how they were interpreted and protected judicially.

My main concern while doing the research has been on examining how the value assigned to
ATI informed and prescribed its level of legal protection and status. For example, the EU
recognizes ATI as a constitutional right, while Canada is still far from granting such status.
Hence, my preoccupation was to provide a framework that enables the recognition of a
constitutional status of ATI in Canada. In order to do so, I employed two theories of democracy,
the deliberative theory by Habermas and the participation theory of Pateman. They provide
standards against which the rhetoric of transparency and ATI can be measured.

While transparency has many meanings, trying to make sense of its practical value, I
approached the term from the perspective offered by Rawlins. He provides a more complete

12

description, one that captures best an understanding of transparency not just as an information
provision, but also introduces a public discourse aspect related to information as knowledge that
affects reasoning and the capacity to react in response to that knowledge. Rawlins stated that
“Transparency is the deliberate attempt to make available all legally releasable information –
whether positive or negative in nature – in a manner that is accurate, timely, balanced and
unequivocal, for the purpose of enhancing the reasoning ability of publics and holding
organizations accountable for their actions, policies, and practices.”8 This definition reflects a
more inclusive approach on transparency, one that is good-willed and not accidental, one that
considers limitations, but only allows for restraints outlined in law, one that does not selectively
releases only “good” but also “negative” information, one that is simple and prompt, one that
considers all interests in play, one that is made of a clear objective to transmit knowledge for the
enrichment of understanding public issues. This definition and the theories that I employ for this
research, provided a solid conceptual foundation that allowed me to advance human rights
claims.

Although transparency is often equated with ATI, the two concepts are very much
distinguished – the latter is regarded much narrowly, and the former has a much wider meaning.
Transparency as a principle is realized by a number of legal instruments, with ATI being one of
them. For this research I referred to ATI as “access by individuals as a presumptive right to
information held by public authorities”9, as described by Birkinshaw. This definition
distinguishes ATI as an individual right which is positive in nature. This means that it is the duty
of the public authorities to make this right possible by securing the ATI required. .

Democratic participation has been thinned to the point that most citizens exercise their
presumed sovereignty only through periodic elections of representatives, and thus have
extremely limited input into other political processes. This fact stands as an irony of our modern
times considering that “political participation is the lifeblood of democratic regimes.”10 To
revive the democratic principles, I found it useful to rediscover the notions of a participatory
Brad Rawlins, “Give the emperor a mirror. Toward developing a stakeholder measurement of organizational
transparency” (2009) 21:1 Journal of Public Relations Research 71 at 75 [Rawlins, “Give the emperor a mirror”].
9
Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 188.
10
Gianfranco Pasquino, Prima lezione di scienza politica. (Roma: Laterza, 2008) [Pasquino, “Prima lezione”].
8
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political system, like the one offered by Pateman in her participatory democratic theory. In
addition, for the participatory democracy to be present a vigorous public discourse must take
place in the public domain which acts as precursory of participation and leads to it. This process
is facilitated by providing public ATI. In this context, the public discourse theory developed by
Habermas helped me explain the process of participation as an active engagement of citizens.
The participatory democratic theory and the public discourse theory served as a theoretical
background of this dissertation and helped in advancing the human right claims for ATI.

My work fits into the ongoing conversation about the significance of transparency and ATI.
My contribution lies in helping to fill a gap in the literature by examining the importance of
access laws on human rights and as human rights. In developing my argument, I build upon the
work of scholars such as Birkinshaw and Roberts to argue that ATI is a fundamental human right
intrinsically and instrumentally. Birkinshaw defined ATI as an individual presumptive right11,
while Roberts suggested that it is logical to claim “that access right is better understood as a
corollary of basic political participation rights.”12 I thus make a claim for the recognition of ATI
as a fundamental right by looking at the value it upholds in a modern democracy and by drawing
a connection between information and knowledge. I argue that this relationship creates better
capacities, opportunities and venues for the citizens to exercise their social, economic and
political rights. I envisage ATI as being in the centre of a triangle in which knowledge, power
and control are its vertices. In this typology information can increase knowledge; knowledge can
create opportunities to have more power, and power, if exercised properly, could translate to
more control.

The shift to the recognition of ATI as a human right has deeper roots in changing notions of
the importance of information in society and the very concept of democracy as an ongoing
participation in decision-making. Certainly, looking at transparency and ATI from this
perspective, means that they have the potential to bind governments and empower citizens. ATI
about government rules, decisions, and activities empowers citizens, enables journalists, and as a

Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2.
Alasdair Roberts, “Structural Pluralism and the Right to Know” (2001) 51 University of Toronto Law Journal 243
at 262 [Roberts, “Structural Pluralism”].
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12
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result, constrains politicians, and exposes corruption. Yet for precisely these reasons, ATI is
considered to be highly political, and therefore, highly contentious. It poses substantial costs for
political actors - it impedes their capability to keep secrets, to mystify, to profit from the control
of private information, and above all to use public office for private gain. What transparency ATI
do is make information a matter of public domain.

There is growing appreciation of the need to view any ATI law from the perspective of the
anticipated user. The literature is fresh and abundant to support the argument of ATI as a human
right. Indeed, we are well beyond the point at which it can disputed that a properly defined right
of ATI is essential to good governance. The time has passed that one could downgrade access
rights reform to the taciturn exile of further study. The time is ripe to move forward towards the
recognition of ATI as a human right.

1.2.3 Research questions
The purpose of this research is twofold: first, to provide some clarity to the conceptualization
and practicability of transparency and ATI, and second, to provide a framework for the
recognition of ATI as a fundamental human right. The research was guided by several questions.
The main question is: What is the nature and value of transparency and access to information in
Canada and the European Union from a human right perspective?

To understand the real value of transparency and ATI or answer the question of whether ATI
should be considered a fundamental human right, I considered these subsidiary questions:
-

Why transparency and ATI laws are important?

-

Who uses ATI laws?

-

How are they considered by different actors?

-

What type of information do different actors usually seek?

-

What do actors usually do with the information they acquire?

-

Are the values that ATI laws uphold worth promoting despite substantial processing
costs?
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I argue that transparency and ATI are values that enable the shaping of ideas and enrichment
of public discourse, and as such they create, enhance and advance human rights. The design, the
authority of the legal provisions, and the institutional approaches towards transparency and ATI
should recognize the value of ATI as a human right. This recognition should not be based upon
an expectation that transparency and ATII will make governments more accountable, or that it
will increase the trust in governments, or that it will make the corruption disappear, or that it
make people participate more in public decision-making. Instead, a human right approach is
based on the necessity of protecting individuals against the wrongdoings of their governments.
Governments should appreciate the value of access rights for individuals in their private and
public lives. By approaching ATI from this perspective, one can appreciate what it can do for
participation, corruption, trust, accountability, and better governance.

1.3 Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation is structured in four parts. Part one sets the foundations of this research and
paves the road for what is coming in the next chapters. This part clarifies to the reader what are
the concerns in the research and what needs to be done to address these concerns. Part one
includes two chapters, and explores the conceptual and theoretical foundations of transparency
and ATI. Chapter one describes the story of the research and the arguments. It provides an
overview of the dissertation and lays out the main research question together with subsidiary
questions, the concerns of the research, and its purpose. This chapter also describes the
methodology employed for carrying out the research explaining what research has been done
(interviews, doctrinal research, case law analysis) to address the research questions. This chapter
also emphasizes the significance of the research in terms of social, legal, and policy perspectives.
Chapter two is a definitional chapter and serves to set up the problem that I am investigating, the
conceptual muddle that exist in the literature on transparency and ATI. In this chapter I go back
to the roots of the concept of transparency, and follow how the concept has evolved over time,
and how it has gradually given rise to the right of ATI. Chapter two also introduces the two
main theories that shape the arguments of this research.
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Part two begins the discussion of the research findings. The purpose is to have a better
understanding of how the two terms are used, the way they have developed historically, how
they are protected legally, and where they stand in comparison with other values and rights (such
as privacy). For this purpose, this part looks at the existing theoretical debates on both
transparency and ATI, exploring them from a historical and legal perspective, and balancing
them privacy. Part two contains three chapters. Chapter three analyzes the historical development
of transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU, and compares them with the international
developments in the field. This chapter tries to answer questions like: How did transparency and
ATI emerge and in response to what? What values did they endorse initially? How did they
develop and change and why? Has there been a shift on the way they were perceived and valued?
Why has Canada not responded to the advancements in transparency and ATI all around the
world? What explains the variation in historical development between Canada and the EU? I
look at the rationale behind the adoption of ATI laws at the first place, the drive of the
governments to pass those laws, the value governments and advocates saw in ATI when drafted
these laws. Chapter four looks at the design of the existing legal framework on transparency and
ATI, the legal rights they protect, their restrictions and limitations, the constitutional status of
ATI rights and the ramifications of the constitutional recognition. The study has a special focus
on ATI legislation on the federal level and its constitutional protection. It compares Canada and
the EU and then more broadly compares both of them with the international legal framework.
Chapter five makes a careful analysis of ATI and privacy, as values that may come into conflict
with each other. Privacy and ATI have a close relationship because they are complementary
right, but that occasionally clash with each other. This chapter explores the conceptual and legal
analysis of ATI and privacy and their implications for the implementation of such rights in
practice. It draws comparisons between the two jurisdictions and lessons to be learned from one
another.

Part three sheds some light on the dynamics of transparency and ATI. Because their
understanding, and the way they are legally protected is informed by many factors and actors
involved, it was important to investigate what those factors and actors were, and how they affect
the implementation of laws in practice. Hence, part three is preoccupied with investigating the
dynamics of transparency and ATI from an actor’s perspective. This part contains four chapters.
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It looks at transparency and ATI as occupying three spaces: a) government institutions - they are
the producers of information records; it is there where deliberations happen and decision-making
takes place; it is them who manage the information dissemination by exercising a great amount
of power and control; b) supervising/reviewing bodies – they are the Information Commissioner
(in case of Canada) or the Ombudsman (in case of the EU) acting as a first step of complaints,
and the Courts, being the next step of the review process. Both steps serve as a bridge between
citizens and institutions; 3) the public - who is the receiver or the user of the information. I focus
in two groups of users for the purpose of this research, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and the media. I dedicate one chapter to each of these actors occupying these three spaces and
draw comparisons between Canada and the EU at the end of each of the four chapters.

Chapter six examines the administrative management system of ATI by focusing on the role
of the government and the public administration. The study of government and administration is
important to understand the political tension that exits in implementing the law and the risk that
this implementation is captured by political agenda. Chapter seven looks at the perspectives of
oversight institutions and their role in improving the general climate of transparency in
government and protecting ATI rights. Chapter eight focuses on the interpretation of ATI rights
by the courts and their role in safeguarding, expanding and transforming their legal protection
and status. This chapter becomes essential for this research because it considers courts as the best
venue that can advance human rights claims of ATI by engaging in an expansive interpretative
exercise to give life to the constitutional principle of the “living tree”. The Charter can
accommodate the constitutional recognition of ATI if courts expand its meaning to allow for
essential changes that are commanded by the growing importance of information in society.
Chapter nine observes transparency and ATI from a user’s perspective focusing on how and why
the two chosen groups (NGOs and media) exploit ATI requests. This chapter is important to
answer questions on who uses ATI, for what purposes, and what they do with the information
acquired.

Part four provides the analysis and conclusions. It is focused on the value of transparency and
ATI from a human right perspective. This is the culminating portion of the research which is
mainly concerned with providing answers to the questions of conceptualizations of transparency
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and the constitutional recognition of ATI. Part four consists of two chapters. Chapter ten offers
definitions for transparency and ATI, by departing from a value-based approach. In addition, this
chapter provides a framework for measuring transparency and ATI against some set of standards
- it develops a typology of information access/delivery by using standards assessed from a user’s
perspective. Chapter eleven offers transparency models by exploring the challenges and tensions
around transparency and the government behaviour in response to these tensions. In addition,
this chapter makes a careful analysis of ATI as a human right from an instrumental and intrinsic
perspective. The Chapter culminates with a framework to establish a fundamental right of ATI in
Canada based on an interpretative and comparative intervention. This Chapter is important to
answer the main question of this research and other questions as well, such as what is the value
of transparency and ATI and if they are worth promoting despite substantial processing costs.
Chapter eleven wraps up the dissertation highlighting some of the empirical findings brought by
this research, how this research contributes to the literature on transparency and ATI, and what it
advances compared to what others have done in the field. In addition, this last chapter
summarizes some of the conclusions about the value of transparency and ATI in Canada and the
EU, and more broadly, and what they mean for future developments.

1.4 Significance of the Research

This dissertation contributes to the literature by bringing together Canada and the EU under
the umbrella of transparency. It builds upon the existing scholarship by evaluating whether the
legal framework in the two jurisdictions of study promotes human rights. This research explores
the value of transparency and ATI and advances its recognition as a fundamental human right.

My research aims to make a scholarly contribution to the Canadian and European Legal
Studies. The significance of this research stems from the fact that a comparative analysis allows
for lesson-drawing on the design and status of transparency and ATI. The comparison also
permits for a better understanding of the long-term developmental trajectories for the
improvement of the status of ATI and its role in the broader picture of human rights as it is
affected by government transparency. This research has a practical value and engages a broad
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range of actors such as legislators by providing them a model for upgrading legal provisions and
ensuring better protection for ATI rights; policy-makers in facilitating their implementation of
access rights, in understanding the tensions underlying processes of handling information
requests and prioritizing the interests at stake; scholars in assisting them to engage in ongoing
conversations around transparency and encouraging them to use access to information requests
for research purposes; and NGOs in making a better use of access rights to promote human rights
while complying with their missions.

20

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter explores the definitional muddle that exists around the concepts of transparency
and ATI. Its purpose is to lay out the conceptual problem I am investigating by illuminating the
work that has been done previously in the field.

The chapter looks at the conceptual framework on transparency and ATIn by keeping a
special focus on how they are perceived and analyzed. The previous literature is carefully
examined in an attempt to elucidate the definitional problem, and introduce an explanation of
how this problem affects the practice in the areas of transparency and ATI rights. Transparency
is a multidimensional term, and therefore requires a multidisciplinary analysis. This chapter
engages in a dialogue and interaction with work in various disciplines such as law, political and
social science. This approach helps capturing and depicting the many faces of transparency.

2.1 Exploring the conceptual framework

2.1.1 Early foundations
The term “transparency” became widely used at the end of the twentieth century. However,
its roots extend far back in time. The origin of transparency as an idea can be traced in Europe at
least since the eighteenth century. The incorporation of transparency in the works of Rousseau,
Bentham, Kant and Constant is a testimony of this early origin. However, back in the eighteenth
century, the term “transparency” was rarely used and the idea of ATI was still a nascent concept.
Transparency was often used interchangeably with the term “publicity” which indicated that
being transparent meant conducting affairs openly in public. In the second half of the eighteenth
century, the pursuit of transparency was closely linked to the idea of representative governments.
By then, transparency transcended to a higher status with claims about its normativity in the
realm of public law. As a result, a normative discourse articulated around the norm of
transparency was truly developed in Europe at the end of the eighteen century. In this context,
the rich philosophical contributions of Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, and Benjamin Constant are valuable, because they each featured a different appeal for
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transparency and they established the foundations for today’s normative approach towards
transparency.

Jeremy Bentham, the British philosopher and jurist, examined transparency both from a
philosophical and a legal perspective bringing into play his significant theory on the Philosophy
of Law, with the principle of legality at the core of his theory. In his work, Bentham observed the
evils that affect public life, and opacity and lack of transparency were amongst them 13. For
Bentham, secrecy was considered an evil and something unacceptable in conducting public
affairs. He elaborated on the requirement of legality in the practice of public authorities.
According to Bentham, the principle of legality becomes a measure against the misuse of
authority; publicity happens through surveillance, and this facilitates and promotes integrity in
both the legal and political domains. Bentham argues that “Publicity is the very soul of justice. It
is the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge
himself, while trying, under trial.”14 This claim about justice as the most important legal
principle is enhanced by transparency. Therefore, for Bentham there is no justice without
transparency because visibility of procedures does not only guarantee legal security, but it also
offers an advantage since, just like in a theatre stage, morality is put into practice and observed
by all.

In addition, Bentham associates opacity and ignorance more radically with arbitrary power.
Bentham’s notion of transparency is most often thought of in the literature as the exercise of an
‘all-seeing’, and therefore omnipotent power15. However, Bentham also sees transparency as an
instrument that limits power and that checks misuse of authority. Bentham states: “The partisan
of arbitrary power does not think thus: he does not wish that the people should be enlightened,
and he despises them because they are not enlightened. You are not able to judge, he says,
because you are ignorant; and you shall always be kept ignorant, that you may not be capable of

13

Jeremy Bentham, eds, First Principles Preparatory to Constitutional Code, Edited by Philip Schofield, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) [Bentham, First Principles].
14
Jeremy Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the
superintendence of ... John Bowring, vol.1, (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) at 316 [Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law”].
15
See Michel Foucault, “The eye of power” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977
(Colin Gordon ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) at 153 [Foucault, “The eye of power”].
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judging.”16 This contribution is very powerful and goes to the core of my arguments for
transparency and access to information – the idea of information as knowledge with the potential
to create capacities for rational judgment, and thus engagement in public space, and further
participation in public affairs. According to Bentham’s understanding, not only secrecy keeps
people away from knowing what is happening in the public realm, but the lack of knowledge
affects their good judgment, making them incapable of thinking rationally. Ignorance takes away
the opportunity to develop intellectually and further to reason rationally.

Furthermore, responding to the argument that transparency hinders trust in public authorities,
Bentham extrapolates that making decisions secretly and mysteriously does not necessarily lead
to a good reputation because hiding is not a good strategy to gain trust. To Bentham, secrecy is
never profitable to reputation, for it encourages doubt and allow misrepresentation. Publicity,
rather than affecting honour, more often preserves it, of course, given that good behavior and
honest intentions are in place. This correlation of transparency and trust is very often discussed
nowadays as one of the drivers that makes governments not very keen to publicity. The fear of
failing to deliver what has been promised, makes governments contemplate they will fail
people’s trust and will be defeated. However, Bentham argues that this is not the case because
transparency will act like a check mechanism which keeps governments on track and not allow
them to fail. For him, transparency represents the most effective source of control, as it helps to
curb infringing behaviors. When Bentham mentions the publicity that must surround legal
procedures, he emphasizes its superiority: “Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient in
comparison with publicity, all other checks are of small account.”17

Bentham lists twelve means of diminishing abuses of power and five of them are directly
linked to the requirement of publicity. These measures involve: 1) acceptability of secret
information; 2) freedom of press, 3) publication of the reasons and facts that have motivated the
development of laws or other acts of government, 4) exercise of power that respects rules and
forms, 5) recognition of citizens’ right to associate, allowing them to express their feelings and
Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law”, supra note 14 at 575.
Jeremy Bentham, “Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice” in The Works of Jeremy
Bentham, published under the superintendence of ... John Bowring, vol. 4, (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) at 335 [Bentham,
“Rationale of Judicial Evidence”].
16
17
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their desires with regards to government’s public measures18. All these measures are
fundamental for transparency to work and their application represents a challenge for the
implementation of transparency and access to information regime. Especially the last measure is
important for this research because it links citizens and governments in a relationship that works
both ways in exchanging information. Although Bentham talks about citizen’s right to associate,
(which is a fundamental human right in both Canada and the EU today, distinguished from ATI)
he looks at this right from another angle – that of giving feedback on government’s public
measures. That is the approach that the EU has taken when it upgraded the right of access to
documents into a constitutional right using a broader interpretation of the freedom of expression.
Bentham’s contribution in the transparency literature is significant because he raises very
important claims about publicity, legality, justice, limits of authority, hindrance of rationality and
public trust, which are at the heart of debates around transparency. They constitute legal
principles that give rise to a normative dimension of transparency which facilitates its
applicability to the working of a state as a complex body of institutions. These principles assist in
understanding different aspects of transparency, but not transparency as a unified concept.

Publicity, as a dimension of transparency has been elaborated by another scholar, the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Publicity for Kant represents a special criterion to evaluate the legal
nature of a norm; it provides this norm with other dimensions – those of ‘legality’ and
‘legitimacy’. Kant writes that “Every claim of right must have this capacity for publicity, and
since one can easily judge whether or not it is present in a particular case.”19 In his approach
Kant looks deeper on the effects of publicity of norms and makes important claims on their
legitimacy. He makes his claim very simple – every legal norm should be published not only for
people to know it exists, but also to make a good judgment based on it. Publicity, in this
philosopher’s work, similarly as in Bentham’s work, rises to the level of a mystical formula in
public law: “All actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not

Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law”, supra note 14 at 570 -578.
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral, translated with an
introduction by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1983), at 135 [Kant, Perpetual Peace].
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consistent with publicity.”20 When one employs Kant’s work, it becomes obvious that publicity
takes on an ethical and legal dimension, most fully developed in “Perpetual Peace”.

Kant considers that publicity warrants a political and moral unity. As a result, if a political
action or statement cannot be exposed to the public it is morally harmful. Using Kant’s moral
ethics, Habermas argues that public opinion, which comes as a result of publicity is indeed
“aimed at rationalizing politics in the name of morality.”21 As a result, if a political action or a
maxim cannot be revealed or ‘divulged’ it is detrimental. In Kant’s view therefore,
transparency’s virtuous dimension is always linked to an absence of duplicity and to the
requirement of truthfulness. Hence, in Kant’s view transparency’s ethical dimension is always
linked to deception and honesty. From this perspective, transparency constitutes a method or a
standard for the control of the legal nature of norms and rules. Of course, publicizing does not
always guarantee the legal character of rules, but an absence of the publicity of norms provides
some ground for questioning of their legal nature. In other words, Kant suggest that transparency
is a condition that if present gives norms their legal dimension and makes them legitimate.
Otherwise, they lose their status of enforcement, for they are not considered to be legal.
Transparency, in Kant’s understanding, focuses on the normative rule with a regard for how it is
respected, as well as its accessibility. The lack of publicity is arbitrary, and goes against a
constitutional regime, that of a juridical State which is based on a specific idea of freedom from
arbitrariness. Hence, in a juridical State people are free to reject any unpublished norms. The
conceivable nature of the law and its application, embodied by the stability of the legal system,
originate in a particular conception of transparency, which in turn refers to the necessity of a
codification that is accurate, rational, and above all, public. This particular dimension of Kant’s
work and its application today certainly needs to be revisited since it touches upon the
foreseeable nature of the law and the stability of the legal systems.
Kant’s understanding of transparency focuses more on the publicity requirement, meaning the
publishing of norms. This is a limited view for two reasons. First, it only includes a one way
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communication between governments and citizens, and second, it focuses more on the
publications of final forms of norms, such as an act passed by parliament. This view leaves out
the possibility of early engagement of the citizens before norms become finalized. Kant’s
normative dimension of transparency is very compelling today and that is the reason why so
many legislatures in the world, including Canada and the EU, have made transparency a
governing principle and have passed laws on FOI. However, this legal approach of
understanding transparency is (as I will analyze later on) challenged by another approach - the
political one. This means that how the legislation works in reality depends on the will of the
politicians in power and of the bureaucrats who are the ones responsible for the dissemination of
information. Just having laws on books and publishing them does not guarantee the successful
application of those laws, but it is a good start in a democratic state where the principles of
legality and justice are cared for. This tension between the normative and the political dimension
of transparency is one of the main preoccupations in this research, and to which I commit lots of
attention.

Benjamin Constant, a French politician, is another important contributor in early discussions
on transparency. Just as Bentham, he argues that publicity is important in the workings of the
government because any attempt to operate in secrecy will be detrimental and lead to suspicions
and mistrust. According to Constant, the public opinion of the people’s representatives depends
heavily on their attitudes towards publicity, meaning that the more openly they behave, the less
suspicious their actions will appear in public’s view. Constant contends that this kind of
behaviour will save the representatives from all accusations made against them. He brings the
example of ministers in government and argues that if they are opened and transparent they do
not have to fear about their honour. Constant maintains that “A full public explanation, in which
the representative bodies of the nation enlightened the entire nation on the conduct of accused
ministers, would prove perhaps both their moderation and his innocence.”22 The idea is that
public officials are not immune of making mistakes, they are people, and as such they may act
wrongfully. Being perfect is not what is expected from, instead they are required to be honest
and opened about their public affairs.
Benjamin Constant, eds, “Principles of politics applicable to all representative governments” in Political Writings
(ed.Biancamaria Fontana), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 171 at 233 [Constant, “Principles of
politics”].
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Constant’s understanding of transparency is mainly focused on official’s behaviour, which is
a simplified view of the complexity of bureaucracy nowadays. This behavior is shaped by
political and hierarchical constraints, and is not simply one person’s response, but that of the
whole bureaucratic machinery. Constant’s approach towards transparency holds an important
message - public officials should not fear the public’s scrutiny, even in cases of wrongfulness.
However, truth be told, this is easier said than done. Revealing cases of wrongfulness is one of
the biggest challenges of transparency nowadays. Governments, being threatened by information
that could reveal their maladministration practices, try to hide any piece of information that
could lead to blaming and shaming. This way, they distance themselves even further from the
public and cover their activities with a secrecy veil. This is probably the most complex matter in
this the study of transparency because issues of hiding information are difficult to research. This
kind of study involves concerns of institutional behaviours, bureaucratic hierarchy, political
culture, legal norms, social construct, and many others. Especially for jurisdictions with multiple
levels of governments, such as Canada and the EU, where diverse legal, political, social and
culture norms are intertwined, the challenges of shaping governments responses to transparency
become even more complex. For this reason, I will return to Constant’s theory of principles of
politics later on in my research.

An early advocate who has left his mark on the doctrine of transparency is Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, a Swiss philosopher. He shares the ideas of Bentham and Kant about the importance
of transparency, but from another perspective. Rousseau is not much concerned about the legal
aspect of transparency, but looks at it more broadly. He focuses at transparency in society as a
whole and a sum of relationships with the selves and with the others. When Rousseau speaks of
transparency, he seldom discusses publicity. Looking at Rousseau’s theory of human association
Hill explains that transparency is prized “as an instrumental good, being, among other things, the
social condition necessary for civic cooperation… and regarded opaque relations as the breeding
ground for many vices.”23 For Rousseau, the absence of transparency is linked to the question of
evil and a transparent political society, visible and readable in all its parts, displays honours at

Greg Hill, Rousseau’s Theory of Human Association: Transparent and Opaque Communities (New York:
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the outside world and prevents the anonymous status which monitors both vice and virtue24.
According to Starobinski, Rousseau’s ideal world is one where “nothing comes between one
mind and another, and each individual is fully and openly to the other.”25
The application of Rousseau’s theory today may seem idealistic, to say the least, if not
impossible because his model of a transparent society is very obviously that of mutual
surveillance and universal visibility. To speak in realistic terms, Rousseau’s theory cannot apply
to certain public institutions, and not exactly according to the model he proposes. We are all
aware that some aspect of government workings are excluded from public scrutiny and
transparency rules. However, Rousseau’s theory of transparency raises important questions about
the benefits of being transparent; how much transparency is good transparency; how privacy and
human interaction play out in rules of transparency, and so on.

The rich philosophical contributions of Bentham, Kant, Constant and Rousseau are a very
valuable asset in understanding transparency today. They represent different approaches on
transparency, mainly in terms of far-reaching principles such as justice, legality, ethics, publicity,
morality, legitimacy, trust or honour. As such, these early works constitute a solid foundation for
developments of transparency as a moral, social, legal and political project. The principles and
philosophical analysis developed by these authors have created a doctrinal corpus which
developed over centuries, and has certainly informed debates on transparency and access to
information today.

2.1.2 Exploring the definitional problem of transparency

A. Defining transparency
As I described above, the work of some of the early philosophers prepared the stage for the
development of transparency as a term and a process. Later, the contemporary scholars enriched
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Government of Poland” in The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 227-228 [Rousseau, “Government of Poland”]. He says: “I
should like that all grades, all employments, all honorific awards be marked by external signs, that no public figure
be allowed ever to move about incognito.”
25
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University of Chicago Press, 1988) at 23 [Starobinski, Jean-Jacque Rousseau].
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its understanding with novel ideas. However, even though the literature on transparency is rich
and diverse, nowadays, there is no agreement between scholars on what constitutes
“transparency”. While transparency has been widely prescribed as a cure-all for better
government, the term exists in a conceptual muddle, and is “more often referred to than
defined”26, as Hood advises. Although many scholars and advocates have offered their insights,
the ultimate description of transparency has not yet been found. Florini argues that “[a]lthough
the word 'transparency' is widely used, it is rarely well defined. There is no consensus on what
the definition should be or how transparency should be measured.”27 Indeed, the study of
transparency is significantly challenged by the absence of a single, generally accepted definition
across disciplines that now make extensive use of the term, including law. In the meantime,
transparency brings together all these disciplines, and offers an excellent opportunity to examine
the rational and practical interrelations between law and social sciences.

In recent years, transparency in governance has attracted increasing attention among various
academic disciplines28 leading to a wide debate on the nature of transparency. In the EU, “This
debate has developed along three central dimensions that may be described as the definitional,
the ethical and the implemental.”29 An important part of the definitional debate focuses on what
transparency entails and what not30. On the one hand, transparency proponents tend to favor an
expansive scope for transparency, which allows for a more definitional leeway and a broad
application. On the other hand, transparency sceptics see it as a form of government
communication, simply as what documents governments decide to make available. They view it
with a more ‘real’ lens focusing in perverse costs and effects. Therefore, transparency advocates
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are frequently misjudged as looking at transparency solely as an end in itself31. While
transparency sceptics identify serious tradeoffs between transparency and other public values,
advocates see such relations as less problematic.32 Critics identify inherent tensions between
transparency and privacy, effective decision making, national autonomy, and efficient
administration, which leads to arguments that administrations must strive for optimal rather than
maximal transparency33. In the EU, some authors warn about the pitfalls of considering
transparency as a panacea for legitimacy problems pointing that this association is weak.34 That
is because of various factors, such as information overload, proceduralization, or the risk that the
media cherry-picks only information that highlights policy failures.35

There are many definitions on the term transparency, depending on the chosen perspective.
This demonstrates a craving for “maturity” within the academic discourse. One can notice that
the inclination for a definition of transparency has improved over time. The earlier definitions
tend to be simple. For instance, at the early 90s transparency was mostly defined as “lifting the
veil of secrecy”36, “the ability to look clearly through the windows of an institution”37 or as a
contrast “with opaque policy measures, where it is hard to discover who takes the decisions,
what they are, and who gains and who loses.”38 The general idea behind these definitions can be
pictured as something happening behind curtains and once these curtains are removed,
everything is open and can be scrutinized. Put simply, common sense understanding associates
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transparency with unlimited visibility, openness and insight.39 From such perspective, the
disclosure of information in itself is significant, but it reduces transparency to a question of
information provision. At the end of the 90s, long-time advocate of transparency, the European
Ombudsman Jacob Söderman, gave a more complete description of transparency as: “the process
through which public authorities make decisions should be understandable and open; the
decisions themselves should be reasoned; as far as possible, the information on which the
decisions are based should be available to the public.”40

Entering in the new millennium, the conceptualization of transparency became more
sophisticated moving beyond the idea of seeing through. For instance, Luna refers to
transparency as “the ability of the citizenry to observe and scrutinize policy choices and to have a
direct say in the formation and reformulation of these decisions…. transparency requires not only
visibility of policy choices but a publicly declared rationale for these decisions’.”41 Williams
introduces a market perspective in defining transparency “as the extent to which the organization
provides relevant, timely, and reliable information, in written and verbal form, to investors,
regulators, and market intermediaries.”42 Likewise, Millar et al, describe institutional
transparency as “the extent to which there is available clear, accurate information, formal and
informal, covering practices related to capital markets, including the legal and juridical
system.”43 Oliver examines transparency as a process with participants. He indicates that
transparency can be described through three elements: an observer, something available to be
observed and a means or method for observation.44 This type of definition builds upon the
principal agent theory in which a principal requires information about the agent to check whether
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the agent sticks to the ‘contract’45. An actor’s perspective definition on transparency is also
offered by Florini who identifies transparency as “the degree to which information is available to
the outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions
made by insiders.”46
At a more general meaning, transparency is described as an arena of communication47, and as
such, it is not an innocent phenomenon. Transparency is about where lines are drawn, about
inclusion and exclusion, about legal and illegal, about approval and disapproval, about an
everyday or an honorary execution. Transparency is also a phenomenon that clarifies, explains,
makes accessible, and provides guidance. At the same time, information which has been made
transparent is also selective and exclusive, emphasizes one thing rather than another, draws lines,
and obscures.48 Being so many things at the same time, Fenster describes transparency as having
an aspirational goal: full openness to the public49 assuming that it is more like a work in progress
which improves over time, but it can never be ideal. Of course, depending on circumstances, this
ideal goal becomes a moving target. This is a conclusion in which Fenster arrived from earlier
work. He advises that transparency's goals require a context-specific definition of transparency,
viewed in terms of specific policy objectives, system constraints, and the costs and benefits of
open government requirements, rather than an approach that regulates secrecy based on the
presumed motivations of officials in the abstract.50

Among legal professionals transparency is referred to as a normative concept, as a set of
standards for the evaluation of the behavior of public actors51 Using legal lens Hood suggests
that transparency denotes “government according to ﬁxed and published rules, on the basis of
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information and procedures that are accessible to the public, and (in some usages) within clearly
demarcated ﬁelds of activity.”52

All these definitions of transparency inform and speak about the conceptual muddle in which
transparency is situated. To add to the difficulty of understanding the term, transparency is often
used interchangeably with openness. To avoid any misinterpretation and confusion in this
research, I am providing some definitional background on openness which I encountered while
reviewing the transparency literature.

B. Openness
Another term that will continuously surface in the research alongside with transparency is that
of “openness”. Some scholars make no difference between transparency and “openness”.53 Some
others do, for instance, according to Birkinshaw54 and Larsson55 if in the concept of
“transparency” the accent is put on simplicity and comprehensibility, “openness” has to do with
a mentality.56 In addition, Birkinshaw argues that “Openness covers such items as opening up the
processes and meetings of public bodies.”57 In fact, transparency is more often used in academic
discourse. Although in some cases it is expressed in legislation and derived by jurisprudence, the
word “transparency” is not often used in legislation. Instead, openness is used, especially in the
European legal framework. For instance, Article 1 of the Treaty of the EU contains the openness
principle: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as
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possible to the citizen.”58 In this context, the two terms have similar meaning, and it is inevitable
that I use openness in this research in any case that refers to a legal framework.

C. Access to Information
While transparency is often equated with access to information, the latter should be regarded
much narrowly. While it is true that transparency has a much wider meaning, and ATI is a
component of transparency, the latter also entails conducting affairs in the open or subject to
public scrutiny59, according to Birkinshaw. Their relationship is obvious: the transparency
principle is realized by a number of legal instruments, with ATI being one of them.

The terms “access to information” (ATI), “access to documents” (ATD) and “freedom of
information” (FOI) are being used interchangeably in this research. They have the same or
similar meaning depending on the jurisdiction. ATI has been defined by Access Info Europe as
“a fundamental right that has been recognized as such by international human rights tribunals
and at least fifty constitutions around the world. This right has been linked to the fundamental
right to freedom of expression, and is essential to protect other human rights.”60
Birkinshaw describes FOI as “access by individuals as a presumptive right to information held
by public authorities.”61 In this context, FOI, just like ATI is a component of transparency. This
definition distinguishes access as an individual right which is positive in nature, and obliges
public authorities to provide access to the information required.

The Canadian legal framework uses the term ATI at the federal level since the Act that
regulates the public access to government-held documents uses this terminology.62 However,
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most of the provinces in Canada use the term FOI in their respective statutes.63 In addition, FOI
is used in other jurisdictions such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, etc. Furthermore, FOI is a
generic term that has been used as an umbrella in discussions about access rights and may imply
a broader meaning than simply the right of access to public information. The EU refers to the
same right as ATD since the Regulation64 that contains the European provisions of this right uses
the term “documents” as opposed to “information”.

Making sense of the conceptual muddle that surrounds the concept of transparency is a
difficult, but necessary exercise if ones need to penetrate to the core of the problems for this
concept. This exercise could be facilitated by looking at the recurring topics that are closely
associated to transparency, and often surface in the literature when discussions about
transparency are made. To better understand the concept of transparency, I have made a
classification of these topics under some main themes, and will engage with them in the section
that follows. These themes not only assist to disentangle the conceptual muddle, but also will
assist on making connections between transparency and ATI. In addition, these main themes will
act as pillars for constructing arguments on the nature and value of transparency and ATI in this
research.

2.2 Making sense of the conceptual muddle of transparency - Main themes

A careful analysis of the literature on the conceptual framework reveals some main themes
and ideas around which debates on transparency and ATI are developed over time with
proponents and critics for each of these themes.

A. Democracy, good governance and accountability
Democracy, good governance and accountability are broad umbrella ideas under which other
matters such as legality, corruption, trust, effectiveness, security, emerge in scholarly debates.
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Legality and legitimacy are two of transparency’s most prominent dimensions today. The
aspiration for legality has greatly increased over the past two decades, probably as a result of the
growing influence of the rule of law and democratic governance. Following the path of Bentham
and Kant, the importance of the principle of legality has been recognized and emphasized by
many twentieth-century theoreticians of the State. For instance, Hans Kelsen as a jurist and a
legal philosopher has paid particular attention to transparency. For him, in democracy, the
legality of state activities is best guaranteed by publicity. He argues that “Since democracy is
concerned with legal security, and thus with lawfulness and accountability in the workings of
government, there is a strong inclination here to control mechanisms, as a guarantee for the
legality required. And the principle of publicity is therefore paramount, as the most effective
guarantee.”65 Using a legal argument, transparency tends to be introduced as a precondition for
administrative or legislative legality or the rule of law. In public administration, according to
Lessig, without appropriate access to government information it will be very difficult to enable
citizens to control the legality of the administration and its actions.66 In addition, referring to
transparency of the legislative procedures Curtin and Meijers claim that legal rights of access to
documents may be viewed in their broader democratic context.67 The quest for transparency from
a legalistic perspective is probably the most convincing one in the literature since it goes to the
core of transparency debates with foundations laid down three centuries ago. The legal
arguments are also the most difficult to bypass or oppose.

Regarding debates over issues of democratic governance, transparency has gained a wide
application to explain processes of accountability and deliberations68 or as a means of ensuring
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that public authorities, are responsive, efficient and effective in the formulation and execution of
policies.69 Because of this wide applicability Hood describes transparency as it “has attained
quasi-religious significance”70 while Florini speaks in highly enthusiastic terms and noting that
transparency “holds great promise for improving the state of the world.”71 Florini explains that
transparency can contribute to efficient and effective governance by providing feedback
channels, enabling officials and citizens to evaluate policies and adjust them accordingly. It
provides a means of detecting, and correcting errors in the policies of governmental institutions.
Pasquier and Villeneuve are more realistic in their prospects when arguing that “transparency in
state activities becomes a sine qua non condition of good governance.”72
Transparency is also debated in terms of its connection to government accountability and the
potential to hold public officials responsible for their wrongdoings. Fox argues that “The
concepts of transparency and accountability are closely linked: transparency is supposed to
generate accountability.”73 That is made possible only if information becomes available to the
public. According to Lindstedt and Naurin, this is the publicity condition. Furthermore, “if the
release of information to the public is to affect the behavior of potentially corrupt government
officials, the public must possess some sanctioning mechanism. This is the accountability
condition.”74 However, the accountability processes are not by any means simple and easy
applicable. One has to be naïve to think that having transparency measures in place will
automatically make public officials more accountable. As I have mentioned previously, this
tension is present throughout this research and many of my arguments will be dedicated to better
understand this tension.
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Many scholars argue about the undesirable consequences of transparency on governance. For
instance, Heald explains that the necessity to account may lead to the quest for blameavoidance.75 Hood reflects upon the blame-conscious bureaucratic culture that underlies the
futility, jeopardy and perversity effects that transparency produces. He explores what happens
when the much-discussed doctrine of transparency, as a key to good governance, meets the
widely observed behavioral tendency of blame-avoidance in politics and public administration.
Hood recognizes three common types of blame-avoidance strategy, namely agency strategies,
presentational strategies and policy strategies.76 In addition, he investigates what can happen
when a widely promoted governance doctrine meets a commonly observed type of behaviour.
Hood identiﬁes ways in which that combination can produce nil effects, side-effects and reverseeffects in the pursuit of transparency. He refers to the work of Roberts in arguing about the sideeffects or reverse effects of transparency. Hood admits that “Alasdair Roberts’ (2006)
comparative work on governmental adaptation to freedom of information regimes suggests that
the achievement of ‘a new culture of openness’ tends to be elusive, to say the least.”77 Hood
advances similar arguments as Roberts when talking about this “new culture” emerging because
of transparency. He states that “More presentational responses to transparency measures ….
include the avoidance of record-keeping (or the keeping of records in such a form as to be
unintelligible to outsiders), perhaps combined with the tactic of producing so much data that only
the most pertinacious and initiated individuals can effectively distinguish signal from noise.”78
Hood stresses the fact that the tension between the pursuit of transparency and the avoidance of
blame is at the heart of some commonly observed problems in public management, and
recommends that something other than the “bureaucratic” strain of transparency may be called
for when those problems are encountered. Hood’s claim is a very significant one and has very
serious implications on the way transparency works in practice. Hood’s idea is not a new one,
and the problem is not a new phenomenon. The same argument was made by Constant some
three centuries ago who responded to this problem by encouraging government officials to be
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transparent even in the face of mistakes since this gives them the possibility of defending
themselves and explaining their decisions.

Other perverse effects of transparency could also be noticed. For Aucoin transparency causes
“the temptation of public servants to commit less to paper, to fail to keep appropriate records,
and to participate in efforts to restrict what is made public.”79 This is indeed, a growing problem
in today’s administration which is more technologically advanced than it ever used to be and
very close to being paperless. In addition, O’Neill writes that “those who know that everything
they say or write is to be made public may massage the truth.”80 Producing less documents,
choosing to disclose some documents instead of others, deliberating in closed meetings are some
of the techniques used by bureaucracy today to give another perception of the truth. I pay
particular attention to this aspect of transparency and develop a typology of transparency to
describe and make sense of this challenge.

Many critics of transparency argue about the negative effect of transparency on the behavior
of politicians and bureaucrats. Heald talks about the perverse effects of over-exposure as “a
feeling of suffocation.”81 Other critics argue that closed deliberations allow policymakers to
make more thoughtful consideration of the available choices, to engage in more fulsome and
substantive debate over the most popular and unpopular alternatives on public issues, and to
bargain openly in order to reach a widely acceptable and optimal result, without the inevitable
pressure that accompanies public scrutiny82. From an economic perspective, Andrea Prat has
shown that there are some signiﬁcant theoretical exceptions to the famous dictum by Bentham
that “the more closely we are watched, the better we behave.” For Prat, even from a principalagent perspective in economics, “it is not always in the interest of the principal to have access to

79

Peter Aucoin, “New Political Governance in Westminster Systems: Impartial Public Administration and
Management Performance at Risk,” (2012) 25:2 Governance 177 at 182 [Aucoin].
80
Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust. The BBC Reith Lectures 2002 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003) at 73 [O’Neill, A Question of Trust].
81
Heald, “Transparency as an Instrumental Value”, supra note 69 at 60.
82
See Michael A. Lawrence, “Finding Shade from the "Government in the Sunshine Act": A Proposal to Permit
Private Informal Background Discussions at the United States International Trade Commission” (1995) 45 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1 at 10-12 [Lawrence, “Finding Shade”].; James T. O'Reilly & Gracia M. Berg, “Stealth Caused by
Sunshine: How Sunshine Act Interpretation Results in Less Information for the Public About the Decision-Making
Process of the International Trade Commission” (1995) 36 Harv. Int’l L.J. 425 at 458 [O'Reilly & Berg, “Stealth”].

39

all available information of activities of the agent”83 because an information overload can create
more confusion and make the understanding of public issues more complex than it would be
otherwise.
In “Blacked out” Roberts spends several chapters showing how the structure and practices of
governance have direct implications for ATI. First, access depends on a professional civil service
and well organized records. Where these are absent, access and transparency are severely
truncated. Second, governments are increasingly outsourcing functions to the private sector,
which is generally not covered by access legislation.84 The era of the New Public Management
brought new anxieties on transparency since the idea of public institutions and their services
became a moving target. This spurred more criticism against transparency.
Roberts observes that “In the last decade, ….there has been an increasingly articulate
backlash against transparency measures.”85 He mentions transparency critics such as Grumet86,
Frum87 and Fukuyama88 who all argue that the problem with American government is too much
transparency. Roberts responds to them by saying that most critics of excessive transparency
assume that it serves exclusively as a tool for oversight of politicians and bureaucrats. Roberts
admits that transparency - conceived in this particular way - aggravates governmental
dysfunction by reducing the capacity of policymakers to deliberate candidly and make the
compromises that are essential for legislation to be adopted. Transparency also makes it easier
for outsider groups to intrude in negotiations, and it is assumed that negotiations become more
difficult as the number of involved groups increases.89 However, Roberts explains that despite
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these constraints, blaming transparency for problems in government affairs does not have any
foundation. These complaints, in Roberts’ view, are misguided for two reasons. They depend
upon a misconception about the purposes served by transparency in government, and about the
role of transparency reforms within the larger pattern of administrative development.90 Hood and
Heald also respond to this misperception of transparency saying that “it is logically problematic
to argue that transparency measure or any other policy measure could simultaneously produce
futility, jeopardy, and perversity.”91 I agree with Roberts, Hoods and Heald and argue that
despite challenges that accompany transparency, it also upholds values that are worth fighting
for. The main problem with the critics of transparency is that they approach its value looking at
its failures and not its promises. I will further the arguments in support of the value of
transparency by taking a human right approach.

The issue of public trust on government institutions and how it is affected by transparency,
has also produced lots of discussions among scholars. This issue has been the focus of many
studies, especially by scholars of public administration and political science, which have
generated controversial results.

On the one hand, transparency optimists argue that transparency is as an important instrument
to increase citizen trust in government92 and there are findings in some studies that support the
idea that transparency and trust play a substantial role, as moderator and mediator respectively,
in curtailing corruption and enhancing citizen satisfaction.93 Citizen satisfaction is not equated
with trust, even though may affect trust positively. There are more direct studies that have shown
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small positive effects of transparency on trust-related measures.94 Other studies show that
government transparency may contribute to greater trust in government.95 However, empirical
research has not been able to demonstrate a clear positive relationship between transparency and
public decision-acceptance and trust.96

On the other hand, transparency pessimists question whether showing citizens the results of
government policies will actually boost their trust.97 These pessimists argue that results of the
exposure of wrongdoing in public affairs by means of transparency may lead to politics of
scandal and even demystification of government. For instance, Lord98, Bernard and Kristin99 and
Hubbard100 believe that transparency makes conflicts worse more and casts doubt on the idea that
transparency is one possible explanation of the democratic peace. Their key argument is that
government policies and democratic processes are so complex that they cannot be easily
communicated and explained to the public through a set of standard performance indicators.
Also, according to critics of transparency, attempts to try simplifying complex government
policies will have adverse effects and result in a further decline in trust. People may become
dissatisfied to see that governments do not operate as fast as they imagined and wished them to,
and accomplish less than they expect. For instance O’Neill argues that transparency erodes trust
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and undermines governance.101 In addition, O’Neill contests that transparency measures without
an effective ethic of two way communication can be a cure that is worse than the disease.102
However, she is not against transparency if the process happens through an effective two-way
communication. According to her, this can produce real transparency.103

Between optimists and pessimists of a relationship between transparency and trust stands a
third group of scholars who are sceptic that such a relationship exists after all. According to this
group, trust in government is a general attitude that can hardly be expected to be changed by
encountering information on one specific topic and this form of trust is affected by many other
factors.104 Some studies have been carried out105 which indicate that neither optimists nor
pessimist are right. The sceptical position argues that transparency seems to have hardly any
effect on trust. De Fine Licht uses procedural fairness (justice) theory to test that increased
transparency does not increase trust in decision-making. Her argument is that “People are, ….
quite uninterested in politics, and therefore the simple belief —or assumption—that information
is there, if they would take the time and effort to engage in it, is enough to create a perception of
transparency.”106 However, only the perception of transparency is not enough to establish its
relationship with trust. Other studies have also shown null results.107

Roberts belongs to this third group of scholars, and has elaborated on the relationship between
trust and transparency. He brings evidence from democracies with long experience of FOI,
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particularly Canada, to show how governments resist moves to greater transparency. They do so
partly through aggressive legal defence of the public-interest exemptions allowed in all freedom
of information laws, and also through informal adjustment of record-keeping and other
documentation in order to avoid disclosure of potentially embarrassing information. Roberts
doubts that freedom of information promotes trust or culture change. He rightly points out that
“In practice, the probability that the adoption of a FOI law will lead to cultural change or
improve trust is small.”108 The reason for this sceptical view is that the existence of freedom of
information laws are not sufﬁcient for governments to be open. Governments deploy deceitful
tricks to resist while formally complying, and Roberts outlines numerous methods by which a
bureaucracy that intends on keeping information out of the public domain may actually do so.
Roberts illustrates with concrete examples the capacity of the bureaucratic system to adapt to
transparency rules using many techniques that actually decrease transparency. These range from
changes in record-keeping practices, to restructuring government services, to not keeping records
at all. This explains the underlying pessimism that suggests that greater transparency in the form
of simply making files, data and information available will probably have the perverse effect of
reducing actual transparency. It becomes clear that freedom of information laws do not equate
with “openness” even when “openness” is the stated aim of such laws.

Looking at all the debates about the relationship between transparency and trust, I see a real
challenge to establish a positive or negative effect. I would agree with the third group of scholars
- ‘the sceptics’ - who find it hard to see any effect of transparency and trust. However, I do find
O’Neill’s idea of a two-way communication as essential for the establishment of trusttransparency relationship. I will return to it later in this research.

Another idea that often emerges on discussions around transparency and ATI is national
security. Roberts argues that ideas of transparency have little to no traction is the area of national
security.109 In the post 9/11 era the scope of information falling under the umbrella of national
security has grown considerably and includes information that was previously available. Roberts
also points out that the trend toward greater networking of security agencies increases the
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amount of information shared between agencies, while also reducing the amount of information
shared to the public. While there is an undeniable tension between national security and the right
to information, there is no evidence to suggest that legitimate national security interests are
necessarily better served in practice when governments operate in total secrecy.

B. The implications of technology

The last decade has seen the booming of the information technology which has had major
implications in record keeping and dissemination of information. Many authors hold a very
optimistic view of technology as presenting great promises for transparency. Noveck introduces
a very optimistic view of technology by making a plea for “wiki government”. She argues that
technology will help to overcome limitations to transparency and open government.110 Similarly,
Lathrop and Ruma give a promising perspective of the value of technology for transparency.111
However, authors like Pasquier and Villeneuve draw attention about the dangers of new
technologies by challenging existing values and raising new institutional uncertainties.112

Roberts explores the implications of vast stores of digitized information for openness and
transparency and argues that the advancement in technology represent opportunities and risks.
While information and communication technologies can significantly improve the conditions for
openness by capturing more in writing and facilitating dissemination, they also can create
problems. The massive amount of data can be overwhelming. In addition, much of the data is
unstructured, scattered and diffuse. Compared with paper-based bureaucracies which create more
limited types of documents, in a digital environment information appears in all sorts of forms,
from databases to emails and spreadsheets to presentation files, stored idiosyncratically on
personal computers and communication devices. Roberts points out that the practical barriers to
transparency that existed in a paper-based world are being displaced by new practical barriers of
a digitized environment. The sheer volume of emails used in government is so huge that one
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study demonstrated that “in 2002 Canada’s 150,000 federal public servants exchanged about 6
million e-mails every working day.”113 This is more than a decade ago. The situation is much
worse now that information technology has usurped almost every government activity.

C. The empowerment of citizens

The empowerment of citizens is also a big umbrella theme which hosts other themes such as
participation, knowledge gaining, and human rights.

The empowerment of citizens is unquestionably a very compelling aspect of transparency and
ATI. There are authors who argue that “There can be no doubt that states should enact
fundamental rights of access to information to empower citizens.”114 In support of this idea,
Florini states that “transparency is seen as an essential element of democracy, part of
empowerment of ordinary citizens so that they can take meaningful part in shaping the decisions
that affect their lives.”115 However, there are some theorists who argue that a certain degree of
“virtuous ignorance” may strengthen rather than undermine representative democracy.116 This
scepticism about democratic governing goes all the way back to Plato’s hierarchical Republic117,
where there have been those who hold the notion that the job of governing needs to be left in the
hands of those who know best – the philosophers. The ship needs a captain; even the guardians
are just to act on the philosophers’ rulings; wise leadership is essential because important matters
cannot be left in the hands of the many. The corresponding argument is that citizens are
incompetent and reluctant to deal with abundant and complex goals, processes and information
and this is why they trust the leader to do this job better in their behalf. However, this claim
depicts a very simplistic if not distorted picture of reality. Our society is not divided into
‘philosophers’ and citizens. As a result, such claims have no plausible foundation and
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justification, especially in the twenty first century, when it is generally accepted that information
is power. In defense of this idiom, Cane argues that knowledge is necessary for accountability,
and hence for democracy. Cane explains that “a precondition of effectively holding public
administrators accountable is knowledge and information about their activity. Secret government
is unaccountable government.”118 However, Hood referring to transparency analysis note “it
would seem that the optimistic view about the effects of transparency provision is far from
proven and the most important element in that view - citizen knowledge - is probably not
provable.”119 I would agree that knowledge is difficult to measure and an empirical study of how
citizens’ knowledge affects transparency is difficult to undertake.

This dissertation is not engaging in any empirical research that proves that a relationship exists
between knowledge and transparency. However, one can depart from an assumption of a lack of
knowledge to realize its value for transparency. Without first knowing what is going on in
government, nobody can take any action. Getting to know is the first step, it is like a key to the
gates of a city. Where you want to go next once you entered the city depends on many factors.

In simplistic terms knowledge is generated through continuous information about a certain
topic. As such, transparency is understood as information delivery. Rawlins urges organizations
voluntarily to “share information that is inclusive, auditable (verifiable), complete, relevant,
accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, accessible, reliable, honest, and holds the
organization accountable.”120 However, as argued by O’Neill, this optimistic view of the effects
of information on transparency is “one-sided” because it “encourages us to think of information
as detachable from communication, and of informing as a process of “transferring’ content.”121
In contrast, O’Neill calls for a more “complete view” of transparency, which recognizes the
importance of the reception and use of information, and of the process of communication. Even
if organizations were able to supply all the types of information prescribed by Rawlins and
others, such understanding reduces transparency to a feature of the sender without considering
the abilities of receivers to actually handle the information made available. Pasquier and
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Villeneuve share a similar view with O’Neill, arguig that transparency is essential to the process
of information exchange.122 This perspective recognizes that information does not travel in one
way, but both ways from institutions to the public and then vice versa. Viewing transparency as
communication rather than the transmission of information reminds us of the interpretive and
relational complexities involved in transparency practices.

Indeed, there may be complications arising by reducing transparency to a mere information
delivery. This view ignores many factors that have to do with the sender and the receiver of
information. The senders - namely public institutions - may sway the use of language to provide
a certain context and to fit the purpose they want to achieve by disseminating a certain type of
information. It is widely accepted that people tend to selectively chose a specific language to
convey a message across audiences – a message which may not necessarily be the truth. O’Neill
calls this “massaging the truth.”123 What we might get as a result may be a different version of
the “truth” which may influence the public towards a distorted understanding of the public
issues. In addition, there are claims against transparency that look at the receiver of the
information – namely the public – and examine its capacity in absorbing, elaborating and using
information. Not all people are able to process amounts of information at the same speed and
depth. More transparency may benefit the most those who are relatively more capable of taking
advantage of increased available information, reinforcing already existing social inequalities.
The danger is that the opportunities created by transparency and its companion mechanisms be
appropriated by the more educated and skilled sectors of society, in detriment of the less well off.
For instance, the information may be used not only by interested citizens but by mass media and
interest groups, which are different from ordinary citizens because of their power and influence.
This may undermine the public interest in exerting disproportional influence through selective
use and misuse of government information. O’Neill argues that “Transparency is useful to the
media and to campaigning organizations who can discover information that bears on others’
performance.”124 It is indeed very interesting to look at people’s capacity to absorb and respond
to the information they get. I will analyse the tension that information delivery creates for
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different categories of people in society and respond to the claims that dismiss the value of
transparency as detrimental for social justice by using capacity arguments.

Closely related to the idea of capacity on using knowledge, is the theme of participation,
which has drawn lots of attention amongst scholars because of its effects on transparency.
Pasquier and Villeneuve argue that “transparency in state activities becomes a sine qua non
condition ….active participation of citizens…. [it] is a tool that encourages the involvement of
the people in the development and implementation of public policies.”125 Participation and
democracy is viewed as a symbiotic relationship for many scholars. Levy calls transparency the
“key feature of the democracy of the future.”126 By referring to Kant’s theory on the need for
transparency in the public sphere, he comes up with a “public use” of transparency – which
includes accountability and participation. Some authors state that a government with transparent
decision making processes can vastly increase citizen participation and, ultimately, improve
democracy127. In fact, Habermas maintains that “Democracies satisfy the necessary ‘procedural
minimum’ to the extent that they guarantee the political participation of as many interested
citizens as possible.”128 Other authors claim that at the core of democracy is the ability of the
people to participate, and influence government through openly expressed public opinion.
Calland and Tilley argue that without access to information, there can be no discussion of a
range of available options, no voting in accordance with one’s best interests and beliefs, no
meaningful public policy discussions, and no informed political debate.129 Stiglitz looks at
transparency and information from a democratic participation perspective and views them as a
prerequisite for citizen participation. He argues that “meaningful participation in democratic
processes requires informed participants.”130 Noveck131 and Lathrop and Ruma132 introduce a
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promising view of transparency from a technological perspective by connecting ATI to new
forms of citizen participation.
Rowe and Frewer133categorize three different levels of citizen participation: 1) citizen
communication, where information is conveyed from the government body to the public; 2)
citizen consultation, where information flows from the public to the government; and 3) citizen
participation, where information is exchanged between the public and the government and some
degree of dialogue takes place. This categorization is a simpler presentation of the Arnstein’s
ladder of participation134 which includes eights levels of participation, from manipulation, being
the lowest level, to citizen control being the highest level, and this is where real participation
happens.
Pateman has developed the “Participation and democratic theory” which elaborates on
transparency in an indirect way. Pateman looks at democracy as involving the active
participation of citizens in decision-making at all levels of society. For Pateman, participation
plays a crucial educative role “gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures.” 135
According to her “people learn to participate by participating, and that feelings of political
efficacy are more likely to be developed in a participatory environment.”136 I borrow Pateman’s
idea of learning and skill-formation through the process of participation, and develop it further
by applying it to transparency processes. From a user’s perspective Pateman’s theory offers
standards towards which information exchange can be measured.

Despite the promising opportunities that transparency holds for citizen empowerment and
participation, there are arguments that challenge this optimistic view. Some scholars have
questioned the value of transparency for citizens, with some of them being highly critical. For
instance, Grumet states that “the supposition that transparency uniquely empowers regular folks
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is quaint fantasy.”137 Yeager argues that the “notion of liberal democratic pluralism – that the
‘public’ benefits from the disclosure of government information – is merely false advertising.”138
A more critical view of the value of transparency comes from Fukuyama, who, decrying the
recent dysfunction of the democratic processes in the US, concludes: “The obvious solution to
this problem would be to roll back some of the would-be democratizing reforms, but no one
dares suggest that what the country needs is a bit less participation and transparency.”139
Fukuyama represents a dramatic perspective of transparency by blaming it for the state of
government affairs. He proposes to turn back to the times when states governed in secrecy, and
portrays this as an acceptable type of governance even for democratic states.
Fukuyma’s approach to transparency is a very limited one. Blaming transparency for
government’s failures, falls short of recognizing many other factors that can contribute to those
failures. A response to Fukuyama’s assumptions comes from Bass, Brian and Eisen who explain
that “information obtained through open government is on occasion used as ammunition in
political battles, but transparency is neither the cause of the systemic problems, nor would
secrecy be the cure.”140 Although, reality demonstrates that some information will remain secret
for the general public due to their sensitive nature, exclusions have to be legal and not arbitrary.
Secrecy applies as an exception, not as the default practice. Thompson debates that “Secrecy is
justifiable, only if it is actually justified in a process that itself is not secret. First-order secrecy
(in a process or about a policy) requires second-order publicity (about the decision to make the
process or policy secret).”141
As it is the case with other transparency-related themes, between optimistic and pessimistic
views on the citizen participation continuum, there are authors who establish themselves
somewhere in the middle of the continuum. They remain sceptic about any effect of transparency
in participation. This groups of scholars find it difficult to establish a direct relationship between
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transparency and participation. For instance Lessig argues that “Giving amounts of information
produced and disclosed, available capacity for processing it, and attention span issues, there is no
way to assume that it produces better citizen choice, and the available evidence suggest its
impact is actually both low and slow.”142 Indeed, the effects that transparency may have on
participation have been little explored.143 Some empirical research has been done with the
purpose of studying the transparency-participation relationship, and they have generated no
positive results. Researchers tend to agree that people are, in general, quite uninterested and
unknowledgeable about politics, and careless about most of the information they actually
receive. Earlier research have demonstrated a sort of apathy of citizens in political matters.144
While these results draw attention to a very complex aspect of transparency, they certainly do
not deny the great promise that transparency holds for those citizens who are interested in
participating in public discussions. These studies are a warning for researchers that participation
heavily depends on subjective factors, but also on the circumstances surrounding individual
cases. Pateman’s and Habermas’s theories serve as a good theoretical background to understand
the challenges and limitations of transparency and access to information and to explain the
variations in the existing research.

A last emerging topic in transparency debates is the consideration of ATI as a human right.
This is the core concern, and the culmination of my arguments in this research. There is an
existing body of literature that recognizes ATI as a human right, with groups of scholars debating
around the values of access rights from three perspectives: an instrumental perspective, an
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intrinsic perspective, or both. This research aims to be part of this body of literature by furthering
the arguments in favour of the recognition of a human right status of ATI.

The view of ATI as a human right is welcomed on a wide range of broadly democratic
grounds, including the protection and realisation of individual rights145. For instance, Roberts
favours the recognition of a separate right to access to information. He argues: “the logic
suggests that access right is better understood as a corollary of basic political participation rights,
rather than the right to freedom of expression alone.”146 Roberts recognises an instrumentalist
basis for a right to information when he suggests that political participation rights “have little
meaning if government’s information monopoly is not regulated.”147 Some non-governmental
organizations with a dedicated work in transparency also promote the instrumental approach of
access rights, such as Access Info Europe and Article 19. Access Info Europe’s mission is
“dedicated to promoting and protecting the right of access to information in Europe as a tool for
defending civil liberties and human rights.”148 Article 19 promotes that “The right to access
public information about one’s economic, social and cultural rights is not only related to these
rights - it is a precondition for their realisation.”149

Florini supports both approaches in recognizing ATI as a human right. She takes an
instrumentalist approach when she argues for a right to information deriving from the
recognition of democratic rights. Florini states that “a broad right of access to information is
fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of representative democracy
is informed consent, which requires that information about political practices and policies be
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disclosed.”150 However, Florini also argued that access to information is not only “a necessary
concomitant of the realization of all other rights” but is also “a fundamental human right.”151 Just
like Florini, Stiglitz supported both approaches. Stiglitz reinforced the existence of an intrinsic
ATI right acknowledging that greater openness could be justified on instrumental grounds as a
means to an end. He also believed that greater openness has an intrinsic value simply because
citizens have a basic right to know.152
Birkinshaw makes a bold and daring argument about access rights – he advocates for ATI as a
human right arguing that it is “fundamental to all other human rights”, to one’s “membership as a
full member of the human race”, and to one’s “position as a citizen and a human being.”153 This
is a morally based approach, one that is usually used to justify the existence of all other human
rights. This approach cannot easily be associated to other scholars and Birkinshaw’s approach is
unique in this regard. Birkinshaw states that “The argument for human rights is based upon
protection for individuals against inefficient, oppressive, or even bullying government. They are
rights that are necessary for our individual integrity, for our acceptance by the state and civil
society as full members of that community, for our right to belong.”154 Birkinshaw talks about
FOI as a human right that can be applied universally, without making any difference on which
jurisdiction. He speaks generally about the nature that FOI ought to have, and not necessarily
has. Birkinshaw’s claims about human rights are certainly very challenging and will be very
important for this research. The claims that he makes about a universal recognition of ATI as a
human right, raise important questions about the applicability of this approach in the two
jurisdictions in focus.

The arguments brought by Roberts, Florini and Birkinshaw are very important for this
research because they provide the foundations for the recognition of ATI as a human right. I
build on their work to see how transparency and access rights are considered in Canada and the
EU and how these considerations affect their practicability.
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The three themes that I analyzed above are important in understanding transparency and assist
on making sense of the conceptual muddle found in the literature. These themes contribute to the
unpacking of the complexity of transparency as a term, and channel its conceptualization into
venues that will guide this research in the next chapters. Outside of the three main themes that I
discussed above, there are other debates about the nature of transparency and ATI that inform
about the tensions that accompany these two terms. The section below illuminates these tensions.

2.3

Tensions in the meaning of transparency and access to information

The three themes outlined above raise questions and doubts about the meaning of
transparency. They examine the limitations and advantages of transparency and identify its use
as a means of rhetoric. Critical remarks are often complemented by the observation that
empirical knowledge on the actual workings of transparency is, unfortunately, rather scarce to
prove the real consequences of transparency. These findings are very significant because they
provide different perspectives on analyzing the ways transparency and ATI work in practice.
They signal that the study of transparency is an unfinished project that deserves further study and
is a moving target. The best way to approach the study of transparency is by addressing both its
positive and negatives consequences in an attempt to find the optimal balance between the two.

The bifurcation of transparency consequences into negative and positive is worth scrutinising.
Hood openly and skeptically questioned the often unspoken assumption that more transparency
is a good thing in itself. Hood warns that transparency is more than openness, just as governance
is more than government.155 He advises that one should be aware of the pitfalls of having
transparency in place and analyze both positive and negative sides of transparency. This kind of
approach is important to understand the conceptual and practical challenges of transparency.

Just like Hood, Florini tries to comprehend and illuminate the consequences of transparency.
She recognizes that transparency is good and necessary but explores it with a certain degree of
practicality. Florini admits that transparency needs to be balanced and optimized because neither
155
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too little nor too much transparency are desirable. In order to understand this tension Florini asks
a timely and compelling vital question: What information should governments ….disclose?156
and, of course, assuming what should be kept secret. She argues that excessive secrecy corrodes
democracy, facilitates corruption, and undermines good public policymaking, but keeping a lid
on military strategies, personal data, and trade secrets is also essential to the protection of the
public interest. Florini provides lessons from many nations’ bitter experience and provides a
careful analysis of transparency's impact on governance, business regulation, environmental
protection, and national security. As government interests clash with citizen insistence over the
growing demand for public scrutiny, they both need a better understanding and new insights into
how greater transparency can serve the public interest while, at the same time, protecting
valuable sensitive information. In continuing to answer her question about how much
transparency is worthy, Florini engages in a simple depiction of transparency as the opposite of
secrecy.157 Secrecy means deliberately hiding your actions; transparency means deliberately
revealing them. Florini argues that transparency is a choice, revitalised by changing attitudes
about what constitutes appropriate behavior. According to Florini, secrecy and transparency are
not conditions but ideals, as such, they represent two ends of a continuum. What we are seeing
now is a rapidly evolving shift of consensus about where states should be on that continuum.158
Regarding the “good” and the “bad” of transparency, Etzioni also argues that transparency is
overrated and by no means able to produce the expected benefits.159 Because the concept of
transparency refers to a variety of ideas, behind it there are various expectations. Fung, Graham
and Weil also argue that there are both positive and negative consequences from transparency.
While in principle it creates more options, it is not clear if and how transparency produces
engagement or participation. The same goes for promoting better, more effective and efficient, or
more egalitarian policy and law making or better outcomes.160 Any attempt to dismiss such a
complex and conflicting nature will lead to a handicapped regulation of transparency as a
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phenomenon. Indeed, the notion of transparency is not neutral, because it responds to deep
aspirations of people. Transparency is a moving target which is constructed and continuously
reconstructed through social and political developments. According to O’Neill, powerful actors
will generally be able to define transparency in specific ways and to steer developments in a
certain direction.161 However, Roberts makes the opposite argument that the rules of power
games change through transparency.162 In other words, transparency is affected by social and
political advancements and affects social and political constructs as well.

The questions raised by Hood, Florini, Roberts and others are indeed very important
questions. There is a tension between a need to disclose information and the need to protect from
such disclosure based on claims of privacy, national security, public interest etc. I analyze this
tension in my research trying to understand when claims of protection from disclosure are
justified. I build on the work of these scholars, explore further the pressures on transparency, and
pay attention to the benefits that transparency can create.

One of the most complex and difficult areas of transparency is its institutional culture which is
historically embedded in secrecy. Curtin and Dekker argue that the lack of transparency is
structural; resulting from incremental changes in the constitutional fabric of a system that was
not designed to be open from the outset.163 Indeed, today’s democratic institutions were not
fashioned with transparency in mind, or at least not with the modern understanding of
institutional openness. These institutions started out as secretive bureaucracies and continued to
conduct public affairs as far as possible from the public eye. Hence, secrecy is an inherited
feature of government. Roberts has continuously raised the secrecy concern in his work164 and
studied how it has gradually been carved to give way to transparency. However, according to
Roberts, the spill-over of passing access laws is not in itself an indicator of a new paradigm in
democratic governance that has replaced the old culture of bureaucratic secrecy. The global trend

O’Neill, A Question of Trust, supra note 80; O'Neill, “Transparency and Ethics”, supra note 97.
Roberts, “Dashed Expectations”, supra note 104.
163
Deidre Curtin & I. Dekker, “The EU as a layered International Organization: Institutional Unity in disguise” in
Paul Craig and G. De Burca, eds, The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) [Curtin & Dekker, “The EU”];
Deidre Curtin & M. Egberg, Towards a New Executive Order in Europe? (London: Routledge, 2009) at 17 [Curtin
& Egberg, New Executive Order].
164
See for instance, Roberts, Blacked Out, supra note 84.
161
162

57

toward enacting access to information legislation would seem to imply a distinct shift toward
openness, so Roberts asks a simple question: “Has the old presumption of secrecy really been
overthrown in favour of a new presumption of openness?”165 His answer is “no”, and he shows
that legislation alone is not sufficient to counter histories and practices of secrecy.

Similarly, Pasquier and Villeneuve argue that secrecy has deep roots in institutions.
According to them, institutional rules and culture result from historical trajectories. Pasquier and
Villeneuve highlight that “cultures of transparency and secrecy are rooted in historical traditions
and traditional state-society relations.”166 Generally, those in power tend to consider public
information their own property and not of the citizen and therefore they will be cautious to make
these documents accessible to the public. Furthermore, bureaucratic organizations are by nature
hierarchic, reclusive and risk-adverse and “public service organizations are little inclined to
disclose the information at their disposal.”167

The study of institutions adds another layer of difficulty to the analysis of transparency. If one
focuses on achieving transparency by simply implementing legal provisions, not only will get
superficial results, but these results will vary from one institution to another. Indeed, the road to
transparency through access laws can be a snaky and shaky one because of the force of dynamic
conservatism in institutions. The trajectory of this road will heavily depend on the political
system of a country. For instance, according to Roberts, “Experience has shown that the
governing institutions in the Westminster systems are particularly resilient and capable of
rejecting alien transplantation such as FOI laws or of developing new routines designed to
minimize the disruptive effect of these new laws.”168 In Westminster countries like Canada and
the UK, the culture of bureaucracy is deeply embedded in secrecy and the attitudes of those in
power are hard to change, becoming a big impediment to transparency. It is hard for
governments in these systems to adopt to legal changes that challenge their style of governing by
allowing their decision-making to be questioned and errors exposed.
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The behaviour of public service providers is studied more in depth by Roberts who scrutinizes
the highly centralized structures for controlling the communications activity of the government
departments. He illustrates this with the Canadian experience and the ATIA which was intended
to constrain executive authority, but officials developed internal routines and technologies to
minimize its disruptive potential169. These practices restrict the right to information for certain
types of stakeholders, such as journalists or representatives of political parties. Roberts labels
these practices as “internal law” and examines them through empirical research. He uses an
econometric analysis of 2,120 requests handled by Human Resources Development Canada in
1999-2001 to suggest that some politically sensitive requests - often filed by journalists or
political parties - are given differential treatment, with longer delays and tougher decisions on
disclosure.170 The analysis of these practices illustrates that internal bureaucratic procedures play
an important role in defining what the right to information means in practice. Roberts admits that
this analysis demonstrates how a statutory right can be shaped through the exercise of
administrative discretion.171 Robert’s study indicates that the implementation of the access legal
provisions highly depends on the willing of the public officials. He argues that:

Whether a freedom of information law succeeds in securing the right to information depends
heavily on the predispositions of the political executives and officials who are required to
administer it. Statutory entitlements could be undermined if government institutions refuse to
commit adequate resources for implementation or consistently exercise discretionary powers
granted by the law in ways that are inimical to aims of the legislation.172
This conflict between the law and the practice is an ongoing tension for transparency and
Roberts spends a considerable time in his work demonstrating how the structure and practices of
governance have direct implications for access to information. To examine these implications he
makes three arguments. First, access depends on a professional civil service and well organized
records. Where these are absent, access and transparency are severely reduced. Second,
governments are increasingly outsourcing functions to the private sector, which is generally not
covered by access legislation. Therefore, what might once have been subject to access legislation
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becomes exempt. Finally, Roberts examines the implications of technology173 which adds new
strains on transparency and access rights. In addressing access rights’ implications Roberts also
argues that transparency can only become a reality if people would act upon it. He calls for an
engaged citizenry by posing a fundamental question: “Do we have a right to information?
Certainly. But we also have a responsibility to act on it.”174 This question goes to the core of the
arguments made by many critics that people do not use access rights because they are not
interested in doing so. Robert’s provocative question and answer certainly deserve closer
attention and I am going to expand on Roberts’ work in this research.

Just like Roberts, Hood makes some provocative claims when making a distinction between
access to information and transparency and warning about their legal nature. He says that
transparency in the public sector is not simply access to information and passive compliance is
not enough.175 Another warning comes from Hood when he notes in this quotation of Rousseau:
“Books and auditing of accounts, instead of exposing frauds, only conceal them; for prudence is
never so ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to elude them.”176 One should be
cautious on taking into consideration the fact that the study of transparency should not only be
focused on what is on the books, what are the legal rules and what documents are produced in
the name of transparency, for they can be deceiving. Transparency is more than that - it has a
much broader meaning.

The sections of this chapter provided a solid foundation for studying transparency and ATI
and unpacking the complexity and conceptual muddle that surrounds them. Themes such as
democratic legitimacy, legality, accountability, good governance, information asymmetry,
participation and human rights have been occupying the scholarly debates for about two decades.
Different scholars argue about different facets of transparency, how they can be measured and
what are their consequences. However, almost all discussions lead to a common understanding
of transparency – its complexity and its continuous inherently battle with secrecy. All these
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discussions are very informative and shed light on some complex issues of transparency, to
which this research pays particular attention. I am aware that the gap between the law and the
practice will be the most challenging aspect in my research in terms of detecting when such gap
exists, investigating political and bureaucratic behaviour in complying with transparency
measures and measuring its consequences. This divide between law and practice really affects
the recognition of ATI as a human right. I build on the work of Roberts and Birkinshaw when
arguing about the law-practice divide and the constitutional recognition of an ATI right.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL APPROACHES

This chapter outlines the two theories I employ for this research with the purpose of setting up
the standards against which the rhetoric of transparency and access to information will be
measured. The chapter includes an explanation of the choices I made in using these two theories
and the reasons behind these choices.
The Habermas’s discourse theory of law and Pateman’s participation and democractic theory
will provide not only the theoretical foundations for this research, but also some practical
perspectives on how to make sense of transparency developments using these theories. They
will both assist me in furthering the arguments about how access to information works in
practice and how it can be recognized and protected.
3.1

Pateman’s Participation and Democratic Theory

Carol Pateman, a very famous British political theorist is not a transparency scholar.
However, one of her early books “Participation and democratic theory”177 conveys a very
significant message on how transparency can be transformed in a tool to achieve a model of
democracy where participation of citizens in public affairs is crucial. To my knowledge, I am the
first to adopt her work on transparency and ATI. I use Pateman’s theory because it provides
some standards of citizen participation based on acquiring skills and knowledge, social training,
psychological attitudinal responses, and learning experiences.
Patemans’ theory performs a deep analysis of the concept of democracy and participation, and
touches upon some of the contentious relationships in this research such as that between
transparency, democracy and participation. Pateman’s theory found a wide application in the
wake of the “participatory revolution” in the 1960s178 when participatory democracy included the
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participation of NGOs and other organizations. More recently, the term participatory democracy
is increasingly used together with participatory governance, referring to the participation of
collective actors of the organized civil society.179

The two jurisdictions in focus, namely Canada and the EU, are liberal democracies where
there has been considerable attention on a broad range of institutional innovations aimed at
encouraging public participation. The general contemporary concern in these liberal
democracies, particularly in the EU, is about declining citizens’ participation in voting and other
political activities. This decline could be explained, in part, by a lack of a two-way relationship
between the government and the public, a lack of communication, and a lack of attention to the
public needs and concerns. One other explanation is related to the workplace democracy,
although there has been little discussion of this kind of democracy. The term “workplace
democracy” goes back to the work of Pateman. Several of the leading advocates of participatory
democracy have specifically emphasized the importance of democratizing the workplace. In
particular, Pateman has made a significant contribution in emphasizing this importance by
introducing a new concept – that of a “spillover process” of democratization. She has argued that
participation in workplace decision-making will spill over into wider society by increasing the
probability of participation in politics beyond the workplace. She explains that the resemblance
between the workplace and government experience in terms of the type, intensity and quality of
participation suggests that the most efficient and effective way of increasing participation in
government is to increase participation in the workplace. This creates a kind of culture that will
be then implanted in other forms and types of communications such as that between government
and the public. The workplace democracy educates people in a way that makes them feel
comfortable to debate over a wide range of issues. Thus, in the light of the current concern for
institutional approaches to the “crisis of participation”, the spillover theory has much to offer.
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Pateman makes a connection between workplace democratization, political efficacy and
public participation by focusing primarily on worker co-operatives.180 She critiques the work of
theorists, such as Schumpeter and Sartori, who had regarded democracy as a popular contest for
the votes, that this was an elitist project that prevented mass participation in both political and
workplace decision-making. The elitist project systematically refuted people the developmental
opportunities that arise through mature systems of participation. Pateman opposes the narrow
definition of these elitist theorists, and demonstrates how the workplace is the central to any
future project to democratize society.
Pateman strongly critiques liberal democracy as a very “thin” form of democracy which
bypasses regular and active participation by all citizens. For Pateman, participation, apart from
being a good thing in itself, also plays a crucial educative role. Hence, participation has both an
intrinsic and an instrumental value. In my view, this is the most important facet in Pateman’s
theory and directly relates to my argument of transparency and access to information, as values
that are good in themselves and also promote other values.
The educative feature of Pateman’s theory brings her spillover process to another dimension that of a state as an entity comprised by a number of institutions. Following Rousseau and Mill,
she argued that individual attitudes and behavior are shaped by the institutions within which they
act. In this context, if individuals actively engage in democratic institutions – debating and
deliberating – they are more likely to develop the necessary attitudes, skills and psychological
qualities that contribute to individual political efficacy, and which in turn will increase political
participation. Therefore, the act of participation is itself educative “Educative in the very widest
sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills
and procedures….Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more
individuals participate the better able they become to do so.”181
Pateman’s key contribution to democratic theory was to notice that bureaucratic organizations
typical of capitalist liberal democracies give people little opportunity to improve their democratic
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skills. Pateman introduces knowledge to explain participatory attitudes of individuals - by
democratizing the workplace individuals will be able to participate in routine decision-making
affecting their immediate work environment, because they already have knowledge in this field.
This quote from Pateman carries an important message: “people learn to participate by
participating, and that feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be developed in a
participatory environment.”182 If people practice this, their attitudes will also escalate beyond
the work environment to civic and political institutions. Moreover, having learnt to participate at
work people will have acquired the confidence, skills and desire to participate in civic society.
This idea of “learning to participate by participating” is very important for this research
because it has applicability in many aspects of transparency. One of the goals of having
transparency in place, is to facilitate and encourage participation. But, participation cannot be
realized without governments being transparent and citizens being informed of the working of
their governments. Just having representative institutions at the legislative level is not enough.
As Pateman puts it “Democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary
individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed.”183 In this context, she talks
about “social training” which is a process that happens through an extensive interaction between
citizens and their government.
A central part of Pateman’s explanation for low public participation was that if the
experiences and perceptions of the operation of the political system leave citizens with a sense of
frustration and powerlessness, then “apathy is a realistic response, it does not seem worthwhile to
participate.”184 This, she argued, is a cognitive rather than a psychological response. As such,
Pateman’s democratic theory offers important insights on issues of democratic deficit, decrease
of trust on governments or lack of transparency. Pateman’s idea of democracy is much broader
and colorful than just a competitive struggle for people’s votes. She puts emphasis on
participation as a key element of democracy. This is fundamental for understanding the
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functioning of democracy and its relation with transparency considering that transparency is
considered to be one of democracy’s pillars.
I will build on Pateman’s work by arguing that transparency is a requirement for participation
which leads to more democratic processes in government affairs. Without transparency and
access to information, participation will not be realized in its full potential and democratic
principles will be undermined. In addition, Pateman’s idea of “learning to participate by
participating” undergirds many transparency issues. People become more knowledgeable and
informed every time they participate, and by mastering their knowledge from the information
they get, they participate better in the future.

Participation can also lead to better transparency practices from government since the same
repetitive process will have its effect not only on people, but also on bureaucratic organizations.
Practice dealing with public participation, will make bureaucracies respond better to public’s
input. Therefore, Pateman’s theory of democratic participation proposes a clear guiding path for
both the government and the public. It provides with both a theoretical and practical perspective
on the central issues of transparency and participation.
3.2. Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law
Habermas’s discourse theory of law gives answers to many concerns in this dissertation. This
theory will help me to evaluate the conditions of transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU.
The discourse theory of law provides a good foundation for explaining the processes that shape
the public discourse and space. It also offers standards for the recognition of a constitutional
status of the right of ATI, and how this recognition can be achieved through a process of
constitutional stretching.

Habermas has consistently been preoccupied with human rights and democracy in his work,
trying to make sense how individual rights and public law can be reconciled. His theory of
discourse of law is not a theory of transparency, but his concern about human rights and
democracy lead him to address and respond to some of the tensions that exist in the public space,
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which are also concerns for transparency. For Habermas, addressing these problems starts with
“reconciling private and public autonomy at a fundamental conceptual level, as is evident from
the unclarified relation between individual rights and public law in the field of jurisprudence, as
well as from the unresolved competition between human rights and popular sovereignty in
social-contract theory.”185 Habermas borrows Hobbs’s idea of a social contract to find grounds
for human rights as deriving from a consensual agreement between individuals and the
sovereign. He argues that this is based on a principle of morality and democracy. As such “The
human rights grounded in the moral autonomy of individuals acquire a positive shape solely
through the citizens' political autonomy.”186 The political autonomy is exercised in a democratic
setting through discussions, communicative freedom, and agreement.
What really attracted me from Habermas’s theory is that he looks at law as a system of
knowledge and a system of action187 which is shaped through a discursive process of “opinion
and will-formation”. By law, he does not mean only statutes, but norms in general. Habermas
makes a great analysis in his theory in relating knowledge to public sphere. Habermas looks at
the public sphere as “a network for communicating information and points of view”188, which
has a great potential as a source of knowledge. This can serve as “a suitable bridge for
connecting the deliberative structures of the constitutionally organized political system with
deeper processes of social reproduction.”189 He argues that in modern societies knowledge is a
scarce resource and it is desirable and which can create paternalistic monopolies on knowledge
and hinder the democratic process. This is a good explanation for why government and
bureaucracies are not usually very receptive to transparency and access to information reforms.
They tend to keep the information they possess for themselves so they create a monopoly of
information. This creates a new system of paternalism.
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Habermas reponds to Dahl's190 concern about the risks brought by the specialization of the
technical steering knowledge used in policymaking and administration. Such specialization
keeps citizens from taking advantage of politically necessary expertise in forming their own
opinions and creates a monopolization of knowledge. Habermas explains that “because the
administration does not, for the most part, itself produce the relevant knowledge but draws it
from the knowledge system or other intermediaries, it does not enjoy a natural monopoly on such
knowledge.”191 It is thus, in the benefit of the bureaucracy to develop a bridge with public
deliberative structures to obtain the knowledge required for political supervision or steering. This
is a missing link in today’s relationship between administration and the public, or at least this
link is not fully understood and developed. Both parties in this relationship will suffer because
they lack the proper knowledge to understand what is happening at the other side. As a
consequence, “individual private rights cannot even be adequately formulated, let alone
politically implemented, if those affected have not first engaged in public discussions to clarify
which features are relevant in treating typical cases as alike or different, and then mobilized
communicative power for the consideration of their newly interpreted needs.”192

Further, Habermas examined the public use of public discourse as an unhindered
communicative freedom in cognitive terms, as enabling rational opinion-and will-formation: the
free processing of information and reasons. He drew attention to mobilizing citizens'
communicative freedom for the formation of political beliefs that in turn influence the
production of legitimate law,193 and warned public administrators about the value of public
discourse These are very powerful ideas that describe how the legal realm, and democracy at a
much broader sense, works.

I borrow this logic to argue about the value of transparency. The system of knowledge, the
discursive process and the system of action, taken together in a close relationship, and can be
used to explain why transparency is significant. People gain knowledge from the information
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made available to them, use that knowledge to debate on public matters (and in the discursive
process enhance their knowledge) and then take action based a tempered “opinion and willformation”. This process initiates with a single human ability, which according to Habermas is
“the cognitive sense of filtering reasons and information.”194

Furthermore, Habermas relates human rights to the legitimacy of law, with ideas that are
beyond “publicity” as explained by Bentham and Kant. He argues that the legitimacy of law
ultimately depends on whether a contested norm meets with the agreement of all those possibly
affected. He then relates legitimacy with human rights by saying “The substance of human rights
then resides in the formal conditions for the legal institutionalization of those discursive
processes of opinion-and will-formation in which the sovereignty of the people assumes a
binding character.”195 This prerequisite of legitimacy is, in fact, part of the democratic principle
which requires that all laws must meet a certain condition: the agreement of all citizens stated in
a discursive process of opinion-and-will-formation which provides for an effective participation
and takes place in forms of communication that are themselves legally guaranteed.196 Habermas
offers a solution to the question of how citizens can judge whether the law they make is
legitimate: the conditions to engage in the public discourse must be legally guaranteed by the
basic political rights to participate in processes that form the legislator's opinion and will.197
According to Habermas, there are five categories of basic rights, with the fourth being “the
basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion-and will-formation”. He
argues that only this category enables legal subjects to become authors of their legal order, and
further emphasizes that “this category of rights is reflexively applied to the constitutional
interpretation and the further political development or elaboration of the basic rights.”198

The idea of communication as a freedom for individuals, which should be part of the political
rights, is a very stimulating facet in Habermas’s theory. He claims that these political rights
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should enable every person to have equal chances to exercise the communicative freedom in all
deliberative and decisional processes. Habermas articulates this as follows:

Equal opportunities for the political use of communicative freedoms require a legally
structured deliberative praxis in which the discourse principle is applied. Just as
communicative freedom prior to any institutionalization refers to appropriate occasions for
the use of language oriented toward mutual understanding, so also do political rights in
particular, entitlements to the public use of communicative freedom-call for the legal
institutionalization of various forms of communication and the implementation of democratic
procedures.199
As one can notice, rights of equal participation are crucially important to Habermas, just like
they were to Pateman, because they are important for the legitimacy of law. Rights of equal
participation, however, cannot easily be achieved. The only way is the recognition of a
symmetrical juridification of the communicative freedom of all citizens by means of political
autonomy in accordance with political rights. Habermas advices that it is important to introduce
the system of rights in this way,200 and argues that in this model of democracy “the citizens
themselves become those who deliberate and, acting as a constitutional assembly, decide how
they must fashion the rights that give the discourse principle legal shape as a principle of
democracy.”201
The most intriguing idea in Habermas’s discursive principle for the purpose of this research,
is the explanation of how human rights become part of the constitutional fabric of a country.
Again, he uses claims of communicative freedom in the form of freedom of opinion and
information which make their way to the legal system slowly over time. Habermas extrapolates
that “This system of rights, however, is not given to the framers of a constitution in advance as a
natural law. Only in a particular constitutional interpretation do these rights first enter into
consciousness at all....every constitution is a living project that can endure only as an ongoing
interpretation continually carried forward at all levels of the production of law.”202 On the same
argument Habermas disputes that “the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure

199

Ibid, at 127.
Ibid, at 127.
201
Ibid, at 127.
202
Ibid, at 129.
200

70

but a delicate and sensitive-above all fallible and revisable-enterprise, whose purpose is to realize
the system of rights anew in changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights
better, to institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically.”203

This generalization that Habermas makes about the living constitution that changes over time
through interpretation finds applicability in the “living tree doctrine” in the Canadian law. This
doctrine allows for Canada’s Constitution to change and evolve over time, and provides flexible
interpretation that accommodates the realities of changing modern life. If the Constitution could
not be interpreted this way, it would be frozen in time and become more obsolete than useful.
This understanding of constitutional interpretation becomes central for my arguments on the
recognition of the access rights. I claim constitutional status of the ATI rights even though I am
not able to find such status in the Canadian Charter.

Moreover, Habermas responds to major concern in this research that originates from critics
of transparency and access rights: the use of these rights. Many critics argue that since people do
not make a good use of these rights, there should be no preoccupation for their recognition.
Habermas explains that there are basic political rights that institutionalize the public use of
communicative freedom in the form of individual rights, but they provide a right, rather than an
obligation to the individuals. Habermas argues that:

The legal code leaves no other alternative; communicative and participatory rights must be
formulated in a language that leaves it up to autonomous legal subjects whether, and if
necessary how, they want to make use of such rights. It is left to the addressees' free choice:
whether or not they want to engage their free will as authors, shift their perspective from
their own interests and success to mutual understanding over norms acceptable to all, and
make public use of their communicative freedom.204
According to Sossin, in Habermas’s theory of communicative action “the system through
which we administer ourselves have become estranged from the social relations by which we
define ourselves and reproduce our culture. This has resulted in a peculiar form of apathy and
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disenchantment” 205 which he calls the “refeudalization of the public sphere”. This form of
apathy noticed by Sossin is, in fact, what many other scholars notice when looking for a
relationship between transparency and trust. However, the existence of citizen apathy should not
be used as an argument against the recognition of access to information as a human right.
Habermas responds to these claims with the free will – people are free to use their rights to
which they are entitled, but they are not obligated to do so. This free will characterizes human
rights generally. Habermas’s discourse theory of law touches upon many concerns in this
dissertation and gives answers to many tensions of transparency. He elaborates on many
concepts through a careful analysis of democratic processes and with a special focus on human
rights. For this reason, this theory will assist me to weave together many arguments and advance
my claim for the recognition of access to information as a human right.
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PART II
THE NATURE OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION

CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS
TO INFORMATION

This chapter makes an analysis of the history of transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU,
and explores their origin and development. It is compelling to know how and why transparency
has become so normalized that we no longer question its existence or relevance. The chapter
engages with the historical dynamics of transparency, but focuses more on the ATI legislation in
both jurisdictions because statutory advancements are easier to track and study.
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the how and why access laws came to be. It is
important to discern how these laws came to life, what were the initial aspirations, how they
progressed and in what environment, who pushed for them, and what was the rationale. The
answers to all these questions inform about the intended nature and value of existent access laws
and the state of transparency.

4.1 Tracing back transparency and ATI at the international level
Many scholars have engaged with the study of origins of transparency, and argue whether it is
a modern construct or has discernible origins in an earlier period. For instance, while mapping
out the different strains and meanings of transparency, Hood traces its use back to the Chinese
legalists and classical Greeks.206 Others have traced transparency in religious texts in Christianity
and Islam. The following verse in the Bible demonstrate a close relationship between position,
trust and accountability: “Everyone to whom much was given, of him much will be required, and
from him to whom they entrusted much, they will demand the more.”207 Something similar can
be found in Islam: “Each one of you is a guardian and each guardian is accountable to everything
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under his care.”208 In addition, both religions remind believers that they are accountable to God
for their deeds. The Bible says: “But I tell you that every careless word that people speak, they
shall give an accounting for it in the Day of Judgment.”209 Islam has similar provisions,
emphasizing the duty of those in power to honestly serve people: “If any ruler having the
authority to rule Muslim subjects dies while he is deceiving them, Allah will forbid Paradise for
him.”210 A story told about the second Caliph (leader) in Islam, Umar al-Khatthab, who asked the
permission from his people to use medicine from the storehouse when he got sick211, implies a
quest for transparency in Islamic governance.

Despite these earlier occurrences, Harlow suggests that the concept was only shaped in the
seventeenth century. She advised that, at that time, access to the political process had been a
central distinguishing characteristic of citizenship in western political thought.212 The so-called
“Enlightenment” in Europe certainly affected this development. Lathrop and Ruma argued that
the ideal of open government, as one context for transparency, and the public’s right to
“scrutinize and participate in government dates back at least to the Enlightenment.”213 The first
FOI law was passed in Sweden in 1766, requiring that official documents be made available to
anyone making a request214. The importance of transparency and openness was recognized in the
Declaration of Independence of the United States. Patrick Henry railed against the secrecy of the
Constitutional Congress, saying: “The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure,
when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them.”215
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Although the term transparency was used earlier, the modern idea was truly developed after
World War II. Anthropologists West and Sanders admitted that the term was born out of the selfreflexivity of a larger historical moment, namely modernity. Transparency constitutes a
fashionable buzzword that inflects ideas with a long historical legacy.216

Just after the War, the term FOI emerged under the United Nations (UN) legal framework. In
its first meeting in 1946, the UN General Assembly issued a declaration calling for a recognition
and protection of the FOI as a fundamental touchstone human right, and defined it as it “implies
the right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters.”217 Two
years later, a Draft Convention of FOI, that failed to garner sufficient support, defined the term
as “the free interchange of information and opinions, both in the national and in the international
sphere.”218 In its very first session in 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I),
stating that “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ….the touchstone of all
the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”219
In the period following WWII, after a long war that brought destruction and questioned the
status of leadership, trust on democratic institutions was gradually being re-established. To
accelerate this process, a whole machinery of political indoctrination was implemented in
Western democracies teaching average citizens what democracy was and why it was superior to
other forms of government.220 However, the high trust on government started to decline rapidly
in the 1960s, which marked a significant turn in politics.221 In the1970s the situation deteriorated,
and data indicated a general decline in trust towards all kinds of socio-political institutions.222
There was also a decline of trust in elites – in Canada, Europe and elsewhere – influenced by
Watergate and more robust investigative journalism. The 1970s came to be perceived as a time
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of permanent political crisis with respect to the crisis of legitimacy or governability.223 New
questions were raised regarding the future of the democratic process.224 The post-war political
indoctrination had its consequences. The elitist theories of democracy were being highly
criticized, and some of them overthrown. New theories of democracy emerged radicalizing the
way of thinking about democracy. They highlighted the inherent right of citizens to participate to
the fullest, not only on symbolic politics, but also in actual decision making in politics and other
sectors of the society. Pateman’s Participation and Democratic theory was one of them. Bell
postulated that “the axial principle of the modern polity is participation.”225 However, Dahl
challenged this view by saying that there was simply no way that citizens in large states could
participate in all political decisions.226
The demand for transparency and ATI overlapped with the rise of the modern administrative
state that was established after World War II. In the 60s and 70s, the crisis of legitimacy lead to
an acceptance in western democracies that more had to be done to restore the trust on
government. One such way was to be more transparent and provide the public with an effective
ATI. After Sweden updated its Freedom of the Press Act, and included it in the Constitution in
1949227, Finland (in 1951), Denmark and Norway (in 1970), US (in 1966) and France (in 1978),
all passed ATI laws. They were considered to be the first wave of countries passing such laws.
After a few years, a second wave of countries introduced ATI legislation. Canada belonged to
this group of countries. These developments led to the recognition in Canada of the need for
special protections for ATI.228 Canada, Australia and New Zealand introduced FOI laws in the
early 80s, being the second wave of an ATI revolution. In 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell down
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there were just twelve FOI laws in the world, to be found mainly in longer-established
democracies.229
In the 90s and 2000s there has been an expansion of FOI laws all around the world. In the
1990’s a third wave of countries implemented access laws and with the entrance in the new
millennium, most of the countries in the world had ATI laws as part of their legal framework.
Many of them, especially in Europe, had introduced an access right in their constitutions,
granting this right a higher status, that of a fundamental right. The late 90s and early 2000 signed
a race of the Eastern Europe countries towards embracing FOI laws.230 Today, most of the
countries in the world have FOI laws in place. Paraguay became the 100th nation in the world to
have adopted such law in September of 2014,231 a year in which three other countries passed FOI
laws, Maldives, Afghanistan and Mozambique.232
Despite the widespread of FOI legislation the process has not gone very smoothly. I bring
here two significant examples from the US and the UK, which demonstrate the controversy and
resistance that have accompanied FOI laws during their passage, and afterwards. The US passed
the FOI Act in Congress in 1966233 after a decade of congressional hearings. The executive
branch opposed the bill - in 1965 all 27 federal agencies and departments that presented
testimony were opposed to it - and so did the President.234 Although President Johnson was
eventually convinced by key staff members, Congressional leaders, and journalists who
advocated the bill, Bill Moyers (then a White House aide) wrote: “I knew that LBJ [referring to
the president] had to be dragged kicking and screaming to the signing. He hated the very idea of
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the FOI Act; hated the thought of journalists rummaging in government closets and opening
government files; hated them challenging the official view of reality.”235
In the United Kingdom, after a civil society campaign, dating back to 1984, the Labour party
made passage of a FOI law a campaign promise in the 1997 election. The law was not passed
until 2000, and did not come fully into effect until 2005.236 And yet, former Prime Minister Tony
Blair called the passage of the law his greatest regret from his time in office, due to its frequent
use by journalists. He wrote in his memoir: “Freedom of Information. Three harmless words. I
look at those words as I write them, and feel like shaking my head till it drops oﬀ my shoulders.
You idiot. You naive, foolish, irresponsible nincompoop. There is really no description of
stupidity, no matter how vivid, that is adequate. I quake at the imbecility of it.”237
The period after 2000s marked a bold move towards international recognition of a right to
ATI. On June 18, 2009, 12 members of the Council of Europe signed the Convention on Access
to Official Documents,238 making history as the first binding legal instrument that recognizes a
general right of access to official documents. Other international organizations have also taken
steps towards this recognition by adopting their own rules on ATI. For instance, in 2010 the
World Bank adopted an Access to Information Policy.239 Also, the International Monetary Fund
has a Transparency Policy in which it recognizes the right to information.240 The UN Sustainable
Development Goals have set as a target that every nation in the world will by 2030 “ensure
public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national
legislation and international agreements.”241
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Looking back at FOI laws, one can notice that at the early stages (60s, 70s and 80s) these
laws were created with an understanding that FOI was part of the freedom of expression, which
was perceived as a right that only affects journalists and political activists. However, there has
been a paradigm change in the new millennium. FOI is now considered as a multi-dimensional
human right that can affect people and their governments in many ways, and which is protected
by many international legal instruments. In many countries, FOI is regarded as critical to the
realization of the constitutional socio-economic rights, such as the rights to adequate health care,
education and clean environment. Many NGOs are pushing for such recognition. For instance,
Open Democracy Advice Centre promotes that if a person wants to find out information about
pollution in a particular area, because of an unusual number of illnesses in the locality, a right of
ATI can assist to get this kind of knowledge.242

4.2 Historical path of access to information in Canada

4.2.1 Milestones leading to the Access to Information Act
In Canada, the term transparency is generally not present, at least not within the ATIA legal
provisions. This section will mainly focus on ATI legislation. The first time Canada recognized a
right to ATI is in the context of the UN framework. Rankin explained that the Canadian
government reported at a 1948 UN Conference on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that “Freedom of Information in Canada is inherent in the Canadian Constitution, but it is not
specifically enacted.”243
At the federal level, the first legislative recognition of a right to ATI came within the context
of the Canadian Human Rights Act244, where Part IV entitled individuals to have access to their
personal information contained in government records. This provision was in fact a precursor of
the Privacy Act which replaced Part IV of the Canadian Human Rights Act when it came into
effect.
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However, the actual Canadian commitment to ATI was a specific legislation – the ATIA. An
ATI law in Canada was not pioneered at the federal level, but instead originated in the provinces.
In 1977 Nova Scotia became the first Canadian jurisdiction to pass such legislation245 followed
by New Brunswick in 1978, Newfoundland in 1981 and Quebec in 1982. Table 3 gives a
summary of the dates when ATI legislation was introduced provincially and federally.
The path to the ATIA’s adoption at the federal level in Canada was long and rocky. It was
paved by private Members’ bills. The first efforts began a bit prior to the adoption of the FOIA
in the US in 1966. According to McCamus, this development has influenced Canadian interest in
similar legislation.246 In 1965 NDP Member of Parliament (MP) Barry Mather, introduced the
first ATI Bill in the House of Commons as a private member’s bill.247 Mather was a columnist
and a journalist by profession and an MP in British Columbia.248 His Members’ Bill249 died on
the Order Paper. In each parliamentary session, for six years, between 1968 and his retirement in
1974, Mather reintroduced identical legislation. Four times it reached Second Reading, but went
no further. It died on the House of Commons Order Paper. Considering that bills go through
three readings at the House of Commons250, this was a relatively short life.
Progressive Conservative MP, Gerald Baldwin, recognized as the father of FOI in Canada251,
tried the same technique. He introduced a private member’s bill each year between 1969 and
1974, but they also never made it past second reading. Baldwin created ACCESS, a Canadian
Committee for the Right to Public Information, and Ottawa’s first effective lobby group for ATI.
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Referring to this contribution, Canada’s Information Commissioner has called Baldwin an
irresistible force which inspired Canada’s ATI law. The ATIA was his enduring moment.252

At the time that these bills were introduced, the political situation in Canada was boiling from
social rights movements. Women, aboriginal, LGBT and separatists movements were rising in
Canada in the 60s. The late 1960s in Canada, as throughout the Western world, saw the
emergence of a new women's movement253. In addition, the year following Prime Minister’s
Trudeau rise to power in 1968, his government issued a White Paper254 on Aboriginal policy.
Aboriginals responded with their own document, named Citizens Plus, in 1970 or known as the
Red Paper255 which countered all of the proposals of the White Paper, and successfully
convinced the government to radically change its policies and positions. Furthermore, the LGBT
movement started in 1965256. Lastly, the separatist movement was taking place in Quebec in the
60s and 70s. All these social movements contributed to the enhancement of understanding of
societal politics and its interaction in democracy.

Certainly, these movements prepared the environment in which ATI arouse and discussed. At
that time Canadians complained about the emergence of a class of “super-bureaucrats”257 whose
influence over everyday life seemed contrary to democratic principles. Worries about the
expansion of governmental authority were fueled by the 1976 Lambert Royal Commission,
which described “a grave weakening, and in some cases an almost total breakdown, in the chain
of accountability”258 within the Canadian federal government. This concern about government
legitimacy influenced the public support for an ATI law in Canada. Smith criticized the
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Canadian government for resembling a “thinly-disguised Presidential system”, without the
benefit of a strong legislature to balance presidential power.259 This environment created the
background for the introduction of an ATI law. Roberts argued that “The timing of the debate
that led to the ATIA is significant”260 pointing to the political battle that was happening in the
US at the early 70s. In October 1974 the US Congress, responding to the secretiveness of the
Nixon administration following his resignation earlier in August, passed amendments that
substantially improved the 1966 US FOIA. President Ford then vetoed the amendments, arguing
that they would erode presidential powers. Congress overrode the veto in November 1974 and
gave the Americans the law they still have today.261 Beyond the American continent, two other
Commonwealth countries presented and adopted similar legislation, namely Australia262, and
New Zealand263, which both passed an ATI law in 1982.
As a culmination of all these developments in Canada was the discussion of the Charter of the
Rights and Freedoms which was passed by the Parliament the same year as the ATIA. The
debates surrounding the Charter and all the other events happening in late 70s, early 80s put the
government under heavy pressure to consider ATI as a means to re-establish its legitimacy. The
Canadian government took a long time to reflect that the adoption of an ATI law was
inescapable. As Rubin explains “It took nearly 10 years of public campaigning for access
….rights before the acts’ June 1982 passage.”264 He was referring to both the ATIA and the
Privacy Act. This hesitation is explained with the common law tradition in Canada which was
not concerned with giving access rights to individuals, except in very special circumstances of
litigation. This tradition was mainly concerned with the publication of law and with legal
certainty, setting limits to arbitrary actions that undermined individual security.265 Certainly, the
adoption of an ATI law meant changing this transition. According to Roberts, this represented
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“for administrations and citizens, a significant cultural transformation away from traditional and
historical administrative privileges”266

A series of government enterprises preceded the adoption of the ATIA. In June 1977,
Trudeau’s Liberal government released a Green Paper called “Legislation on Public Access to
Government Documents.”267 The Green Paper was issued by the Secretary of State, and
examined policy options for creating Canada’s federal legislation on ATI.268 It observed that
Canada began seriously contemplating the enactment of FOI legislation in the 1970s269, although
prior attempts were made earlier in the 60s. The Green Paper deliberated on the challenge of
balancing the need for ATI in government records to enable effective participation of citizens in
public decision-making with situations in which government operations required confidentiality.
The Green Paper rejected the option of allowing direct appeals to the Federal Court explaining
that “There is no way that a judicial officer can be properly made aware of all the political,
economic, social and security factors that may have led to the decision in issue. Nor should the
courts be allowed to usurp the constitutional role that Parliament plays in making a Minister
answerable to it for his actions.”270 This way of thinking tells a lot about the law we have today.

In October 1979, the Progressive Conservative Government led by Joe Clark introduced Bill
C-15, the proposed FOI Act, fulfilling a promise made during his election campaign. Before
coming to power Clark gained public support for the ATIA. In 1978 he referred to ATI as:
What we are talking about is power – political power. We are talking about the reality that
real power is limited to those who have facts. In a democracy that power and that information
should be shared broadly. In Canada today they are not, and to that degree we are no longer a
democracy in any sensible sense of that word. There is excessive power concentrated in the
hands of those who hide public information from the people and Parliament of Canada.271
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The approach taken by the Progressive Conservatives in Bill C-15 was virtually identical to
one that had been taken when US FOI Act was amended in 1976272. It is important to emphasize
that the Liberal party has been in power all the time from the first introduction of the ATI bill in
1965 by Mather. This is the first party change in Canada after 16 years of Liberal rule and
represented a break for ATI proponents. However, the Progressive Conservative government fell
shortly, after losing confidence in the House of Commons, just after the Bill made it to second
reading.
Following public pressure, Trudeau’s newly elected Liberal government announced that an
ATI legislation would be introduced273. Bill C-43 was first presented in Parliament in 1980 by
the Honorable Francis Fox, Secretary of state who predicted that the “legislation will, over time,
become one of the cornerstones of Canadian democracy ….and bring about a very major change
of thinking within government….Under this legislation, access to information becomes a matter
of public right, with the burden of proof on the Government to establish that information need
not be released.”274 The bill was anticipated to reverse the then-present situation whereby ATI
was a matter of government discretion. Government departments and agencies were instructed
by a letter from the Prime Minister (PM) Trudeau to abide by “the spirit of the legislation.”275
However, despite the positive attitudes and high hopes, Bill C-43 was later changed preceded by
a long debate and the tabling of multiple bills. Rees explains that “the passage of the ATIA into
law was delayed for a year until the governing Liberal Party of Trudeau secured the exclusion of
cabinet from ATIA jurisdiction (section 69).”276 On November 4, 1981 the Honorable Francis
Fox, tabled certain amendments to the Bill in the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee of the
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House of Commons.277 The final Bill C-43 contrasted with Bill C-15 in that it included exclusion
for Cabinet confidences, not merely an exemption as found in other legislation.
McCamus has strongly criticized the Bill C-43 as “a rather pale imitation of the American
Freedom of Information Act” and as having “the appearance of a freedom of information law
drafted by individuals who have little sympathy for the basic objectives of such a scheme.”278 All
these changes happened in the final stages of the legislation. This later version of the bill became
law in 1982. PM Trudeau promised that the law would promote “effective participation of
citizens and organizations in the taking of public decisions.”279 The ATIA received Royal Assent
in July, 1982, and came into effect on Canada Day on July 1, 1983. The Act was proclaimed in
the final months of Trudeau’s Liberal Government and it was considered to be Trudeau’s gift to
PM Mulroney because it was Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative regime that had to deal with
its effects.280 The ATIA created the Office of the Information Commissioner. At the same time,
Parliament also adopted the Privacy Act281, which provided for the protection of personal
information under the control of government institutions.
The passage of the ATIA was considered a big success at the time, because it meant a move
away from the secretive bureaucratic and political culture of a Westminster model of
government. The Information Commissioner Legault has characterized the Act as
‘groundbreaking’ explaining that Canada was one of the first countries to enact such a law in a
Westminster style parliamentary model of government.282 However, the credit for the ATIA’s
adoption, according to McCamus goes to the American influence and pressure from opposition
parties, business, labor and NGO groups, associations of academics, public interest groups and
the press.283 The optimism accompanying the ATIA’s passage, however, would not last long. A
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look at the after-passage period gives a better idea on the tensions and implications that were yet
to come.
4.2.2 Post-Access to Information Act environment
Soon after the adoption of the ATIA, not only the enthusiasm began to fade, but signs of
resistance and hostility began to appear. Considering the long history of secrecy within
government, this reaction did not come as a surprise. Savoie argued that “Secrecy and
confidentiality have [historically]….permeated government operations at Canada. They begin at
the top: members of the Privy Council swear: ‘….I shall keep secret all matters committed or
revealed to me in this capacity, or that shall secretly treated of in Council.”284 This swearing still
exists today. As a result of this historical pledge to secrecy, declarations such as the one made by
John Crosbie, the first Justice Minister to be responsible for the Act, were not surprising. He
dismissed the act as a tool that “gives the media and other mischief-makers the ability to ferret
our snippets of information with which to embarrass political leaders and to titillate the public.”
According to him, “In the vast majority of instances, embarrassment and titillation are the only
objects of access to information requests.”285 This declaration meant that the system would be
flooding from requests aiming at embarrassing the government. However, in 1985, two years
after the Act came into force, J. Thomas Babcock wrote: “Federal agencies and departments
received only 475 requests for information during the firsts three months the Access to
Information law was in effect, far below the 15,000 in governmental plans.”286 This indicated
that the Act was not being used as much as expected, which meant that there were problems
either with the law itself or its implementation.
In 1986, three years after the ATIA came into force an in-depth review of the provisions and
the operations of the act was conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on
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Justice287 and the Solicitor General. The Committee asserted that the Act was of “similar
significance” to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms288. Its report “Open and Shut:
Enhancing the right to know and the right to privacy”289 was unanimously tabled in Parliament in
March 1987. The Justice Committee proposed that the exclusion of Cabinet records from the
operation of the Act be deleted and replaced with an exemption that would not be subject to an
injury test.290 Exempting rather than excluding these documents would have allowed the
Commissioner or the Court to investigate the government’s determinations that such documents
should not be released291. The report listed a series of recommendations for amending the
ATIA.292 Some of the findings indicated that the act was not well-understood by the public and
public service and that the Act needed to modernize some provisions and clarify some others. As
a result calls for law improvement emerged soon after the report. In response to “Open and Shut”
the government issued “Access and Privacy: the steps ahead”293 later the same year. However,
none of the legislative recommendations were taken into consideration.294
Amendments to the ATIA were made later on in a span of 10 years. In fact, the ATIA was
amended four times since its enactment in 1983, but none of them were actually substantial. In
1992, the Act was first amended to deal with the provisions of records in alternative formats to
individuals with sensory disabilities.295 In 1998, the Somalia Affair and the “tainted blood
scandal”296 lead to the introduction of a private member’s bill which amended the ATIA in 1999
with a new section 67.1297. This section made it a criminal offence for anyone to intentionally
287
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destroy, falsify or conceal a record, or to counsel anyone else to do so. The offence is punishable
by a maximum of two years in prison or a fine up to $10,000. This can be considered as a
positive development with a potential to improve the ATIA implementation. The third
amendment was made in 2001, following September 11, which added another exclusion for
documents containing national security or foreign intelligence information.298 Bill C-36, the
Anti-terrorism Act299 provided that a certificate by the Attorney General prohibiting the
disclosure of information for the purpose of protecting national defense or national security
would override the provisions of the ATIA. The Anti-Terrorism Act, added section 69.1 to the
ATIA to exclude from the operation of the Act any documents that are prohibited from disclosure
by certificates issued under the Canada Evidence Act.300 This amendment was considered a step
back to the ATI regime in Canada with negative consequences to the rights of Canadians. It
concentrates so much power in the hands of one person – the Attorney General - which can
downplay the importance of ATI in favour of matters of national security. This has been a
concern for many of the authors in the literature review since matters of security can often be
misused to justify violations of ATI rights.

Amendments of the ATIA for the fourth time were a promise during the electoral campaign of
Harper’s Conservative Party which came to power in 2006. As a response to the Gomery
Commission301 in 2006, the government introduced the Federal Accountability Act 302(FAA). At
the same time, in April 2006, the government tabled a discussion paper entitled “Strengthening
the Access to Information Act – A Discussion of Ideas Intrinsic to the Reform of the Access to
Information Act”303. This discussion paper offered comments on some of the 2005 Information
Commissioner’s proposals (in the “Open Government Act”) and some alternate approaches to
consider for reform.304
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The FAA amended the ATIA in three ways. First, it introduced a legislated “duty to assist”
applicants, which required institutions to make every reasonable effort to help applicants receive
complete, accurate and timely responses to requests, without regards to their identity. It offered
applicants reasonable assistance throughout the request process, informing them when their
requests needed to be clarified applying limited and specific exemptions. Second, the FAA
extended the range of the subjects under the ATIA’s access regime by adding several new
institutions to be covered by ATI legislation. It also amended the regulatory powers under
section 77 of the ATIA to allow for additional bodies to be added to the Act in the future. Under
this new provision, Cabinet now has the power to make regulations prescribing criteria for
adding a body or office to Schedule I of the Act.305 This is certainly one of the most positive
achievements in enhancing ATI regime in Canada so far. The range of institutions covered by the
Act has always been criticized by ATI advocates (see Chapter 8 and 9). However, many public
bodies are currently outside its purview, including Parliament, some Officers of Parliament, and
other organizations performing public functions or spending public money. This has been the
subject of significant debate. These first two amendments were considered positive to the
strengthening of ATI, but were still less than what was promised during the electoral campaign.
What really disappointed the ATI advocates was the third type of amendment brought by the
FAA which added a number of institution-specific exemptions and exclusions related to some
Officers’ functions which are not available to other entities already covered by the ATIA. The
FAA also granted new mandatory class exemptions.

These four amendments were attempts that became finalized in actual changes to the Act.
However, these were not the only attempts that occupied the post-ATIA environment. The 90s
can be considered to be “silent years” in terms of ATI activism. Entering in the new millennium,
signaled a real shift in the political and social action toward improving ATI regime in Canada.
However, every attempt in achieving this goal failed in face of political indifference and
resistance. The 2000s was a busy time for ATI proponents. A private member’s bill introduced in
the House of Commons in 2000 by Liberal MP John Bryden306 to overhaul the ATIA, was
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defeated at second reading. John Bryden continued pressuring the government and together with
a group of MPs from various parties formed their own ad hoc Committee on ATI in summer
2001, pushing for changes to the ATI system. This Committee, chaired by Bryden, produced a
report in November 2001, “A Call for Openness”307, containing eleven recommendations for
improving the provisions and operation of the Act. One of the recommendations was that section
69 exclusion of Cabinet records be replaced by an injury-based discretionary exemption.
As a response to the pressure from the MPs, the Ministry of Justice and the president of the
Treasury Board launched an ATI task force with a mandate to review both the legislative and
administrative issues relative to the ATI regime, including the Act, regulations, policies and
procedures. The Review Task Force, set up in early 2001, consisting of government officials and
chaired by Andrée Delagrave, created advisory committees, published a consultation paper,
commissioned and published research papers, and held consultations. In 12 June 2002, it released
a lengthy report, “Access to Information: Making it Work for Canadians”, containing 139
recommendations for change.308 The Task Force recognized a need to modernize some aspects of
the ATIA.309 For many ATI proponents this report was considered a milestone event. The report
found “a crisis in information management” within government and called for an amendment of
the ATIA that would include a “public interest override”310. The Task Force noticed that
Canadians were making a relatively modest, but increasing, and more sophisticated, use of the
ATIA. It emphasized the role of knowledge in a democratic society by saying: “In a knowledgebased society, information is a public resource and essential for collective learning. If Canada is
to thrive and compete, government information must be made available as widely and easily as
possible.”311 The report recognized that after 20 years, the Act was still not well-understood by
the public, requesters, third parties who supply information to government, or even the public
service. It pointed out that the public servants did not have the training, tools and support they
needed. The work done on ATI was not often perceived as “valued” work or part of their “real”
newspapers including the Hamilton Spectator, the Globe and Mail, and the Toronto Star. See
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_H._Bryden>.
307
MPs’ Committee on Access to Information [ad hoc MP’s Committee], A Call for Openness, Ottawa, November
2001.
308
The Department of Justice, “A Comprehensive Framework for Access to Information Reform”, A Discussion
Paper April 2005, at 4. <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/atip-aiprp/ati-aai/ati-aai.pdf>
309
Douglas et al, supra note 291 at 4.
310
Rees, supra note 276 at 60.
311
ATI, “Making it Work”, supra note 290 at 3.

90

job. The principles of access had not yet been successfully integrated into the core values of the
public service and embedded in its routines. The report concluded that there was a pressing need
for more education on ATI. Another finding was that the journalistic use of ATI had grown in
number and focus - requests were sharper and to the point.312
The Task Force made many proposals concerning an array of issues in the ATI system. They
included expanding the scope of the Act by extending coverage to most Officers of Parliament,
as well as to Parliament, granting order power to the OIC, limiting discretion by a proof of harm
test or public interest override, introducing penalties for noncompliance and lowering fees. The
Review Task Force, referred to some of the OIC proposals for legislative change in its report,
and included them as Appendix A, the “Blueprint for Reform” reprinted from the 2000–2001
annual report of the OIC.313 The federal government failed to act on the report. Instead, while the
work on the task force was still ongoing, in late 2001 the government proposed the Antiterrorism Act with more provisions for secrecy.
In response to the findings of the Review Task Force, in October 2002, the Information
Commissioner John Reid tabled a special report in Parliament. He was critical of both the
process and the results of the Task Force’s review.314 In addition, following the report of the
Task Force, in 2002, the Liberal MP John Bryden introduced another private member bill which
had the same fate as previous bills. However, he continued to introduce private members bills in
the years to come. In the fall of 2003, he attempted to initiate a comprehensive overhaul of the
Act through Bill C-462 which had its first reading in October 28, 2003315, and died on the Order
Paper with the dissolution of the 37th Parliament in May 2004. The bill would have changed the
name of the ATIA to the “Open Government Act”. It would have expanded the scope of the Act
by adding new institutions to Schedule I, which lists the institutions under the Act. The bill
would have broadened the purpose section of the Act, adding a reference to the federal
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government’s obligation to release information to assist Canadians in assessing government
effectiveness and compliance with the Charter.316
A similar bill was introduced by the NDP MP Pat Martin as Bill C-201, which had its first
reading on October 7, 2004.317 Martin withdrew it later after taking a pledge from then-Justice
Minister Irwin Cotler to introduce a government bill. That promise was later broken. Instead, in
April 2005, Cotler introduced a discussion paper entitled “A Comprehensive Framework for
Access to Information Reform”318 asking the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics for input on a range of policy questions before the
introduction of legislation. Many areas were left open for consideration by the Committee, but in
some areas government positions were indicated.319 The Minister indicated that while he agreed
that reform of the ATIA was required, he believed it was important that a parliamentary
committee first study the major issues before draft legislation was developed.320 By motion
passed in the House of Commons on 15 November 2005, Members of the Committee agreed that
the ATIA should be amended to expand coverage of the Act to all Crown corporations, all
Officers of Parliament, all foundations and to all organizations that spend taxpayers’ dollars or
perform public functions; establish a Cabinet-confidence exclusion; establish a duty to create the
records; provide a general public interest override for all exemptions or make all exemptions
discretionary and subject to an injury test.321 Rather than embarking on a study of the matters
raised in the Framework, the Committee asked Information Commissioner John Reid to develop
a bill that would amend the Act. The Commissioner accepted this request and worked on
accomplishing it with the help of the Legislative Counsel of the House of Commons. His
proposal, in the form of a bill amending the ATIA, went substantially further in promoting
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openness than any of the previous reform proposals.322 A primary objective was to address
concerns about a “culture of secrecy” within political and bureaucratic environments. Like Bills
C-462 and C-201, the Commissioner’s proposed bill was entitled the “Open Government Act”,
and expanded the number of institutions to be covered by the ATIA, reduced the scope of secrecy
permitted by the Act, expanded the powers of oversight by the Commissioner and the courts, and
increased incentives for compliance and penalties for non-compliance.
The Commissioner’s proposed “Open Government Act” Bill was endorsed by Justice John
Gomery in his 2006 Phase 2 report for the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program
and Advertising Activities, Restoring Accountability323. In 2005, the Gomery Commission was
created to investigate the scandal, and found that senior officials and Ministers failed to respect
the spirit of the ATIA – they often delayed responding to information request and failed to
document decisions. All of the elements of the Commissioner’s proposal were supported in the
Gomery report, which also specifically urged the government to adopt legislation requiring
public servants to document decisions and recommendations, and made it an offence to fail to do
so or to destroy documentation recording government decisions, or the advice and deliberations
leading up to decisions.324 Contrary to other proposals before, the Commissioner did not
recommend that his Office be changed from an ombudsman to that of a quasi-judicial, ordermaking body.325
In April 2006, in response to the Gomery Commission’s findings, the government introduced
the Federal Accountability Act (FAA).326 At the same time, the government tabled a discussion
paper entitled “Strengthening the Access to Information Act – A Discussion of Ideas Intrinsic to
the Reform of the Access to Information Act”.327 The FAA became law in December of 2006.328
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However, what the FAA delivered in terms of strengthening the ATIA, was not what the
Conservatives promised as part of their election campaign. The 2006 election platform of the
Conservative Party of Canada included a framework that proposed to: “Ensure that all
exemptions from the disclosure of government are justified only on the basis of the harm or
injury that would result from disclosure, not blanket exemption rules.”329 The break of this
promise brought the reaction of many ATI advocates, including the ad hoc Committee of MPs in
the House of Commons. As a result, in October 2006, a House of Commons Committee passed a
resolution on to the federal Justice Minister to introduce a bill keeping the Conservatives election
promises. Nothing came out of this resolution and the introduction of a bill on ATI kept being
pushed back.
On April 1, 2008, the Harper’s government shut down CAIRS (Coordination of Access to
Information Request System) - the ATI database which had catalogued requests made to the
federal government since 1989. Until May, 2008, the Treasury Board, through policy, required
government institutions to register their requests in the system. Summaries of requests were
logged into the system and disclosed on a monthly basis. The government announced that as a
cost-saving measure, this initiative had been cancelled. Harper explained that CAIRS was
“deemed expensive, [and] deemed to slow down the access to information.”330 In
response, Stéphane Dion, who was then the leader of the opposition, reacted by saying that “The
registry made it possible to know who asked for what through access to information.”331 He
described Harper's government as the most secretive government in Canada’s history.
In the spring of 2008 two MPs introduced bills, very similar to each other, aimed at amending
the ATIA to implement the reforms proposed by ICC John Reid in 2005. Pat Martin introduced
Bill C-554332, An Act to amend the Access to Information Act (open government) on 29 May
2008. A few days later, on 2 June, Bloc Québécois MP Carole Lavallée introduced Bill C-556333,
An Act to amend the ATIA (improved access). Both bills died on the Order Paper with the
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dissolution of the 39th Parliament in September 2008. Martin re-introduced his bill in the 40th
Parliament on 25 February 2009334, and again in the 41st Parliament on 29 September 2011.335

In February 2009, ICC Robert Marleau released 12 recommendations for strengthening the
ATIA and its enforcement system. Some of recommendations included extending the right of ATI
to all persons; granting OIC with order-making powers; extending the application of the ATIA to
Parliament and the courts; applying the ATIA to Cabinet confidences, etc. In March 2009, in the
wake of the publication of his special report on systemic issues affecting ATI, he presented these
recommendations at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information,
Privacy and Ethics. The Committee studied these recommendations and endorsed most of them.
However, the Committee did not support the Commissioner’s recommendation that the ATIA
apply to Cabinet confidences. It heard from various witnesses, and in June 2009, the Committee
tabled a report to Parliament. It suggested that the Minister of Justice consider amending the
ATIA to implement the Commissioner’s recommendations.336 No steps further were taken from
the government to amend the ATIA. The Conservatives rejected all recommendations in
December 2009337 and limited its action to a review of policies and guidelines on ATI. In the
Government’s response to the Committee’s report, the Minister of Justice, Rob Nicholson,
indicated the following:
The Access to Information Act is a strong piece of legislation. It is crucial that careful
consideration be given to the impact changes to the legislation may have on the operations of
the ATI program. Legislative amendments must be examined in the context of administrative
alternatives, such as enhanced guidance and training that can be equally effective to realize
continued improvements.338
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On March 18, 2011, the Government announced its commitment to an open government
initiative along three main streams: open information, open data, and open dialogue. The
Government of Canada first launched its Open Government strategy in March 2011, and then
further enhanced its commitment by announcing its intention to join the “Open Government
Partnership” in September 2011. However, the Open Government strategy did not include any
plans for amending the ATIA. Canada’s information and privacy commissioners suggested that
the Action Plan on Open Government represented a missed opportunity for a comprehensive
reform of the ATIA. In January 2012, a letter to Minister Clement on behalf of Canada’s
information and privacy commissioners, the ICC Suzanne Legault, offered to assist the
government in developing the Action Plan. The letter suggested that the government recognize
and support the relationship between open government and a modernized ATIA.339
In the 1st Session of the 41st Parliament, on 17 April 2012, the Honourable Tony Clement,
President of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) announced Canada’s membership in the
international “Open Government Partnership”340 (OGP). At the Annual General Meeting of the
Partnership held in Brazil, Minister Clement presented Canada’s “Open Government Action
Plan” and endorsed the Partnership’s declaration of principles as Canada’s final steps toward
membership in the Partnership.341
The OGP strategy brought some progress regarding the online publication of information
requests. By 2012 all departments were publishing summaries of completed ATI requests
monthly on their websites. Almost a year after, on April 9, 2013, Clement announced the launch
of a new pilot project that enabled Canadians to submit ATI and privacy requests online. This
pilot made it easier to submit ATI and privacy requests to the three departments participating in
the project: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Treasury Board Secretariat, and Shared
Services Canada. This initiative was part of the modernization of the administration of ATI, one
of the commitments of Canada’s Open Government Action Plan.342
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MP Pat Martin continued his efforts for statutory change of the ATIA, despite his prior several
defeats. He introduced the Bill C-567343 in January 2014, which was defeated in May 2014.344
The Bill proposed seven amendments, amongst which, to give the ICC order-making powers,
expand the coverage of the act to all crown corporations, officers of Parliament, and foundations
and organizations that spend taxpayers' money or perform public functions, subject the
exclusions of cabinet confidences to the review of the ICC, oblige public officials to create and
retain documents, provide a general public interest override for all exemptions, and ensure that
all exemptions from the disclosure of government information are justified only on the basis of
harm or injury test.345

A new name appeared in the House of Commons in 2014 as a supporter of an ATIA overhaul,
the Liberal leader, Justin Trudeau. Following the legacy of his father Pierre Trudeau, who holds
the signature for the ATIA in 1982 (but not necessarily the merit), Justin Trudeau introduced a
Bill in 2014.346 In the House of Commons debate, Trudeau highlighted four ways his Bill would
change the ATIA: making data “open by default and easily accessible”, ATI requests to cost no
more than $5.00, giving the ICC enforcement powers, and making it mandatory to review the
ATIA every five years.347 Trudeau explained the principle of being opened by default as “when
civil servants are uncertain as to whether or not something falls under the exceptions or whether
it’s a bit of a grey area, their default position will be to release it.”348 In addition, Trudeau
emphasized the underlying purpose of his Bill saying that ATIA is “stuck in the 1980s and needs
to be overhauled to rebuild the trust between citizens and their government.”349 Trudeau’s Bill
had the support of the NDP leader Tom Mulcair who said that “his party would support anything
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that would make the government more open.”350 Although the Bill was innovative, it faced some
criticism for not doing enough, soon after it had its first reading in Parliament. Ken Rubin, a
long-time ATI advocate emphasized that for the Bill to improve transparency “Trudeau must do
more than move the secrecy yard line slightly.”351 The debates on the Bill did not last long since
it was defeated in the House of Commons on April 1st, 2015 with a result of 122 in favor and 139
against.352 On October 19, 2015, Justin Trudeau became the PM of Canada, and pledged to make
transparency one his government priorities. In the Liberal Party’s website it is pledged that “open
government is a sweeping agenda for change”353, and greater openness and transparency are
viewed as means to restore trust in Canadian democracy.354 We will be witnessing if the Liberals
will be able to keep that promise.
As all these developments demonstrate, the ATI regime in Canada has been characterized by
the resistance of the political leadership. Its history has witnessed the obstinacy and indifference
of those in power to take serious steps in modernizing the ATIA. Although the world has changed
so much in terms of information delivery, nearly forty years later, the ATI environment in
Canada lingers almost unchanged. As Rankin noticed “the citizen's access to government records
remains subject to the whims of the government of the day.”355
While the word “transparency” was somewhat alien to the ATI regime in Canada at its early
years, its recognition has grown over time. From the 2000 and on, ATI is more associated with
the notions of transparency and open government. At this period, attempts to change the law are
intensified and there is recognition that ATI and government transparency go hand in hand
together. Some of the bills introduced (by Bryden, Reid, Martin and Trudeau) after the 2000s go
even further in proposing to change the name of the Act from the ATIA to “Open government
Act”. These developments demonstrate some level of maturity in understanding the issues
related to the ATI regime, and trying to see ATI embedded in a much broader context. The
350
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international advancements in ideas of open government, and the worldwide recognition of the
role that government transparency plays in better governance, seems to have influenced the
Canadian ATI proponents and part of its political class. Although attempts to modernize the
ATIA have failed so far, the idea of open government is embraced. This trend opens up new
perspectives in appreciating the potential of ATI in achieving government transparency goals.

4.3 History of transparency and access to documents in the EU

4.3.1 Roots of transparency and access to documents
Transparency in Europe has much deeper roots than in Canada. This is comprehensible
considering Europe’s long history and experience with political institutions. It is well known for
scholars of transparency that Sweden has the oldest access law in Europe and in the world,
dating back to 1766356. The Freedom of the Press Act was largely motivated by the parliament's
interest in information held by the King.357 It granted public access to government documents,
and became an integral part of the Swedish Constitution. This is the first ever piece of FOI
legislation in the world.

Transparency established its legitimacy in Europe during the second half of the eighteenth
century. The Enlightenment challenged the authority of institutions that were deeply rooted in
society. It was a time when cultural and intellectual forces in Western Europe emphasized
reason, analysis, and individualism rather than traditional lines of authority. Representative
governments began to emerge in Europe, and a discourse articulated around transparency was
truly developed. Transparency began to transform from a concept to a political, legal and moral
project. The 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man recognized an ATI in articles 14 and
15. Article 14 stated: “All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their
representatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to
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what uses it is put.”358 A similar declaration adopted in Netherlands in 1795 stated that
“everyone has the right to help to demand accountability from every Officer of public
administration for the execution of his office.”359

The nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century signed a step back to
Europe’s history on transparency. The period between 1815 and 1944 witnessed so many events
that changed the face of Europe. To mention just a few, some of these developments include the
Industrial Revolution, territorial claims, redefining of state boundaries, de-colonialism and many
independence wars, two World Wars, the rise, clash and demise of empires (Ottoman, Prussian,
Austro-Hungarian, etc) and ideologies (such as communism, capitalism, fascism, Nazism), and
political unrest.

It was only after World War two that Europe achieved political stability. The European Coal
and Steel Community360 began to unite European countries economically and politically. The six
founders were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.361 In 1957,
the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (ECC).362 Neither of these
founding treaties included any provisions on transparency. Transparency gained popular appeal
within the European Community from the early 1990s when it was seen as a useful device to
combat claims of democratic deficit and complexity in the operations of the ECC.363 However,
on the state level, the situation was different. Sweden started a revolution of on ATI by
modernizing its 1766 law in 1949364. Soon after, Finland followed with an autonomous
regulation that was introduced in 1951, then Norway, Netherlands, and Austria passed legislation
before the 90s.
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4.3.2 EU integration and transparency – Pre-Regulation environment
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EU institutions were born out of a deep crisis of
legitimacy that confronted the project of European integration.365 As a response to the crisis, the
European Parliament (EP) was among the first of the EU institutions to attempt to put
transparency on the political agenda. Curtin and Meijers argue that on two occasions (1984,
1988), it called for “legislation on openness of government.”366 Despite these attempts, the
principle of openness was only officially introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.367
Declaration No 17 “On the Right of Access to Information”368 was attached to the Treaty with a
view to “strengthening the democratic nature of the EU institutions and the public’s confidence
in the administration.”369 Accordingly, it was recommended that the Commission submit to the
Council a report on measures designed to improve public ATI available to the institutions. The
Maastricht Treaty also signed the creation of an important EU institution, which would later
become an advocate of transparency, the European Ombudsman. The Ombudsman can only
make recommendations and, as a last resort, draw political attention to a case by making a
special report to the EP. The effectiveness of the Ombudsman thus depends on moral authority.
Following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, a series of political developments compelled
the European politicians into action in the field of transparency. The Danish voters rejected370 the
Treaty on European Union (TEU)371 in the June 1992 referendum372 and a ratification vote in
France, in September 1992, almost produced a second defeat.373 The process of ratification of the
TEU by the UK Parliament was prolonged and difficult,374 while in Germany ratification was
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delayed for a year by an unsuccessful court challenge that claimed that the delegation of
authority to EU institutions violated guarantees of democratic government in the German Basic
Law.375 In response to the Danish vote the EU promised in 1992 to “make the Community more
open, to ensure a better informed public debate on its activities.”376
As the history demonstrates, at the EU level, the need for transparency came as a response to
a prevailing culture of secrecy in European politics, and the democratic deficit whose criticism
had become commonplace.377 As Héritier argues “The debate about transparency and access to
information came about because of the perceived lack of transparency and openness in the
complicated European decision-making processes.”378 A number of initiatives were taken to
address the culture of secrecy. In the so-called Birmingham Declaration379 on “A Community
closer to its citizens”, the Council engaged to more openness in the decision-making process.
The Commission carried out a survey of national laws and practices. Subsequently, at the request
of the European Ombudsman, other Community institutions and agencies introduced rules on
access to documents (ATD).380
Pressure for transparency commitments increased in 1993 as negotiations for accession to the
EU began with Sweden and Finland, two nations with strong traditions of governmental
openness.381 On the basis of Declaration No 17, the Commission and the Council adopted a
“Code of Conduct on Access to Documents”382, in which the two institutions committed
themselves to providing “the widest possible access to documents”383 - the Council384 and the
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Commission.385 Later, the EP established new detailed procedures for obtaining ATD.386
However, they pledged to provide public ATD for their documents, but not to the documents
they received from other institutions. These decisions acknowledged that the Code of Conduct
should be adopted and lay down more specific and detailed rules on access.387 This move
indicated that all three EU institutions were on the same page regarding their commitment to
transparency and ATD.
The accession of Sweden and Finland in the EU in January 1995 added two voices for greater
transparency.388 Harden argues that “The entry of Sweden and Finland to the European Union in
1995 increased the pressure for greater transparency.”389 It is not accidental that with the
accession of Sweden and Finland the debate on open decision-making in the EU gained
momentum.390 The potential for an erosion of Sweden's historic commitment to open
government had been a major issue during the Swedish national debate on accession.391 Both
governments of Sweden and Finland added declarations to their accession agreements stating
that access to official documents was a matter of “fundamental” importance.392 In addition,
Netherlands and Denmark increasingly objected to the secrecy surrounding the Council of
Ministers, and were dissatisfied with the steps which the Council had taken393 because “Meetings
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of the Council were secretive and minutes were not published. The Commission was perceived
as a distant and remote bureaucracy.’394 All four countries, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands and
Denmark “formed an advocacy coalition pushing for more transparency”, and they were referred
to as “the Gang of four.”395 Upon accession, this Gang sought strategic and diplomatic ways to
facilitate the emergence of transparency using preferences and persuasive power derived from
their long experience with transparency practices. They proactively shaped the agenda, giving
more visibility to transparency, despite many Member States’ reluctance to increase
transparency. The attitude among transparency-sceptic Member States was that “transparency
and all that is for the birds, but if [the pro-transparent members] want it, they can have it.”396
Indeed, the pro-transparency coalition faced little opposition. The former EU Ombudsman, Jacob
Söderman, argued that advocates for openness were aided by the plasticity of the concept in the
EU. The legal recognition of a right to information was regarded as a corollary of the concept of
“European citizenship.”397 Therefore, the capacity of EU member states to resist calls for
transparency was restricted by their acknowledgement that citizens of member states were also
“citizens of the Union.” According to Roberts, the situation was ripen in the EU for the
recognition of the right to ATD because:
Europhiles could use the legal recognition of such right as evidence that the European
citizenship has become more than an abstraction. Pragmatists …could promote
transparency as a device for maintaining [economic] accountability….And
Europhobes…could support a right to information as a check on the power of the decisionmakers.398
Transparency in the EU advanced even more with the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty399 in
1997 which acknowledged a right of ATD.400 It also embedded the right of ATD in the Article
255 of the EC Treaty. This article called for an adoption of an implementing regulation within
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two years of its entry into force which would give public ATD to the EP, the Commission and
the Council.
It is important to mention that at the time of the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, ten of
fifteen Member States (see Table 5) had laws acknowledging a right of ATD.401 The Advocate
General of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has observed a strong convergence in national
laws402, which made agreement on a comparable policy for the EU institutions more probable.
Roberts argued that the national attitudes towards transparency could be circumvented by the
“availability of well-established procedures for delegated rule-making.”403 He noticed that the
delegation of rule-making increased the chances for better transparency.
While preparing for the draft of the Regulation, pursuant to the Article 255 of the EC Treaty,
the Commission proposed several provisions intended to limit ATD, such as the exclusion of
texts for internal use, deliberations that could undermine the effective functioning of the Union
or ‘authorship rule’. In January 2001, the negotiations entered the last months before the official
deadline laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. The pro-transparency coalition occupied a
relatively powerful position. Harden explains that “Sweden held the presidency, while the EP,
the media and civil society were on its side, pressurizing negotiating parties to honor the
commitment made in the Treaty.”404 In addition, the European Ombudsman and some national
governments criticized the breadth and vagueness of the new exemptions.405 As a result, most of
the exclusions were eliminated. Regulation 1049/2001406 was passed slightly after the deadline,
on 30 May 2001.407 The Regulation was preceded by 18 months of complicated negotiations.
Since the early 1990s, the EU institutions had started to develop independent transparency
approaches, which included both formal rules and soft approaches. According to Bignami, it
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took almost ten years to decide on Regulation 1049 “after a long, bitter set of negotiations”408
which marked a substantial enhancement of the right of ATD held by the EU institutions. After
the adoption of the Regulation 1049, all three EU institutions adopted their Rules of
Procedures409 according to the provisions of the Regulation.
At the same time that negotiations on the Regulation 1049 were taking place, The EU’s
history marked another milestone, the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.410 Article 42 of the Charter provides that the right of ATD belongs to any EU
citizen or resident. This makes ATD a fundamental Treaty right (pending the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty) since the TEU recognizes this status for all Charter rights411. The Charter
represented an explicit attempt to elaborate upon the implications of European citizenship412
which included the recognition of the ATD.

4.3.3 Post-Regulation environment
By enacting Regulation 1049, the EP and the Council had implemented the provisions of
Article 255 of the EC Treaty. The legal basis did not extend to other institutions and bodies other
than the EP, the Commission and the Council. Considering this as a weakness, the Council made
the executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community
programs subject to Regulation 1049.413 Prior to that, the EP, the Commission and the Council
adopted a Joint Declaration414 in which they undertook to make the regulation applicable to
agencies and similar bodies, and appealed to the other institutions and bodies to adopt similar
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rules voluntarily. Many institutions and bodies modified their internal rules to include the same
elements as Regulation 1049. For instance, the European Central Bank (ECB), adopted a
Decision on public access to ECB documents.415 In addition, the Commission adopted a White
Paper on Governance which initiated a second stage in the evolution of openness416 because it
placed “openness” alongside other “principles of good governance” (Article II), such as
accountability and participation.
The EU was faced with another challenge when the French and Dutch rejected the proposed
European Constitution417 in hotly contested referenda in 2005.418 The rejection demonstrated that
the so-debated “democratic deficit” was deepened, meaning that the disconnection between the
EU and its citizens had grown. As it was the case previously, the European Commission turned
to accountability measures for relief. Thus, discussions on transparency in decision-making
assumed greater salience. In March 2005, the EU Commission proposed the European
Transparency Initiative (ETI) trying to address issues of lobbying and transparency in the EU
decision-making. A Green Paper consultation on ETI was launched in May 2005 to discuss a
reporting system that would apply to the Commission, EP and Council, and be easily accessed
online by the public. The Green Paper began by stating that “The Commission believes that high
standards of transparency are part of the legitimacy of any modern administration.”419 The ETI
communication was published in March 2007 and the Commission announced a voluntary
lobbying register in 2008.420
The recognition of ATD as a fundamental right in the EU was finally sanctioned by the
Lisbon Treaty.421 This treaty placed a new emphasis on transparency. Transparency was
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considered ancillary both to representative and participatory democracy (articles 10(3) and 11(2)
TEU) and was, as such, at the democratic foundations of the Union. In addition, Article 15 of the
TEU established that “in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil
society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as
possible”, and reiterated that “any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing
or having its registered office in a member state, shall have a right of access to documents of the
Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium.”. This recognition
gave the right of ATD a new dimension. Not only it was considered a fundamental human right,
but it stood at the core of the principles of good governance and participatory democracy.
As part of its ETI, the Commission also started a review of Regulation 1049, and adopted a
proposal for a new regulation in April 2008.422 The purpose was at achieving more transparency
in legislation, and bringing the EU provisions into alignment with the Århus Convention.423 The
proposal triggered an intense debate amongst the EU institutions and advocates since it was
considered controversial, and became mired in what had been referred to an “an institutional
impasse.”424 The EP opposed the choice of a recast procedure of the regulation as well as some
other amendments. It decided not to adopt a legislative resolution, as it considered that the
dossier should be referred to the next parliamentary term. Hence, there was no formal position of
the EP at first reading. Some of the most controversial issues of the proposal concerned: the
definition of a ‘document’ [Article 3(a)] and the scope of application [Article 2(5),(6)]; the
exception of legal advice provided by the legal services of the EU institutions [Article 4(2c)];
relation between the right of ATD and the right to personal data protection [Article 4(5)]; and
Members States’ documents and Member States’ rights to restrict access [Article 5(2)].425
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There has been some controversy over the proposed regulation and an ongoing disagreement
between the Council and the EP. The latter has sought to make changes increasing rights of
access, and the Council blocked them. Being “far from a ‘marginal’ political dossier,” the recast
of Regulation 1049 had attracted considerable political attention.426 With the coming into force
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a central objective of the ongoing revision procedure had become
to align the regulation with its requirements.427 Some Member States used this process to reevaluate the status quo, and to advocate a revised law that gives greater weight to other values,
such as privacy and effective decision making. A Council minority, led by Sweden, did not
tolerate a reform outcome that “rolled back” the existing arrangements.428 With two groups of
Member States advocating change in opposite directions, the process stagnated, and eventually
led to a deadlock. Pending resolution of this matter, the Commission published an interim
proposal in March 2011 to extend the scope of the Regulation to cover a range of other EU
institutions.429 This was the last action taken regarding the proposal. Regulation 1049/2001 is
still under review.
To make the citizen’s rights of ATD as effective as possible, the EU institutions obliged to
provide public access in electronic form to a register of documents. The EP established a public
register of EP documents in 1996, the Council launched such register in 1998430, and the EU
Commission in 2008. In the course of the ETI both, the European Commission and the EP,
emphasized the possibility of a common register for all three European institutions.
Consequently, an inter-institutional working group between the Commission and the EP was
formed at the end of 2008 to prepare a joint register.431 After a long period of negotiations, a
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compromise was found, so that an inter-institutional agreement was signed on 23 June 2011,
which was also the starting point of the common “Transparency Register”432. This is a voluntary
system, where individuals and organizations can register and then automatically sign a code of
conduct. The goal is to improve citizen participation practices, and monitor organizations and
individuals engaged in the EU policy making and implementation.433 Building upon the existing
registration systems, the Transparency Register provides citizens with a “one-stop shop” to help
them exercise their right to know.434 The Register enables the registrants to commit themselves
to provide accurate and updated information on the entity they represent.435 However, the
voluntary nature of the Register has drawn considerable criticism as being ineffective and
providing only selective information.
The right of ATD of the EU citizens was enhanced by the introduction of the European
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) expanding the scope of participation rights.436 ECI’s legal basis is
found at the Article 11(4) TEU.437 This initiative was adopted by the EP and the Council on
February 16, 2011. It allows EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies
by calling on the European Commission to draft legislative proposals. Alemmano referred to ECI
as the first transnational, direct democratic tool in history that clearly provides civil society with
a new venue of access to EU action.438
It is evident that the EU institutions have played a major role on the establishment,
development and consolidation of a transparency principle and a right of ATD in the EU.
Roberts argued that three institutions are important to the building of the EU’s architecture of
transparency: the Parliament, the Office of the Ombudsman (EO), and the CJEU.439 However,
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they have been part of a larger coalition that has pushed for institutional and policy changes on
openness and transparency. I will scrutinize the role of the EO and the CJEU in the next
chapters. Three EU institutions have been important in the debates around transparency in the
EU – all subjects to the Regulation 1049 - the EP, the Council and the Commission.
The EP has been from the start, one of the main catalysts for transparency, emphasizing the
need for transparency in addressing the “democratic deficit”. The authority of the Parliament has
grown substantially after the adoption of the TEU and Amsterdam Treaty. As important as the
growth in formal powers has been the emergence of an institutional culture that emphasizes
Parliament's role as a counterweight440 or a “watchdog” over the Council and the Commission.441
The EP has lobbied for the introduction of legal safeguards on transparency for years. Indeed, the
debate on lobbying and transparency began in the EP in 1989442 with a regulation of financial
interests of Members of the EP. In 1991, the EP introduced a proposal for a code of conduct,
which failed.443 It re-introduced it again three years later, and finally established a code of
conduct and a voluntary lobbyist register in 1996, which got a de facto mandatory character later
on.444 The Council and the Commission followed suit.
The European Council has traditionally been “cloaked in secrecy.”445 However, the crisis of
legitimacy in the early 90s and the co-decision procedure played a role in changing this tradition.
The “Declaration on the Right of Access to Information” (annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht in
1992) was the first explicit link between transparency and democracy on the part of the European
Council. Maastricht introduced the co-decision procedure, according to which the EP and the
Council shared the responsibility of lawmaking in the EU. The co-decision meant that the
Council was bound in its decisions by the position of the EP which was a proponent of
440

See Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs, et al., The European Parliament (London: John Harper Publishing, 2000) at
5-6 [Corbett, Jacobs, et al]; Lambert & Hoskyns, supra note 381 at 93-116; Neill Nugent, supra note 373 at 215-220.
441
Ian Harden, “Statement to meeting of the Council of Europe Group of Specialists on Access to Official
Information”, Office of the European Ombudsman, Strasbourg, 22 February 2000 [Harden, “Statement”].
442
Michelle Cini, “The Limits of Inter-Institutional Co-operation: Defining (Common) Rules of Conduct for EU
Officials, Office-holders and Legislators, Paper prepared for the Conference of the Jean Monnet Multi-lateral
Research Group DEUBAL, Leiden University, 3-4 November 2011, at 4. Online
<http://www.ces.ufl.edu/files/pdf/DEUBAL/workshops/2011/Cini_DEUBAL_110311.pdf> [Cini, “The limits”].
443
Michelle Cini & Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, “Ethical Governance and Lobbying in the EU Institutions”,
Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association Conference, Boston, 3-5 March 2011, at 8. Online
<http://www.euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/5f_cini.pdf> [Cini & Borragán].
444
Raj Chari & Daniel Hillebrand O'Donovan, “Lobbying the European Commission: Open or Secret” (2011) 11
Working papers series in Economics and Social Sciences, at 5 [Chari & O'Donovan].
445
Curtin, “Betwixt and Between”, supra note 393 at 104.

111

transparency. In an attempt to respond to the concerns raised in the Danish rejection of
Maastricht 446 , the European Council re-iterated its dedication to ensure a better informed public
debate on EC activities. However, a more serious attempt on acknowledging and addressing a
“democratic deficit” in the EU was only made in 2005. The Council announced that it would
open its meetings to a wider audience on all the issues that were decided under the co-decision
procedure. This move was criticized by the European Ombudsman, who urged the Council to
open its doors to all meetings that deal with concrete policy measures.447
The recast of the Regulation 1049, marked a step backwards in the Council’s attitude towards
transparency. The Council was criticized of restricting the right of the ATD while the EP tried to
block its proposal. The recast procedure revealed a strong opposition on transparency between
the EP and the Council, which is to date keeping the Regulation at a stalemate. The EU treaties
altered at some degree the legal and political parameters of Council transparency policies448,
however, the Council’s tolerance towards transparency is declining. A majority has formed in
favor of a more conservative policy (supported by the UK, France), and opposed by the “Gang of
Four” (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands).449 This development shows that the initial
usage of a language that brought forward the normative dimension of transparency has subsided
to a more narrow conception of transparency. It demonstrates that the historical traditions on
transparency, and institutional culture deeply affect transparency trajectories.
The European Commission’s initial position on transparency was similar to that of the
Council. However, under the influence of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Commission seriously
engaged with the Council in the formulation of the common Code of Conduct about
transparency. Later on, in the 2000 Discussion Paper, the importance of transparency and a
better information policy was underlined in order “to improve and strengthen the existing
relationship between the Commission and the NGOs”450, with the purpose to foster participatory
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democracy.451 In 2002, the Commission published a communication452 to “encourage more
involvement of interested parties through a more transparent consultation process.”453 The ETI
454

announced in 2005 by the Commissioner Kallas, introduced the “interest representation” with

which the Commission eliminated the negative connotation of lobbyism and simultaneously
broadened the participatory concept. Interest representation now includes all “activities carried
out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of
the European institutions.”455 These developments show a progress in the Commission’s position
towards transparency. It has given special consideration to the issues of participatory rights and
accountability, which stand at the core of the transparency principle.

4.4 Comparisons and conclusions
Looking back at how transparency and the right of ATI/ATD have developed over the years
in Canada and the EU, one can notice a few common themes, but also some differences. First,
the introduction of an ATI/ATD legislation in both jurisdictions has originated in the provinces
/members states, and was later picked by the federation/Union. By the time Canada introduced
its ATIA, three other provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Quebec) had already done so.
In the EU, before the adoption of Regulation 1049, nineteen of the countries which are now
members on the EU, had previously passed laws on ATD. Therefore, one can argue that the right
of ATI was born out of national aspirations and then travelled to the federal level. The public
was already informed and somehow familiarized about the importance of such laws by the
national experiences, achievements and failures on ATI systems. The terrain was already
explored by the advocates to bring the discussions on ATI at the forefront of the political battles,
and push for changes at federal/Union level. The national debates on ATI had broken the taboo
of government secrecy and paved the way to the introduction of an ATI legislation beyond
national/provincial borders. The national experiences seem to have facilitated the discussions and
451
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prepared the terrain for a broader ATI system. This is the case especially at the EU, where
national experiences of the Nordic countries played a crucial role in the shaping of an ambitious
agenda about transparency and ATD. It is not accidental that with the accession of Sweden and
Finland in the EU in 1995, the principle of transparency was further developed and the
recognition of a right to ATD entered a new dimension.
Second, the developments in both jurisdictions demonstrate that the culture of the government
and historical traditions have a major influence in approaches towards transparency. The
introduction of an ATI legislation, but especially its implementation strongly relates to the
institutional culture of those responsible for giving life to an ATI right. Pasquier and Villeneuve
highlighted that cultures of transparency and secrecy are rooted in historical traditions and
traditional state-society relations. Institutional rules result from historical trajectories456. In
Canada, the history demonstrated a persistent culture of secrecy which has played a crucial role
in the drafting of the law (changing it at the last phases), the designing of the legal requirements
and coverage (leaving out many institutions), the implementation (constant undermining of the
rights it upholds) and the improvements of the law (leaving the ATIA unchanged for more than
three decades). The political system in Canada, which is rooted in the principle of ministerial
responsibility, allows for little oversight on government actions. Especially in the case of a
majority government, which occupies most of the seats in Parliament, the legislature transforms
into a tool in the hands of the government of the day. Having no strong political opposition, and
controlling two branches of the government (legislature and executive) with a strong party
discipline, breeds a culture of secrecy. As Savoie argued “The government of Canada has stood
firm on the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the anonymity of career officials, and the
traditional bargain between politicians and career officials.”457
In the EU, the situation is more complicated since there is a mix of political cultures and
traditions. The introduction of Regulation 1049 confirmed the existence of such diversity and
revealed a clash of political cultures between member states. The approach adopted in
Regulation 1049 corresponded to the Nordic concept of public ATD. A coalition of Nordic
countries, the so-called “Gang of four”, made ATD one of the conditions for their accession in
456
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the EU, and pushed strongly for it after the accession, bringing with them their home traditions
of transparent government. Some scholars spoke about a demarcation between the “protestant
North” – Nordic countries with strong traditions of governmental openness – and the “Catholic
South” – nations with étatist political cultures in which political executives and bureaucrats are
accustomed to greater power and secrecy.458 A survey conducted by Statewatch459 in 2000
looked at the refusals of the EU governments to give ATD. The survey showed a clear divide:
Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece consistently
opposed the release of EU documents, while Denmark, Sweden and Finland have consistently
supported access on appeal. Three other member states, Netherlands, UK and Ireland have
supported them in some appeals. As the survey determined there was a clear split between the
EU countries on their approach to ATD. However, this diversity created a positive atmosphere
for a healthy discourse on transparency and led to the incorporation of transparency rules in
treaty provisions.
Third, circumstances were important for the timing of the ATI legislation in both jurisdictions.
This means that the debates on ATI emerged and developed as a result of other forces outside the
government, and not because of government inspired policies. The reasons for adopting an ATI
law at a specific point in time are related to both national and international developments. In
Canada at the time that the idea of ATI was emerging, there were many social movements
dominating the Canadian political arena, all raising concerns about the workings of the
government and demanding participatory rights. The ATIA was a promise made at an electoral
campaign, which meant it had a highly political connotation. In addition, when the debate on
ATI was heating, there was a similar bill adopted in the US, and later in Australia and New
Zealand. The Canadian ATIA was strongly influenced by the introduction of a FOIA in the
neighboring country, and other countries in the Commonwealth. Some scholars attribute ATIA’s
success to the American influence, among other things.
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In the EU, the timing was very important for an elaboration of the principle of transparency
and the establishment of a right of ATD. Transparency and ATD in the EU were born out of a
serious crisis of legitimacy. The EU was initially established as an elitist project, with six
powerful countries deciding to join an economic partnership. For many years, the European
integration failed to raise the basic question of its policy legitimacy. Popular resistance to
integration was often expressed as a complaint about the secretiveness of the EU institutions. To
address this culture of secrecy the Maastricht Treaty emphasized transparency as an important
value.460 Persistent claims of a democratic deficit in the EU, fueled by the initial rejection of the
Maastricht Treaty in the 90's and of the European Constitution in 2005, placed the goal of
increasing transparency on top of the EU agenda as a solution to the “democratic deficit”
problem. Subsequent treaty provisions (such as Amsterdam and Lisbon), Charter status
recognition, and Regulation 1049 were a response to the EU crisis of legitimacy.
Fourth, there is recognition for a need to change the legal framework on transparency and
ATI, but political compromise seems impossible in both jurisdictions. This means that beside the
recognition of a right of ATI, it still remains a highly contested area which heavily depends on
government politics. Both the ATIA and Regulation 1049 have been lingering for years in
government offices or parliamentary Committees without any success. However, the situation is
worse in Canada which had problems with the law from the beginning. Proposal for change were
made for the ATIA soon after its adoption. From 1982, the year the ATIA was passed, it has not
changed significantly. There have been numerous parliamentary studies and reports analyzing
the ATIA and its requirements, all of which have reached the same conclusion: the law is
outdated and badly in need of an overhaul. Unfortunately, all of these calls for reform have been
ignored by federal administrations. Indeed, apart from a few minor changes, some of which
actually served to further limit the disclosures required by the ATIA, the law remains very similar
to what it was 30 years ago.
Regarding Regulation 1049, proposals for change started in 2008, soon after the adoption of
the Lisbon Treaty to align the Regulation with the Treaty requirements. Strong positions between
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the EP and the Council have caused stagnation in legislative advancements. The recast procedure
of the Regulation is stuck in a political deadlock with no progress for almost ten years with a
highly polarized political environment. On the one side, the EP advocates for more transparency,
and on the other side, the Council and the Commision ask for sacrifices on the right of ATD in
favour of other rights (such as data protection).
Fifth, while paying attention to the language used in the debates that preceded, accompanied,
and followed the introduction of the ATI laws in Canada and the EU, I notice some differences.
First, in Canada, the terms “transparency” and “openness” have been somehow foreign to the
legal framework on ATI. The discussions at the initial phase of the ATIA’s adoption, and later in
the proposals for amendments, seem to have bypassed transparency as a notion and as a
principle. Only after 2000, transparency and openness appear in the debates of ATI proponents in
Canada. The ICC Reid and some of the private Member bills (Bryden, Martin and Trudeau) have
included transparency in the language of their proposed ATIA. The transparency vocabulary was
then picked up by the government which in 2011 announced its commitment to transparency and
openness. Part of this commitment was the OGP membership.
At the EU, the discourse on ATI was more focused on transparency as a value, and as a
panacea in addressing the democratic deficit. The need for transparency came as response to a
prevailing culture of secrecy in European politics. However, there has been a shift in the politics
of transparency in the EU. From an internally regulated “transparency as communication”,461 the
policy has shifted in the direction of “transparency as access”462, as enforced not only by the protransparent Member States, but also by external actors, such as the EP, the CJEU and the EO.
This is the second difference between the Canadian and the European framework - transparency
is closely related to the right of ATD. This right is viewed as a way of connecting the citizens
and the EU institutions and a means of stimulating a more informed and involved debate on
European policy. Therefore, because of the importance of the right of ATD, it gradually gained a
constitutional status. Hence, at the EU we have a fundamental right discourse, which is not
existent in the Canadian legal debates. In Canada, the debate is still focused on ATI as a means
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to ensure information, and not as a right worth of Charter protection. This difference is my
preoccupation throughout this project.
Sixth, another difference noticed in the historical development of ATI relates to the different
actors engaged in the deliberations and decision-making. While government institutions in both
jurisdictions have initially been hostile towards the idea of transparency, the Canadian
counterparts have been more persistent in their opposition. The executive branch of the Canadian
government has been more inclined to resist openness and transparency. In fact, the adoption of
the ATIA was the result of decades of discussion and attempts, going back to 1960s, when a
private member’s bill seeking to recognize the public’s right to access government records was
read for the first time. This bill provided the catalyst for further passionate debates that led to
other persistent attempts in a span of twenty years to the adoption of the ATIA. All those Bills
were private members bills, which means the Parliament of Canada was amongst the early
advocates who prepared the ground and pushed for the adoption of the ATIA. Later, reports from
the Standing Committee of Ethics were supportive of statutory changes. In 2004 a new
Parliamentary Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics was formed and held
hearings. In 2006, the Commission investigating the “sponsorship scandal” also recommended
many changes based on the ICCs recommendations.463 However, changes in the ATIA have not
been substantial because of the opposition of the government of the day. One can say that the
right of ATI emerged and developed as an outsider of the government. It only made it to the
political agenda, not because the government was fond of the idea - it only came as an electoral
promise and the perseverance of the MPs and other actors. I would label the Canadian approach
to ATI a bottom-up approach.
In the EU, the situation looks a bit different. Although the EU institutions have been accused
for acting in secrecy, debates around transparency and ATD seems to have engaged them
actively. All three main institutions in the EU have been preoccupied with addressing the
democratic deficit in the EU, and have compromised to promote transparency and ATD as a
mean to solve legitimacy problems. This does not mean that all three institution were active
supporters of the idea of transparency, but they recognized its necessity and value for the
See Alasdair Roberts, “Two Challenges in Administration of the Access to Information Act”, Commission of
Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Restoring Accountability - Phase 2 Report.
February 2006 [Roberts, “Two Challenges”].
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realization of the EU project – the EU integration. Three EU treaties altered the legal and
political parameters of Council transparency policies464, the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Lisbon.
Frequent treaty amendment processes can be regarded as a type of institutional catalyst.
Changing institutional structures in the EU meant that the Council in its internal negotiations
increasingly had to anticipate the preferences of other institutions.
Just like in Canada, the EP has played the most important role to uphold, promote and expand
a right of ATD in the EU. The strengthened role of the EP that resulted from the Maastricht and
the Amsterdam Treaties meant that it could increasingly exert political pressure on the Council.
During the negotiations leading up to Regulation 1049, the EP for the first time acted as a colegislator with direct influence on the Council’s internal transparency rules. Again, the EP’s role
was evident in the recast procedure of Regulation 1049. The Commission proposed several
provisions intended to limit the right of ATD, but was faced with the opposition of the EP, and
other supporters. In the EU, attempts to limit ATD were unsuccessful due to the persistence from
EU institutions, national government and NGOs. Such opposition was weak or absent in Canada.
Below are the two tables that provide dates regarding ATI legislation enactment in Canada
and the EU in both provincial/Member states and federal/Union level.

Table 1: Canadian statutes on ATI/FOI at the federal and provincial level.
Jurisdiction

Name of statutes

Dates

Federal

Access to Information Act /

1983 /

Privacy Act

1983

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act/

1996 /

Personal Information Protection Act

2003

2.British

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act/

1993 /

Columbia

Personal Information Protection Act

2003

3.Manitoba

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

1997

1.Alberta

4.New Brunswick Right to Information Act /

464
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1978 /
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Protection of Personal Information Act

1998

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act

2002

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act

1994

7.Nova Scotia

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

1977, 1993

8.Nunavut

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act

1994

9.Ontario

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

1988

10.Quebec

Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public
Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information

1982

11.Saskatchewan

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

2002

12.Yukon

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act

1996

Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

2001

5.Newfoundland
and Labrador
6.Northwest
Territories

Territory
13.Prince Eduard
Island
Source : Table drawn by the author with information from the Department of Justice
http://justice.gc.ca/eng/trans/atip-aiprp/provincial.html, Right2Info. http://www.right2info.org/laws/#section-13 and
websites from the Access to Information and Privacy Commissioners.

Table 2: The EU and the Member State legislation on ATI/FOI
Jurisdiction
EU

1. Austria

Name of legislation
Charter of Fundamental Rights
Regulation 1049

2001 /

Data Protection Regulation

1995

Federal Law on the Duty to Furnish Information /

1987 /

(member 1995465) Data Protection Act
2. Belgium
(member 1958)

465

Dates

Constitution

2000
1994, 2000/

Note that the information about accession dates is drawn from: European Union, EU member countries.
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/
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Law on the right of access to administrative documents
held by federal Public Authorities

1992, 1998

Act on the Protection of Privacy in Relation to the
Processing of Personal Data
3. Bulgaria

Constitution

(member 2007)

Access to Public Information Act /

2000/

Personal Data Protection Act

2002, 2006

4. Croatia

Constitution

(member 2013)

Act of the Right of Access to Information

5. Cyprus

2003, 2013

2013

(member 2004)

Draft Bill on Access to Information

6. Czech

Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

Republic

Law on Free Access to Information /

1999 /

(member 2004)

On Protection of Personal Data

2000

7. Denmark

Access to Public Administration Files

1985 /

(member 1973)

Act on Processing on Personal Data

2000

8. Estonia

Constitution

(member 2004)

Public Information Act /

2000/

Protection Data Protection Act

2007

9. Finland

Constitution

(member 1995)

Act on the Openness of Government Activities /

1951,1999/

Personal Data Act

1999

10. France

Law on Access to Administrative Documents /

1978 /

(member 1958)

Data Protection Act

1978

11. Germany

Federal Freedom of Information Act

2005

(member 1958)
12. Greece

Constitution

(member 1981)

Law regulating the relationship between state and
citizens
Law on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data

1986/
1997
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13. Hungary

Constitution

(member 2004)

Act on the Freedom of Information by Electronic Means
Act on the Protection of Personal Data and the Publicity

2005 /
1992

of Data of Public Interest
14. Ireland

Freedom of Information Act

1997/

(member 1973)

Data Protection Act

1998

15. Italy

Law on Access to Administrative Documents /

1990 /

(member 1958)

Data Protection Act

1996

16. Latvia

Constitution

(member 2004)

Law on Freedom of Information

1998 /

Personal Data Protection Law

2000

17. Lithuania

Constitution

(member 2004)

Law on Provision of Information to the Public /

1996, 2000/

The Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data

2003

Draft Law on Access to Information

1999-2000

Freedom of Information Act

2008

18. Luxembourg
(member 1958)
19. Malta
(member 2004)
20. Netherlands

Constitution

(member 1958)

Act on Public Access to Government Information

1978 /

Personal Data Protection Act

2000

21. Poland

Constitution

(member 2004)

Law on Access to Public Information

2001 /

Act on the Protection of Personal Data

1997

22. Portugal

Constitution

(member 1986)

Law of Access to Administrative Documents

1993

Act on the Protection of Personal Data

1998

23. Romania

Constitution

(member 2007)

The Law Regarding the Free Access to the Information

2001

of Public Interest
2001
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Law for the Protection of Persons Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and Free Circulation of
Such Data
24. Slovakia

Constitution

(member 2004)

Act on Free Access to Information /

2000

Act on Personal Data Protection

2002

25. Slovenia

Act of Access to Information on Public Character /

2005

(member 2004)

Personal Data Protection Act

2004

26. Spain

Constitution

(member 1986)

Law on Transparency, Access to Information and Good

2013

Governance
Law on the Protection of Personal Data

1999

27. Sweden

Constitution

(member 1995)

Freedom of the Press Act,

1949, 1999

Personal Data Act

1998

28. The UK

Freedom of Information Act /

2000 /

(member 1973)

Data Protection Act

1998

Source: Table drawn by the author with information from the ‘Global Network of Freedom of Information
Advocates, <http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/united-kingdom/>, Legislation on line.
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/53/topic/3, Right2Info http://www.right2info.org/laws/#section-13,
and websites from the Member States.
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CHAPTER 5: LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO
INFORMATION

It is essential to analyze the access to information laws in Canada and the EU to understand
their purpose, requirements, principles and exemptions. Legal provisions have direct
consequences on the application of a right to ATI in practice. Many scholars have argued that
while the law itself does not fully determine the availability of information, access laws are
nonetheless an important contributor to transparency. Kasuya provides a comparison - having a
legal guarantee to ATD is analogous to installing a fire alarm. The device’s usefulness is only
realized when there is a fire. At normal times, the value of the fire alarms is not noticed, so as the
transparency instruments.466 Therefore, the study of ATI could not be complete without the
assessment of the law itself.

Both Canada and the EU have passed legislation to protect the right of ATI. This chapter
explores the law passed in both jurisdictions with a special attention to the implications of the
principles they endorse, and the place they hold in the hierarchy of a broader legal framework. It
also looks at two case studies, one in each jurisdiction, namely Ontario as one of the provinces in
Canada, and Albania as one of the prospective members in the EU. These case studies are chosen
because of their contrast in legal provisions with the constituency to which they belong.
National-federal contrasts on ATI legal requirements demonstrate the dynamics of ATI rights
and the factors that contribute to those dynamics. I look especially at the purposive sections of
the acts in the two jurisdictions and case studies to understand what they imply, what the
connection is between ATI and broader principles like transparency and openness, what they say
about the intentions of the legislatures and inspirations of the acts, and what are the shortcomings
of legal requirements.
Before exploring ATI laws in the jurisdictions of study, I first have a look at the international
legal framework on transparency and ATI. The purpose is to understand the international status

Yuko Kasuya, “Democracy and Transparency: Enacting the Freedom of Information Acts around the World”,
Paper prepared for delivery at the International Transparency Conference, June 10-12, 2012, Utrecht, the
Netherlands, at 7.
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of the right of ATI and the principles that guarantee such status, and study how Canada and the
EU are upholding international obligations.

5.1 International legal framework on transparency and access to information
Internationally, ATI is considered a fundamental human right. Many countries in the world
explicitly protect ATI in their constitutions.467 According to Darbishire, 89 of the world’s 98 ATI
laws recognize that the right may be exercised by “everyone”.468 However, there are countries
that limit this right to citizens and residents only, such as Canada, Malta, and Turkey.469
Under the UN legal framework the right of ATI is protected as part of the wider right of
freedom of expression. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights470 recognizes the
freedom of expression and the right to information in article 19. This article identifies ATI as the
right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.” Similarly, the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights471 (ICCPR) in
paragraph 2 of article 19 recognizes the right to information as freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds and by any means, but with limitations for privacy and
national security. Canada signed the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights in
1976, while Albania did so in 1991472.
The UN Human Rights Committee has specifically confirmed473 that ATI is part of an
obligation which falls upon: all branches of the State (executive, legislative and judicial) and
other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level that– national, regional or local – are
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in a position to engage the responsibility of the State party.474 In 1999, the UN Human Rights
Committee expressed the view in Gauthier v Canada that Article 19, read together with Article
25475 of the ICCPR “implies that citizens, in particular through the media, shall have wide access
to information and the opportunity to disseminate information and opinions about the activities
of elected bodies and their members.”476
The UN framework conceptualizes ATI as a right to exchange ideas, not simply information,
which is a much broader understanding. This conception gives the right of ATI another
dimension, beyond the traditional legal understanding. This dimension of ATI is elaborated in
the Habermas discursive theory of law, and to a certain degree in the Pateman’s theory of
participatory democracy. I expand on this conception of ATI because it provides strong
arguments to consider ATI a fundamental human right.
Part of the UN legal framework on ATI is also the so-called Aarhus Convention.477 It
prescribes the sharing and free public access to environmental information amongst 47 parties478
in Europe and Central Asia. Most of the 46 signatory countries in this Convention fulfill their
Aarhus obligations through national FOI laws. Albania ratified the Convention on 27 June 2001,
and the EU ratified it on 17 February 2005479. Yet, there is no North American equivalent to such
a treaty, so Canada is not a Convention party.

Internationally, the process of consecration of ATI as a fundamental right culminated in the
Convention on Access to Official Documents480. This Convention, adopted by the Council of
474
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Europe, represents the first internationally binding instrument recognizing a general right of
access to official documents held by public authorities. The Convention sets forth the minimum
standards to be applied in the processing of requests for access to official documents. It provides
in Article 2, that parties shall “guarantee the right of everyone, without discrimination on any
ground, to have access, on request to official documents held by public authorities.” None of the
countries in study has signed or ratified this Convention. However, Robert Marleau, then-ICC
supported the Convention by saying that it “is an important initiative aimed at developing an
international treaty on the right to information.”481
5.2 The Canadian legal framework on transparency and access to information
In Canada, there is no specific legislation that deals with transparency, but separate provisions
directly or indirectly linked with transparency can be traced in many laws, especially those that
regulate the functioning of government bodies. In 2006, the Parliament passed the Federal
Accountability Act (FAA)482 that deals among others with “conflict of interest rules, restrictions
on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and
accountability.”483 FAA is important because not only is an attempt to keep the government
accountable, but also because it amended some parts of the ATIA in a significant way.
Another statute, the Canada Evidence Act484 (CEA) limits the application of the ATIA since it
constitutes the statutory means for safeguarding Cabinet confidentiality. CEA enables the
Cabinet to establish a regime which prevents the disclosure of information consisting of
confidences of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. Section 39 of CEA sets out a definition of
“a confidence” and outlines a list of documents that can be considered as such.
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, the ATIA was passed in 1982, and entered into force a year later.
Before looking closer to the ATIA’s provisions, I first look at the Canadian Charter to see what
kind of protection it offers, and the status it confers to ATI.
5.2.1 Charter status of the right of access to information in Canada
ATI is a statutory right in the Canadian legal framework. In the Charter there is no provision
for ATI. Although, the ATIA and the Charter were passed at the same year, in 1982, ATI did not
become part of the fundamental freedoms of Canadians. Article 2, “Fundamental Freedoms” of
the Charter includes freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of the press, but not ATI.
The lack of this status makes a difference on the treatment of this right. Charter rights have a
very special status in Canada’s legal and political traditions. The notion of fundamental rights
carries relevant democratic implications. They are strongly protected and cannot be
compromised by the preferences of the government of the day. The ATIA is a piece of federal
legislation, which may be repealed or revised by a simple majority vote in the federal House of
Commons, to improve or limit the right it confers. If ATI were to be a Charter right, it would
establish uniform application of some common rules to all levels of government in Canada. Also,
the ATIA is administered quite differently from the Charter. Whereas complaints of violations
of Charter rights are adjudicated strictly through Canada’s court system, the ATIA complaints are
generally dealt first through the ICC.
There are important consequences from treating a social value – as ATI is often considered as a human right. First, the fundamental nature of the right requires a strict interpretation of any
limitation to the exercise of that right. Secondly, public authorities must subject any such
limitation to a scrutiny of proportionality. The principle of proportionality requires that
derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim
in view. If a social value is accepted as a human right, it is also expected that some sacrifices will
be made for the realisation of these rights to take place. Human rights take precedence over other
issues. In the case of ATI, a human right status would allow sometimes that the government will
be disadvantaged. For many other human rights, these sacrifices seem to be the rule. But “In
stark contrast, in the area of access to information, the dominant approach in Canada is to deny
requests if there is even a small risk that disclosure of the information may cause even minor
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harm to a protected interest.”485 This approach puts into risk the whole ATI regime and makes
access rights vulnerable and subject to the will of the government.
There are rights that have made their way to the Canadian Charter as a result of an
interpretative enterprise exercised by the Courts. According to the “the living tree doctrine” the
Canadian constitution is organic and must be read in a broad and progressive manner to adapt it
to the changing times. This doctrine allows for legal stretching in interpreting the Charter rights
by putting them in a broader social context beyond the legal realm. That has been the case with
the social and economic rights, which were not explicitly included as rights in the Charter.
However, the protection of social and economic rights is recognized as a component of other
constitutional rights such as the right to equality (s.15) and the right to “life, liberty and security
of the person” (s.7). It is up to the courts to provide such protection for those groups who most
need protection, and have the most legitimate claims for judicial intervention on their behalf.
In addition, the Supreme Court has also emphasized that broadly framed Charter rights must
be interpreted consistently with Canada’s international human rights commitments. While
international human rights are not directly enforceable as law in Canada, the Court has
emphasized that international human rights articulate the Charter values and rights, and that the
reasonable exercise of conferred decision-making authority must conform to these values.
While the Charter does not confer constitutional status to ATI, there has been an attempt to
push for constitutional protection of the right to ATI under section 2(b) of the Charter, but
without success. In 2010, in the case Ontario Public Safety486, the Supreme Court established
that ATI is derivate of the freedom of expression, but this claim may arise only in special
circumstances. The Court argued that “the scope of the s. 2(b) protection includes a right to
access to documents only where access is necessary to permit meaningful discussion on a matter
of public importance, subject to privileges and functional constraints.”487 In the case in question
these requirements were not satisfied, and section 2(b) was not engaged. According to
Kazmierski, “The case rightly garnered much attention because it was the first decision in which
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a majority of the Court recognized that there was constitutional protection for the right to access
government information.”488
Furthermore, the right of ATI has acquired a quasi-constitutional status thanks to the Supreme
Court. In Minister of National Defence489 the Court has characterized ATI as quasi-constitutional
because of the role privacy plays in a democratic society. The Supreme Court deems quasiconstitutional laws as fundamental or of special importance to the Canadian legal system. They
are given primacy over ordinary legislation. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that quasiconstitutional statutes are to be interpreted purposively.490 This means that conflicts in
interpretation should be resolved in favour of the underlying purposes of the acts.491
Additionally, the recognition of the quasi-constitutional status of a statute is a factor in the
statute’s interpretation, suggesting that the rights it confers are to be construed broadly, and any
exceptions to them must be made clear.

The Courts in Canada have a tool box at their disposal which allows them to stretch the legal
interpretation of rights by considering a broad contextualization and the Canadian international
commitments in human rights. As mentioned in section 5.1 above, Canada has signed the ICCPR
and was one of the first countries to ratify its Optional Protocol.492 These international
documents recognize a right to know as having a fundamental value. As such, Canada has
committed to confer to such recognition. The living tree doctrine could help push the actual
recognition even further to give ATI rights a constitutional status, able to meet international
standards.
5.2.2 Exploring the Access to Information Act
When the ATIA was introduced in Parliament in 1980, its goals were to have a more informed
dialogue between political leaders and citizens, to improve decision making, and have greater
488
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accountability by the federal government and its institutions.493 However, the version of the Act
adopted in 1982 had no mentioning of any of those aspirations. The ATIA has 77 sections and its
purpose clause (s.2) states:
The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada to provide a right of access to
information in records under the control of a government institution in accordance with the
principles that government information should be available to the public, that necessary
exemptions to the right of access should be limited and specific and that decisions on the
disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of government.
Reading this purpose clause one can imply that this statute did not intend to bring a
fundamental change in terms of better transparency, accountability or citizen participation.
Instead, it simply extended the right of the public in accessing to government information.
The ATIA applies to “government institutions” at the federal level, which include government
departments, ministries, and bodies listed in Schedule 1 and Crown corporations and their wholly
owned subsidiaries (s.3). The ATIA does not cover to important public authorities such as the
House of Commons, the Senate and the judiciary - they are excluded from its application. The
FAA in 2006 extended the reach of the ATIA to approximately 70 additional bodies including the
Canadian Wheat Board, five Agents of Parliament, five Foundations created under federal
statute, seven Crown Corporations, and other parliamentary officers and crown corporations.
However, many public bodies still remain out of the scope of the Act.
The ATIA has been highly criticized for its wide regime of exclusions and exemptions. It
provides a special category of exclusions in sections 68-69. In accordance to article 68, the Act
does not apply to:
-

published material or material available for purchase; library or museum material; or
material placed in the Canadian national archives, libraries, galleries or museums.
information under the control of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation that relates to
journalistic, creative or programming activities
any information under the control of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Another type of exclusion is found in section 69 which excludes the confidences of the
Cabinet from the application of the Act. This exclusion, which became part of the ATIA at the
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last minute before its adoption, has been one of the most criticized sections of the Act. Meetings
or discussions between ministers can result in the creation of records that are Cabinet
confidences, providing that the discussions concern the making of government decisions or the
formulation of government policy.494According to the Treasury Board of Canada “In order to
reach final decisions, ministers must be able to express their views freely during the discussions
held in Cabinet. To allow the exchange of views to be disclosed publicly would result in the
erosion of the collective responsibility of ministers.”495 It is, in fact, recognized by the Supreme
Court that Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government. In Babcock, the Court
explained that “The process of democratic governance works best when Cabinet members
charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express themselves around the
Cabinet table unreservedly.”496
To preserve this rule of confidentiality, the Act provides that it does not apply to confidences
of the Council. According the section 69 Cabinet confidences include: memoranda or discussion
papers presented to Council, agenda, communications, or briefings of Council and draft
legislation. However, there are three situations outlined in s. 69(3) of the ATIA, where certain
classes of documents are producible. First, any Cabinet confidences that have existed more than
twenty years can be made public. Second, discussion papers where the decision to which papers
relate has been made public. Third, discussion papers where the decision has not been made
public must be produced if four years have passed since the decision was made. In all other
cases, Cabinet confidences remain not only outside the scope of the ATIA, but also the judicial
review. In the context of litigation, under the CEA, cabinet confidences cannot be reviewed
neither by the ICC nor a court. This type of exclusion make Cabinet confidences unreachable by
the ATIA.
In addition, the ATIA does not apply to other categories of records which are listed as
exemptions in sections 13-24. The exemptions fall into two distinct categories, mandatory and
discretionary. Mandatory exemptions must be invoked. They are introduced with the wording
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“… the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose …” which indicates that there is
no option but to refuse ATI. For instance, section 13 provides that information obtained in
confidence will be refused. Discretionary exemptions [s.14, 15(1), 16(1), 16(2), 17, 18, 21, 22,
23, 26] are introduced with the wording “the head of a government institution may refuse to
disclose.” In these instances, government institutions have the option to disclose or to protect the
information. Each exemption is based on “an injury test” or “class test”. Exemptions which
incorporate an injury test take into consideration whether the disclosure of certain information
could “reasonably be expected” to be injurious to a specific interest (i.e. to the conduct of
international affairs, the conduct of a lawful investigation, financial interests of Canada etc.). In
order to successfully invoke the provision, it must be shown that the expectation of injury is both
reasonable and likely (versus improbable or doubtful). Class test exemptions are those applying
to a record that matches the description given in the statutory provision (i.e. information obtained
in confidence from other governments, advice or recommendations, trade secrets etc.). If the
information being requested falls within the described type, then the exemption can be applied.
There are a number of exemptions in the ATIA that demonstrate a major structural weakness in
Canada’s ATI regime. By erecting multiple walls of defense against information requests, the
law treats ATI as a threat to be neutralized rather than a right to be promoted. While ATI is not,
under international law, absolute, it may be overridden only in limited and justifiable
circumstances. Schedule 1 fails to include a large number of the authorities which, according to
international law, should be covered by an ATI law. Experience in many countries demonstrates
the shortcomings of a list approach.
Another weakness in the Act is the lack of a general provision for the public interest override
which is found in many other provincial laws in Canada and internationally. The Act does not
contain a general public interest override which would require that information be disclosed in
all cases where the general public interest in disclosure outweighs the specific public interest or
other (third party) interest protected by the exempting provision. Rather, the public interest in
disclosure is addressed on a case-by-case basis and only in connection with two exemptions in
the ATIA. First, paragraph 19(2)(c) incorporates the provisions of section 8 of the Privacy Act
which includes, in subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i) a discretionary provision for the release of personal
information in circumstances where the head of the institution forms the opinion that “the public
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interest in disclosure of the personal information in issue clearly outweighs the invasion of
privacy.” Second, subsection 20(6) provides for the disclosure of third party information “if that
disclosure would be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection
of the environment and, if the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs in importance any
financial loss or gain to, prejudice to the competitive position of or interference with contractual
or other negotiations of a third party.” These two provisions protect important interests of
Canadians, such as privacy, health or safety, but these are not the only cases where one may find
a public interest. This demonstrates that the ATIA does not engage seriously with the test of the
public interest override.
Furthermore, several exceptions in the ATIA are either overbroad or the legitimate interest for
nondisclosure is hard to find. There are many overlapping as well, which diminishes the clarity
of the Act. For example, section 20.4 specifically excludes information about National Arts
Centre contracts or donations, while section 14 protects federal/provincial relations. There is no
need for these special warrants since section 18(b) already excludes information that “could
reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of a government institution or to
interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a government institution.” This argument also
applies to sections 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 20.1 and 20.2. Specific information the disclosure of
which would be harmful is already covered in section 16(1)(c) of the ATIA. Hence, there is no
reason why the law enforcement exception would be insufficient to protect against disclosures
that would harm these agencies’ investigative and enforcement functions.
Some exceptions in the ATIA lack proper harm tests, which make one wonder why it would
be necessary to withhold information the disclosure of which would not cause any harm.
Exceptions which lack a harm test include: information received in confidence from other States
or governments (section 13(1)), law enforcement information (section 16(1)(a)), information
related to law enforcement investigative techniques (section 16(1)(b)), information obtained or
prepared by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while performing their duty (section 16(3)),
information treated as confidential by crown corporations (18.1(1)), financial or commercial
information which is treated as confidential by a third party (section 20(1)(b)), those in favour of
government advice (section 21), draft reports or internal working papers related to government
audits (section 22.1). There is no doubt that there are legitimate interests protected by these
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exceptions, but they fail to include a harm test. In the last example (s.22.1) government should be
able to refuse requests for information the disclosure of which would harm its interests, but this
does not mean that all information should be treated as confidential. By failing to specify a harm
test, these exceptions undermine a public interest in information, and limit ATI as a public right.
There is no penalty or sanction on the public servants who wrongly deny requests for ATI. At
the time the ATIA was adopted, Rankin argued that it was expected that such provisions were not
necessary in Canada and that the legislation itself would provide sufficient motivation in
achieving compliance with its objectives.497 Now, it is known for a fact that the expectation was
not met. Although, in 1999, section 67.1 was added to make it an offence to intentionally
obstruct the right of access. A punishment of imprisonment varies from six months to two years,
and fines ranging $5,000-10,000 may be applied against the offenders. To my knowledge, the
penalties have never been applied. However, even these penalties are only given in two cases,
when obstructing the work of the ICC, and when intentionally destroying, falsifying or
concealing a record. In all other cases, no penalties apply.
Regarding the subjects of the ATIA, the law limits the right of ATI only to citizens and
permanent residents of Canada. Section 4(2) allows this right to be extended to other persons by
order of the Governor in Council. However, this can only happen in rare circumstances. In
addition, in 1989, an Extension Order498 extended the right of ATI to individuals who are present
in Canada, even if not permanent residents or citizens. However, this extension was done within
the meaning of the Refugee and Protection Act, which meant that it could benefit refugees in the
country. This is a clear flaw in the ATIA, and runs counter to the established international
practice. International law recognizes ATI as a human right, which means that it belongs to all
people, regardless of nationality.
Among the most significant and recurring problems reported by users of the ATIA are long
delays in responding to ATI requests. The act has set time limits to answer information requests.
In accordance with section 7, public authorities should generally respond to access requests
within 30 days. However, section 9 allows public authorities to extend this by “a reasonable
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period of time” by giving notice to the requester and, if their extension runs longer than 30
additional days, by giving notice to the ICC as well. However, the “the reasonableness” of
extension is left undetermined, allowing for indefinite time extensions, which could last for
months, or even years. In limited cases, requests never get a response, and they are labelled as
“deemed refusals.”499
Formally, time extensions may only be invoked in exceptional cases where “the request is for
a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records and meeting
the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government
institution” (s.9(1)(a)) or where “consultations are necessary to comply with the request that
cannot reasonably be completed within the original time limit” (s.9 (1)(b)). The 2015 National
FOI Audit found that response times exceeded 30 days in 59% of all cases which resulted in a F
grade on speed of disclosure.500 Other studies have shown that public authorities regularly
exceed their own, discretionary and often already unduly long timeframes for responding to
requests.501

ATI requests are without doubt time-sensitive. Timeliness should be the core goal for public
authorities in dealing with requests, and the legislation should certainly set it as a requirement.
Long delays in access can often render requests moot, for example if the information is sought
by a journalist working under a deadline. Studies have suggested that Canadian authorities
frequently use their power to delay in responding to requests with the specific purpose of
controlling information flows.502 Another problem with the ATIA is that it does not formally even
require authorities to respond to requests as soon as possible. Section 4(2.1) requires that the
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government provide “timely access to the record”, but this provision is too vague. There was an
amendment made to the Act in 2006 to include a statutory duty to assist requesters. The duty
required institutions to make every reasonable effort to help applicants receive complete,
accurate and timely responses to requests, without regard to their identity. However, because of
the vagueness of this amendments, it has not been taken very seriously by the government.
Naurin argued that if transparency is not accompanied by sanctions applied to those acting
against social expectations or even in a corrupt and illegal manner, then their public
accountability remains toothless.503
An area where the ATIA lags behind global standards is the cost of access. The ATIA has
made it a requirement that an application fee must be paid to make a request for information.
Although the fee is only five dollars, it affects the making of requests. In addition to the initial
requesting fee, requesters may be required to pay access fees based on the resources spent in
responding to the request. Once the idea of fees is in place, it affects demands for requests.
Indeed, in 2011, the federal government proposed a hike in access fees. Remarkably, this was
claimed to be “in order to control demand.”504 The government was specifically seeking to use
fees as a means of discouraging Canadians from exercising their right of ATI. Responding to
access requests should be a core government responsibility, and the resources to recoup the costs
of access should be included within the agency’s overall budget.

A. Access to Information Act need for change
It is now widely agreed that the ATIA should be updated505 because it is in desperate need of
reform506. In fact, the Act was criticized since its adoption as being very seriously flawed.
Rankin argued that “a last minute amendment to the Bill may conceivably have gutted it, by
exempting politically embarrassing information.”507 In addition, according to Rubin, Canada
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never ranked near the top on ATI since the adoption of the Act.508 He argued that it was no secret
that Canada adopted a rather weak access act in 1982, and indeed, in the 1986-1987
Parliamentary statutory review, all the parties saw this, and recommended a better act.
Today, ATI regime is recognized of being outmoded, out of step with international trends,
and subject to systemic delays.509 Canada has fallen behind due to failure to reform the act and
modernize its procedures.510 McKie argued that “Narratives concerning Canada’s ATIA follow
what has become a disturbingly familiar pattern, punctuated with words including ‘broken’,
‘dysfunctional’, and ‘useless’.”511 Especially for a legislation like the ATIA, which the courts
have affirmed is quasi-constitutional in nature512, its continuing vitality now hinges upon
meaningful reform efforts513.
As explained in Chapter 4, there has been an increased advocacy in the last few years to
amend it. Most of the debates focus on the coverage of the ATIA. ATI proponents are pushing
that “the Act covers the House of Commons and Senate as two of the most significant
institutions in the functioning of Canadian Democracy.”514 Also, the Cabinet confidences, and
information in Ministers’ offices have been part of the amendment proposals. This is the case in
all Canadian provinces where Cabinet documents are reviewed by the Commissioner in the case
of a dispute. Internationally, only South Africa’s FOI law follows Canada’s example.515
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5.2.3 The case of Ontario
Ontario is the fourth province in Canada to adopt an ATI law in 1988 after Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick and Quebec. It represents an interesting case to compare with the federal level since
the design of the law is slightly different comparing to the ATIA. There are two laws governing
ATI in Ontario, one at the provincial and the other municipal level. The Freedom of Information
and Protection Privacy Act (FIPPA)516 and the Municipal Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA)517 together establish a system for public access to
government information and for protecting personal information. The first thing that one can
notice about both these laws is the facts that both ATI and privacy are governed by the same law.
This is different at the federal level, where the ATIA and the Privacy Act are two separate
statutes.
The FIPPA came into effect on January 1, 1988, five years after the ATIA. The coverage of
FIPPA was not much different than the one provided by the ATIA - legislature, courts, and
cabinet confidences were excluded from the Act. It initially applied to all provincial ministries
and most provincial agencies, boards and commissions. However, the range of institutions
covered under the FIPPA expanded three times in one decade. Information Commissioner of
Ontario reports that in 2003, Ontario’s energy utilities, Hydro One and Power Generation, were
brought under FIPPA; Ontario’s universities were placed under FIPPA in 2006; in 2012, Ontario
became the last province in Canada to bring its hospitals under FOI legislation.518 In 2005, a
definition of “educational institution” was added to subsection 2 (1) of the Act and amendments
relating to educational institutions were made to several sections of the Act. Also, the Broader
Public Sector Accountability Act519 amended the FIPPA to designate hospitals as institutions
under the Act.
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In 1996, the Savings and Restructuring Act520 amended FIPPA giving institutions the
authority to refuse access in certain circumstances to records on the basis that a request was
frivolous or vexatious. As a result, section 27.1(1) was added to the FIPPA to deal with
vexatious requests to deny the right to information if “the head [of an institution] is of the
opinion on reasonable grounds that the request for access is frivolous or vexatious.”521 According
to the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) a request is considered vexatious when “the
head considers the request as abusing the right of access or interfering with the operation of the
institution; or to be made in bad faith or for ulterior motives.”522 Such provisions have been
debated for long of having positive and negative effects on ATI regime. However, the Delagrave
Report concluded that there are a “very small” number of frivolous, vexatious or abusive
requests under the Act, but recognized that “processing them represents a waste of resources that
could be better spent responding to legitimate access requests.”523 However, there is a risk in
having these provisions in place. According to Hofley et al “The adoption of a clause allowing
for the rejection of a request on this basis would raise the question of the need for a process to
ensure that government institutions do not abuse such a power”524.
Exemptions in the FIPPA are listed in sections 12-22, and some of them are subject to the test
of public interest override. According to section 23 of the FIPPA exemptions do “not apply
where a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose
of the exemption.” The public interest override applies to sections 13 (advice to government), 15
(relations with other governments), 17 (third party information), 18 (economic and other interests
of Ontario), 20 (danger to health or safety), 21 (personal privacy) and 21.1 (species at risk). The
public interest test contains three parts, and all three must be satisfied for the disclosure to take
place: 1.a public interest in disclosure, 2.this public interest must be compelling, and 3.this
520
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compelling public interest must clearly outweigh the purpose of the exemption claim. However,
section 23 leaves out certain exemptions. That means that the override does not apply to
exemptions covering section 12 (Cabinet records), section 14 (law enforcement records), section
16 (records relating to the defence of Canada), and section 19 (records qualifying for solicitor
client privilege).
An interesting provision of the FIPPA is section 11(1) which provides for a proactive duty to
disclose certain information. It states: “Despite any other provision of this Act, a head shall, as
soon as practicable, disclose any record to the public or persons affected if the head has
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that it is in the public interest to do so and that the
record reveals a grave environmental, health or safety hazard to the public.” This section
demonstrates a real commitment to promote transparency and openness, despite of the
restrictions posed by the provisions in the Act. This is done in the name of the public interest,
and for important issues like health and safety. This commitment shows that the government
appreciates certain public values and is ready to act proactively in protecting them.
The FIPPA is enforced by the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) who
according to section 59 has order-making powers. In addition, the IPC engages or commissions
research on issues concerning the ATI and privacy regime in Ontario, and conducts public
education programs. The IPC has proved itself to be a very powerful body that has influenced the
implementation of the FIPPA and the advancement of the rights of ATI and privacy.
Looking at the FIPPA and the ATIA, one can notice several differences. First, a section
similar to section 27.1(1) of the FIPPA is not present in the ATIA. There is no mechanism in the
ATIA for rejecting requests based on the ground that they are “unreasonable”, “frivolous” or
“vexatious”. From an institutional perspective having such provision in place is a good thing,
because it prevents the overloading of public bodies.
Second, there is no section in the ATIA containing a general public interest override, like
section 23 in the FIPPA. The ATIA only provides two provisions of limited application
[s.19(2)(c) and 20.(6)], but lacks such an important safeguard in other provisions for exemptions
in the Act. This is a major weakness in the ATIA, one that undermines the public’s right to know
about matters of general interest.
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Third, a proactive disclosure provision, like the one found in section 11(1) of the FIPPA, is
absent in the ATIA. This adds to the weakness of the federal act, and demonstrates that the act is
falling behind not only internationally, but also at home.

Fourth, the IPC has order-making powers, which means that it has some teeth to compel ATI
to institutions that fail to disclose information upon request. In addition, the IPC plays a
significant role in public education and research. The ICC does not such powers. He/she is rather
an ombudsman with powers to investigate and make recommendations. There is no power to
order disclosure of a record. Of course, the requesting party and/or the Commissioner may
initiate a complaint before the Federal Court, but this is a much longer way to compel an
institution to disclose records. This undermines the ICC roles and leave her powerless against
government defiance of the ATIA.
Fifth, the FIPPA covers to a certain extent the legislature “but only in respect of records of
reviewable expenses of the Opposition leaders and the persons employed in their offices and in
respect of the personal information contained in those records.”525 Although this provision is
limited, it is a powerful weapon in the hands of the opposition to control the government in
power and keep it accountable. Such provision is inexistent at the federal level, and has been the
focus of a lot of debate, especially from the ICC.
5.3 EU’s legal framework on transparency and ATD
At the EU, the right of access to administrative documents has been closely developed along
the need for more transparency. They have both come a long way in less than two decades. In the
past, administrative transparency was considered an appealing but innocuous idea. At best, it was
a merely political, non-binding guideline. Its implementation was not commanded by law, but
rather entrusted to the good will of the government or even to the discretion of the front-line civil
servants. However, transparency now is a principle recognized by the treaties, and ATD has
gained a constitutional status. I look closely at this development below.
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5.3.1 Treaty status
In the EU, legal provisions on transparency are complicated and dispersed in treaties,
regulations, the Charter and the Convention. Three treaties have shaped the foundations of
transparency as a principle, and of ATD as a human right. First, a theme of transparency gained
relevance in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht526, known also as the TEU. Article A(2), which
is the very first article, stated: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to
the citizen.” This is a clear expression of a commitment to openness and establishes a principle
of transparency. In addition, the Declaration that was attached to the Treaty stated:
The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the
democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration. The
Conference accordingly recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no later
than 1993 a report on measures designed to improve public access to the information
available to the institutions.

Here, the principle of transparency is clearly linked to democratic governance and trust in
institutions, and all of them are related to public ATI. The EU makes real commitments for
concrete measures in improving ATI with the intention to bring the Union closer to its citizens.
However, the access right was not yet established as a self-standing right. The Treaty of
Maastricht, Article 138e signed the creation of the EU Ombudsman appointed by the EP and
responsible to administer cases of maladministration of the activities of the Community
institutions and bodies.
Second, in 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced Article 191a (which later was renumbered
255 EC Treaty), which established a full right of ATD. This article stated:
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having their
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be
defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.
2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right
of access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance with the
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procedure referred to in Article 189b within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam.
3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific
provisions regarding access to its documents527.

The Amsterdam Treaty brought transparency and ATD to a whole new level. First, it
recognized a treaty right to ATD for all organizations and persons in the EU without limitation to
citizenship. However, the right of ATD was only limited to three institutions, the EP, the Council
and the Commission. Second, it required the establishment of general principles on the right of
ATD within two years. This provision was the precursor of the Regulation 1049 - the EU law
governing ATI regime. Third, it required from the EP, the Council and the Commission to
establish their own provisions on ATD in their Rules of Procedure. As such, the Treaty signed a
new era for both the transparency a principle and the recognition of ATD as a fundamental right.
Third, in 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon provided a legal framework for transparency that
included a general, unconditional right of ATD. The treaty sanctioned ATD as a fundamental
right and considered transparency as ancillary both to representative and participatory
democracy. An Article 16 A was inserted in the treaty, with the wording of Article 255 as
follows:
(a) 1. In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as
possible.
2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering
and voting on a draft legislative act.
(b) …. The words ‘European Parliament, Council and Commission documents’ shall be
replaced by ‘documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever
their medium’….
(c) ….
(d) …‘The Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the
European Investment Bank shall be subject to this paragraph only when exercising their
administrative tasks.
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The European Parliament and the Council shall ensure publication of the documents
relating to the legislative procedures…528.
The Lisbon Treaty brought several changes to the EU legal framework on transparency. First,
it reinstated the EU’s commitment to improving openness and transparency, and engaging
citizens in participating in the EU governance. This commitment explicitly links the principle of
openness to the right of every citizen to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Second, it
expanded the subjects of the Regulation 1049 (which was already in place from 2001) from only
three institutions to all the EU bodies, except for the CJEU and the two EU Banks529. Third, it
required from the EP and the Council to hold open meetings in the course of legislative
proceedings, and publish those documents.
These three treaties changed the face of transparency in the EU and gave ATD the status of a
fundamental human right. They signed a new chapter in the discussions of democratic
governance and citizen engagement by considering the principle of transparency as one of the
pillars of democracy.
Transparency and ATD have also been shaped by two other important legal documents in the
EU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Convention on Human Rights. The EU Charter,
binding on all the member states from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, explicitly
guarantees ATD to “any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having
its registered office in a Member State.”530 The right of ATD is listed under the “Citizen’s
Rights” Part of the Charter, which means that it is considered important for the enjoyment of the
EU citizenship. Article 42 the Charter echoes the terms of the Lisbon and Amsterdam Treaty.
The fundamental nature of the right of ATD has direct consequences in its treatment. First, it
requires a strict interpretation of any limitation to the exercise of the right. Secondly, public
authorities must subject any such limitation to a scrutiny of proportionality. The principle of
proportionality requires that derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and
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necessary for achieving the aim in view. Thirdly, transparency regimes should be revised so as to
guarantee the widest possible access to official documents. As a result, the right of access at the
EU level significantly influences legislation and court practice in the Member States as they are
expected to discipline administrative transparency accordingly. It is possible, for example, to
demand specific information from an EU institution, when the source of that information is a
Member State.
In addition, the EU Convention, although it does not contain any express right to ATD, has
evolved its own “right to freedom of information” as part of the right to freedom of expression in
Article 10 of the Convention. It grants the right to “hold opinions and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority.” The lack of a self-standing right of ATD has
often been identified as an important weakness in the Convention. However, the position is
changing, the Convention is considered to be a “living instrument” and recent case law suggests
that, the Convention has been influenced by international trends.
To sum up, in less than two decades, transparency and ATD in the EU law have evolved
dramatically, from a guidance to a principle, and from an institutional guideline to a fundamental
human right. The principle of transparency is considered one the main pillars of the EU law and
an inextricable element of the unional principle of democracy.531

5.3.2 Exploring Regulation 1049
In the EU, the present regime of ATD is governed by Regulation 1049/2001.532 At the time
of its adoption it was considered by the EU institutions to have constituted a “major change”.
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However, several scholars have argued that it has merely consolidated the existing legal
framework533 since it was shadowed by treaty requirements.

The regulation has a grand opening by boldly stating the treaty principle of openness. The
language used throughout the entire Regulation demonstrates great ambitions for the future of
the EU. The first Recital underlines the commitment of the EU institutions for “a new stage in
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are
taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”534 Just reading the first
opening recital of the Regulation one has a feeling that its mission is not only granting ATD to
the citizens but also making them part of the decisions in the EU. This is manifested clearly in
Recital (2) where the true purpose of the principle of openness is revealed – to enable the
participation of the citizens in the decision-making process. Openness and participation in the
EU have even a bigger purpose in the Regulation – to strengthen the principles of democracy.535
The ambitions and enthusiasm about this “new stage” of the EU politics is evident in the
purposive clause. The purpose of Regulation is to “to give the fullest possible effect to the right
of public access to documents”536 and:

(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest
governing the right of access to….documents ….in such a way as to ensure the widest
possible access to documents,
(b) to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right, and
(c) to promote good administrative practice on access to documents.

The purpose of the Regulation is threefold, all aiming to build the right infrastructure of
principles, rules and practices in order to facilitate the exercise of the right of ATD. This
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language shows a serious commitment in establishing a right to ATD, one that goes beyond a
mere proclamation of a right, and is promoted through good administrative practices.

Regulation 1049 applies to all institutions in the EU, but the CJEU, two EU Banks and some
central agencies. It includes some exceptions listed in Article 4. The exceptions of Article 4 (1)
have a general scope. They are regarded as compulsory and absolute, meaning that “should
disclosure of a document cause harm to one of the interests mentioned [in Article 4(1)], access to
this document should be denied.”537 In other words, there is no possibility of an overriding public
interest in disclosure with regard to these exceptions. Article 4(1) provides that:
The institutions shall refuse ATD where disclosure would undermine the protection of:
(a) the public interest as regards:
– public security,
– defence and military matters,
– international relations,
– the financial, monetary or economic policy of the community or a Member State;
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with community
legislation regarding the protection of personal data.

By contrast, the exceptions provided for by Article 4 (2) and 4 (3) have a more limited scope.
Both exceptions are subject to an overriding public interest in disclosure. This implies a
balancing of the public interest in disclosure against the protection of another interest. Article 4
(2) and 4 (3) state:
2. The institutions shall refuse ATD where disclosure would undermine the protection of:
— commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property,
— court proceedings and legal advice,
— the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public
interest in disclosure.
3. Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an
institution, which related to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution,
537
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shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution's
decision making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
Article 4(3) has been the focus of a lot of debates. It safeguards the decision-making process of
the institutions and is intended to protect the so-called space-to-think. This article makes a
distinction between cases where the institution has not yet finished its thinking and those where
the thinking period is over because the institution has made a decision. Two tests may be applied
in this case, the harm test and the public interest override. Engaging the harm test a document
would be denied only if public access would seriously undermine the institution’s decisionmaking process. Furthermore, an overriding public interest requires an evaluation of institutional
interest if it is worth being protected. Regulation 1049 does not contain an exception that
automatically protects a so-called “space to think”. The exception might occur only by applying
the two tests. Documents containing internal discussions are thus within the scope of the
Regulation. The CJEU538 has recently established that public access must, therefore, be given to
such documents on request unless the institution concerned can show that serious harm to its
decision-making process is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.
Another important class of exceptions relate to the EU-Member State relationship. A Member
State may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from that Member State
without its prior agreement (Article 4 (5)). In case a Member State holds a document originating
from an institution, it is entitled to apply its own national law on public access.
A set of special provisions are included in Article 9 which regards sensitive documents. These
documents (called EU RESTRICTED) are classified as “Top Secret”, “Secret” or “Confidential”
in accordance with the security rules of the institution concerned. They protect essential interests
of the EU or one or more of its member states in the areas covered by Article 4 (1) (a), notably
public security, defence and military matters.
The Regulation provides that public access applies to all documents held by an institution. The
term “document” is defined broadly so as to include any content, whatever its storage medium,
concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution's
sphere of responsibility (Article 3). A Community institution may - if an exception to public
access applies - consider giving partial access to a document. Article 4 (6) states that if only parts
538
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of the requested document are covered by any of the exceptions, the remaining parts of the
document shall be released. Partial access is an important element of the ATD regime, as it
restricts the scope of exceptions to only cover the specifically excepted information of a
particular document. In certain circumstances, an institution might even be obliged to release
only a part of a document.539
An important element of an ATI regime is the cost of submitting a request. In the EU,
submitting a request for documents is free of charge. The only charges that can be incurred when
requesting documents are those that correspond to the cost of producing and sending copies. This
comes as no surprise as ATD has a human right status in the EU.
The scope of the Regulation extends the right of ATD to every citizen and resident in the EU.
The right of access extends even further, as the institutions by discretion540 may grant access to
any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a Member State.
This is expected considering that the EU has joined the Council of Europe’s Convention on
access to official documents. Its standards provide: first, the right belongs to everyone, without
discrimination on any ground (Article 2.1); second, there is no obligation to give reasons (Article
4.1); third, the person can remain anonymous except when disclosure of identity is essential in
processing the request (Article 4.2). The EU follows these standards strictly.
The timelines for processing ATD requests are strictly settled in Regulation 1049. According
to Article 7, institutions have fifteen working days to respond to access requests. This can be
extended with another fifteen days for cases relating to very long documents. In cases of refusals,
the applicants have fifteen days to make a “confirmatory application” to the institution to
reconsider the refusal. The institution has another fifteen days to either grant the information or
give reason for refusals. After refusals, applicants have two choices, they can either institute
court proceedings against the institution or make a complaint to the European Ombudsman.
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Hence, the Regulation provides a two-stage administrative procedure for application, followed
by the possibility to contest a refusal through the court or complaint to the Ombudsman.

A. Proposals for change of Regulation 1049
The debate over changes of Regulation 1049, or the so-called the recasting process is going
on for almost a decade. The Commission’s first proposal was in 2008541, another attempt came in
2011542, and the EP proposed amendments tabled by the Parliament on 11 March 2009543. The
Council and the Commission have come against the EP, with the latter tabling proposals to
increase access rights, and the former blocking them and “wishing to restrict in seemingly new
ways the right of access to documents and the manner that it has been implemented.”544 MEPs
viewed the Commission’s original proposed changes as a backwards step for transparency. But
the Parliament’s amendments to the bill were fiercely opposed by member states in the Council
of Ministers. The 2008 proposals to revise the regulation were blocked for so long, the EU’s
executive was forced to issue a second set of proposals in 2011 to bring the legislation in line
with the Lisbon Treaty, which had come into force in the meantime.

The main concerns are focused on normative definitions of what should be considered a
document, the scope and extent of exceptions, etc. The most far-reaching of the proposed
changes is to amend the definition of “document” so that no application for ATD drawn up by an
institution could be made unless that document had been “formally transmitted to one or more
recipients or otherwise registered.”545 Another proposed change would exclude any possibility of
public ATD that form part of the administrative file of an investigation or of proceedings
concerning an act of individual scope until the investigation has been closed or the act has
become definitive.546 The Commission also proposed to add two new exceptions to Article 4 -

541

Eur-Lex. COM(2008)229: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents. April 30, 2008
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com(2008)0229_/com_com(2008)0229_en.pdf
542
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents /*
COM/2011/0137 final, March 23, 2011, online:
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0137:FIN:EN:HTML>.
543
Philip Choppel QC, Information rights: law and practice, 3 rd eds, (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2010) at 99.
544
Maiani, Pasquier & Villeneuve, “Less Is More”, supra note 426 at 155-170.
545
This would be changing Article 3(a) of the Reg 1049.
546
Ibid.

151

the protection of “the environment, such as breeding sites of rare species”, with no possibility of
an overriding public interest in disclosure547 and the protection of “the objectivity and
impartiality of selection procedures”, subject to the possibility of an overriding public interest in
disclosure. This exception would apply to procedures for the award of contracts and for the
selection of staff. The exception for the protection of court proceedings and legal advice in
Article 4(2) would be expanded to include “arbitration and dispute settlement proceedings.”548
Regarding privacy and integrity of the Individual, the Commission also proposed to replace the
exception in Article 4(1)(b) by a new Article 4(5) based on the CJEU case Bavarian Lager. The
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has produced an opinion549, which is critical of the
Commission’s proposal.
These proposals would actually narrow the right of access550 and the scope of the Regulation.
One of the objectives “which seems to underlie the proposals, is to increase the institutions’
discretionary power to control the flow of information during the policy-making process.”551

5.3.3 The case of Albania
The Albanian case is interesting for this research since it offers new insights on how
transparency emerges in the legal framework and then normalizes in the legal system. This case
represents an interesting experiential pattern of the EU’s influence in transplanting transparency
through accession requirements. I have argued elsewhere that this influence has the potential to
ignite a new policy paradigm for transparency that I call “transparency through integration.”552
Albania is not yet a member in the EU, but it is a candidate from June 2014553. It was officially
recognized by the EU as a “potential candidate country”, when it started negotiations on a
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Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2003.554The SAA was successfully agreed
and signed on 12 June 2006, thus completing the first major step toward Albania’s full
membership in the EU. The SAA with Albania entered into force in April 2009 and that same
month Albania presented its application for membership in the EU. The deadline for the
fulfilment of all the commitments in the SAA is 31 March 2019. For Albania to be accepted as
an EU candidate, the European Commission has outlined twelve key priorities as identified in the
EU 2010 Opinion on the country’s European Union Membership Application.555 These
requirements and the Albanian’s aspirations to join the EU have deeply influenced the countries
approach towards democratization, and transparency as one of the pillars of democracy. As such,
the EU has served “as a catalyst for positive change on government transparency.”556
The principle of transparency is reflected in many legal provisions in Albania. FOI is
considered a fundamental human right in the Albanian legal framework. Article 23 of the
Albanian Constitution establishes the right to collect, receive and disseminate information557 and
specifically guarantees the right of access to government-held information. In addition, Article
56558 guarantees the right to be informed for the status of the environment and its protection.
Furthermore, Article 17559 of the Constitution provides for limitations on rights, but only in
accordance with the standards articulated in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
which Albania ratified in October 1996 and where FOI, including the right of ATI is a core
element of the broader right to freedom of expression. The principle of transparency is also
reflected on Article 20 of the Code of Administrative Procedures560.
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Albania was the first country in the region to adopt a law on ATI. The Law “On the Right to
Information on Official Documents”561 was adopted on 30 June 1999. This law was replaced by
Law 119 “On the Right to Information” in September 2014, and entered into force in November
of that year. This new law was congratulated for the advanced provisions of transparency and
safeguards of the right to ATI. Experts stated: “The New Right to Information Law of Albania, is
assessed by many experts as one of the most important steps taken towards transparency and
accountability, bringing the legislation in line with the best international standards in the region
and beyond.”562
Some of the sweeping changes introduced by the new law are:
-

The introduction of a more extensive definition of the term “public authority” extending
to commercial companies where the state holds the majority of shares, and entities that
exercise public functions (Article 2).

-

Proactive disclosure of information, according to well-designed transparency programs
which every public institution should have in place. These programs should be revised
every 5 years (Article 4 and 5). This includes publication of certain categories
information that are made public without request (Article 7).

-

The register of requests, which should be updates every three months and published at the
website of the public institution (Article 8).

-

The obligation for public authorities to designate a Coordinator for the Right to
Information, whose role is to supervise the authority’s responses to requests (Article 10).

-

Much shorter times for responding to information request, from 40 days (with the old
law) to 10 working days (Article 15). There is an extension of 5 days in specific cases.

the Code states: Every person participating in an administrative procedure has the right to be informed on and to
have access to the documents used during the procedure, unless limits defined by law. The right mentioned in the
first paragraph of this article may be exercised personally or through an authorized representative. The
administrative body, developing the administrative procedure, is obliged to grant information to the participants
concerning their rights and duties.
561
The Law on the Right to Information for Official Documents, No. 8503, 30 June 1999, online:
<http://hidaa.gov.al/english/pub/l_8503.htm>
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Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, “New Right to Information in Albania”, 7 November 2014,
online:<https://idfi.ge/en/new%E2%80%93freedom%E2%80%93of%E2%80%93ifnromation%E2%80%93legislati
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-

the creation of a new body, the Information Commissioner, which existed as the
Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data. Previously, the oversight of the access
law was attributed to the People’s Advocate (Article 24).

-

Heavy administrative sanctions for failure to respond to the requirements of the law
(Article 18). There are seventeen types of fines which go from $1500 - $3000 Cad in
value563.

In addition, the requests for information are free. According to Article 13, for hard copies
tariffs may apply only to cover the cost of reproduction of materials and delivery. The new law
also includes a number of new concepts, including reclassification of secret documents564, and
release of partial information and through maximal use of information technology.
All these provisions are very progressive considering the equivalent laws in Canada, and even
the EU. The Albanian law has the shortest deadlines, very wide coverage of public bodies, and
very high penalties for those who fail to implement the law by letter. What is the most striking
element in the law is the purpose clause in Article 1, which states: “The rules provided for in this
law intend to guarantee the recognition of a public’s right to information, in the framework of
exercising the rights and freedoms of individuals in practice, and the formation of ideas on the
state of the country and the society.” This provision is not found in any of the laws in focus for
this research. It resonates with the idea of the right to ATI as developed by Habermas in his
discursive theory of law. The law considers the right of ATI as one of the individual’s rights and
freedoms and looks at it from two perspectives, instrumentally, as facilitating the enjoyment of
other rights in practice, and intrinsically as an independent right which contributes to the
exchanging and shaping of ideas and views around much bigger issues such as those of state
affairs and the society. This second perspective is very compelling considering that it comes
from a country with a relatively short experience with democracy. This perspective appeals my
idea of the right of ATI as a human right that helps shaping persons in private lives as individuals
with right and freedoms, but also shaping citizens in the public sphere by facilitating the
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dissemination of information that contributes to forming views and actively participating in
influencing societal and political directions.
5.4 Comparison of the Canadian and the EU legal framework
Looking at the ATI legislation in the two jurisdictions, and the two case studies, one will
notice some significant differences. Table 6 below is a summary of the differences noticed from
the comparison between the ATI laws in Canada and the EU, and the two case studies.
First, the ATIA and the Regulation 1049 are guided by different principles. Regulation 1049
follows the Nordic approach concerning ATD, and establishes the principle of the widest
possible access as its central principle. The EU puts more emphasis on the principle of
transparency and openness which holds in itself a bigger mission – addressing issues of
democratic deficit in the EU, reducing the feeling of alienation towards the EU institutions
among the citizenry, filling the gap between the Union and its citizens, bringing them closer
together, and making them part of the decision-making process. Hence, the provisions of
Regulation 1049 have developed with the principles transparency, openness and democratic
participation at heart. The same purpose and mission is not evident at the ATIA and any
mentioning with regard to the above principles is missing. The aspirations when the Act was
introduced in 1980 were very similar, but then the final draft, did not include such language. The
ATIA did not show any other ambition, rather than extending the right of ATI to complement
other laws already in place. It looks like the inspiration for an ATI legislation came from the
same concerns in both Canada and the EU, but then developed in different directions.
This difference demonstrates the dynamics of every ATI legislation which emerge from
aspirations of widening democratic rights, but could only develop to truly protect those rights if
they are embraced by political power. ATI rights only become embedded in political traditions
by a strong advocacy in moments in history when politics need transparency for survival. Rubin
claimed that the law was only written because of popular demand and pressure (there was a
lobby group called ACCESS) would be pushing matters565.

Ken Rubin, “The myth of access to information”, The Hill Times, January 31, 2011, online:
<http://www.kenrubin.ca/articles/myth-of-access-to-information.pdf>.
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Second, the right of ATI has a higher status, and hence, a higher protection in the EU than in
Canada. ATI is a statutory right in Canada, recognized as quasi-constitutional by the courts. This
could be considered a positive development and a step forward on the recognition of the special
status of access rights, but it is not enough. There are arguments that the power of the ATIA as a
whole is often illusory because of a weak oversight body with only limited powers. The Ontario
case provides a model that addresses this weaknesses. In the EU, the right of access, has a
constitutional nature, as confirmed by the fact that it was reproduced in Article 42 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights. This upgrade in status has been made possible by the different treaties in
the EU that put ATD together with the principle of transparency at the heart of the EU law. The
right of ATD emerged in the EU project as a right of citizenship, which would allow citizens of
the Member States to become citizens of the Union, as it is clearly established in Article 10 (2)
of the revised Treaty of the European Union.566 The Albanian case offers another example of a
constitutional protection of the right to ATI. Its law has been upgraded to reflect this status and
has a compelling purpose clause which appeals to an ideal right of ATI instrumentally and
intrinsically.
Differences in the content of the laws are a result of the status they hold in the hierarchy of
legal norms – the higher the status, the higher the protection. Four elements are a reflection of
the difference in status of the ATI rights:
a. The time limits available to respond to requests. At the EU requests of access should be
processed “promptly”(Article 7 and 8 of Regulation 1049) or without undue delay within 15
working days with a possibility for extension for 15 days. In Albania this time is 10 working
days with an extension of 5 days. In Canada, this time is 30 days567 with the possibility of
extension for “a reasonable period of time” in case of complex cases. The same provisions are
found in the FIPPA. Of course, what is considered to be “reasonable” is a matter of subjectivity
which leads to inconsistencies in timelines within government institutions. Long delays in
responses are a big concern because they cause a depreciation of the value of information.
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Article 10 par. 2 of the Treaty of the European Union states: Citizens are directly represented at Union level in
the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or
Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national
Parliaments, or to their citizens.
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Section 7 of ATIA
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Darbishire argues that information “is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication even
for a short period may well deprive it of all value and interest.”568

b. The range of persons to whom a right of ATI is granted. The right of ATI in Canada is given
on the basis of citizenship or residency. Non-residents cannot file access requests. In the EU the
right is enjoyed by everyone. Non-residents seem to be excluded, but the EU institutions have
never applied the existing distinction to the detriment of non-residents, implicitly acknowledging
the inconsistency of the distinction. In Albania, the right is extended to everyone, even the
stateless persons. Indeed, if ATI has a fundamental nature, then the exclusion of non-resident
aliens is questionable.

c. The difference in the rules for exemptions. It is often argued that the success of an access
regime depends on the clarity of its exceptions – when exemptions to access rights are set up
clearly in the law, there is no room for abuse of discretionary power. In the EU, mandatory
exemptions are listed clearly, so that there will not be exceptions to the rule (Article 4(1)). For
other exemptions (Article 4(2) and (3)), a three part harm test is established to consider in any
case when discretionary power would be exercised. A general public interest override test was
also found in the FIPPA. Such test does not apply to the ATIA. Instead, injury-test and class-test
exemptions are set up with most of the discretionary exemptions free from the application of
public interest test. Furthermore, there is some overlapping in some provisions, which adds
difficulty to the clarity of provisions and complicates the application of the act.

d. The range of institutions covered. In the EU, the Regulation 1049 regulates public access to
the EP, Council and Commission documents, in addition to all other agencies which were
included after the Lisbon Treaty. In Canada, all courts, the Parliament, the Prime Minister’s
Office and ministerial offices are excluded from the access regime. Similar coverage was in
place for the FIPPA. This wide range of exclusions has drawn lots of criticism among ATI
advocates who have come forward with proposals for amendments of the ATIA.
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Third, the recent developments in ATI legislation in both jurisdictions reveal the tensions that
exist around issues of transparency and ATI. They demonstrate that any advancement in ATI
comes through tough political battles. In the EU, amendments to Regulation 1049 have been
delayed for years because of the tensions between the main EU institutions. In Canada,
amendments to the ATIA are not going anywhere because of the little support they have from the
political class. Trying to explain the hostility towards ATI laws, Roberts argued that FOI laws
are political creatures - although in the long run they significantly improve governance, they do
not represent an immediate benefit for those who are in power, and ATI laws depend heavily on
the predispositions of the political executives and officials who are required to administer it.569
Having examined the legal requirements for ATI in both countries, one can notice that they
offer opportunities and challenges for all actors involved. Despite their weaknesses ATI laws
provide a starting point towards a wider recognition of ATI rights. Of course, better laws make a
better start, but they do not guarantee a successful access rights regime in and on themselves.
Sometimes the gap between law and practice is surprisingly much wider than expected, and
deeply affects law implementation.

569

Roberts 2002, at 176.
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CHAPTER 6: INFORMATION VS PRIVACY – A CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL
DISCOURSE

This chapter makes an analysis of the rights of privacy and ATI in Canada and the EU. As I
explained in the previous chapter, one of the main exceptions for ATI in both jurisdictions is for
reasons of privacy. In addition, privacy contains an element of ATI since it gives individuals a
right to access their personal information.
The purpose of the chapter is to shed some light on issues surrounding the rights of ATI and
privacy, their interactions, and when they complement and/or conflict each other. In doing so, I
engage with some definitional analysis of ATI and privacy and then look at the legal provisions
to understand what they have to offer for a harmonization of both rights.

As argued previously in this research, transparency and ATI come with the expectation that
information held by the government should be openly accessible to the public. In the meantime,
we all want that our personal information remains private and be protected. Governments
nowadays are vast storehouses of information, including information about individuals gathered
from different sources. Tom Onyshko argued more than ten years ago that “the federal
government has probably become the single largest collector of personal information in
Canada.”570 In this context, two rights are at stake, the right of ATI, and the right of privacy of
the persons to whom information belongs. In this case, there is a need to reconcile the twin
objectives of these rights, but to do so, one needs to know where to draw the line between public
and private information. Sometimes, drawing that line is a tough choice to make, since these
“boundaries…. have been moving targets for several generations.”571 To engage with this
analysis one first needs to know: what is privacy?

6.1 Conceptualization of privacy
Privacy is broadly defined in many disciplines, taking different approaches. Privacy also
means many things for different people and different things for the same person in different
Onyshko, “The FCC & ATIA”, supra note 244 at 102.
Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information? From Privacy to Public Access (New York: BasicBooks,
1994) at 8 [Branscomb].
570
571
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contexts. Indeed, as BeVier argues “Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to
designate a range a wildly disparate interests.”572 Many scholars and academics have given
different definitions on privacy. For instance, going far back to John Locke, he looks at privacy
as man having property on his own person and products of his labour.573 Later on, “The right to
Privacy”574 was a profound beginning toward developing a conception of privacy as the “right to
be let alone”. Post referred to privacy as a black hole that causes headache to those studying it.
He admitted that “Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory
dimensions, so engorged with various distinct meanings, so that I sometimes despair whether it
can be usefully addressed at all.”575
In the legal and philosophical discourse privacy is described to be in “chaos”.576 In the legal
context, Hulett argues that “the greatest difficulty in this area is the ambiguous nature of
privacy.”577 He talks about the existence of a constitutional right to privacy, and refers to privacy
as a newly emerging constitutional right (although not included in the Constitution) without a
clear legal definition. Although Hulett writes on the American context, the same situation applies
in Canada regarding the constitutional status of privacy. Privacy is not explicitly mentioned in
the Canadian Constitution, although it is recognized to have a constitutional status.

Some Canadian scholars have contributed to the legal discourse on privacy. For instance,
Bruyer introduced an innovative idea on addressing privacy issues. He argues that “Privacy… is
conceived as an equality issue, not a liberty issue. Perhaps at its core privacy protects and
ensures equality in the sense that we are all entitled to equal concern and respect as individuals,
and not that we are entitled to do as we please.”578 This idea is especially compelling if we
Lillian R. BeVier, “Information about individuals in the hands of Government: Some reflections on Mechanisms
for privacy protection” (1995-1996) 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 455 at 458 [BeVier].
573
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Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 [Warren &
Brandeis].
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Robert C. Post, “Three Concepts of Privacy” (2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2087 at 2087 [Post].
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consider privacy a societal rather than an individual value, an approach taken by some authors
mentioned in this article. Another Canadian scholar, Brown, recognizes the chaos that exists in
the legal literature around privacy by emphasizing the consequences in understanding cases
when privacy is invaded. He writes: “Because no single version can possibly claim common
assent…. We have no reference point to determine whether “privacy” has been “breached”579.
This is a concern for the public officials dealing with privacy cases, and as I will explain later in
this article, a challenge for the courts as well.
According to Solove, “Privacy is a sweeping concept encompassing (among other things)
freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over information
about oneself, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from
searches and interrogations.”580 Solove adds a very interesting facet to the definition of privacy.
He goes further of what people think about their own privacy saying that “Privacy…is not
simply a matter of individual prerogative; it is also an issue of what society deems appropriate to
protect.”581 Similarly, he argues that privacy “is an aspect of social structure, an architecture of
information regulation.”582. A comparable approach was taken by Allen-Castellito who also
argues that “Privacy involves not only individual control, but also the social regulation of
information.”583 Another scholar, Penney, offers a taxonomy in studying privacy focusing in
economic and moral aspects of the term. Penney argues that “privacy is described in relation to
the discrete interests that it protects.”584

Solove advances a theory on how to reconcile the tension between transparency and privacy.
He contends that information privacy must be re-conceptualized in the context of public
records.585 What he offers is a taxonomy of privacy which serves the purpose of studying and
approaching privacy while competing with other values such as ATI.
Russell Brown, “Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation and Tort Law” (2006) 43:3 Alberta Law
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For the purpose of this chapter I focus on a particular aspect of privacy, one that encapsulates
its meaning in the Privacy Act586 and ATIA587 – the informational privacy. This term is first
introduced by Westin in 1967 and describes privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.”588 Similarly, the Canadian Federal Privacy Commissioner (PCC)
defines informational privacy as “the right of an individual to exercise control over the
collection, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information.”589

6.2 Debates on the dichotomy access to information-privacy
At the first sight, it seems like the rights of ATI and personal privacy are always in conflict
since the former gives the right to ATI held by the government and the latter prevents the ATI
pertaining to individuals held by the government. However, these two rights in most of the cases
complement each other. There are many scholars who support this argument. Banisar argues that
“RTI [right to information] and Privacy often play complementary roles. Both are focused on
ensuring the accountability of powerful institutions to individuals in the information age.”590
O’Brien contends that “although informational privacy and access to governmental information
appear contrary and point in opposite directions, they are conceptually complementary and the
nexus between the two is information flow.”591 Indeed, the purpose of privacy provisions is to
protect the privacy and provide individuals with a right of access to their information held by the
government. In this context, Julie Innes discusses, “Privacy might not necessarily be opposed to
publicity; its function might be to provide the individual with control over certain aspects of her
life.”592 However, it is not uncommon that privacy and access rights may come into conflict with
each other. As Ann Cavoukian, former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
(IPCO), contends “Government-held public data may contain the personal information that
586
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relates to businesses, or may contain the personal information of identifiable individuals.”593
Both business and personal information cannot be disclosed unless there is a public interest that
overrides the private one. In these circumstances conflicts are expected to arise. The graph below
simplifies the relationship between the rights of privacy and ATI, and the situation when they
collide

Protecting
personal
data

Access to
government
information

Source: David Banisar, The right to Information and Privacy: Balancing Rights and Managing Conflicts, World
Bank Institute-Governance Working Papers Series, 2011, Figure 3.1, at 9.

Some misperceptions on the use of these two pieces of legislation have created tension in the
application of their provisions. Carlson and Miller argue that “FOIAs create a presumption that
all public records, including those containing personal information, shall be available for public
inspection.”594 In addition, some arguments arise in relation to the reasonable expectation of
privacy. According to the IPCO “Many would argue that once personal information has been
made public, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy relating to that information, and
therefore, privacy protection rules no longer apply.”595 Solove talks in this sense about a “secrecy
paradigm” drawing attention to the assertion that “private” means “secret” (which he criticizes).
He urges for an abandonment of the “longstanding notion that there is no claim to privacy when
information appears in a public record.”596 In this context he calls for a reconceptualization of
informational privacy.

This problem is reduced with the inclusion of exemptions in both Acts. For instance, Onyshko
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observes that in the ATIA “The personal information exemption seeks to reconcile the claim of
individual privacy with the benefit of broad public access.”597 O’Brien argues in this regard that
“Privacy Act allows for disclosure in the public interest of only certain kinds of information,
while the Freedom of Information Act allows for invasions of privacy by disclosures of personal
information if a public need is established.”598

An important principle of privacy protection is that personal information acquired for one
purpose should not be used for another purpose without the consent of the individual to whom
the information concerns. However, in many cases personal information finds its way out to the
public domain by different means. This can become unpredictable since, as O’Brien argues, the
problem is exacerbated “by the ambiguous nature of the information control and the absence of
any specific constitutional guarantee of either personal privacy or right of access.”599
Furthermore, with the use of technology being significantly intensified, information has become
a commodity in the market of goods and ideas. The IPCO contends that “Personal information
has become a commodity that is being bought and sold by companies, almost entirely at the
expense of personal privacy.”600 This is a non-anticipated consequence of access laws because,
as Branscomb puts it, “Commercialization of the information is in conflict with established
notions about the right of individuals to privacy.”601
These situations are not easy to manage by the public officials602 in charge of handling
information requests. They often find themselves in the middle of two fires. O’Brien observes
that in some cases “Administrators have two options: they may refuse to disclose information
and risk a lawsuit under FOI by the party denied access, or they may disclose the information
and risk a suit under the Privacy Act by the individual whose file was released.”603 This is not a
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comfortable position to be in, especially if someone is making decisions on these grounds on a
daily basis. In order to make fair decisions one needs to have detailed guidelines in the
laws/policies/regulations or some sort of directions which should be unified across all
government departments to assure consistency. I will return to this problem later in section III
when I analyse the legal framework.

More than three decades ago, in 1982, McCamus identified a problem with the balance
between between privacy and ATI. He asked “If, at all, can these two conflicting values be
reconciled?”604, and answered that under the Canadian federal legislation reconciliation of access
and privacy values is left essentially to the discretion of public officials.605 McCamus found it
problematic that the Canadian law addressed the conflict between access and privacy by simply
subduing it to the administrative discretion. He argued that in following this approach, the
Canadian scheme risked to undermine both the access rights conferred by the ATIA and the
degree of privacy protection afforded by the Privacy Act. Indeed, in applying this scheme it is
expected that the resolution of conflicts between privacy and access rights will not be consistent
throughout government administration since different public officials will decide differently
based on their perception of the value of these rights. In my view, this inconsistency stems from
the conceptual chaos that exists in the Canadian legal framework where privacy and information
may take many faces. McCamus further argues that the situation becomes even riskier when
public officials find themselves in a situation of a conflict of interest when they are asked to
disclose information about their offices or colleagues which might enable tangible public
assessment of their performance.606 In this context, it is anticipated that access to records will be
denied in order to prevent appropriate scrutiny of public affairs on the excuse that disclosure will
unfairly violate the privacy of the individuals involved. Similar assertion was made by Banisar
about 30 years later who observed that “A conflict sometimes arises when government officials
attempt to shield their decision-making from scrutiny by misinterpreting their demand for
secrecy as a privacy interest.”607
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McCamus raised two important questions: First, one of institutional design: In what
institutional forum should conflicts of access and privacy be resolved - courts, legislature or
bureaucracy? Second, what guidance should be given to those dealing with the resolution of such
conflicts? He points out that the American response to the first question is: the courts through
judicial review. However, the Canadian response has been to rely on administrative discretion.608
McCamus identifies a significant problem with this response – the bureaucrats having a lot of
discretion and not much guidance do not provide an adequate institutional design to maintain the
“delicate balance” between the two rights. To address McCamus’s concerns a careful analysis of
the available legal provisions is necessary.

6.3 Legal framework of privacy in Canada

6.3.1 Charter Status of Privacy
Canadians do not enjoy an explicit constitutional right to privacy since the Charter does not
specifically include such right. There have been some early unsuccessful attempts to include
privacy in the Charter. For instance, in the Special Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee
on the Constitution in 1981, the Honorable David Crombie proposed the inclusion of a
constitutional right of privacy in the Canadian Charter. This amendment was defeated by a vote
of fourteen to ten.609 Nevertheless, a whole body of case law has developed in Canada around the
status of privacy which recognizes that privacy is protected under the Charter indirectly through
sections 7610 and 8611. Many Supreme Court of Canada decisions acknowledge that privacy is
protected under the Charter. According to Khullar and Cosco “The Supreme Court has … linked
the right to privacy with human dignity, liberty and security in its reflections on the s. 7 of the
Charter.”612
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The cases discussed below make the assertion that privacy is a constitutional right. In
Beare613, Justice LaForest expressed “considerable sympathy”614 for the proposition that section
7 includes a right to privacy. The same approach was taken by Justice Wilson in Morgentaler615
where section 7 was recognized to grant “the individual a degree of autonomy in making
decisions of fundamental personal importance.”616 Justice McLachlin (dissenting) in Rodriguez617
acknowledged that “security of the person, [is] a concept which encompasses the notions of dignity
and the right to privacy.”618 In addition, he argued that “Security of the person has an element of
personal autonomy, protecting the dignity and privacy of individuals with respect to decisions
concerning their own body. It is part of the persona and dignity of the human being that he or she
have the autonomy to decide what is best for his or her body.”619
Justice LaForest again in Godbout620emphasized his position held in Beare, and reiterated his
general view that “the right to liberty enshrined in s. 7 of the Charter protects within its ambit
the right to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently
private choices free from state interference.”621 Same observations about privacy as reflected in
s. 7 of the Charter are made in Children’s Aid Society622 where the Court recognized that “In a
free and democratic society, the individual must be left room for personal autonomy to live his or
her own life and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance.”623

Section 7 of the Charter protects informational privacy which means that the liberty and
security interests are related to the freedom to engage on private and personal communications
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without being observed upon. This association was made clear in O’Connor624 in which Chief
Justice Lamer and Justice Sopinka referred to the “constitutional right to privacy” in information
stating that “a constitutional right to privacy extends to information contained in many forms of
third party records.”625 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, specifically located the reasonable expectation
of privacy in the liberty and security interest in section 7 of the Charter. She made a good
analysis of the “Right to Privacy” in paragraphs 110-199 and explained that “Respect for
individual privacy is an essential component of what it means to be “free”. As a corollary, the
infringement of this right undeniably impinges upon an individual's “liberty” in our free and
democratic society.”626 The Supreme Court of Canada has discussed the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” in its decision in the case of Hunter627. Similar observation was made in Ryan628,
where the court recognized that the liberty and security protected in section 7 encompasses the
right to privacy. The court reiterated that “In its s. 7 jurisprudence, it has expressed great
sympathy with the notion that liberty and security of the person involve privacy interests. That
privacy is essential to human dignity, a basic value underlying the Charter, has also been
recognized.”629 When addressing privacy and access legislation in Dagg630 Justice LaForest
explained the importance of privacy describing it as a “fundamental value….grounded on
physical and moral autonomy- freedom to engage on one’s own thoughts, actions and
decisions.”631 Furthermore, in Lavigne632 the Court recognized the constitutional value of privacy
and the quasi-constitutional status of the Privacy Act.

All the above cases acknowledged that section 7 protects the right of privacy. In addition,
there are other cases that recognize privacy as a constitutional right protected under section 8.
Khullar and Cosco argue that “The right of privacy is not only a human right, it is a human right
protected by the Charter....The right to privacy, particularly informational privacy, is frequently
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addressed under section 8 of the Charter.”633 In Hunter634, the Supreme Court made it clear that
section 8 protection against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to privacy.635 In
Dyment636 Justice LaForest held that the underlying purpose of the section 8 is to protect the
right to privacy which is more than just a physical right as it includes the privacy in information
about oneself. He states that there are “reasonable expectations of the individual that the
information shall remain confidential to the persons.”637 Furthermore in Tessling638 the Supreme
Court confirmed that privacy is the “dominate organizing principle”639 in an analysis under
section 8 of the Charter, and distinguished between three kinds of privacy “personal privacy,
territorial privacy and informational privacy.”640 In Mills641 the Court refers to Hunter as the first
case to recognize that section 8 protects the right to privacy642, and makes an analysis of privacy
in paragraphs 77-89. In Duarte643 the Supreme Court also recognized that section 8 promotes
values by protecting the right to control the dissemination of information about oneself.
Moreover, in Dagg the Court refers to privacy as “worthy of constitutional protection, at least in
so far as it is encompassed by the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under
s. 8.”644

As noted in Chapter 5, ATI is not protected under the Charter, and except for a limited
recognition under section 2(b) there is no agreement in the case law that suggests that such
protection exists. On the contrary, the right of privacy is widely recognized by the Supreme
Court of Canada jurisprudence that it is protected under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. This
observation of the constitutional status of the two rights is significant since it helps to understand
which of them will take precedence in cases of conflict. The uneven protection of the rights of
ATI and privacy in Canada has its ramifications in the implementation of the respective Acts.
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6.3.2 Exploring the Privacy Act and its interaction with the Access to Information Act

The Canadian Privacy Act and the ATIA were part of the same Bill (C-43) and both came into
effect at the same time in 1983. The Supreme Court in has characterized both acts as “quasiconstitutional” because of the role they play in the preservation of a free and democratic society.
The purpose of the Privacy Act, as it is enshrined in section 2, is to “protect the privacy of
individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by a government
institution and that provide individuals with a right of access to that information.”645 The Act
does not contain any definition of “privacy”. Instead, it defines “personal information” as
“information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form”646. This definition is
broad and contains examples of personal information. Obviously, this definition does not offer a
good reference to understand the complexity of privacy, and its interactions with other rights.
This was noticed shortly after the law was passed. The Report of the Standing Committee on
Justice and Solicitor General in 1987 recognized that “This problem of lack of definition of the
central concept of privacy is endemic in data protection legislation.”647 The definition of
“personal information” is followed by a lengthy list (twelve elements) of what constitutes
personal information for the purpose of this legislation. This list cannot encompass all cases of
personal information the governments deal with in their everyday operations. However,
information not specifically mentioned in the list but clearly covered by the broad definition, is
to be considered personal information.

The Privacy Act imposes obligations on how the government must handle personal
information. As the PCC puts it “The Privacy Act ….imposes obligations on some 250 federal
government departments and agencies to respect privacy rights by limiting the collection, use
and disclosure of personal information.”648 There is another act on privacy in Canada, PIPEDA
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(Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act)649 , which regulates privacy in
the private sector. This Chapter does not engage with PIPEDA.

If we now look at the ATIA, personal information is part of the mandatory exemptions, and
found in section 19, which states: “the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose
any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as defined in section 3 of
the Privacy Act.”650 However, this section allows for information to be disclosed if it is requested
by the person to whom it relates; it is publically available, and in accordance to section 8 of the
Privacy Act.651 The purpose of section 19 of the ATIA is to strike a balance between the right of
ATI in records under the control of a government institution and the right of each individual to
his or her privacy. Section 19 incorporates by reference section 3 and 8 of the Privacy Act, which
are essential for the interpretation and application of this exemption. According to the TBS, the
application of section 19 of the ATIA requires a three-step process:
1. Establish that the information falls within the definition of personal information found in
section 3 of the Privacy Act.
2. Ensure that paragraphs 3(j), (k), (l) and (m) of the definition of personal information do
not apply to permit the disclosure of the personal information.
3. Exercise discretion as to whether the information may nonetheless be disclosed under
subsection 19(2) of the ATIA652
Subsection 19(1) is a mandatory exemption based on a class test that provides that, subject to
the three exceptions in subsection 19(2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to
disclose any record requested under the ATIA containing personal information as defined in
section 3 of the Privacy Act.
Just like in the ATIA, there are a few exemptions in the Privacy Act, as well. They are listed in
section 8, and permit disclosure for eleven exceptions. The last one, section 8(2)(m)(i) includes
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the public interest, which allows for disclosure of personal information by the head of the
institution if “the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that
could result from the disclosure.”653 Regarding this section, the PCC clarifies that “The provision
is applied in unique, fact-specific situations. It is not designed to deal with the disclosure of
personal information on a systematic or routine basis. Rather, it is an important section in the Act
which provides institutions with a tool they may need to effectively balance an individual’s right
to privacy with the public’s need to know.”654 This argument is premised on the idea that the two
Acts complement each other, no one takes precedent over the other, and they are to be read
together.

Indeed, section 8(2)(m)(i) is a very significant provision that deals with balancing the right of
privacy against access when a public interest is involved. The principle of “public interest
override” takes precedence over the protection of privacy when the two conflict each other. This
demonstrates the importance of these two values in the Canadian legal system. But, establishing
a “public interest” may become problematic since has to satisfy two criteria: first it has to be
proven it exits, and second, it has to outweigh privacy. According to the subsection (m) of
section 8 of the Privacy Act, this responsibility falls on the head of the institution. Even if the
public interest is evident, how can one say when it outweighs privacy? There clearly is a need
for a balancing exercise in these circumstances, so the question to ask is: how will the process of
balancing be pursued? There are no additional provisions in either acts on how this process
happens, and what rules should be taken into account when deciding on the “public interest”.
Therefore, the decision on the “public interest override” falls under the discretion of the head of
the institution processing requests. As Karzmieski argued “government officials exercise
discretion at almost every stage of the access process.”655
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The Supreme Court has described the two Acts as a “seamless code with complementary
provisions that can and should be interpreted harmoniously.”656 This means that neither Act can
be read without the other. In other words, privacy provisions have exceptions about information
that falls under ATIA, and the ATIA provisions have exceptions about information that falls
under the Privacy Act. The complexity of these exceptions in both statutes is not always easy to
disentangle. It is challenging to classify information that is covered under the ATIA if it falls
under any of the exceptions, including privacy. That is the reason some scholars have debated on
the complexity of ATI Acts. For instance, Antonia Scalia has labelled FOI laws as the Taj Mahal
of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences.657 Similarly, Beall argued that “one of the
continuing themes spicing the reams of literature on FOIA has been the view that the Act opened
a Pandora’s jar of unintended consequences.”658

The leading case regarding the interaction between the two rights is Dagg, a the Supreme
Court case, which ruled that once it is determined that a record falls within the definition of
“personal information” in s. 3 of the Privacy Act, it is not necessary to consider whether it is also
encompassed by one of the specific, non-exhaustive examples set out in paragraphs (a) to (i).659
However, in some cases, it is necessary to refer to paragraphs (a) to (i) of the definition to
determine to whom the personal information belongs – for example, views and opinions of
individuals, which are discussed in paragraphs (e), (g) and (h) of the definition.

6.4 The legal framework of privacy in the EU

The current EU privacy rules originate from Convention No. 108, adopted within the Council
of Europe in Strasbourg in 1981660. This Convention has proved to be very influential in the
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shaping of data protection law at domestic level in Europe and it is still the only international
treaty on data protection. The Convention is currently ratified by all EU Member States.
Europeans value their privacy as one of the most important individual rights. The Eurobarometer
survey, conducted in March 2015, asked 28,000 EU citizens what they think about the protection
of their personal data. The survey showed that the protection of personal data remains a very
important concern for citizens.661 Based on this incentive, an entire edifice of privacy protection
was built to improve the information flow between Member States. In 1995, the EU adopted
Directive 95/46662. This is the equivalent of the PIPEDA in Canada and deals with information
processed by private companies. Pursuant to Article 286 EC, Directive 95/46 was transposed in
2001 into a regulation on the processing of personal data, Regulation 45/2001663. This is the
equivalent of the Canadian Privacy Act and governs the information processed by the EU
institutions.

6.4.1 The Charter status of privacy and Treaty provisions

Protection of informational privacy in Europe is dealt with primarily by means of data
protection laws, the purpose of which is to set standards for the handling of personal information.
Privacy and data protection are however distinguishable. They are protected by separate
provisions in the EU Charter. Privacy falls under Article 7 of the Charter “Respect for private
and family life” which states “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family
life, home and communications.” Data protection falls under Article 8 “Protection of personal
data” which states “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or
her” (Article 8.1). Additionally, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects the
right of privacy under Article 8 “Right to respect for private and family life” which states
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.” (Article 8.1). Furthermore, data protection also received a major boost from the
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inclusion in the Lisbon treaty, and then Article 16 of the TFEU, which provides that “everyone
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them.”664

However, the distinction between data protection and privacy is often blurred in practice, since
both rights are closely connected and even overlap each other to a very high extent. The courts
have opted for a broad scope of the right of privacy which extends further than the notion of
respect for private and family life of Article 7 of the Charter. The jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for example, though it is based on the right to respect for
private life found in Article 8 of the ECHR665, has sometimes relied on data protection
instruments. They include Convention No.108 and the Directive to determine the scope of that
right in the information privacy context. Indeed, according to Krananborg, the scope of “private
life” in Article 8 “seems to be on a par with the scope of data protection”666.

Decisions involving a conflict of ATI and privacy in the EU have as their starting point the
relevant articles of the Charter, which include not just Article 42 (regarding the right of ATD of
the EU institutions) and Articles 7 (concerning the protection of private life/privacy), but also
Article 8 (concerning data protection). They must also take account of the requirement of Article
52(3)667 of the Charter to interpret those rights from the point of view of their ECHR
counterparts thus requiring an examination of the Charter rights from the point of view of both
Article 8 (privacy) and Article 10 (FOI found under the Freedom of expression) of the ECHR.

A recent example in the EU where an extensive exercise of balancing the right of privacy and
the right to know is the Google case.668 The CJEU upheld that internet companies like Google
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have to accommodate requests to remove certain personal information from their search engine
results.669 In this case, the information was picked by Google from the website of a Spanish
public body regarding two legitimate announcements for insolvency. In its reasoning of the case,
the Court made several references to Articles 7 (Private and family life) and 8 (Protection of
personal data) of the EU Charter. This served as a reminder “about the value of information in
society, which…. help us make informed decisions in our public and private lives.”670

6.4.2 Exploring Regulation 45 and its interactions with Regulation 1049
Regulation 45 was adopted with a clear objective, laid out in Article 1 as having two
purposes:
- for the institutions and bodies [...] to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data,
- to neither restrict, nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between themselves or to
recipients subject to [the principles of the data protection directive.

There are several articles in the Regulation 45 that might have a strong effect in their
application when they are cross-referenced with the provisions of Regulation 1049. First, Article
5 has four requirements which state:

Personal data may be processed only if:
(a) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest on the
basis of the Treaties
(b) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is
subject, or
(c) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party
(d) the data subject has unambiguously given his or her consent
This article plays an instrumental role when it comes to public disclosure of personal data as
it defines whether such an act may be legitimate or not. The two first elements of the Article (a
and b) recognize the fact that a public administration or body is sometimes obliged to disclose
personal data. Therefore, the data protection regulation opens up to an interpretation according to
669
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Regulation 1049. In case Regulation 1049 requires disclosure, Article 5 does not constitute an
obstacle.
Second, Article 8 requires that personal data shall only be transferred to recipients subject to
the national law:
(a) if the recipient establishes that the data are necessary for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest or subject to the exercise of public authority, or
(b) if the recipient establishes the necessity of having the data transferred and if there is no
reason to assume that the data subject's legitimate interests might be prejudiced.
Article 8(b) is an illustration of the tension between the data protection regulation and the
public access regulation, and moreover between the different objectives of the two regulations. A
literal interpretation of the text would lead to a result which seriously impairs the effectiveness of
the Regulation 1049. Such a result could not have been envisaged by the Community legislature.
This subsection presupposes that the recipient of a document containing personal data establishes
why he needs access to it. However, ATD is given to enable citizens to participate more closely
in the democratic process. As such, it is essential to this objective that the citizen does not have
to establish any specific interest in the disclosure of a document.

Therefore, subsection sub-section 8(b) has to be interpreted in the light of the objectives of
the relevant provisions of both the Regulation 45 and the Regulation 1049. On the one hand,
Article 2 of the Regulation 1049 gives the EU citizens a legally enforceable right to ATD. On the
other hand, Article 8(b), merely envisages the protection of the data subject, in cases when the
disclosure of the data is in itself allowed according to the provisions of Community law on data
processing. In such cases the transfer of the data in itself would normally not prejudice a
persons’s legitimate interests. In other words, if the transfer of personal data is allowed by the
other provisions of Regulation 45, Article 8(b) cannot restrict disclosure.

These considerations lead to the following interpretation: in cases where data are transferred
to give effect to Article 2 of the Regulation 1049, and provided that the disclosure of the data is
allowed according to the provisions of Community law on data processing, the necessity of
having the data transferred is by definition established. Moreover, such a transfer cannot
prejudice the legitimate interest of the data subject. In other words, a necessary transfer cannot
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prejudice legitimate interests, taken into account the conditions and safeguards provided by
Regulation 1049.

If we now look at Regulation 1049, Article 4 (1) (b) is cross-referenced with Regulation 45
because the relevant rules on data protection referred to in this provision are laid down in
Regulation 45. Article 4(1)(b) provides that:
“1. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the
protection of:
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community
legislation regarding the protection of personal data.”
This provision must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, where three elements need to be
taken into account:

1- the mere fact that a document mentions personal data does not automatically mean that the
privacy and integrity of a person are affected. It should be proved that the privacy and the
integrity of the data subject must be at stake.
2- the words “would undermine” imply that the protection of the privacy and integrity of an
individual must be harmed. The level of harm needed for the applicability of the exception to
public access is not mentioned. However, the wording “undermining” implies that the effect on
the interest of the data subject should be substantial. Hence, it should be proved that the public
access must substantially affect the data subject.
3- the harm done to a person's privacy and integrity should be examined in accordance with
community legislation regarding the protection of personal data. The prime sources of
community legislation regarding the protection of personal data are Directive 95/46/EC and
Regulation (EC) 45/2001. Hence, public access can only be given if this is allowed by the data
protection legislation.

The interaction between Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049 and Article 8(b) of Regulation 45
has been extensively interpreted in the Bavarian Lager671, a guiding privacy case of the CJEU.
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The decision clarified the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049 which must be
interpreted as a direct referral to the data protection regulation, without any threshold. Moreover,
the Court is clear about the fact that names may be regarded as “personal data” and that the
communication of such data falls within the definition of “processing” in the sense of Regulation
45. In case of a public access request for a document containing personal data, such as in the
Bavarian Lager case, the rules on data protection are entirely applicable, with Article 8(b) having
crucial importance.

6.5 Comparisons and conclusions

The comparisons of the rights of privacy and ATI in Canada and the EU demonstrate the
tensions and the challenges that exist in implementing ATI laws. In Canada, ATI and privacy do
conflict each other on a regularly basis as the data shows. Over the years the number of privacy
exemptions under the ATIA has grown exponentially (see Tables 4 and 5).

Scholarly debates describe privacy as an individual right rooted in traditional liberal
thought672, based upon premises of individualism existing to promote the worth and the dignity
of the individual.673 Similarly, privacy has been described as inherently personal and as a right
which recognizes the sovereignty of the individual674. As such, the rationale for information
privacy, is most commonly articulated in terms of personal rights. It is often conceived of as a
civil liberty of negative nature and as human right which protects individual autonomy and/or
human dignity675. Such categorization of the right of privacy makes it a strong competitor to the
right of ATI.
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A conceptual analysis of the notions of privacy and information validates the concerns of the
legal practitioners. Chief Justice of Canada McLachlin admitted that “it is logically impossible to
give both rights a dominant position. On the one hand, as a ‘right’, one would expect the right to
personal privacy to be understood broadly. On the other hand, because personal privacy is cast as
an exception to the right of access to government information, it must be interpreted
narrowly”.676 In Canada, the structure of the ATIA and Privacy Act mirrors the inherent tension
between the public’s right to ATI, and the individual’s right to restrict the disclosure of
information for privacy reasons. Indeed, the legislator’s choice to enact these two pieces of
legislation together, to draft them so that they share definitions and exemptions, to design them
as a “seamless code”, places this tension at the heart of any interpretative exercise of the Acts677.

The Canadian legal framework has established a constitutional privacy right, but does not
grant such status to the right of ATI. This right has been slower to develop in that direction, and
it has not yet reached the same degree of acceptance constitutionally. The statutory scheme
establishes a far-reaching domain of discretionary power which creates the risk that access to
records will be denied in order to preclude appropriate scrutiny of public affairs on the pretext
that disclosure will unfairly invade the privacy of data subjects678. The three-step test applied to
the section 19 of the ATIA, include discretion as the last step of the test. Therefore, the dominant
approach in Canada will be to deny requests if there is even a small risk that disclosure of the
information may cause even minor harm to a protected interest. The requirement of harm to a
protected interest is not interpreted rigorously, as it should be to override a fundamental human
right. The public interest override in section 19 is applied only where there is a clearly dominant
interest in the information in question, and not at all for exceptions such as privacy. For this
reason Canada, has been criticized of going “far beyond keeping private lives private…. This
slavish devotion to privacy chokes off information that really should be public.”679
In the EU, both privacy and ATI rights have a constitutional status recognized in treaties, the
Charter and the Convention. This gives them equal footing when conflicting with each other. The
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two Regulation governing each rights have a wider and more complex relationship with each
other, with manyArticles referring to each other. The three-part test applied for the section
4(1)(b) of the Regulation 1049 when is cross-referenced with Regulation 45, does not include a
discretion step. However, even in the EU, it seems that privacy has preference over access,
because of the value embedded in it as an individual value. I will look further into the privacyATI dichotomy when I explore the courts jurisprudence and the legal discourse that surrounds it.
Although, the prevailing view is that ATI and privacy are inherently contradictory, their
interrelationship is in fact a complex one. ATI is concerned with the transparency and access,
while privacy with secrecy and protecting information from disclosure. However, the rights of
privacy and ATI may overlap in a complementary manner. First, privacy laws may have
important transparency dimensions. Rights of access under privacy laws may overlap with ATI
rights to the extent that individuals are able to use ATI laws to access their own personal data.
Hence “an individual should be able to use them to access his or her own personal information
unless the FOI or privacy law specifically precludes this.”680 Second, privacy regimes require the
granting of access to personal information and ATI regimes include privacy provisions
exempting personal information from access. Third, both regimes rely on effective information
management to be able to operate appropriately. Solove (2003) argues that “information flow
and privacy are both extremely important values; finding the right balance will be critical to
shaping the future of a world increasingly driven by information.”681

Table 4 below provides information regarding the times ATI requests have been rejected in
Canada because of privacy exemptions. The numbers suggest that it happens quite often. Table 5
illustrates in a graph the rejections for privacy reasons (blue line) in relation to the total number
of rejections (orange line). The numbers show that privacy rejections constitute a considerable
amount when compared to the total number (always over 30%), and they keep increasing.
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Table 4: Exemptions applied under ATIA
sec.19

2013-14

2012-13

2011-12

2010-11

2009-10

2008-09

2007-08

2007-08

2006-07

2005-06

20,702

20,797

18,665

18,392

16,544

13,985

12,119

10,755

9,098

8,499

(36.5%)

(34%)

(31.2%)

(29.5%)

(30.2%)

(30.5%)

(32.1%)

Source: Data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Available at http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp

Table 5: Access to Information and privacy requests

Source: Table drawn by author using data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Available at
http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp
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PART III
THE DYNAMICS OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION: ACTORS
AND PRACTICES
CHAPTER 7: THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF ACCESS TO
INFORMATION

In this chapter I look at the administrative system of management of ATI laws, government
institutions responsible, their mandate and practices. As I have argued in the previous chapter,
the disclosure of information heavily depends on the public officials holding the information.
Many scholars have paid close attention to this challenge and have emphasized the critical role
of implementation of ATI laws plays for an effective ATI regime. The purpose of this chapter is
to examine how the practices of government institutions affect the ATI regimes in both Canada
and the EU, and what are the implications of discretionary powers on transparency and ATI. To
do so, I play close attention to the institutions responsible for the administration of the ATI laws.
Their practices are indicators of how governments perceive and value ATI as a right. Statistics,
policies, and guidelines of some of these institutions will be studied to understand the dynamics
of the ATI regime.

In addition, I look at the role of the public official assigned to deal with ATI requests, the
ATIP Coordinators. To complement the study of ATI practices, I have prepared a questionnaire
that asks ATIP coordinators a few questions about the value of ATI laws. Then, I compare the
data gathered in this chapter with the information I received from the interviews with the some
representatives of the media and the NGOs. By doing so, I examine ATI processes both from an
“insider” (looking at those responsible for the management of the ATI system) and an “outsider”
perspective (looking at the users of the right of ATI). Berzins draws attention that the analysis of
the issues may suffer from lack of familiarity with the internal working of the access process.
Also, an insider’s view could be of value to those outside the process since it helps them
empathize with ATI’s objectives and dynamics and understand how the system works better.682
Christopher Berzins, “Ontario’s Freedom of Information Access Process: ‘A view from the Inside’” (2002)
26:1&2 Advocates Quarterly 1 at 2 [Berzins].
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7.1 Looking at access to information from a political and cultural institutional perspective

The contextual factor which matters most for understanding variations in the design and
implementation of ATI laws is the institutional structure of political power, understood in the
broad sense as including both the formal rules governing relations between important actors, and
the organisational forms those actors take.683 In countries where there are centralised institutions
enjoying a formal monopoly over representation in the policymaking process, ATI laws tend to
be weaker than in countries where there are more veto points which tend to compete with one
another. This is because, in the former case, political groups who hold the monopoly enjoy
privileged access to a good deal of official information without the need for general access laws.
In fact, their privileged access is likely to be threatened by such laws, and they are likely to share
a preference for secrecy with the bureaucracy.

According to Larsen and Walby, the debate about government transparency takes place in two
interconnected realms. The first is the political realm and it focuses on participatory democracy
and the constitutional state. The second is the administrative realm and it focuses on managerial
concerns related to the idea of good governance684. Especially in governmental systems, where
the political power is highly concentrated in the executive branch, the relationship between the
two realms has a strong bond of a subjugatory nature. In these systems, the political realm seems
to dictate “the urge to regulate the flow of information”685, as Savoie puts it. First-past-the-post
parliamentary systems such as Australia or Canada, which produce frequent majority
governments, have systematically resisted calls to overhaul their FOI laws686. This is explained
with the political traditions of the monarchy, which allowed for the concentration of power on
the monarch’s hands. Political control is exacerbated even more in systems with little checks and
683
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balances on executive power. Looking at the factors that affected ATI legislation in Canada,
McCamus noted:
The Canadian system of government places effective control over both the executive and
legislative branches of government in the hands of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. If the
enactment of freedom of information legislation ….is to be explained in part by the existence
of tension between executive and legislative branches of government, such tension normally
is absent in the Canadian context.687
McCamus countered these arguments by saying that, in a system which emphasizes party
discipline, access legislation is needed to restore accountability.688
The Westminster system of government had always been criticized for the degree to which
it concentrates political authority in the hands of Cabinet ministers and bureaucrats. The
long tradition of this monopoly has resulted in a political apathy of the citizens. Chambers
rightfully argued long time ago that “In parliamentary systems based on the British model,
citizens are more likely to defer to the judgment of their representatives, rather than having
power in their hands, because their democratic institutions were added onto an aristocratic
institution - the British monarchy.689
Another important factor which determines how ATI is perceived, debated and implemented
is the political and administrative culture dominant in the institutional settings. ATI laws are only
the tip of the iceberg in the enormous ATI edifice. Base on his experience with ATI, former
Information Commissioner Michinson argued that:

FOI laws are not fundamentally flawed. There are areas that need to be amended or updated
to reflect experience and societal progress, but the laws do a pretty good job of reflecting the
underlying value of open and transparent government. The main difficulty is a cultural one.
Unless there is a culture of transparency within government, the legislation will never work
to its optimum potential.690
Similarly, Larsen and Walby contended that “The dysfunctionalities of the current ATI
framework are by no means reducible to problems with the law, ‘techniques of opacity’ are tied
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to political and administrative cultures.”691 Indeed, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, with the
notable exception of the Nordic countries, until recently a strong anti-transparency tradition
characterised both the Canadian and the EU legal orders.

Many scholars argue that there is a strong association between transparency, ATI and
democracy. Yet, international developments demonstrate that the idea that stronger democracies
are more favourable to transparency and ATI, is not necessarily true. Indeed, countries like the
UK and Germany, which were democratic throughout the post–war era and have older traditions
of parliamentary governments, have only adopted ATI laws in 2000 and 2005692 respectively,
while former communist East European countries, like Albania, did so before them.

This behaviour has been explained by evidence in comparative contexts which reinforces the
observation, anticipated by Roberts693, that transparency can be expected to weaken confidence
in government because, first, it offers a drum-beat of scandal, and second because the
discretionary decisions over the release of information itself, reinforces the public‘s view that the
government has something to hide694. Speaking about the US on the difficulties of achieving a
fully transparent state, Fenster argued that formal legal rights have failed to overcome the
political, practical, and bureaucratic obstacles that obstruct the state‘s visibility to the public695.

A politically sensitive area with respect to the ATI right is national security. There is a
danger that claims of national security may unduly limit the openness and transparency needed in
a democratic society.696 Edward Snowden, a former U.S. National Security Agency contractor
who made possible the leaking of classified documents about the NSA's surveillance programs,
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argued that “Terrorism is ‘an extraordinarily rare natural disaster’ and should not be used as an
excuse by government to pass laws that limit our rights and freedoms.”697

7.2 Government approaches to access to information in Canada

7.2.1 The Canadian political environment on transparency and access to information
The Canadian government has a long history of promises for improving transparency and
enhancing the public’s right to know. When the Liberals introduced the ATIA in 1980 they
claimed that the Act would be “one of the cornerstones of Canadian democracy.”698 However,
John Crosbie, the first Justice Minister to be responsible for the Act, dismissed it as a tool for
“mischief-makers” whose objective is to “embarrass political leaders and titillate the public.”699
Again, in its 1993 election platform, the opposition Liberal party complained that “the people
are irritated with governments . . . that try to conduct key parts of the public business behind
closed doors”. They promised that open government would be “the watchword of the Liberal
program.”700 However, in the 2000s Canada’s government was involved in many scandals, with
the sponsorship scandal in 2004 being one of the biggest for misuse of public funds. This meant
that the culture of secrecy was still resilient in Canadian politics, and that ATI was a necessary
tool against this culture.
At the electoral campaign in 2005, Stephen Harper affirmed that “Information is the lifeblood
of a democracy. Without adequate access to key information about government policies and
programs, citizens and parliamentarians cannot make informed decisions, and incompetent or
corrupt governance can be hidden under a cloak of secrecy.”701 When the Conservative
government came to power in 2006 Harper promised to include the changes recommended by the
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ICC into his first bill “The Federal Accountability Act”. Instead, the government announced that
the ATIA reforms were going to be sent separately to a Parliamentary committee for review,
reportedly due to pressure from the bureaucracy. The proposed changes were strongly criticized
by the ICC as reducing ATI702. The Harper government was later highly criticized to have “failed
to champion access to information”703 and also for imposing “new gag rules on officials speaking
to the media or releasing information without permission.”704 In addition, the Harper government
according to the Globe and Mail, used amber-lighting protocols to ensure that all potentially
sensitive requests were sent to the Privy Council Office and Prime Minister’s Office for
review.705 Furthermore, in 2012, the Harper government was involved in the Senate expenses
scandal when several senators were accused of spending public money for personal expenses,
hence, pointing on matters of accountability and transparency.

The current Liberal government of Canada, elected in October, 2015 made big promises on
improving openness as part of an effort to restore popular faith in the government that was
thought to have become remote and unresponsive. Before coming to power Liberal leader
Trudeau introduced a Bill in 2014706 for an overhaul of the ATIA, which was defeated in
Parliament in 2015 (See Chapter 4.2.2). Time will tell whether and how these electoral promises
will be fulfilled.

Despite all the promises, ATI in Canada has been kept hostage of political indifference
towards transparency. The repetitive failure to truly commit to transparency has strong roots in
Canada’s Westminster model of government. This model is supported by the legal structure in
place which keeps transparency away from the Cabinet confidences. The Supreme Court of
Canada explained that “the process of democratic government works best when Cabinet
members charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express themselves
around Cabinet table unreservedly.”707 Cabinet confidences are currently excluded from the
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application of the ATIA and the Privacy Act, and the government believes this should continue.
“The fear is that if Cabinet discussions were made public, ministers would censor themselves,
refraining from unpopular opinions or making politically incorrect comments, thus
compromising the value of the discussions.”708 However, in 2005, the Department of Justice
proposed a modification to the current scheme. If the proposal were considered, the Government
would have enshrined in the legislation the right of the ICC and the IPC to go to court to
challenge definitional issues (if information constitutes a confidence). The proposal would have
also allowed the ICC to ask the Federal Court to review the government’s determination that
information sought under an access request, fell within the definition of a Cabinet confidence
and, for that reason, was properly not accessible pursuant to the Act. If the Court would not agree
with the determination made by the government, then the information would have no longer been
excluded from the application of the Act.709 No action has been pursued following this proposal,
which demonstrates the difficulty of changing the status quo of the Cabinet confidences.

The Canadian ATI regime took a step back in May 2008 when cancelled CAIRS - a
centralized tracking system. This was in contradiction with the inspiration of the ATIA. The
development of CAIRS was approved by Cabinet in 1988 and became operational in 1990. The
system was substantially upgraded in 2001 to enable the government to monitor the progress of
ATI requests and facilitate the coordination of responses to requests.710According to the
Canadian Bar Association “CAIRS provided a central repository of information on all current
and past requests and an opportunity for enhanced proactive disclosure under the ATIA.”711 One
of the reasons for the scrapping of CAIRS was its cost. The government argued that it “was no
longer useful and too expensive to manage”.712 According to Roberts, in 2000 the Canadian
government estimated that the annual cost of administering the ATIA was US $ 19.4 million or
about US $ 1,340 for each information request received that year713. According to the TBS, the
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total cost of operations relating to ATI requests from 1983 to 2014 was $670,470,779 which
represents an average cost of $1,077 per request completed.714 These expenses seem high, and I
am not sure whether the numbers are realistic or what kind of expenses they include. However,
they cannot be a reason for dismantling good tracking systems as CAIRS. Especially now, the
advancements in information technology offer better data management.
The general rule in the ATIA is that “government information should be available to the
public,” and that “necessary exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific.715”
Justice La Forest in its 2005 report on the ATIA review, advised that if this legal principle is to
have its full effect, the bureaucracy must experience a profound cultural shift.”716 To achieve this
shift government must do much more to foster a “culture of compliance” by making it clear to
officials that access should be provided unless there is a clear and compelling reason not to do
so; developing better information management systems; ensuring adequate training for access
officials; and providing adequate incentives for compliance717. The persistence in preserving
rules that limit transparency, directly affects the working of the entire machinery of the
government, the politically elected ministers and bureaucrats supporting them. According to
Sossin:
Elected officials are supposed to maintain the fundamental values of responsible government,
which guarantees that a cabinet minister maintains political responsibility for the actions of
his or her ministry. This legal fiction holds that bureaucratic actors work in the loyal service
of government, thus ensuring a hierarchal line of accountability between elected ministers
and unelected bureaucrats.718
Hence, for the change to occur, it has to start from above at the polical level, and spill over
the bureaucratic machinery. Especially in a system with strong party discipline as Canada, a topdown approach would be a more viable option.
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7.2.2 Government practices affecting the Access to Information Act implementation
Having a piece of legislation in place does not translate to an effective ATI regime. In the
case of ATI, Roberts has argued that “Statutory entitlements could be undermined if government
institutions refuse to commit adequate resources for implementation or consistently exercise
discretionary powers granted by the law in ways that are inimical to aims of the legislation.”719
Indeed, several practices exist in Canada that limit the scope of the ATIA. First, there are some
internal departmental procedures, described by Roberts as the “hidden law” on ATI, or “internal
routines and technologies.”720 They can substantially restrict statutory rights for certain kinds of
requesters721. This “hidden law” is built upon the development of sophisticated procedures within
federal institutions for managing politically sensitive requests for information.722

Second, there is potential for differential treatment of requesters, depending on their status.
The ATIA provides that individuals making requests should identify themselves. This provision
poses risks for any potential discrimination based on the status of the individual. For instance,
the results of a study conducted by Roberts at the Human Resource and Development Canada for
requests in 1999-2001 showed that “requests that came from the media and political parties had
significantly longer processing times and the probability that such requests would exceed
statutory response times was significantly higher.”723 This study suggests that while the ATIA
mandates that all requesters be treated equally, some requests coming from specific subjects are,
in practice, often treated differently. Roberts also reports that at the Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC), there is a procedure for handling politically sensitive requests, which is known
within CIC as the “amber light process”. An amber light is a warning to officials to proceed with
caution in their handling of an ATI request. The complete “disclosure package”, including
documents which are to be released to the requester, along with the “communications products”
is sent to the Minister’s Office for review.724 According to Roberts, comparable amber light
procedures have been adopted within other major departments such as Department of Foreign
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Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), the
Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), Department of Justice725.

In support of the differential treatment of requests, Roberts observed that federal departments
and agencies deployed software systems for tracking information requests such as the ATIPflow.
This was a case-management software program to manage the workload and collect data. It
allowed ATIP officers to categorize incoming requests by level of sensitivity. Roberts criticized
this system for being a clear violation of the ATIA, since the practice of categorizing requests by
sensitivity is not sanctioned anywhere in the Act.726 Because of the controversy it attracted, the
ATIPflow tracking system was replaced with the new AccessPro Case Management System
software727 in 2009.

The differential treatment based on the content of a request was analyzed in a report on the
ATIA administration completed for TBS in February 2002. The report found that in some
departments, “senior management required weekly updates as to the content of requests. This
would allow them to highlight areas of interest/sensitivity for close monitoring. Other
departments were requested to give senior management this type of information on an as-andwhen required basis.”728 The report confirmed that the differential treatment did exist in ATI
administration, and it was against the requirement of the ATIA that all requests should receive
equal treatment.

Third, blame-avoidance policy-strategy responses accompany transparency. These strategies
typically involve a more active and defensive central management of information than before,
with the intention to lower political risks of blame. According to Hood, they may consist of
charges for information that had previously been freely supplied, price levels not likely to be
readily affordable by ordinary citizens or even the abandonment of services, where blame might
ensue. There is good evidence that large fee estimates will cause requesters to narrow or abandon
725
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their requests.729.To the extent that blame-avoidance prompts policy strategy responses of this
type, the result is likely to be at least jeopardy and, perversity. Hood claimed that, while FOI
measures are almost invariably introduced with the promise that they will produce a new culture
of openness in executive government, the effect in practice tends to be the opposite, in the form
of a climate of tighter central management of politically sensitive information.730 It is in these
situations when, in Heremans’s words, “too much transparency can kill transparency by
triggering a variety of evasive practices.”731

Fourth, there is a chance of abandonment, tweaking, or redundancy of record-keeping. Some
practices in bureaucratic behaviour involve a risk of shifting from written deliberation or
recorded phone conversations, to informal face-to-face discussions, whenever civil servants or
policy-makers want such debates to take place in secret.732 It has been argued that ATI triggers a
chilling effect whereby the record is either reduced or exists “off paper,” a process labeled as
“empty archives” phenomenon in Sweden.733 In many cases erasure of records takes place,
which is the worst thing, because an erasure of records means erasure of history. Vallance-Jones
alleged that “A lot of time you can't prove that the reason you got a response of ‘no records’
wasn't because nothing existed, but because perhaps the records were destroyed.”734 Certain
practices aim at derailing the disclosure of information by producing documents which are
difficult to find and make sense of. Fenster argued that “when an agency or an individual
government official prefers to protect information from disclosure, then the agency or official is
more likely to produce it in a form, circulate it by a method, and/or maintain or destroy it so that
the information will either fall outside disclosure requirements or avoid detection.”735 For
instance, the Senate expense scandal left no public paper trail in the Prime Minister's own
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bureaucracy, not an email, memo or even a sticky note, according to CBC News. According to
Weston “The PM's public service, claimed ….that it had no documents of any kind related to the
scandal nor anyone involved in it, including Harper's former chief of staff, Nigel Wright. The
federal Justice Department made a similar claim”.736

Another way to circumvent responses to transparency measures is producing so much data
that only the most persistent and knowledgeable individuals can effectively distinguish signal
from noise. Hood mentions “snowing” as a procedure in which the pursuit of blame-avoidance
leads to so much data being produced with so little interpretation or quality control that it has the
effect of reducing rather than increasing effective openness and information.737

Information technology represents great opportunities for the dissemination of data, but also
a greater challenge for the preservation of information. We are now at the age of electronics,
internet, emails, virtual clouds, online social networks, and so on, which were foreign to human
communication in the 80s. Much of government business is now done by emails. Electronic
communication cannot be recorded properly and in many cases gets lost. This loss could occur
either purposely or involuntarily, but both ways can have a major repercussion on access rights.

Fifth, sometimes selective proactive disclosure is introduced as an improvement of ATI.
Politicians and officials often strategically choose to disclose “information” through coordinated
public relations campaigns that produce pre-packaged, tightly controlled “news”. In this
institutional process, the texts of government information are edited, explained, de- and recontextualized, and interpreted.738 For instance, considering Canada’s commitment to the OGP
and the Action Plan to honor it, the government has taken pride of the achievements. In the
debates that took place at the House of Commons for the Justin Trudeau’s Bill C-613 (amending
the ATIA), Dan Albas, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board,
maintained that under the Conservative government, Canadians were accessing more information
from the government than ever before. In support of this statement he referred to the increased
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number of the pages of released information from the government (6 million pages in 20122013). 739 But, is open data the same as open government? Responding to these comments, Geist
critically argued that “An open government plan that only addresses the information that
government wants to make available, rather than all of the information to which the public is
entitled, is not an open plan.”740 Of course, providing more data can improve transparency, but
data alone cannot be a substitute for ATI since it fails to honor the right of the public in getting
the information it needs, instead of what is being offered selectively.
Sixth, delays and the creation of backlogs can become commonplace. Backlogs can develop
for several reasons. A simple answer can be a shortage of resources that prevents from
responding on time. Another is the lack of experience in handling a large number of requests. A
toothless ICC also creates backlogs since it cannot order public officials to release information.
In that case, bureaucratic incentives to comply with the law become weaker, creating another
backlog at the ICC office, those of complaints and appeals.741 The Globe and Mail experience
with an information request in 2009 discovered two years later that departments try to get as
many requests as possible out the door within the legally mandated timeframe. That way, they
can claim they adequately processed a number of requests. The files left sitting in the system
have already been deemed to be failures and no amount of work can restore their status – so they
may sit there for a long time. According to a civil servant “Once a file is late, it's late. There is
nothing that can change that. A day late, a month late, a year late, it's all the same. It's late.”742
Since there is no sanction for late responses, the incentive to respond to them is missing. This
situation brings the creation of huge backlogs and extended delays. It is obviously a hole in the
ATIA that needs to be fixed.
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Seventh, reducing resources available for the administration of the ATIA can affect its
implementation. According to the TBS, in the 90s federal departments and agencies reduced
resources for FOI administration and enforcement, as part of a broader restraint exercise that was
intended to trim “non-essential spending” within the public service743. Some central agencies
explored the possibility of increasing ATI fees744 to recoup the cost administering ATI, but there
was no action on that idea. For some officials, the resources dedicated to ATI administration
could not be defended as essential spending; on the contrary, FOI requirements were viewed as a
“disruptive and costly” imposition745. Budget reductions have certainly lengthened processing
time for FOI requests and increased the inclination of departments and agencies to withhold
requested information. Cutting off resources is against the spirit of the ATIA - it deeply affects its
practices. It is obvious, according to Vallance-Jones, that “the act cannot function as it was
intended to if officials aren’t given enough people to do the job.”746

Most of these practices surfaced during the Inquiry on the Sponsorship Scandal. Referring to
the Inquiry, ICC John Reid explained that witnesses in the Gomery Commission gave plenty of
evidence about the abuse of power. He said:

We have heard evidence about deliberate attempts to avoid keeping a paper trail of decisions,
recommendations and actions…We have seen how access requests are stonewalled and
ignored, and ATIP coordinators bullied, in order to save ministers and departments from
embarrassment. And, most troubling of all, we have seen evidence that, in times of a
perceived national unity crisis, governments may feel that the obligation to be law abiding is
optional and that ends come to justify any means.747
All these examples demonstrate how much power rests on the hands of the political
leadership and their bureaucratic machinery, and how this power can be detrimental to the proper
implementation of an ATI law.
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A. Institutions responsible for the administration of the Access to Information Act
In Canada, three different central agencies have specific roles and responsibilities under the
ATIA: the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), the Department of Justice (DJ) and the Privy
Council Office (PCO). Two ministers share responsibilities for ATI, the President of the TBS
Board, and the Minister of Justice. The TBS supports the President of the Treasury Board in his
duty as designated Minister responsible for the administrative oversight of the Act. He is
responsible for issuing policy instruments to the ATI and Privacy community and other federal
institutions with respect to the administration of the Act and advising, training, and guidance.
TBS publishes InfoSource748, a compilation of statistical information about the ATIA
administration of institutions, their programs and information holdings to assist individuals
exercising rights under the legislation. It also collects annual statistics on the administration of
the Act.

The Minister of Justice is also a designated minister for the ATIA and responsible for the
legislation. He deals with issues such as the extension of the right of access, the designation of
the head of a government institution, specifying investigative bodies and classes of investigations
and amending schedule I which enumerates the institutions covered by the Act. Institutions
receive legal advice on ATI from the DJ through in-house legal services units or from its
Information Law and Privacy Unit.

Finally, the Clerk of the Privy Council is responsible for policies on the administration of
Confidences of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada and determines what information
constitutes a Confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. Cabinet Confidences are
excluded from the application of the Act, according to section 69. The Act lists a number of
examples749 of records that may be excluded including: Cabinet memoranda, discussion papers,
agendas, records of discussions and communications between Ministers on matters relating to the
making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy; pre-Cabinet briefings
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of Ministers and draft legislation. This list indicates that the workings of the Canadian
government is immune from transparency rules.

The everyday administration of the ATIA is carried out by the head of each institution, ATIP
coordinators and occasionally other public officials. The head of each institution is responsible
for the administration of the Act within the respective institution. The “head of a government
institution” is the elected Minister responsible for a department or agency, an appointed public
office holder or the chief executive officer of an organization. Their responsibilities include the
processing of access requests, the designation of a delegate, the exercise of discretion and ATI
awareness. There are more than forty powers, duties and functions in the Act that can be
delegated. Many models of delegations exist across the federal government.750

The ATIA establishes an annual reporting requirement for all departments and agencies under
the Act, based on which they are required to report to Parliament of their administration of the
Act. This is a good practice, especially if the legislature has some level of political competition
between parties which would put those reports in good use to control government. But, in case of
a majority government the reports go unnoticed.
After joining the OGP in 2012, Canada committed to intensify its efforts towards better
transparency, and learn from international best practices.751 A series of projects were introduced and
implemented following the OGP. In 2013, the government announced an Access to Information and

Privacy Online Request Pilot Project752. Three departments participated in the one-year pilot
project, the Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Shared Services Canada and the TBS. Now
the list has extended to 31 institutions that offer their services on line through a common
portal.753 Through this service people may submit their request on line and pay online as well.
The common practice to make a request for information under ATIA has been to write a letter and a
Josée Villeneuve, “Assessment of public institutions’ performance in access to information: The Canadian
experience”, Office of the Information Commissioner at 9.
751
Government of Canada, “Canada's Action Plan on Open Government 2014-16”, online:
<http://open.canada.ca/en/content/canadas-action-plan-open-government-2014-16>.
752
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Access to Information and Privacy Online Request Pilot Project”, online:
<https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/atip-aiprp/tools/request-demande-eng.asp>.
753
Government of Canada, “Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Online Request”, online: <https://atip750

aiprp.apps.gc.ca/atip/contactUs.do?caller=/atip/welcome.do>.

199

check in the amount of the application fee. This was a substantial barrier to ATI usage, considering
that many other services now are provided online. The online service will certainly improve the
process of preparing and submitting a request, but that alone will not change much in terms of how
request will be administered upon submission.

Another initiative that took place in 2013 was the launch of the open data portal.754 It contains
datasets compiled by over 20 departments and agencies755, covering a broad range of topics. By
accessing the portal, people may explore different kinds of data from housing to health and
environmental data. Furthermore, in 2014, the TBS issued the Directive on Open Government,
which established an open by default position and required institutions to maximize the release
of data and information, with a goal to effect a fundamental change in government culture756.
This directive includes commitments falling in three streams: Open Data (aimed at better use of
new technologies), Open Dialogue (aimed at citizen participation), and Open Information (aimed
at increasing professional integrity).757 Since this is a recent initiative there are not enough data
available to assess its effectiveness. It certainly has the potential to serve as a bridge to link
citizens and government.

Certainly, these achievements are a step forward towards more transparency, but the open
data movement has failed to confront the problems in the ATIA regime in Canada. Government
commitments to the OGP have been silent on any action that may address the weakness in the
law or the practices that are governed by the ATIA.
B. Public Officials – Access to information and Privacy Coordinators
The central point of service for the day-to-day administration of the ATIA are the ATIP
coordinators. They generally have delegated authority for responding to requests. Depending
upon the size of the institution and the volume of requests it receives, a coordinator may be
supported by a team of specialized analysts. Coordinators establish procedures for providing
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responses to access requests, ensure that all records relevant to the request are identified and
reviewed, determine whether any exemptions or exclusions must be invoked, conduct
consultations and apply the principles found in the ATIA.

The TBS has a list available on line with the names of all ATIP coordinators across the
federal government, including their addresses, emails and telephone numbers. There are 260
ATIP coordinators at the federal level. I have drawn information from the TBS list to prepare my
questionnaire for the ATIP coordinators.

To recognize the work that the ATIP coordinators do for the administration of the ATIA, one
has to understand the position they hold in the structure of the institutions they are part of. Their
position in the public office requires them to adequately respond to public’s information requests
while protecting the interests of their institutions. Regarding this delicate balance they have to
strike, Mann argued long time ago that “Access coordinators represent the ‘meat in the
sandwich’, positioned between a suspicious requesting public and a distrustful bureaucracy, and
are further positioned in a confrontational role with oversight bodies.”758. There is no doubt that
officials dealing with the ATIA are subject to continuing pressure from other officials to adopt
restrictive understandings of an institution’s obligations under the law. Only a few years after the
law’s adoption, a TBS survey found that many ATIP coordinators felt significant cross-pressures
between their obligations under the law and career considerations within their department.759
Recent studies show that these cross-pressures continue to operate. In 2002, The Review Task
Force reported that it had a “number of very frank discussions” in which coordinators “talked
about the stress involved in dealing with sensitive files and difficult requests.”760 The coordinator
role is almost always at a fairly junior level in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Having this position,
Flaherty argued “they rarely have the clout to make a significant difference in their agency. In
fact, even a Chief Privacy Officer would have problems making his or her own voice heard in
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such hierarchical power structures.”761 Very recently, a story from British Columbia, which
emerged in the media in May 2015, revealed that “a BC former bureaucrat came forward to
claim he was told to delete messages someone else might want to see.”762 Such story is a clear
indication of the tension that exists inside the ATIA machinery.

Referring to such a weak position of the ATIA officials, Savoie acknowledged that the bottom
line for the average public servant is to not embarrass the minister, because that is the surest way
to have the career stopped or slowed down.763 To do so, they have to pursue instructions from
above in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and in many cases engage in practices that limit ATI rights.
For instance, a survey of ATIP coordinators in thirteen large federal departments, conducted for
the ATI Task Force in 2001 revealed that “Additional attention is often given to requests that
originate from the media, political parties or other high profile categories of requesters…. The
complexity of these requests are heightened as institutions attempt to prepare for any possible
questions or potential for any public scrutiny which may arise as a result of the release of
records.”764

The work of the ATIP coordinators is to reveal the workings of politically elected or other
bureaucrats in their offices. As such, they are part of a larger bureaucratic machinery. One of the
reasons they resist the idea of ATI is blame-avoidance. Weber argues that concealment insulates
bureaucracies from criticism and interference; it allows them to correct mistakes and to reverse
direction without costly, often embarrassing explanations; and it permits them to cut corners with
no questions being asked.765 Hood described blame-avoidance as a descriptive account of a force
that is often said to underlie much of political and institutional behaviour in practice.766 He asked
a question: what happens when the supposedly irresistible force of transparency as a doctrine of
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better governance meets the apparently immovable object of blame-avoiding behaviour in
political and institutional affairs?767 Hood’s response is that blame-avoidance can lead to the
banalization of transparency.

Another reason for bureaucratic resistance to ATI is the control of information and
knowledge. Max Weber explained the function and logic of bureaucratic administration as
resting in part on the production and hoarding of information. According to Weber, keeping
secret its knowledge and intentions from competing organizations and from the public768 is
embedded in the bureaucratic ethics. Hence, it is not a surprise that “Officials are well versed in
the code of silence and under gag orders”769, according to Rubin, because the motive to engage
in secrecy is partly inherent to bureaucratic organisations. Weber has recognized that
bureaucracies are machines for controlling information and for controlling through
information770. This is such a powerful revelation to which I will expand on developing my
theory of ATI as a human right, a right which contributes to the acquiring of knowledge through
controlling government information.

Similar arguments on information as knowledge are made by Fenster. He maintains that state
institutions know what information they have produced and where such information is stored
and, through that monopoly of knowledge about their own information, retain significant
discretion over the existence and ultimate release of documents.771 Because they have the
monopoly in their hands, producers or custodians of information shift the medium, classification,
or content of information they prefer to keep secret towards the safe harbors provided under the
exceptions to disclosure laws.772 In doing so, public officials become a “law unto themselves”
within the limits clearly stated in the statute773. At times that can stretch the limits of law to the
point that it allows to engage in practices that are not obviously a violation of the law, or to the
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point that the law is silent. In this sense, they operate at the limits of the law. Roberts recognized
such tension and maintained that “Statutory entitlements could be diminished or obliterated by
the informal norms and routines that govern the work of officials responsible for administering
the law.”774

C. The Exercise of discretion and its implications
It is widely accepted that government officials exercise discretion at almost every stage of the
access process. When the statutory provisions give discretionary power to the bureaucrats to
make their own decisions, it represents an opening for them to engage in practices “inherently
embedded in their culture”, in Habermas’s words.

Despite the risks it represents, discretionary power may be necessary for many reasons. For
instance, the law cannot regulate all scenarios of real life, it is designed for a general application.
As such it is difficult to produce a rule that is applicable to all cases. There will always be
complex cases for which it is difficult identifying all the factors to be applied, and weighing
those factors.775 This is the reason why the law allows for discretionary powers, so that the public
officials have space and freedom to apply the general rule. For the discretion to be applied within
legitimate limits, there should be enough guidelines to make the exercise of discretion easier and
allow for consistency within the institutions. To facilitate this process Sossin and Smith advised
that every time a specific discretion has been granted by law, it should be followed by guidelines
from the institutions that are assigned with the law’s application. These guidelines should be
broad enough to be applied across departments or institutions, and allow space for use of
judgement or options for choice, but narrow enough to “set out the various factors which may
not be considered by decision-makers.”776

Sossin made a careful analysis of discretion and described it as having different faces. It could
be an exercise of authority, an act of choice, a social judgement shaped by organizational

Roberts, “Administrative discretion and ATIA”, supra note 5 at 178.
David Phillip Jones & Anne S. de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 4eds, (Scarborough: Thomson
Canada Limited, 2004) at 86 [Jones & Villars].
776
Sossin & Smith, 718 at 893.
774
775

204

boundaries inside the bureaucracy, and by the need to attain the results desired by others.777 This
description fully captures the tensions that are embedded in the exercise of every discretion
which encapsulates the pressures that exist in public administration. The ATI system of
management certainly suffers from the same tensions which define and shape how the access
rights will be implemented in practice. This is one of the main concerns throughout this research,
one that focuses on the huge impact that the discretion has on restricting or expanding the rights
granted by statute. Unfortunately, the restriction of rights happens way too often. Davis asserts
that “Perhaps nine-tenths of injustice in our legal system flows from discretion and perhaps only
one-tenth form rules.”778 In the case of ATI rights this holds much truth, as scholars and
practitioners have recognized. Roberts has continuously argued that “internal bureaucratic
procedures play an important role in defining what the right to information means in practice”779,
or that the right of ATI “depends heavily on the predispositions of the political executives and
officials who are required to administer it.”780The Office of the ICC has often experienced that
the public officials in Canada tend to operate on the restrictive side of discretion, where
exemptions are the norm, rather than exception. Michinson explained that more alarming
instances are those “where government organizations try to push the scope of an exemption
beyond the stated legislative intent.”781

To prevent cases of injustices from happening, Sossin suggested that there is a need for a
legitimation of discretion by the wider public. This could minimize the suspicions about any
abuse of power by the public officials. Sossin advocates for a form of administration sufficiently
democratic as to engage the population in the administrative process782 by validating the
discretion publically on the basis of its substantive content.783 This translates into a decisionmaking that is supported by reasoning which is opened for scrutiny by the public. Instead of just
giving the outcome of their decisions, the public officials have to explain in detail how and why
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they reached that outcome, by listing all factors that influenced the decisions. Only this way,
according to Sossin, the exercise of discretion by public officials will be accepted as both
legitimate and just. Otherwise, a suspicious shadow will accompany every decision-making.
Sossin’s suggestion for a legitimation of discretion offers a tangible solution for the
establishment of a credible public administration. However, applying Sossin’s suggestion to the
ATI regime means to be transparent about transparency, and this is what public officials are
trying to avoid in the first place.
7.2.3 Studies and official data on access to information requests
There have been several studies concerned with exploring the tensions and constraints within
the ATI system in Canada. They focused on different problems with ATI taking various
approaches. Most of them have produced valuable data about ATI requests.

A major study on ATI in Canada was conducted by Alasdair Roberts in 2001. He used a
novel approach to study ATI by examining the different procedural treatment of information
requests. He looked for evidence in internal routines that govern the administration of the ATIA.
Roberts analyzed data collected within an administrative database of one major Canadian
department – Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) - relating to the processing of
2,120 ATI requests for three years between 1999 and 2001.784 According to the study, the delays
occur because of the involvement of higher up authorities and the need to contemplate the
political and personal relations angles when deciding whether or not to disclose the information.
The study discovered that requests from journalists and political parties require more time to be
responded to and are more likely to be deemed refusal. It confirmed the role of internal practices
in the way in which legislation is implemented and understood by government officials.

Roberts described the procedure that the request had to follow if it was spotted to come from
journalists. It was considered an “amber light” request, and identified as sensitive. In that case,
the request had to be sent to the minister’s office and to the communications department. These
two would work together with the office that possessed the information to develop a media
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strategy. This strategy together with the document were finally sent to the minister for approval,
and only then could they be made available to the applicant.785
The “amber light” practice seem to have become common place in the Canadian public
offices. It is obvious that going through an “amber light” procedure requires time and resources.
To examine the cost of ATI procedures, a study was conducted by the TBS in 1996. It found that
“one-third of total FOI costs could be attributed to time spent in determining whether material
should be withheld from requesters.”786 This could explain, in part, the big costs associated with
keeping in place an ATI system.

Attallah and Pyman conducted a study in 2001 on the use of the ATIA. Using official
statistics, they discovered that between 1985 and 2000 around 10% of the information requests
received by the Canadian government were made by journalists787. They found that the nature of
the stories had changed over time. In the first stage of the law’s implementation, the pieces were
very specific or they were part of more extensive stories that belonged to the genre of
investigative journalism. Later, they became more complex, based on more sophisticated
questions and following-up on previous work. The stories had varied apparent intentions, such as
exposing clientelism or showing inefficiency and the waste of resources, although in the majority
of situations the requests, and the stories aimed to describe the work of governmental agencies.

-

InfoSource Data

Using the InfoSource from the TBS website, I looked at some of the statistical data and
developed my own tables. The tables contain statistics for a period of 10 years, from 2004-2014.
Table 6 looks at the source of ATI requests. The data includes 5 categories of requesters,
business, public, media, organization, and academia. The trend shows that ATI in Canada is
dominated by business as a category. Public also occupies a significant space of ATI requests. In
the last two years is has overpassed business and has a steady progress. The numbers confirm
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that ATI is important for citizens and they are making use of the system, despite the constraints
they may face. Contrary to the general belief, and what has been argued by the politicians, media
only constitutes a small percentage in ATI requests. Data shows that media requests are also
progressing, but with a much smaller pace. The trend demonstrates that ATI is not controlled by
the media, and only for journalistic purposes. It is noticeable that ATI request from organizations
are declining, and this was explained by the frustration described by the NGOs in my interviews.
Many of them admitted that long delays and hefty fees has caused their withdrawal from the ATI
system due to the lack of resources. Academia is the category with the fewest requests, and that
raises important questions about the use of ATI in research.

Table 7 compiles data on the number of requests and their status (if they were closed,
disclosed, exempted, or excluded). The trend shows that while the numbers of exclusions and
exemptions have remained steady, the numbers of the documents partly disclosed is progressing
much faster than those completely disclosed. And while the total number of requests is climbing
at a high rate, the documents disclosed had a decline in 2007-2010, and are progressing slowly in
2011-2014.

Table 8 contains data on the time of reply. While the total number of requests were following
the same trend until 2012, this is not the case in 2012-2014. The number of documents disclosed
have remained almost steady, although the total number has risen, meaning that more requests
are replied late. This confirms the concern regarding delays on ATI request, and there is no
measure how late they are replied to, because as one public official admits “once a response is
late, it is late” – how late its does not matter.

Table 9 comprises data on the type of exemptions applied under the ATIA, according to
specific sections. There are 13 categories of exemptions. The trend shows that the most common
of exemptions is privacy, with a huge difference with other exemptions. The high number
confirms what is argued in Chapter 6, that ATI and privacy collide very often with each other,
and that privacy tends to trump ATI rights in Canada. Public officials do not engage in a careful
balancing exercise, but play the safe card by declining request every time information may
concern personal data. Privacy is followed by International Affairs and defence, and then law
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enforcement exemption, which have also come up in the scholarly debates and the interviews, as
being often misused to sway from the ATIA application.

Table 10 includes data about exclusions applied under the ATIA. The numbers in both
categories there have remained almost steady, and that is explained with the mandatory nature of
these exceptions under the law. The Cabinet confidences have been the source of considerable
debate for reform by many actors, including the ICC.

Table 11 lists the top ten institutions receiving most of the requests over the years. Citizenship
and Immigration has occupied the first place for ten consecutive years. Also Canada Revenue
Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Border Services Agency, and National
Defence have most of the time occupied the top five places among the institutions receiving
more requests. These data are significant because they indicate what matters the most to the
Canadians. Areas like immigration, taxes, law enforcement, national defence, health,
environment, seems to be hot topics to the public eye.

Table 12 compiles data about the fees and costs of the ATIA operations. This is complemented
with Table 8 which shows the costs in a graph form for a period of 30 years since 1983 when the
ATIA entered into force. The total cost of operations relating to ATI requests since 1983 is
$670,470,779 which represents an average cost of $1,077 per request completed. Total fees
collected were $6,116,471 which represents an average fee of $9.82 per request completed788.
The total expenses of processing ATI requests are $664,354,308 which divided with the number
of years from 1983 (31 years) represents $ 21,430,784 per year. It is obvious that costs of
operations have increased exponentially, while the fees have remained the same. These costs
have been the focus of many government decisions, and the main reason for removing CAIRS.
While there are financial constraints related to the ATIA operations, the costs are not an
acceptable excuse if one considers the provision of this service a public good. From this
perspective, the focus should not be on the cost, but the efficiency of the service.

Treasury Board Secretariat, Info Source Bulletin Number 37B – Statistical Reporting, online:
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Questionnaire of the ATIP coordinators

As I previously mentioned, there are 260 institutions listed at the TBS webpage. The total
number of persons serving as ATIP coordinators is smaller since there is some overlapping
where the same persons serve as an ATIP Coordinator in more than one institution. It is
interesting that the number of women is about twice the number of men (120 of them are women
and 70 are men). Only 31 of them offer online services for requests.

I prepared a three-part questionnaire for the ATIP coordinators with the purpose of
understanding the practices of administration of ATI requests, the guiding principles and the
value attached to ATI from their institutional perspective. I selected 113 from 260 institutions
listed on the website, making a random choice, but paying attention to include those listed in
Table 11 containing data about institutions with the most requests. I sent out the questionnaire in
April 2015 via email using the contact addresses available at the TBS website, suggesting a
period of one month to reply. At the end of the month there was no response.

I sent the questionnaire again in May, and received 2 emails from institutions requesting
reassurance that their names and institutions would be kept confidential. From these two
institutions only one replied by filling the questionnaire, after I sent another email saying that
their names would remain confident, and that they could fill the questionnaire partly, if they were
not comfortable of answering all the questions. Soon after my second email I received two more
filled questionnaires. Also, five institutions sent emails declining to participate and saying they
“could not fill the questionnaire”. Furthermore, I received three emails from institutions
providing web links with their information (one of them very detailed), and so indirectly
responding that they wouldn’t fill the questionnaire.

In addition, I received an email from one of my informants saying that the TBS had instructed
all ATIP Coordinators not to respond to my questionnaire, and that the TBS was instead going to
respond on their behalf. The informants reported that “the policy division of the Treasury Board
Secretariat has arbitrarily decided they want to respond on behalf of the entire Government, and
have instructed all ATIP Coordinators not to respond to you”.
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In a hopeless attempt, I sent the questionnaire for the third time and extended the time
available for reply till June. However, this attempt yielded no results. In total, for this
questionnaire, I received four responses out of 113 requests, five direct and three indirect
declines. This is a turnout of 3.5% response rate, and it came as a great disappointment at a time
that I was expecting to get some questions answered for my research. However, after reflecting
on the research I had done up to that point, I realized that the silence of the ATIP coordinators
was an expectable behaviour. In fact, the email I received from my informant, was the
confirmation of what it had already surfaced in my literature review, and which often came up in
various debates from scholars and practitioners. The TBS instructions were the evidence of a
centralized ATI system, which did not allow for much freedom in the work of the ATIP
coordinators.

This was not the first time a researcher got a surprisingly low response rate on a project on
ATI in Canada. Laverne Jacobs conducted a similar study, and the initial results were
disappointing. She writes that “the most striking finding that arose from this study was how few
responses were received. Although 33 government departments were approached and all given at
least two weeks to respond, with reminders, only one response surfaced.”789 However, at the end
of the project the response rate had increased to 12 and the responded pool was qualitatively
significant.

Regarding the results of the four responses I got from the questionnaire, some observations
are worth pointing out. Some responses drew my attention, due to their deviation from common
expectations. There was at least one participant that disagreed to the role of proactive disclosure
(Question (Q) 1, Part I) in public information, participation, debate, understanding and trust, and
one or two that agreed that proactive disclosure contributes to information overload, reduction of
a space to think for public officials and confusion about choices in decision-making. Responses

Laverne Jacobs, “Building on the Ombudsman: Polyjuralism and the Impact of Dispute Resolution in the
Canadian Access to Information Context”, Prepared for the 1st Global Conference on Transparency Research
(Rutgers, May 19-20, 2011); For final results see: Laverne Jacobs, “Evolution of the idiosyncrasy of the role of
ombudsman/person in Canada”, in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Baglay, eds., The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Pub. Company, 2013).
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to Q.2 revealed that that sometimes institutions frame information in certain ways which are
beneficial to the institutional interests; leave out information details if that information is
controversial; choose a technical language that needs a certain level of education to make sense
of. Responses to Q.3 disclose that 3 of 4 agencies do not make information available even if
there are a lot of ATI requests. There are also indications that agencies do not have policies in
place to stimulate proactive disclosure, and that there is not enough number of people dedicated
to transparency. Responses to Q.4 reveal that the most common used source to make information
available is through the agency’s website, and that none of the institutions asks for the public’s
feedback on the quality of information provided.

Responses to Q.1, Part II, tell that 3 out of 4 agencies disagree that ATI helps in decisionmaking by providing public input. There are also concerns related to the numbers of people and
the budget assigned to the ATI processing. Responses to Q.2 confirms that agencies believe that
ATI has a journalistic nature; they do not help fighting corruption; they embarrass government,
and do not protect human rights. Responses to Q.3 and 4 reveal that the interactions between
their agencies and requesters are either functional or friendly, and that except for media, all other
requesters have basic or no knowledge on the ATI legal framework. Responses to Q.5 confirm
that responding to ATI requests needs consultation with superiors, and in some cases ATIP
coordinators find themselves in troubles trying to respond the sensitive requests. Q.6 reveals that
ATIP coordinators use their discretion in responding to ATI requests, but also seek advice from
at least another person in their institution.

Part III discloses that most ATIP people have experience in the public office, have an average
of 16 hours of training on ATI, and that ATIP offices have 1-3 people working in them.

These results, although limited because of the small number of responses, confirm some of
the problems highlighted in the literature review, and reveal important insights of how ATI is
understood by the public officials in Canada.
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7.2.4 The case of Ontario
I bring now the case of Ontario and present practices that have developed during the FIPPA
implementation. Of course, the practices noticed at the federal level are not exclusively applied
there. They may be found elsewhere, in Ontario as well. I was focused in bringing here examples
that are specific for Ontario.

It is interesting to mention that in Ontario, the service of submitting ATI requests was free
until 1995. After the economic crisis in the early 90s, the Ontario’s 1995 Savings and
Restructuring Act was adopted and introduced a new five-dollar application fee. Additional fees
were introduced for processing requests for personal information; and fees for processing all
other requests – known as “general record” requests - were extended. New fees for filing
complaints to the IPC were also introduced790.
Defended by the government as a “broadening of the user-pay principle”791, the changes have
already had a dramatic effect on the frequency with which FOI law were used. Between 1995
and 1997, the total number of FOI requests submitted to the provincial government dropped by
over thirty percent792, and appeals to the provincial Information Commissioner dropped by over
forty percent793. This is an example where fees act as a deterrent to the ATI rights and have an
immediate effect on the frequency of ATI usage.

7.3 Institutional approaches to transparency and access to documents in the EU
7.3.1 The EU political environment on transparency and access to documents
As mentioned previously, a reason behind the movement towards the adoption of an ATD law
in the EU was to overcome the “democratic deficit” which characterizes EU governance794. The
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EU is a supranational organization, which, by its very nature, is more distant from the populace
than a national government. Because of this structure, Leino argues “often the right of public
access turns into institutional politics with the institutions and the Member States in fact
buttressing their own interests.”795

Moreover, there is a general lack of knowledge about Brussels politics, resulting in a
perception of the EP Members as being more removed from their constituents. Another feature
of the EU politics and representative system is the absence of true European parties. All of these
factors combined make constituencies quite weak and furthers the distance between the EU and
its citizens. Eurobarometer data shows a sharp decline in trust in national and European political
institutions since the advent of the financial crisis.796 Transparency plays a significant role in
restoring the public’s trust in the EU institutions. According to Birkinshaw, within the EU legal
discourse, transparency has a specific meaning: it is placed against the so-called lack of
democracy of the EU that is the reality of the complexity of the European construct797. The EP
has recognized that “transparency is essential to a democratic political union of citizens, in which
citizens can fully participate in the democratic process. Secrecy and discretion belong to an era
when Europe was built by diplomats and civil servants.”798
In the EU, the most prominent aspect of transparency is the right of ATD which is part of an
actual legal framework, including treaties, the Charter and the Convention of Human Rights.
Other aspects of transparency, such as the transparency of conducting consultations, the register
of experts and of interest representatives, have been dealt with by the EU institutions. In the case
of the Commission, it has declared that it “believes that high standards of transparency are part
of the legitimacy of any modern administration.”799 Consultations and dialogue are the main
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venue though which the Commission achieves its communications with the public.800 The
Commission uses two important policy tools to enable citizen engagement and participation. The
first tool was introduced in the follow-up of the White Paper801 and signed the establishment of
an online consultation system, “Your Voice in Europe”802. This is the European Commission's
“single access point” to a variety of ongoing consultations and feedback opportunities which
enable citizens to express their views on EU policies at different stages throughout the policy
lifecycle. While this system is a venue for public participation, it only gives a limited and
indirect right to citizens to decide on important public matters. The formal right for policy
initiation and decision-making remains in the hands of the Commission. Hence, such policy tool
has its limitations.

The second policy tool originates in the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced a new instrument
to involve citizens directly. The European’s Citizens’ Initiative803 (ECI), operational since April
2012, creates for the first time an instrument for citizens to call on the Commission to initiate
legislation.804 It allows one million EU citizens from at least seven Member states to participate
directly in the development of EU policies, by calling on the European Commission to make a
legislative proposal. The precise rules for submitting an initiative successfully are laid down in
the Regulation on the Citizens’ Initiative.805 Once having met all requirements for submitting an
initiative, the organizers of an initiative meet the Commission representatives in person and have
the opportunity to present their initiative at a public hearing in the EP. The Commission has to
decide whether to act on it within three months and has to publish a reasoned response. While
this venue for public participation may represent opportunities to engage in EU law-making, it is
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still up to the Commission to take the initiatives seriously. For instance, in 2014, the European
Commission rejected a European-wide citizens’ initiative on the controversial trade deal of
Canada-EU CETA. The initiative was supported by 230 organizations, with 3,284,289
signatures806 from 21 EU members. The Commission refused to register the initiative, claiming
that the proposed citizens' initiative falls manifestly outside the framework of the Commission's
powers.807 This example demonstrates how vulnerable this forms of participation are to the
political will. While they may have potential, they are no substitution for other forms of
transparency.

In addition to these policy tools, the Commission, together with other EU institutions,
engages in dialogue with interest groups which through lobbying and consultation push their
agendas in the EU’s political process. This is part of the ETI808 which makes an effort to regulate
lobbying and other consultation standards in the EU. In the course of the ETI, the European
Commission and the EP, integrated their registers in one “Transparency Register” on 23 June
2011, thus establishing a joint framework for relations with interest representatives for both
institutions. This Joint Register constitutes a single database that lists all individuals or
organizations that take part in EU policy-making.809

It is widely accepted that the Commission is dependent upon its exchanges with organized
civil society, because of their expertise in many policy areas. So, an increase of legitimacy is
expected, because all kinds of interest groups will seek to represent their interest at EU level.810
The fact that the European Commission has no direct mandate by the citizens makes exchanges
with interest representatives necessary to close the gap between the Commission and the citizens.
However, there are concerns about these negotiations taking place away for the wider public.
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According to Michalowitz “there is …. no guarantee that all stakeholders are included and
included equally.811 Greenwood argues that the solution for equality and inclusion is
transparency which “should enable wider civil society to control these exchanges.”812

Looking at the ETI, it outlines that transparency provisions are principally inclusive and in
respect of political equality. However, at the end, it is up to the EU institutions to decide upon
whom to consult. In addition, the publicity enforcement on lobby organizations in the registers is
fairly weak, since it takes a laissez-faire approach. Furthermore, organizations themselves cannot
be sure that they are equally heard nor listened to by the EU institutions, nor is the public able to
scrutinize the contacts of EU civil servants and lobby organizations. Greenwood observed that
the analysis of ETI related documents definitely shows a justificatory rhetoric towards the
pursuit of the normative goal of participatory legitimacy813. Indeed, the normative dimension of
transparency is traceable in the public discourse surrounding the ETI, but it seems that the
political will to act accordingly is not yet sufficiently strong to make even more use of the
democratic potential of transparency and transparent governance.

Apart from the Commission, the EP has regular and intensive contacts to various interest
groups.814 According to Rasmussen, lobbying the EP is a “necessary evil”815 because it is
essential to the functioning of the EP, particularly when MEPs are attempting to gauge the
impact of policies on specific sectors. Interest groups provide information and technical expertise
to MEPs, which ensures more informed policy formulation. In addition, the principle of openness
is firmly applied by the EP, because the internal rules of procedure stipulate that both the plenary
and the committee sessions be public816. This was realized only recently with regards to the
Council, as only after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon a provision was introduced
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stating that the Council shall meet in public817 when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative
act. The EP took a step forward in 2014 to bring greater transparency to its decision making by
recording and publishing records of final voting in committee. Previously most committee votes
were taken by a simple show of hands and were not recorded. The decision818, adopted on 26
February 2014, applies to all final votes on resolutions and legislation. It also makes it
compulsory to record and publish the final votes by MEPs in plenary on non-binding resolutions.

All three EU institutions, conforming to the requirements of Regulation 1049, have now
established specific information catalogues called the “register” of official documents covering
all information that has been processed or collected by government agencies. Many of the
documents produced are automatically recorded on the registers after processing. The registers
are published on line with many documents available for searching and downloading freely. The
registers also enables citizens to make ATD requests by filling an online form. The Council819,
the Commission820, and the EP821 have all operated a register that contains documents dating
from at least 2001, date of the Regulation 1049.

7.3.2 Institutional practices affecting the right of access to documents
In the EU, the path towards transparency and the right of ATD encompasses a contradiction –
the progress in the legal recognition of a treaty transparency principle and a constitutional right
of ATD is not accompanied with same progress in practical application of this legal framework.
Secrecy was the rule rather than an exception to the workings of the EU institutions until the late
90s. At that time, the idea was that if the Council were to deliberate in public, “progress would
either be blocked because delegations would be forced to take an immovable position, or the
817
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public proceedings would be theatre, with the real business being done by officials behind closed
doors”822. Although, in 2000 the legal framework on transparency transformed significantly, the
culture of secrecy still finds its way in the everyday operations of the EU institutions and
agencies. Data of the European Ombudsman shows that complaints relating to lack of
transparency within the EU institutions continue to top the list of complaints, occupying 20% to
30% of the total complaints that the Ombudsman’s office. The most common transparency issues
raised are the institutions’ refusal to grant access to documents and/or information.823

The experience with transparency and ATD in the EU demonstrates some practices that
indicate resistance towards openness. Especially in the phase when specific issues among the
myriad of possible issues are chosen for the agenda of the European decision-making bodies,
access is narrowed down drastically. Heritier argues that the phase of policy preparation where
proposals on specific issues are being drafted allows for access offered through public hearings,
formal consultations and the use of Commission Green and White Papers, but deliberation and
bargaining is insulated824. Even the EP, which is considered the most opened among the EU
governing bodies, engages in secrecy practices. EP committee process is open to the public825.
However, many pre-conciliation negotiations between the Council and the EP are removed from
the public826. In addition, the EP engages in practices where exceptions are used to deny ATD
requests. The rate of use of exclusions for the EP shows that for the last three years, 2012 (32%),
2013 (50%) and 2014 (39%), privacy is the most common of the exceptions laid out in Article 4
of the Regulation 1049.827
The internal dialogues between the three main EU institutions, known as “trilogues”, are
usually covered in secrecy. Trilogues are informal negotiations between the EP, the Council and
the Commission aimed at reaching early agreements on new EU legislation. Currently trilogue
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negotiations are not regulated, and meetings have an informal and ad-hoc nature. In spite of their
crucial role in the legislative process, trilogues are closed meetings, and there is a severe lack of
access to key information such as participants, agendas, minutes or documents considered.
Hence, it is difficult for citizens to follow specific legislative processes during trilogues.
Concerned about this weakness, the European Ombudsman, Emily O'Reilly, opened an
investigation into the transparency of trilogues with a view to boosting transparent law-making
in the EU. The Ombudsman asked the three institutions for information about their disclosure
policies on trilogue documents, including details of meetings, documents relating to ongoing
trilogues, minutes or notes drawn up after such meetings, as well as lists of participants.828

Regarding the operations of the Commission, they expose practices that limit transparency and
ATD. Requests of ATD are often rejected under many exceptions. The privacy exception is the
third most frequently invoked exception used by the European Commission when denying
requests829, and the numbers reveal that its use is increasing. The Commission in 2014 denied
Access Info a breakdown of Commissioners expenses on official travel and hospitality on
grounds of privacy.830 Another exception used to justify the rejection of disclosing information is
the international relations. Civil society has raised concerns about the way in which the
international relations exception is applied to matters of high public interest. There is still
controversy around the lack of openness of trade negotiations with the United States (TTIP
negotiations) and Canada (CETA negotiations), where a culture of secretive diplomacy rather
than of democratic transparency persists.
A recent decision of the European Commission is impeding the public’s right to submit ATD
online requiring a valid postal address for an ATD request. In April 2014 the European
Commission introduced a new requirement831 that asked all requesters to provide a postal
828
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address as a precondition for registering their request. In May, the Commission started to send
messages to requesters stating that postal address were required for registering and handling
requests in line with the procedural requirements. The Commission message stated that “Pending
your reply, we reserve the right to refuse the registration of your request.”832 Hence, requests via
the AsktheEU.org web portal were refused to be registered by the Commission if they were not
accompanied by a postal address.833 AsktheEU.org, which is run by Access Info Europe, was
launched in September 2011 with the aim of making the requesting process more transparent. It
is set up to work via email, with requests and responses published online in real time. This kind
of practice goes against the spirit of Regulation 1049, since this requirement for postal address is
not found in the law.

The workings of the Council have drawn a lot of criticism for failing to comply with EU
transparency rules. Most of the critics point to not respecting time frames for responding,
applying too many extensions to requests, and not informing all requesters of their right to appeal
when information was denied.834 According to a report of Access Info Europe, an analysis of 50
ATD requests submitted to the Council between 2011 and 2013 via the AsktheEU.org platform,
found that the average time for answering was 20 working days, over the maximum 15 working
days permitted by EU law. Requests which resulted in partial denials of information were
answered in an average of 49 working days835. This report also raises concerns about the broad
application of exceptions such as privacy and international relations. The privacy exception was
used to deny information about the identities of Member State representatives participating in
Council meetings, even on legislative negotiations. The international relations exception was
invoked to deny public access to multiple documents about the Council’s interactions with third
countries such as China and Mexico. A further issue was that of record keeping: the Council
informed requesters that it does not keep minutes of all working parties and in one instance
reported that legal advice had only been delivered to Member State representatives orally.836
Access Info Europe, “European Commission attempting to block citizens’ requests via AsktheEU.org”, 2 June
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The discussions over changes in Regulation 1049, have revealed another weakness in the
ATD regime in the EU. Member States such as France, Germany and the UK are seeking to limit
the public’s right of access to EU documents. They are using the reform of the regulation as an
opportunity to add new exceptions and to weaken the right of ATD837. The influence of these
Member States has led to a common Council position, which, if adopted, would increase the
opacity of the EU decision-making process, lead to a regression of the right of ATD in the EU
and weaken citizens’ ability to hold the institutions to account; thus violating the EU and
international law.838
7.3.3 Official data on transparency and access to documents requests
- Data from the Register of Documents of the EP, Commission and Council
Using data from the Annual Reports on ATD from these three institutions, I developed my
own tables. The tables contain statistics for a period of 10 years, from 2005-2014. Tables 15, 18
and 21 look at the source of ATD requests, respectively for the Commission, the Council and the
EP. The data includes the same or similar categories of requesters for all three institutions, such
as academics, public authorities, lawyers, journalists, civil society, other EU institutions and an
unspecified category which includes mainly the public. The tables share some interesting trends.
The most requests are submitted by the public (others or unspecified) and the academics,
followed by the civil society. There is a significant gap in numbers for these categories compared
to other ones. This trend is distinguishable from that in Canada, where academia requests are
insignificant. Another difference with Canada is the number of civil society requests which
comes third in the list of categories. In Canada, this number kept declining despite the rise on
total requests. Journalists, for all three institutions, just as in Canada, have kept a low profile, and
only occupy a small percentage of requests. These numbers, again, confirm that ATI should not
be associated with the media.
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Tables 16, and 19 compile data on the number of requests and their status (if they were
disclosed fully, partially or refused). The numbers indicate that requests disclosed outnumber
significantly those refused, although the Commissioner’s data are steadier than those of the
Council.839

Tables 17, 20 and 22 contain data on the refusals made based on exceptions for all three
institutions. Privacy is the second largest reason for refusals for the Commission (tab 17) and the
EP (tab 22), and the decision-making is the first reason for refusals in the Council (tab 20) and
the EP (tab 22), and the third for the Commission (tab 17). These data demonstrate that the
decision-making process in the EU happens away from the public eye, and is protected by a veil
of secrecy. In this approach, the EU does not differ much from Canada, where also the Cabinet
confidences are fanatically preserved from being affected by the ATIA provisions. Also, privacy
exceptions prevail in both jurisdictions as one of the main reasons for declining requests for ATI.

-

Questionnaire for the Transparency Units

I delivered the same questionnaire (as the one used in Canada) to the EU institutions and
agencies. However, the steps were different from what I did for Canada. The EU does not have a
government body assigned to manage the administration of the ATD. As a result, it does not
have a central database that gives the names or contacts of the persons that process ATD
requests. The EU does not have ATIP coordinators, but the main institutions have “Transparency
Units”. Hence, I had to search each of the EU agencies’ website, for information on where to
send my questionnaire.
The EU has 42 agencies: 2 EUROATOM agencies, 6 executive agencies, 37 decentralized
agencies including three Agencies under Common Security and Defense Policy to which
Regulation 1049 does not apply. Only 10 of these agencies have a designated space in their
website for Access to Documents or Transparency, but only 4 of them have email addresses to
contact these Units. Most agencies have forms in their websites that could only be completed on
line. Many agencies do not even have a general email contact, but just phone numbers and
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addresses. I could find the email contacts of 23 agencies and sent the questionnaire to all 23 out
of 42 agencies. In addition, I sent the email to the EP, the Commission, and the Council. The
requests were sent at the same time, following the same procedure as in Canada.

One agency sent links of websites instead of completing the questionnaire and suggested to
file an ATD request in case I don’t find the information needed. Two agencies declined to
complete the questionnaire. One explained that the agency was not in a position to participate in
my project “at the current juncture, due to a stress on resources coupled with urgent work in the
field of its competence”. The other declined saying that since my request did not constitute a
request to ATD, they would not consider to fill the questionnaire. I have received six completed
questionnaires in total, which constitutes a 23% response rate. This rate is also low, but it is
significantly higher than what I got for Canada.

The results are worth of observations, and reveal interesting trends, especially if compared to
the Canadian counterparts. Most of the answers to Q.1, Part I, are positive to the role of the
proactive disclosure. However, four participants agreed that early proactive disclosure leads to a
public information overload, and that increases the workload and expenses of the institution.
Responses to Q.2 revealed that most of the agencies admit that depending on the issue, they
leave out information details if that information is controversial; frame information in certain
ways which are beneficial to the institutional interests, and choose a technical language that
needs a certain level of education to make sense of. Responses to Q.3 inform that agencies do not
have enough people dedicated to transparency. Responses to Q.4 inform that agencies use all
sorts of means to make information available, such as social and traditional media, press, and
open meeting. In addition, they do ask for the public’s feedback on the quality of information
provided.

Responses to Q.1, Part II, inform that all agencies agree on the value of ATD. The only
concern is on the numbers of people and the budget assigned to ATD processing. Responses to
Q.2 confirms that only sometimes ATI has the purpose to protect human rights; make institutions
accountable; participate in decision-making; stimulate transparency, or prevent corruption.
However, differently from Canada, agencies rarely believe that ATI has a journalistic nature. Q.3
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and 4 inform that academia has the closest relationship with the agencies. The other interactions
are either functional or friendly. Also, they reveal that mostly media and organizations have
either a strong or a basic knowledge. Responses to Q.5 confirms that, sometimes, responding to
ATI requests needs consultation with superiors, and that information benefits certain groups
rather than the general public. In addition, responses assert that information only rarely helps
requesters advance some other human rights it. Q.6 reveals that none of the ATD people use their
discretion in responding to ATD requests. Instead, they seek advice from at least another person
in their institution.

Part III discloses that most ATD people have experience in public office (mostly 5-10 years),
mostly have an average of 1-5 hours of training on ATD, and that most agencies have either none
or over five people working assigned with ATD requests.

The results of this questionnaire inform a lot about how EU institutions and agencies perceive
and value ATD, which is an important indicator of how they implement ATD rules in practice.

7.3.4 The case of Albania
Albania represents an interesting case of an advanced legal framework on ATI, but that lacks
proper implementation. This case is a perfect example of a failure to live up to the requirements
of the law, and even worse to the acknowledgement of its importance. I have argued elsewhere
that “Some of the main problems with the transparency regime in Albania have to do with the
legislation, but more importantly with the practices related to it, with the administrative culture
of the civil servants and with the awareness of the citizens.”840

The main problem in Albania is that the administration does not have the necessary
knowledge about this legislation, nor the capacity to carry on its requirements. In many cases the
public offices do not have the will to respond to requests for reasons of neglect or purposely to
hide information. One of Article 19’s regional partner organizations, the Centre for Development
and Democratisation of the Institutions, reported in 2003 that 87% of the people surveyed
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working in public authorities did not even know that Albania had a FOI law.841 David Banisar
argued that “Some laws are adopted and never implemented. In Albania, there has been little use
of the law because neither users nor government officials are aware of it.”842 The US State
Department in its 2005 Human Rights Report noted that “this law has not been fully
implemented, and limited access to public information for citizens and noncitizens remained a
problem. A lack of government information offices and limited understanding of the law by
government officials contributed to the problem.”843

The facts point to an immediate need for awareness and training in public administration.
What happens very often is that civil servants do not comply with the procedural requirements
for a transparent administrative activity either because they do not have enough knowledge or
resist it. The assessment of the NGOs in Albania demonstrate the very limited knowledge of the
law by public officials at all levels of the administration844. The image of a public official is not
very highly regarded in Albania. Part of the administration still reflects a secret culture where
information is considered to be in the ownership of the institution if not of the person holding the
information. There is certainly need for training of public officials to improve the understanding
and knowledge of the legal provisions, since its lack may bring serious impediments to the
realisation of the right of ATI.

Often, the release of information becomes a commodity which is sold to the citizens at a hefty
price. As Szekely puts it “Another current problem is the cost of public information – both its
official and black market price. The black market price (the price of information obtained
through bribery) is not common knowledge.”845This mentality is embedded in the culture of
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secrecy that has predominated the Albanian administration for many years. Szekely argues that
“For decades, information handling was a party-state monopoly . . . the provision and the content
of information were subordinated to a centralized political will.”846

To explain the problems in ATI implementation it is important to consider that the
government has changed several times since the FOI law was adopted in 1999, and each change
normally leads to the reorganization or abolishment of various ministries, with senior public
officials being replaced. It is a common practice in Albania that every time a party comes to
power, most of the public officials are replaced with militants as a reward of their support during
electoral campaign. Appointments of people in offices based on party politics and not on
personal merits demeans the image of the public official in Albania. This practice causes
politicization or bad management of administration. This is a fundamental problem for the whole
process of legal and administrative reform in Albania.

Another reason for the failure of the ATI regime in Albania is an uneducated public. There is
a concerning lack of awareness regarding the law at all levels of the Albanian society, from civil
society to ordinary citizens. According to Article 19, in practice, the law is rarely applied, and
most Albanians have little knowledge of its existence847. That explains why there are only a few
requests for official documents and little use of the FOI Law. The situation is expected to
improve with the new law which has introduced better safeguards and high penalties for noncompliance. Gent Ibrahimi, a legal expert who participated in the drafting of the law, said the bill
introduced the concept of personal responsibility in the decision-making process of public
officials, which is a novelty in Albanian law. Ibrahimi acknowledged that the Albanian legal and
administrative culture is such that officials only implement what is prescribed by law.848
However, legal safeguards face many obstacles in Albania – a weak judiciary, a strong
executive and a politicized administration. This combination is a recipe for failure. The right to
judicial review of information refusals has almost never been exercised in Albania, perhaps as a
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result of the small numbers of requests made for information, the excessively lengthy time for
administrative review, and the lack of confidence in the judiciary due to its reputation for
corruption. The courts are usually perceived as not trustworthy to solve conflicts or violation of
rights. As “In most East European countries, judges are accustomed to a phone call form a party
boss suggesting the dispositions of a case.”849. In one case, the newspaper Republika was
threatened by a body guard of the Minister of Health, following publication of an article
reporting on the ongoing problem of unlicensed dental clinics850. Stories like this are a clear
indicator of a weak system of government which is unable to protect those who exercise their
legitimate rights recognized by the law and the Constitution.
The paradox of Albania stands on the disaccord between the quality of the legislation, and the
practices of the administration of the law. Albania has one of the best laws in the world, which
has so far failed to be properly implemented. So, how can this disaccord be explained? One
strong stimulus for improving the legal framework, not only on ATI, but also more broadly, has
been the Albanian aspiration for a membership status in the EU. Just like in other countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, political elites in Albania have been willing to support ATI
legislation, because they are “eager to boost their democratic credentials in order to be
considered as possible members of the European Union”851. Elsewhere, I have called this process
of adapting to the rules of accession of the EU “Europeanization by convenience.”852 This is a
demonstration of the dichotomy that exists between the ATI rules and practices. These practices
are shaped by the political environment in a given country, but also other inside and outside
political pressures, which dictate to a certain degree, the path of transparency and ATI.

7.4 Comparisons and Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter shows how a statutory right can be shaped through the exercise of
administrative discretion, an observation made by Roberts853 more than a decade ago. The
practices in all jurisdictions expose how everyday operations of public administration are
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continuously trying to circumvent legal requirements by giving life to new rules on ATI. Having
a good ATI law in place is the first step to building an effective ATI regime because, as Berliner
argues, it institutionalizes transparency and “makes…promises of transparency more
credible.”854 However, this institutionalization does not happen in vacuum, but it builds upon
existing institutional culture and rules. In the Canadian context, Bazillion has argued that
“Administrative secrecy is endemic in the Canadian political system.”855 The same is true for the
EU, where Pasquier and Villeneuve have pointed to the cultures of transparency and secrecy,
rooted in historical traditions and traditional state-society relations.856 When considering that the
ATI regime in the EU is tempered through a battle of interests between Member States, the
cultural explanation becomes clear. This battle reflects a divide between pro-transparency
members and other members who oppose it.

The application of ATI laws requires considerations of broad principles of public interest,
harm, balancing of rights, and generally, government agencies have a tendency to neglect these
broader considerations. They worry mainly about the narrower interests that are tied to their
agency's mission. For instance, according to the ICC, government departments do not take
seriously their obligations to undertake a two-step process before applying discretionary
exemptions. Too often departments are content with addressing only the question: “May the
requested records be kept secret?” Instead, they should be asking: “Even if they may, why should
the records be kept secret?”857 However, as one cross-national study reveals, there can be high
costs for setting up the necessary infrastructure for the implementation of ATI laws858 which can
act as an impediment for having an effective ATI regime. Financial constraints demonstrate that
ATI does not operate in a tension-free environment, but in one where priorities should be picked
and choices should be made. Of course, this is not to say that lack of resources justify restrictions
in ATI, especially if they are made in an arbitrary manner. In any case, the development of
Internet offers great opportunities for cutting costs on disseminating information.
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The comparison of ATI trends in practices between Canada and the EU offers some
interesting insights. While the legal protection they offer to transparency and ATI is different
(with the EU being much more progressive), the practices demonstrate a similar trend – there is a
tendency towards a restriction of the right of ATI. The decline in Canada is more prevalent, and
is mostly a result of administrative practices. In the EU, the analysis reveal similar practices.
Lieno argues that “In today's Europe, there seems to be nothing shameful in arguing that citizens
are outsiders, and that openness and citizen participation distract efficient decision-making in the
institutions.”859 In addition, there is an attempt to restrict the right of ATI through both practical
and legal venues by trying to limit the scope of the Regulation 1049. The case of Albania depicts
a similar picture where the government has improved the ATI legal environment due to
international pressures without paying much attention to improvements in practice.
The data on the tables presented for both Canada and the EU represent attention-grabbing
trends on the ATI practices and dynamics. The ATI right is expansively used by the public in
Canada and the EU. Also, media requests are not significant in both jurisdictions. However,
other actors are different. In the EU, a significant part of the ATI space is occupied by the
academia, while in Canada it is occupied by business. The NGOs are much more active in the
EU than in Canada.
The question that is naturally raised when looking at these cases is: Why are government not
very keen of an expansion of the right to ATI? Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballasteros offer an
explanation for this trend by taking an international approach. They argue that FOI laws do not
represent an immediate benefit for those in power. FOI laws open the government to external
scrutiny, making elites much more vulnerable to outside criticism and significantly empowering
civil society.860 Flaherty makes similar claims arguing that FOI “only appeals to Opposition
politicians, not to politicians in power. It has no appeal, and is only a bother, if not a threat, to the
government and public servants and their control of access to general information.”861 As a
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result, one should always expect some level of resistance from the part of government when
dealing with transparency and ATI. When the FOI laws were expanding in the 70s, it was argued
that they represented a “certain kind of public myth” because there was a strong belief that the
“So-called liberal democratic governments keep a lot of information secret”862. This lack of
belief in FOI laws has accompanied any FOI laws, and continues to date. According to
Woodbury “if governments were serious about information access, then information acts would
have teeth to them, providing punitive damages, the disciplines or dismissal of employees”.863
There is a close relationship between law, practice and ATI protection. Below, I offer a
diagram which simplifies this relationship, but also describes how it works, with law and practice
being two variables that determine the ATI protection progression line. Canada, the EU and
Albania occupy different spaces in the diagram depending on the expansion or restriction in the
two variables.

Best

Best ATI protection

norms

Worse

Best practices

As I have argued above there are many reasons why governments resist the idea of ATI.
Power and control are two of the most prevailing incentives for such resistance. The cliché about
information being power has much truth to it. As Max Weber explained, the logic of bureaucratic
administration rests in part on producing information and “keeping secret its knowledge and
intentions” from competing organizations and from the public864. Pasquier and Villeneuve
observed that those in power tend to consider public information their own property.865. The
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analysis in this chapter validates such claims. In most of the cases there are state institutions who
have exclusive knowledge on the information they produce and where such information is stored,
hence possessing a “monopoly of knowledge”. They also retain significant discretion over the
release of documents they prefer to keep secret and shift this discretion towards the safe harbors
provided under the exceptions to disclosure laws.866 This tight control over knowledge gives
them a big amount of power over citizens. As such, governments are rarely willing to share this
power in the absence of compelling incentives,867 according to Florini. Hence, governments have
a free hand to control the public space in which debates occur and ideas are shaped. This could
lead to alienation of the citizenry from public discourse.

Considering all above, ATI becomes a powerful tool for providing a rich public space which
enables individuals to become citizens and be part of debating, shaping and steering the direction
of their countries. In the Canadian context, Curry argues that there is a certain David versus
Goliath aspect every time someone files an ATI – common citizens can obtain some of the most
sensitive documents held by some of the most powerful people in the country.868 At first sight,
this seems like an unequal playfield for the citizenry. However, as the analysis in this chapter
indicated, governments have a culture of secrecy embedded in them, but also some incentives,
and pressures to act accordingly to the ATI requirements. ATI regimes involve many other
actors, such as information commissioners, courts and NGO-s, whose role is important in
shaping directions of the right of ATI in a given jurisdiction. They have the potential to promote
compliance with existing laws and policies, and encourage governments to revise laws, policies,
and practices869. I study the role of these other actors in the next chapter of this research.
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CHAPTER 8: MEDIA AND THE NGOs – LOOKING AT ATI FROM A USER’S
PERSPECTIVE

ATI regimes in Canada and the EU are advanced by the noteworthy contribution of different
NGOs and media working to defend the public’s right of ATI. This chapter looks at the media
and NGOs for three reasons. First, they are among a few categories of users of ATI rights.
Second, and more importantly, they play an essential role in promoting transparency and ATI as
fundamental to democracy and good governance. Third, to clarify a point that seems to emerge
from the literature for claims (especially from the political class) that the ATI space is occupied
by journalists who abuse the system just to embarrass governments. Hazell and Worthy argue
that there is sometimes a strained relationship between governments and media - the government
feels that information is distorted by the press, and the press feels that there is no information
that is not fed or manipulated by the government870.
The purpose of this Chapter is to look at ATI from a user’s perspective. In the previous
chapter, I examined ATI from an insider’s point of view – that of the government. Now, I turn to
examine it from an outsider’s standpoint. To understand the outsider’s perspective I examine the
work of some of the most influential NGOs and media organizations or journalists in Canada and
the EU on ATI. In addition, I look at the strategies employed by them for the promotion of
transparency and the right of ATI. An analysis of the websites of the some of the newspapers
and NGOs was complemented by interviews with the representatives of some of them. The
interviewees in this research were chosen among important persons who have been part of
different deliberations on issues of transparency and ATI.

The traditions role of the media is investigatory journalism and breaking story. Walby and
Larsen see a connection between ATI and breaking news. He argued that “ATI/FOI requests are
associated with the breaking of a big story that is the golden goose of investigative
journalism.871” In addition, McCamus recognized the role of the press as “a prime mover in
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working for freedom of information legislation.”872 The work of the media and NGOs has
enriched the understanding of the principle of transparency and has stretched the right of ATI to
the limits of legal recognition. The relationship between ATI and media has been twofold. On
one hand, media has helped giving life to the right of ATI by using its breaking stories. On the
other hand, ATI has “helped the media become much more aware of how government works and
to identify administrative miscues.”873

The NGOs, or more widely civil society has also been closely associated with the immense
work on ATI. Schutter addresses the “promise of participatory democracy” in his account of civil
society in EU governance and maintains that interest groups and citizens’ initiatives “participate
in public information and communication processes, so helping to create a general perception of
the common good.”874 In addition, Curtin refers to the same concept when assigning civil society
the function of establishing a space for the public deliberation of values and policies.875 Eriksen
argues that democracy at the level of the EU requires a “single overarching communicative space
accessible for all, in which proponents and opponents can voice and justify opinions and claims,
and mobilize support in order to sluice them into decision-making units via social movements
and political parties.”876 Usually the relationship of the NGOs with the government is less
confrontational than that of the media. In an Interview with Viola Aliaj, lawyer at the QZHDI,
she admitted that “The interaction with ATI officials in Albania has an investigative nature, but
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not adversarial or conflictual. The administration usually asks why the centre wants information,
how is it going to use it and for what reasons.”877
Media and NGOs’ approach to ATI rights could be seen in a spectrum – from human rights
advocacy to association of ATI with broader themes such as equality, development or justice.
According to Access Info Europe, “The right of information is a fundamental right in itself….It
is also an instrumental right, essential for the protection of other human rights.”878 At a broader
scope, part of aspirations of the UN Sustainable Development Goals from an NGO’s perspective
is that human development in the coming decades will depend on people’s ATI.879

Below, I discuss some of the strategies that the NGOs and media use to promote transparency
and ATI. These strategies are diverse and range from whistleblowing to advocacy to litigation.
They demonstrate the potential of the media and NGOs for ATI rights promotion and protection.

8.1 Raising public awareness and revealing scandals
8.1.1 Canada’s activism on access to information
Generally, NGOs and media are good advocates when it comes to protecting and promoting
important values in democratic societies - ATI - being one of them. They have demonstrated a
firm determination to explore the loopholes and weaknesses of the current operational systems
on ATI legal provisions and their implementation. According to Sulyok and Pap, an NGO’s
impact is twofold. First of all, they serve as a very powerful source of information, raise
awareness, and initiate public debate on issues formerly unknown. Second, they perform an
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investigative role on sensitive issues.880 Similarly, media is one of the most passionate and public
advocates of access rights today.881

Indeed, people get most of their information from the news in TV, radio or newspapers. With
the advancement of technology we can hear or read about breaking news wherever we are
through our devices. As such, media’s reach to people extends limitless. This role not only brings
public’s attention to the importance of ATI, but also creates the public space to think about,
initiate or join debates of public importance. It is not novel to say that governments are not
particularly sympathetic to being opened when it comes to decision making. In this context,
NGOs and media that engage in access rights advocacy are not always very welcome to be part
of deliberations of public importance. Their role is often perceived as taking advantage of
transparency by revealing information that bears on others’ performance.882 Speaking about the
EU, Kohl-Koch argues that ‘empirical research documents that civil society involvement in EU
governance ensures neither equal nor effective representation of stakeholders883. This situation
stands in contrast to the role that NGOs should play in democratic governance – participating in
political processes and holding governments accountable.

In Canada, many NGOs criticize the ATI regime for being subject to significant exceptions
and the costly, time-consuming and frustrating process for obtaining information. Most NGOs
are concerned about the delays and costs associated with the Canadian ATI system and dispute
that the presumption of openness and transparency is being seriously undermined. They hold that
Canada is falling behind internationally884 at a time when governments all over the world are
increasingly being more proactive about disclosing information to the public. The Canadian
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NGOs’ approach towards the current system of ATI, especially at the federal level, is a strong
critique of the law and its implementation. The pervasive opinion of the NGOs is that the system
is out-dated and weak at best and broken at worst. Vincent Gogolek, executive director of the
B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association (FIPA) reported that game playing,
delays and workarounds are nothing new to advocates.885 In an interview with me he said that his
centre uses ATI requests to test the state of the law, and learn what is going on in the
government. He raised two issues regarding ATI implementation, first – information not being
recorded, and second - the high fees imposed on the requesters. He illustrated these problems
with examples. First, the Ministry of Citizenship replied to a FIPA request about records of a
Conference they had with the US trade representative, that they did not write anything down. In
another instance, the fee for a request, sent by the centre about the correspondence between the
BC government and the Governor’s Office in Washington State, was estimated over $600 in BC,
while in the Washington state costed only $5. The request was the same. When the centre went
public with the difference in cost, the Deputy Minister sent a letter to them saying that fee was
reduced to zero. Gogolek explained that “they were clearly using fees to delay and
discourage.”886
In addition, the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD) states that “It is neither revolutionary
nor even controversial to note that Canada’s right to information system is broken.”887 According
to them, “the problem has become entrenched at many levels in Canada: problematic legal rules,
negative official attitudes towards disclosure, an adversarial approach on the part of many civil
society groups and actors, and general public apathy on this issue.”888. In an interview with
Michael Karanicolas, Legal Officer at the CLD, he stated that “the ATIA is 30 years old, and
there is presumably an entire generation of bureucrats that have spent their entire careers under
the ATI law, and there is still not a culture of openness by default.”889 He considered this
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situation troubling and frustrating to deal with. Another issue which he criticised is the latest
practice of the government to substitute ATI with open data, claiming that it has been more
transparent. Karanicolas said that “Open data is great, and it is great the government is doing
that, but open data is not a substitute for access to information, because information about
corruption, mismanagement, or information about anything government is embarrassed about,
that is never going to get released through open data, or it is very unlikely.”890
Reporters and editors of Newspapers Canada891, who have an extensive experience with ATI,
had long complained of government restricting information despite legislative guarantees of
access. In an interview with John Hinds, President and CEO of Newspapers Canada, he outlined
numerous problems with ATI in Canada. Hinds explained that ATI suffers from many problems,
it is legalistic in nature (professionals take more advantage), it is complex (one should know how
to navigate the system), it is resource dependent (only those who can afford it can pay for it), it is
forgotten into public’s memory (not enough promotion), it is dependent on the institutional
culture, governments often play a privacy and security card which trumps ATI892. In 2005, the
Canadian Newspaper Association presented evidence to the OIC describing a policy of “amber
lighting” or “red flagging” that had been detailed by investigative journalists Ann Rees.
Thompson describes the amber light process as “a heads up process to advise senior management
of upcoming access to information releases that may attract media or political attention.”893
Roberts and Rees described that practice as “a highly sophisticated, government-wide access to
information surveillance system.”894
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The Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) strongly believes that “without access to
information, freedom of expression is a hollow freedom.”895 It writes in its most recent 20142015 Report Card that 2014 has been a terrible year and arguing that “Our right to know has
never been more threatened. Years of government neglect and political interference have left our
Access to Information system an antiquated, ineffective shell of what it is supposed to be.”896
Tom Henheffer, CJEF’s Executive Director, expressed his disbelief in the ATIA saying that in an
interview that our access law has no teeth since the government can deny requests without any
consequences. He explained that “because of the government approach, ATI is becoming
useless. Many journalists cannot afford to spend a long time following a story …It is a nigh
nightmare situation.”897 CJFE also issues Reviews of Free Expression in Canada every year
where it also looks at problems with ATI regime. In 2012 CJFE initiated a survey of its online
readers seeking input for a dialogue that the OIC was conducting regarding the ATIA. CJFE
initiated the survey in early December 2012, and received 95 responses to a ten-part
questionnaire898. A large majority (79%) of those responders were either very or somewhat
familiar with the ATI system. Regarding the scope of the ATIA’s ‐what it covers ‐ only 1% of the
respondents would keep things the way they are.899
CJFE also designs an ATI Annual Public Poll900 which asks Canadians about their opinions
on some of the most important public issues, including government openness and ATI. The most
recent Poll demonstrated that Canadians consider ATI important (79%). This is a significant
change compared to the last year’s Poll, when the response to the question “if Canadians have
more access to government information than ever before?” only 36% disagreed and 22% agreed.
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, ‘A Hollow right: Access to Information in crisis: A Submission by
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These type of polls are very significant not only because they give a sense on how public feels
about access rights, but also because they raise public awareness by drawing attention that these
issues matter. Henheffer said that these polls take the temperature on a few issues, including ATI
and see what Canadians feel in regards to these issues.901
Table 23: CJFE Review 2014-2015

Table 24: CJFE Poll 2014

Source: CJFE Poll 2015. Gives us back our rights.
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The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) also uses ATI for monitoring, advocacy
and policy implementation purposes. According to Interviewee No.5, the centre uses ATI “to
advocate for a particular type of policy to be implemented…, to inform particular projects, but
also to get a better sense of how ATI regime works overall.”902 In this interview it was
recognized that the ATIA is very out of date, there are a lot of exemptions and exclusions, and a
lot of them are interpreted very broadly. The interviewee gave an example of request that the
centre had filed to the CSE which took a year to get a no answer. The answer was: “we can’t tell
you if we have it or not, and even if we do have it is exempted under the provisions of the
statute.” However, the Interviewee also acknowledged that she has met journalists who get a lot
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of good information using ATI, because they have built some expertise on how to navigate the
system. Journalists, especially of the big media, are taken more seriously by the government
because “the stakes are higher if they’re messing around with the media”. Also, the interviewee
admitted that the CCLA does not engage with ATI as much as they wanted to, because of the
shortage of staff and limited resources which don’t allow to go after information that might get
long time to generate results.
Another Canadian NGO - Democracy Watch – has also been active in its criticism against the
ATIA in Canada. It has been advocating for changes in the Law in a public campaign - the Open
Government Campaign – trying to inform the public and engage people to participate in putting
pressure to the government in this issue. Democracy Watch has prepared a template letter903
which people can fill and send it directly from their website to key politicians calling for changes
in the ATIA in Canada. The letter is also an appeal to the government to stop excessive secrecy
and protect the whistleblowers. On May 22nd, 2015, the number of letters sent was 75, 382904
which is an impressive number that speaks directly about the public interest in ATI issues.

A. Breaking Stories of ATI requests in Canada
The so-called sponsorship scandal in Canada began with a single ATI request by The Globe
and Mail. The stories that followed the request triggered a public inquiry and a host of reforms to
federal ethics rules.905 The scandal came as a result of a Canadian federal government
“sponsorship program” in the province of Quebec and involving the Liberal Party of Canada, in
power from 1993 to 2006. Jean Chretien's Liberal government created the sponsorship program
in the '90s to promote national unity in Quebec, but the administration of the program became a
huge scandal because of corrupt payments to Liberal-friendly advertising firms, sometimes in
return for no work.906 Until the issue hit the front pages in early 2004, the federal government
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sponsorship program had been in operation quietly, but not altogether anonymously, since 1994
because of intensifying media coverage.907 Government advertising and promotion were on a
sharp upward curve, with $111 million spent annually on advertising campaigns by 2003.908
Daniel Leblanc, a Globe and Mail reporter, helped expose the federal sponsorship scandal using
documents obtained under the ATIA “to show that three-quarters of the funding was heading into
Quebec.”909 He then talked to an anonymous whistleblower in the government who totally
exposed the sponsorship scandal. When the matter became a public inquiry LeBlanc was asked
in Court to reveal his source. In response, he said that he would rather face jail time than reveal
the source of information.910.
In another case, the Canadian Press journalist Dean Beeby reported in February 2010 that a
federal cabinet minister’s aide had impeded the release of material – an act for which he had no
legal authority. Under the ATIA, Beeby had asked for information on the extensive real estate
portfolio of the Department of Public Works. His request was tagged as sensitive, put into a
purple-coloured folder, and handed to Sebastien Togneri, a political aide to the minister Christian
Paradis. The department’s ATI officers decided they had no legal basis to withhold the
information and ordered 137 pages released to the reporter. Then, at the last minute, Togneri sent
an urgent email to a senior access official to “unrelease it” and there was a rush to the mailroom
to save the file from being delivered to media hands. Four months later Beeby received only a
fraction of the information and it was heavily redacted.911 The final release was made 82 days
later than allowed under the law and included just 30 pages.912
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Access requests also played a part in The Globe's series on the treatment of detainees in
Afghanistan handed over by the Canadian Forces, which led to new transfer rules between
Canada and the Afghan government.913 Documents obtained under the ATIA show Canada’s
Conservative government stopped short of a categorical repudiation of torture. Instead, it issued
memos to security and defence agencies permitting the use of information that may have been
gathered through coercion. The series of documents, dubbed Canada’s torture memos, formed
the basis of several exclusive stories, ones that could not have been written without ATI.914

It was an access request in the late 1990s by McKie that ultimately made public a key
database inside Health Canada chronicling cases of adverse drug reactions. Through
negotiations, Health Canada agreed to release most of the database, and the CBC made it
available to the public on its website. The data allowed the CBC to report a major rise in adverse
drug reactions among youth taking certain antidepressants. A second story using the same
database showed that thousands of seniors were dying each year from the drugs prescribed to
them by doctors.915
Regarding the Senate expense scandal, requests were made from reporters and others using
the ATIA to obtain all documents relating to the Senate fiasco in the possession of the two
departments, the Privy Council Office and the Department of Justice. In total, the departments
responded to more than two dozen requests for documents. In every case, the response was the
same: The search yielded “zero” pages because the information “did not exist.” A subsequent
request to the Privy Council Office for “all records related to the expenses of senators” turned up
five pages of documents, but the government refused to release them on the grounds they
contained confidential advice from lawyers.916
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In Ontario, the provincial government increased its inspections of daycares after a series of
revelations by the Toronto Star, which used provincial and municipal freedom-of-information
requests to uncover hundreds of illegal daycares and unsafe conditions at licensed centres.917
8.1.2 The EU’s activism on access to documents
To understand the NGOs ATI activism in the EU, one should have a general idea about their
status in the EU politics. The EU accepts NGO involvement in policy and decision-making as
not only a necessity, but as a requirement of the democratic system. Heidbreder acknowledges
that “As a basic element of the public sphere, civil society has a sense-making, communicative,
and discursive role in shaping the democratic legitimacy of the Union embedded in identity and
society formatting processes.”918 Suffering from a general democratic deficit due to its indirect
forms of representation and political appointment, the EU includes NGOs in policy processes in
order to increase its democratic legitimacy and bring itself closer to its citizens. The EU actively
promotes the regular consultation and further involvement of civil society since these
organisations have a lot of expertise in particular areas and are involved in implementing and
monitoring EU policies.The Commission has formally recognized the contributions NGOs can
make through different instruments, such as consultations through Green and White Papers,
Communications, advisory committees, business test panels and ad hoc consultations. However,
NGOs have better relationship with the members of the EP, up to a point where NGOs will draft
legislation on behalf of a parliamentarian. The Commission is somewhat less open, and the
Council is the hardest to access.

A scandal broke out in early June 2012 when European Commission spokesman Antonio
Gravili was quoted by the EUobserver.com, characterising the debate around the reform of the
EU's ATI rules as “infantile”. He asserted that most requests for what he called “internal EU
documents” came from corporate lawyers and “nutty NGOs” instead of concerned EU citizens.
Those targeted by the comments were the Brussels based anti-lobby organisations, who
increasingly use ATD, including through the AsktheEU.org website. Civil society organisations
and international FOI experts reacted strongly, in a letter to the Commission’s Vice-President
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Maros Sefcovic and to the Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso calling on them to
disown Gravili's comments. The letter was signed by over 50 NGOs, civil society platforms and
FOI advocates, and called on the European Commission to publicly affirm that it respects the
fundamental right of access to EU documents and the debate about the future of the transparency
rules. An apology was received in this regard.919

NGOs in the EU have played an important role for the advancement of ATI. Organizations
such as, Article 19, the Open Society Justice Initiative, and Access Info Europe (AIE) have urged
ratification of the Convention on Access to Official Documents because it sets legally binding,
minimum standards for ATI.920 AIE also intervened in April 2009, when an internal guide from
the EU Directorate General for Trade was giving tips to public officials on how to not record
information and to avoid providing documents to the public. AIE team filed requests for copies
of documents giving staff guidance on how to handle ATD requests. As a result, the matter was
pursued by an investigation which produced a report called “Questions to Brussels: How should
a citizen request EU documents?”921
Another strategy is pursued in regards to access rights – using it as a tool to advance other
human rights by gathering empirical data. For instance, AIE considers ATI a tool for defending
other civil liberties and human rights,922 and it has initiated many projects in the EU, in which it
has used ATI as a tool to assess human rights. This work confirms what research demonstrates,
that “there is the primary objective on their [NGOs] side to promote access to …information as
an accessory to evolve the performance of fundamental rights.”923 One such project that will use
Europe’s ATI laws to get comparative data on civil liberties issues is “Access for Rights.”924

919

Access Info Europe, EU Commission urged to respect right of access, June 2012, online: <http://www.accessinfo.org/eut/11660>.
920
Freedominfo.org., 12 countries sign First International Convention on Access to Official Documents, 19 June
2009, online: <http://www.freedominfo.org/2009/06/12-european-countries-sign-first-international-convention-onaccess-to-official-documents/>.
921
Freedominfo.org, Access Info Unveils Question to Brussels Report on Requesting EU Information, 19 November
2009, online: <http://www.freedominfo.org/2009/11/access-info-unveils-question-to-brussels-report-on-requestingeu-information/>.
922
See its Website, Access Info Europe <http://www.access-info.org/>
923
Sulyok & Pap, supra note 880 at 5.
924
Access for Rights, Using the Right of Access to Information to protect Human Rights, online:
<http://www.access-info.org/access-for-rights/page/2>.

245

This project is a cooperation with another NGO, Statewatch925, and intends to generate
information that can be used in advocacy. The aim is to address the need for greater transparency
of security and counter-terrorism measures in Europe in order to minimise the negative impact of
these measures on civil liberties, including the right of ATI. The project produces data that can
strengthen the capacity of civil society to use ATI to engage in debate about existing and
proposed measures and to evaluate their impact on human rights. AIE observes that national and
EU ATI rules are currently underused by civil liberties and human rights organisations in many
countries across Europe.926 In an interview with Darbishire, she stated that ATI is important
because it plays a significant role in participation. According to her, participation is not only
formal mechanisms, but also engagement via public debate. The presence of media and NGOs is
important in lobbying - hence we need to control lobbying. In countries with increased
transparency we have increased participation of one kind or another.927
Another AIE project is “Access Info Europe and Reprieve” which uses the right of ATI to
investigate flights associated with “extraordinary rendition”928 – the covert transfer of prisoners
by the USA from locations in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The project revealed that the
two of the 29 jurisdictions929 studied, Canada and EuroControl, have taken respectively 1 and 9
days to deny information, and the reason of refusal for both was: “body not covered by law.”930
Information obtained by AIE as part of the Rendition project using ATI in order to get
information on secret CIA flights, has been used by REDRESS931 and the Human Rights
Monitoring Institute (HRMI) to bring to court a complaint calling for an investigation into
allegations that Mustafa al-Hawsawi was illegally transferred to and secretly detained and
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tortured in Lithuania as part of the CIA-led programme.932 The Global Rendition System
database and mapping has been released on the eve of President Obama’s major speech on
counter-terrorism policy. The mapping is the most comprehensive resource so far visualising the
CIA’s programme of renditions and secret prisons as part of the “war on terror”.
In the “Policing of protests” Project, AIE asked 42 countries through ATI requests about the
use of force by police in protest situations. The requests contained five questions designed to
obtain the information necessary for public oversight of police action during protests.933 For the
“Detention of Migrants” Program AIE (in cooperation with Global Detention Project) submitted
66 information requests to 33 governments (two requests for each country) about the detention of
migrants with the purpose of improving transparency of immigrant detention practices. The
information informs statistics regarding the numbers and types of detainees, as well as details
about where people are detained for immigration-related reasons.934 The data also provides
evidence for victims and human rights advocates, to inform public debate and policy, and to
facilitate comparative study of detention regimes.

In addition to using ATI as a tool to advance human rights by means of data gathering, NGOs
may serve intermediaries to facilitate the public’s ATD. AIE in cooperation with other civil
society organizations have created a portal - AsktheEU.org935 - to help members of the public get
information about the EU institutions. The website facilitates the exchange of information
between the public and the EU public officials. On one hand, the EU citizens may ask questions
about the EU through this portal using an email that is automatically sent to the correct EU body,
which in turn has to answer within three weeks. When the EU replies to one’s request, it gets
published on this website and the person gets a notification.936 On the other hand, the EU
institutions is less likely to have to answer repeated requests about the same subject. Once a
question has been answered everyone will be able to find the information stored on this website.
Access Info Europe, “Mustafa al-Hawsawi Case”, online: <http://www.access-info.org/a4r/11969>.
Access Info Europe, “The Transparency of the Policing of Protests: Using the right of access to information to
assess the transparency of police activities during protests”, April 2015, at 7. http://www.access-info.org/wpcontent/uploads/Police-and-Protest-Report_Final.pdf
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In Albania, although many NGOs have pursued different strategies in advancing ATI right (as
I explain in the next sections), some of them still consider the publication of legal acts and
legislation as suffering from lack of transparency. In an interview with Shella, he explained that
Albanian institutions do not still understand the importance of the publication of the legal acts
they produce, and this is why the centre has dedicated a good part of its work to improving this
culture.937 This demonstrates the level of primitivism and the secrecy culture that characterizes
the public administration in Albania where information in many cases is still considered a
property of the institutions.

8.2 Rating systems of access to information regimes

Another strategy used by NGOs and media for the promotion of ATI is the design of Rating
and Grading systems. There are two Rating systems currently operating to evaluate the ATI
regimes: one for the legal framework and the other for its implementation.
Regarding the evaluation of the legal framework, AIE and the CLD have created “The Right
to Information Rating”938, known as the RTI project. The RTI Rating analyses the quality of the
world’s ATI laws by assessing the strength of the legal framework for guaranteeing the right to
information in a given country against international standards. The RTI Rating does not measure
the quality of implementation, but is limited to a comparative analysis of legal frameworks. One
pitfall of this system is that in many cases the law itself does not give the whole picture of an
ATI regime. CLD recognizes that “relatively strong laws do not necessarily ensure openness if
they are not implemented properly’939. However, regardless of these outlying cases, over time a
strong ATI law can contribute to advancing openness and help those using it to defend and
promote the right of ATI. In an interview with Karanicolas, legal officer at CLD he stated that
“The value of the RTI rating project is that it allows for a systemic and objective analysis of
937
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access to information legislation and to allow for comparative analysis. It is very useful from an
advocacy perspective. Countries tend to compare themselves to their peer group, how well a
country is doing comparing to another worldwide.”940

The central idea behind the RTI Rating is to provide ATI advocates, reformers, legislators
and others with a reliable tool for assessing the overall strength of the legal framework in their
country.

Table 25: Right to Information Global Rating

Source: Global Right to Information Rating, Country Data. 2014. Online: <http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data#>.

As the table 25 above shows, in the 2014 RTI Rating Canada scored 79 /150 (while first
country – Serbia - scored 135/150) and ranked 59/102 countries. Based on this ranking, CLD
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Interview, 14 April 2015.
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argues that “It is tempting to say that, when it comes to the right to information, Canada is a third
world country. Unfortunately, this phrasing is far too kind since, as the Global RTI Rating
shows, when it comes to the right to information, many third world countries have a lot to teach
Canada.”941 This is a very strong critique considering that in 1982, when Canada’s national law
was first adopted, Canada was among the first countries to boast this important democratic
achievement. But while standards around the world have advanced, Canada’s access laws have
stagnated and sometimes even regressed.942

Using the same methodology as the Global RTI Rating, CLD has developed the Canadian
RTI Rating which compares all thirteen jurisdictions and the federal jurisdiction in Canada (see
Table 26 below). It is evident that the federal law ranks last, confirming the allegations of the
NGOs (discussed previously) about a broken system of access in Canada.

Table 26: RTI rating of the Canadian provinces

Source: Centre for Law and Democracy, Canadian RTI Rating. 2014 http://www.law-democracy.org/live/global-rtirating/canadian-rti-rating/

Centre for Law and Democracy & Access Info Europe, “RTI Rating Data Analysis Series: Overview of Results
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Karanicolas mentioned in his interview the impact that the RTI rating had in the case of Bill
C-29 in Newfoundland, which aimed to change the ATI law in the province. CLD made a strong
opposition to the Bill and produced a report, in which they argued that this Bill was going to
harm transparency in the province and used data from the RTI rating to show that after reform
the ATI law would be weaker than Uganda, and Moldova. The NDP opposition picked up on the
CLD report and cited it in the House of Assembly. This spurred a lot of debate and the Attorney
General after calling CLD an “amateurish organization”, apologized later.943 This example
demonstrated the potential of the RTI ratings and the advocacy power it may generate.
Another system that is used to assess the implementation of the access laws in Canada is
developed by Newspapers Canada. This is a grading system in the form of a survey – the
National Freedom of Information (FOI) Audit - which initiated in 2005 and is since then
conducted annually. The purpose of the survey is to gather objective information on the health of
Canada’s ATI regimes and test how readily officials disclose information that should be publicly
available on request. The audit reviews the performance of Canadian governments and various
public institutions with respect to their ATI regimes. To obtain the data for the audit, a team of
researchers requests the same information from the federal and provincial government, as well as
a selection of municipalities across the country. Newspaper Canada has been doing so for about
ten years now. Vallance-Jones, who leads the Audit every year admitted in an interview with me
that “Although the audit is done for journalistic purposes, it is also interested on how law
works.”944

For the 2014 audit, almost 400 requests were sent to 11 federal, provincial and municipal
institutions across the country. Identical requests are sent to all government bodies, allowing
their responses to be compared both as to how fast they respond and how much information they
release. The institutions get graded on the speed and the amount of information released.945
According to Vallance-Jones, the federal government continues to struggle to produce anything
better than a mediocre performance in the Newspapers Canada audit. At the 2014 Annual Audit,
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it received an F for speed of responses and a C for the extent of information disclosed.946 In the
interview I had with Vallance-Jones he explained his experience with the Audit by saying that
the federal government is following a tactic of delaying responses, narrowing and changing the
scope of the requests by proposing to disclose something else instead of what is initially
requested. For the Audit requests he expected a two month delay from the federal government.947
Table 27 below shows the grades assigned for 2014.

Table 27. Grades for Speed of responses

Source: Newspapers Canada, National Freedom of Information Audit 2014, at 53, online:
<http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/sites/default/files/FOI2014-FINAL.pdf>.

The National FOI Audit is the largest and most comprehensive survey of its kind in Canada.
With its approach of sending identical requests to governments at all three levels, the study offers
the chance to compare jurisdictions against one another and encourage the kind of openness that
the authors of FOI legislation seek. The Audit provides the public with the opportunity to see the
degree to which governments comply with their own FOI legislation, as well as facilitating
comparisons among jurisdictions. As such, the audit represents an important tool for asserting
the public’s right to ATI. However, according to Hinds “the Audit is most effective at the
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municipal level…The federal government doesn’t really care – the Prime Minister doesn’t get
embarrassed for getting an F.” This quote demonstrates the persistence of the federal government
in its attitudes towards ATI. Hinds explains it as a secrecy culture problem. He says “The
government is hierarchical – everybody gets everything signed off, and everybody has to let their
superiors know everything.”948 Vallance-Jones also expressed concerns about some kind of
internal direction that is telling federal institutions to aggressively try to clarify request that are
very clear, as a strategy to delay responses.949 This culture of tight control was evident in the
responses to the questionnaire I sent to the ATIP coordinators in Canada.

8.3 Pressuring governments and courts on advancing access to information rights

8.3.1 Engagement in Law reform
In Canada, many NGOs have been engaged in Law Reform at the federal and provincial level.
McCamus credited many civil society groups for the passage of the ATIA in 1982, among others,
“the Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, associations of
academics, public interest groups and the press.”950 While there are several attempts at the
federal level to push for Law Reform, they are mostly done through producing policy assessment
papers and recommendations. A similar strategy involves supporting the ICC in his/her
recommendations for Law Reform.951

Similarly, in the EU, the Ombudsman has been supported by NGOs. For instance, Statewatch,
which has included the EU’s FOI as one of its observatories, has chosen to file complaints to the
EU Ombudsman.952 Statewatch claims that “as a result of Statewatch’s complaints, the right of
the Ombudsman to investigate secrecy complaints was written into the Amsterdam Treaty
together with a commitment to ‘enshrine’ the public’s right of ATI in an EU Regulation.”953
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In Canada, at the provincial level, it is noteworthy to mention the work of the CLD which has
contributed to Law reform by making submissions to the legislative committees and provincial
governments. The Centre made a submission on ATI Reform in Quebec in April 2013954. The
submission was prepared for a general consultation and public hearing held by the Province of
Quebec’s Committee on Institutions to address the implementation of Quebec’s Act Respecting
Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information. The
CLD made another submission to the Independent Review of the Newfoundland and Labrador
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act on July 2014.955

Newspapers Canada has also been lobbying for reform to the ATI for two decades, but
without success. In April 8, 2011 Newspapers Canada , and two other organizations, the
Canadian Taxpayers Association, and the BC FIPA asked the political parties in Canada to say
what they will do to fix the ATI system to combat an already disastrous situation956. Newspapers
Canada contributed to the latest recommendations of the ICC for ATI reform, which according to
Hinds is long due. For Hinds, in order to makes changes to the system, there is need to give
order-making power to the ICC, people need to be afraid of him/her. In fact, for Hinds, the whole
law should be modernized.957

Another ATI advocate, CJFE supported the amendments proposed in Bill C-613, An Act to
amend the Parliament of Canada Act and the Access to Information Act (transparency) proposed
by Trudeau in 2014. It argued that “The bill would improve the current failing access to
information system and increase government transparency.”958
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In the EU, Statewatch has engaged in Law Reform using public campaigns. During the
negotiation of the draft Regulation 1049 on public access to EU documents, Statewatch led a
coalition of NGOs in a campaign for openness and citizens' rights - the “Call for an Open
Europe”. This was launched in 2000 in collaboration with the European Federation of Journalists
and was supported by hundreds of groups and individuals across Europe.959
Regulation 1049 is under review and the Commission’s and Council’s proposals are criticized
for restricting the ATI rules. As a response, an alliance of 131 groups, including transparency
and ATI campaigners and human rights organisations, have called on the EP to prevent going
backwards with the proposed legislation. The NGOs warned that European Commission
proposals that are set to be approved in the coming weeks will "substantially reduce the number
of public documents" available upon request960. Under the proposed rules, only documents that
are formally transmitted would be made available upon request to a member of the public. As
thousands of documents are informally passed between European policymakers, the alliance
fears that such papers and emails will now be out of reach to the public. Such language could
even encourage policymakers to begin engaging in administrative practices that actively avoid
formal transmission of documents so as to prevent the public from gaining access to them.961

Some Albanian NGOs have also been engaged in law reform in the country. For instance, in
2012-2013, the “Res Publica” Centre sent 200 requests to various institutions to test the
implementation of the ATI law in Albania. The test demonstrated that the law is ineffective and
its practice very slow.962 As the law of 1999 was considered weak and out of date some NGOs
gave their contribution in improving the legal structure of ATI. The Soros Foundation in Albania
has offered its expertise on the ATI law review, updating it in accordance with the best
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international standards in the field.963 In April 2014, Soros and two other NGOs presented their
proposals for the amendament of the ATI law which were reflected in the new law, adopted six
months later.964
8.3.2 Involvement in litigation
There are many examples of NGOs and media engaging in litigation in defence of the ATI
rights in both Canada and the EU. I will briefly mention some of the most important cases, and
will look at them again in more detail in Chapter ten where I examine the ATI jurisprudence.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) has a history in intervening in ATI cases
before the Supreme Court. In a recent case - John Doe v. Ontario (Minister of Finance)965- the
Court interpreted and decided on an exception to Ontario’s provincial ATI regime for “advice or
recommendations” of a public servant. CCLA intervened in the case to argue that the “advice or
recommendations” exception should be interpreted narrowly and records should not be shielded
from disclosure. CCLA also argued that the interpretation of the legislation should respect the
values enshrined in the Charter and the global trends towards greater openness and transparency
in government. Although, the CCLA was not successful on this intervention, its arguments
before the court opened up discussions about the amount of government information that are
labelled as “policy options” and therefore inaccessible by the public. The negative decision of
the Court demonstrates the justice’s system inability to circumvent legislative provisions.

The CCLA intervened in another the case, Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada
(Minister of National Defence)966 which was brought before the Supreme Court to consider
whether Minister’s offices, including the Prime Minister’s Office, are considered “government
institutions” for the purposes of the ATIA. The Supreme Court found that the meaning of
Fondacioni Shqiperia a Hapur per Shqiperine, “Diskutimi i projektligjit të ri “Për të drejtën e informimit”,
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“government institution” under the Act did not include ministerial offices and that to expand the
scope of the Act in this way was an issue for Parliament and not the courts.967 The CCLA
intervened in this case to argue for a large and liberal interpretation of the ATIA emphasizing its
quasi-constitutional968 and asked from the Court to recognize this status so that it could conduct a
broader interpretation of the Act. Once more, the reasoning in this decision confirmed that the
Courts can only go that far in the interpretation of the access laws in Canada. According to
Interviewee No.5, these cases were brought before the Court to at least make the argument about
the link between the freedom of expression and ATI, and push further on what was established
before regarding a constitutional status of ATI.
Another Canadian NGO, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (CLA),969 intervened in in a
landmark case of the Supreme Court - Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers’
Association970. The Court decision recognized a limited right to ATI held by public authorities as
part of the freedom of expression of the Canadian Charter.971 The Supreme Court recognized,
albeit in somewhat careful language, that ATI “is a derivative”972 which may arise in certain
conditions. The CLA made a request under Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act973 for documents held by the Ontario Provincial Police which were denied. The case
was brought as a constitutional claim and in turn, the Court recognized for the first time in its
history the right of ATI as a “derivative right” of the freedom of expression. This recognition,
however, was limited to where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful expression on the
functioning of government974. This case has a meaningful significance since it provides a
constitutional framework for ATI laws.
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The European NGOs have also played a significant role in challenging the governments to the
courts for breaching ATD rights. A series of cases initiated from the NGOs can be traced in both
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU). In its
judgment in Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary975, the ECtHR recognised that the public
has a right to receive information of general interest. The applicant, the Hungarian Civil Liberties
Union, alleged that the Hungarian courts denied it access to the details of a parliamentarian’s
complaint - was a breach of its right of ATI of public interest976.The Court characterized the
applicant as a “watch dog” which status warrants Convention protection.977
In its judgment of the case Youth Initiative For Human Rights v Serbia978, the ECtHR
recognised more explicitly than ever before the ATD right held by public authorities, based on
Article 10 of the Convention (right to freedom of expression and information). The applicant was
a Serbian NGO - Youth Initiative for Human Rights - and the judgment recognised the
importance of NGOs acting in the public interest979. The Court engaged in an interpretative
exercise of the ATI right, and argued that “the notion of ‘freedom to receive information’
embraces a right of access to information.”980
In the case of OVESSG981 the ECtHR further clarified and expanded the scope of application
of Article 10 of the Convention with regard to the right of ATD. The decision is especially
supportive for requests by journalists and NGOs to have ATD/982 The ECtHR, recognized that
the function of creating forums for public debate is not limited to the press. That function may
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also be exercised by NGOs whose activities are an essential element of an informed public
debate. The Court has therefore accepted that NGOs, like the press, may be characterised as
social “watchdogs.”983 NGOs are characterized with such an important status, since they are
involved in the legitimate gathering of information of public interest984 and therefore, their
activities warrant similar Convention protection to that afforded to the press.985
The CJEU has been another venue followed by the NGOs to defend the public’s right to
information. In the landmark case - Council v Access Info (280/11)986- AIE submitted a request
to the Council for a copy of the report which contained information on the Member States’
reactions to the Commission’s proposal for the reform of Regulation 1049. With this appeal AIE
moved the CJEU to clarify the obligation for transparency on the EU isntitutions in the course of
a legislative procedure. The case demonstrates the power of using ATI in holding institutions
accountable even in ongoing conversations during the course of a legislative procedure. The case
will certainly affect issues of accountability and democratic nature of the EU representatives.987
In another CJEU case - IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH – a German animal
rights NGO asked the Commission for access to certain documents which the Commission had
received from Germany. The Court decided that the Member States do not have a right of
absolute veto, but had to give reasons for refusal.988 This case epitomises “new grounds for the
relations between Member States rules and the EU rules of access to documents.”989
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cooperation which governs relations between the institutions and the Member States, Member States should take
care not to hamper the proper application of this Regulation and should respect the security rules of the institutions.”
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Spahiu, “Courts”, supra note 987 at 12.
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The Albanian NGOs have also engaged in litigation, although in a limited number because of
the limited resources and the high political pressure. The number is growing together with public
awareness and citizen consciousness. “Res Publica” and the QZHDI are two centres that have
been involved in many court cases. In 2013, “Res Publica” was very active in litigation engaging
Ministries. “Res Publica” filed two requests at the Ministry of the Environment, one about the
advertisements paid by this Ministry in 2009-2013, and the other about the pollution levels in
Albania. Both requests were refused by the Ministry. Both cases ended up in court, which ruled
in favor of the Centre and requested the release of the information by the Ministry, as part of its
legal obligations.990 In addition, “Res Publica” requested from the Ministry of Economy
information regarding the file of the privatization of “Albpetrol”, the biggest public oil company
in the country. The request was ignored for months and ended up in court. The Court decided in
July 2013 that the Ministry should provide the centre with the information.991 In 2014, a famous
case against the Council of Ministers, originated from an ATI request filed by “Res Publica”
about the files on the hiring process of the members of the Commission of Public Procurement.
The Council of the Ministers, the body that appointed the members, turned down the request.
The case was sent to the Administrative Court which decided in October 2014 that the Council of
Ministers should release the requested information.992

QZHDI has also been involved in ATI litigation since the adoption of the ATI law. QZHDI
started a judicial review against the decision of the Ministry of Education that denied information
to an NGO regarding the criteria needed to start a day-care centre. The Court of Tirana ordered
the Ministry to provide the information requested. This was the first time that a court in Albania
decided on an ATI case. In October-November 2003 QZHDI led a group of five NGOs at the
Constitutional Court of Albania against an order of the then Prime Minister Fatos Nano, who
ordered all institutions to withhold information from the media. Only four days before the
appearance at the Court, the Prime Minister Nano changed his order and abandoned the case.
Res Publica, “E drejta e informimit – Dy vendime te tjera, kesaj rradhe kunder Ministrise se Mjedisit”, 8.10.2014,
online: <http://www.respublica.org.al/e-drejta-e-informimit-dy-vendime-te-tjera-kesaj-rradhe-kunder-ministrise-semjedisit/>.
991
Res Publica, “Detyrim për dhënie informacioni: Res Publica Vs Ministria e Ekonomisë, Tregtisë dhe
Energjitikës”, 18.7.2013, online: <http://www.respublica.org.al/detyrim-per-dhenie-informacioni-res-publica-vsministria-e-ekonomise-tregtise-dhe-energjitikes/>.
992
Res Publica, “E drejta e informimit – Res Publica fiton gjyqin kunder Keshillit te Ministrave”, 6.10.2014, online:
<http://www.respublica.org.al/e-drejta-e-informimit-res-publica-fiton-gjyqin-kunder-keshillit-te-ministrave/>.
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This case demonstrated how easily and openly the government dismissed the ATI law without
fear of legal consequences. In another case, QZHDI got involved in a project for which
information requests were sent to the administration and the court. The centre got refusals from
both branches and some cases went to court. According to Aliaj, a lawyer at the centre, it was
ironic that the courts refused to release information, even after they ruled in their judgements in
favor of the release.993 The QZHDI is actually leading a court case against the Ministry of
Economy for a refusal to provide information regarding the privatization of AlbTelecom, the sole
public company of telecommunication in Albania. The Ministry refused to release the acquisition
contract to the QZHDI and the case is still ongoing.994
8.4 Data for access to information requests made by the NGOs and media
The following data informs about the amount of ATI requests filed by the NGOs at the main
government institutions in Canada and the EU. At the federal level, the Canadian government
has received a considerably small amount of ATI requests compared to the other categories
(business or public). Table 28 below compares data from 2012 and 2013. The number of requests
reflects data form all the Departments and Agencies at the federal level (approximately 256).

Table 29 has all the data collected from the Canadian federal departments and agencies from
2004 to 2014. The table includes information about organizations and the media, but many media
are organized in associations which pursue interests that are similar to those of the NGOs (as
argued in Chapter 3), which makes this division not clear cut. As one can notice, while the
number of ATI requests for media has significantly increased (from 2680 to 8421), the
percentage to the total requests has not followed the same pattern (only increased 3.4%). For
organizations, the numbers have remained more or less steady (from 2107 to 2898), but the
percentage to total requests has declined significantly (from 8.4% to 4.8%).

993

Note that all this information about QZHDI cases were reported in the Interview with Viola Aliaj, QZHDI, May
8, 2015. I could not find further information elsewhere.
994
Ceshtje gjyqesore (case law), online: <http://qzhdi-alb.org/ceshtje-gjyqesore>.
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Table 28: Source of Access to Information requests received

Source: Government of Canada, Info Source Bulletin Number 37B – Statistical Reporting. Online:
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/bulletin/2014/b/bulletin37b02-eng.asp#ai>.

Table 29: Requests for ATI to the federal government of Canada 2004-2014
Years

Total

2013-

2012-

2011-

2010-

2009-

2008-

2007-

2006-

2005-

2004-

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

60, 105

62,839

51, 332

41, 641

39, 154

34, 041

31, 487

29, 182

27,269

25,207

8,421

8, 321

5,133

5, 234

3, 693

4,804

4,411

3,617

2,451

2,680

(14%)

(13%)

(9%)

(12.6%)

(10.5%)

(14.1%

(14%)

(12.4%)

(9%)

(10.6%)

req.
media

)
Orgz.

2,898

2, 415

1, 946

1, 706

1, 559

2,097

2, 850

2,932

1,980

2,107

(4.8%)

(3.8%)

(3.7%)

(4.1%)

(4.4%)

(6.2%)

(9.1%)

(10%)

(7.3%)

(8.4%)

Source: Table drawn by author using data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Online:
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp>.

This trend is interesting and reveals a lot about the constraints of pursuing ATI requests. The
process is lengthy and costly, and only powerful media can afford. Some of the media
interviewees have emphasized the lack of resources which works as an impediment to engage
with ATI – the system is difficult to navigate for someone unexperienced, and needs money and
time, which most of the NGOs and small media do not have. This was confirmed in the
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interviews that I had with Hinds (Newspaper Canada), Henheffer (CJFE), Karanicolas (CLD),
and CCLA. The number of requests from the NGOs show a concerning trend – the percentage
has dropped by more than half. While this has happened for different reasons (mainly lack of
resources), it constitutes a retreat of the NGOs from the ATI system. Many authors have argued
about the important role of the NGOs for establishing spaces for public deliberation of values
and policies, and courts have attributed them the status of a “watchdog”. Therefore, an NGO
withdrawal from the ATI space means missing opportunities for discussions of values and
extraction of knowledge. This may have major repercussions in the ATI regime in Canada.

Table 30: Requests for ATI at the federal level

Requests for ATI to the federal government
Canada 2004-2014
70,000

62839

60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000 25,207
20,000
10,000

60105

51332

27269

2107
1680

29182

1980
2451

31487

3617
2932

34041

2850
4411

39154

4804
2097

41641

3693
5234
5133
1559
1949
1706

8321
2415

8421
2898

0

Total

Media

Organizations

The data in Tables 28, 29 and 30 show another interesting pattern which answers my third
concern I laid out at the very beginning of this chapter – whether media occupies most of the
space in ATI requests. Data reveals that journalists are not at the ones who make the most of
requests for ATI. Yes, the numbers are rising, but very slowly (only 3.4%). In 2014, the requests
from journalist constituted 14% of the total number of requests, which is not a big number
considering that most media engage in investigative journalism to get their stories. Therefore, the
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claims from the government that journalist exhaust the ATI system, with the purpose to reveal
stories that embarrass governments, are not based in facts and numbers. Table 30 shows the
same data in graph form.
Table 31 below shows ATD requests made to the European Commission from 2004 to 2013.
The categorization of groups here is slightly different from the Canadian one. Instead of the term
“organization”, the term “civil society” is used. This is an umbrella term that does not
specifically indicate what groups could be included in the categorization and what is the
percentage of the NGOs. As a result the numbers could be a bit misleading. However, for the
purpose of this research, civil society can be accepted as an umbrella term that can be identified
with NGOs. This is part of the problem of the definitional certainty, as I explained in Chapter 3.

Table 31: ATD requests to the European Commission
Years

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

Total

6,525

6,014

6,477

6,361

5,055

5,197

4,196

3,841

3,396

3,093

Journal.

364-

289-

210-

213-

102-

127-

121-

43-

36-

15-

5.58%

4.81%

3.25

3.35

2.02

2.46%

2.9%

1.14%

1.07%

0.5%

%

%

%

Civil

1084-

620-

556-

520-

498-

949-

745-

663-

1000-

844-

Society

16.62

10.32

8.59

8.18

9.85

18.26

17.77

17.27

29.44

27.31

995

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

Source: Chart drawn by the author using data from the European Commission, Access to Documents. Online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/reports_en.htm>.

Table 32 below reflects the same data in graph form.

995

Civil Society here includes: Interest groups, industry, NGOs, etc. See,
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/docs/rapport_2013/com-2014-619_en.pdf>.
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Table 32: Requests for ATD to the Commission

Requests for ATD to EU Commission 2004-2013
7000

6361

6000

5197

5000

6014

5055

4196

3841

4000

6525

6477

3396

3093
3000
2000
1000

844

1000

745

663

1084

949

15

36

43

121

127

498
102

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

520
213

556
210

620
289

364

2010

2011

2012

2013

0

Total

Journalists

Civil Society

A similar pattern of decline (as the Canadian one) is noticed at the European Commission.
The number of requests made by journalists has increased almost 25 times, while its percentage
has only increased about 10 times. The number of requests of civil society has an irregular
pattern, declining from 2009-2012, but increasing in 2013. However, it is still lower than it was
in 2004-2005, when it was almost ¾ higher. This significant drop can be explained by many
things. It is worth mentioning that in 2008 the Commission submitted its proposal for the recast
of Regulation 1049, which received a huge backlash from civil society organizations. The fact
that the numbers are still low may be attributed to the fact that the position of the Commission
has not changed much on the Regulation, and the negotiations between the EU institutions on the
matter are still frozen.
Tables 33 and 34 below shows ATD requests made to the Council of the European Union
from 2004 to 2013. Here the numbers show a different picture from the tables above.
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Table 33: Requests of ATD made to the Council of the European Union
Years

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

Total

7,564

6,166

9,641

9,188

8,444

10,732

7,809

11,353

9,454

12,907

Journal

136-

172-

318-

239-

228-

300-

226-

261-

217-

335-

.

1.8%

2.8%

3.3%

2.6%

2.7%

2.8%

2.9%

2.3%

2.3%

2.6%

Civil

2224-

1677-

2487-

2563-

2305-

1964-

1109-

1998-

1626-

2813-

Society

29.4%

27.2%

25.8%

27.9%

27.3%

18.3%

14.2%

17.6%

17.2%

21.8%

996

/431-

/222-

/260-

/165-

/135-

/386-

/132-

/124-

/113-

Os

5.7%

3.6%

2.7%

1.8%

1.6%

3.6%

1.7%

1.1%

1.2%

/NG

Source: Table drawn by author using data from the Council of European Union, Access to Documents Annual
Reports. Online: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/search/?q=access+to+documents+annual+reports>.

Table 34 reflects the same numbers in graph form.
Table 34: Requests for ATD to the Council

Requests for ATD to the Council of the EU 20042013
14000 12907
11353

12000

10732

9454

10000

8444

7809

8000

9641

9188

7564
6166

6000
4000
2000

2813
335

1626
217
113

1998
261
124

1109
226
132

1964
300
386

2563
239
165

2305
228
135

2487
318
260

2224
1677
172
222 136 431

0
2004

996

2005

2006

2007

2008

Total

Journalists

2009

2010

Civil Society

2011

2012

2013

NGOs

Civil Society here includes: Consultants, Environmental Lobbies, Other groups of interests,
Industrial/Commercial Sector and NGOs. Online: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documentspublications/publications/2014/council-annual-report-access-to-documents-2013/>.
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In tables 33 and 34 the number of the requests and the percentage for journalists has steadily
declined. The same trend is noticed for the total number of requests. But, the numbers are
different for civil society and especially for NGOs (which are shown separately from the civil
society numbers for the Council). These numbers have increased despite of the big decline in the
total number. What is noticeable here is the hike in numbers of requests of the NGOs (from 1.2%
to 5.7%). The Council is perceived to be the most secretive body in the EU, and which does not
offer much cooperation with civil society. That might have drawn the attention of the NGOs.

Tables 35 and 36 shows the number of requests for ATD made to the EP. The number of total
requests has decreased significantly, almost two times lower than ten years ago. The requests
made by the journalists show a very irregular trend, going up and down, with 2008 being the
lowest point in terms of numbers of requests and percentage (1 and 0.11% respectively).
However, they follow the same trend with the total requests. The requests from civil society have
also dropped from 2004 in both numbers and percentage. The small numbers of requests is
noticeable for this table. The data might be explained with the fact that the EP is considered to be
an advocate of ATD in the EU, and has fought in many political battles to improve transparency
and ATD in the EU. This makes it not a very important target for filing ATD requests.

Table 35: Requests for ATD to the European Parliament 2004-2013
Years

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

Total

610

777

1,161

1,139

1,260

1,300

1,865

1,917

1,814

1,245

Journal.

30-

23-

68-

81-

42-

1-

53-

55-

117-

21-

5%

3%

5.84%

7.12%

3.35%

0.11%

2.86%

2.88%

6.47%

1.71%

Civil

110-

132-

120-

233-

274-

703-

409-

410-

373-

305-

Society

18%

16.95

10.36

20.47

21.75

54.06

21.95

21.39

20.59

24.57

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

997

Source: Table Drawn by the author using data from European Parliament, Register of Documents: Annual Report.
Online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/information/report.htm>.

997

Civil Society here includes: Interests Groups, Industry, NGOs, etc. online:
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/register/pdf/rapport_annuel_2013_EN.pdf>.
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Table 36 below shows the same figures in graph form.
Table 36: Requests for ATD to the European Parliament

Requests for ATD to the EP 2004-2013
2000

1917

1814

1865

1800
1600
1400

1300

1245

1260

1139

1200

1161

1000
600
400
200

777

703

800
305
21

373

410

610

409
274

117

55

53

1

42

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

233
81

68120

132
23

110
30

0
2004

Total

Journalists

2010

2011

2012

2013

Civil Society

The data above is somehow mixed, but is an indicator about the amount of work being done
by NGOs in both Canada and the EU. In Canada, although the total number of requests have
risen significantly, requests made by the NGOs have dropped. As some of the interviews have
revealed, the falling numbers are attributed to the broken ATI regime. Long delays and high fees
coupled with the attitudes of the government officials mean that the information takes longer and
more expensive to get, resources that most of the NGOs don’t have. This situation makes NGOs
less attracted and active in their ATI activity.

In the EU, the numbers are diverse. On the one hand, for the European Commission the
requests from civil society seem to have steadily grown, following the same curb as the total
number, while for the Council the numbers have grown even faster. On the other hand, for the
EP numbers have dropped, but following the same trend as the total number. It seems that the
Council is the EU institution that has attracted the most attention of the civil society and the
NGOs in particular. This could be explained in part with what is happening at the EU regarding
the changes of Regulation 1049. Another reason might be the extensive lobbying mechanism that
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exists in the EU, where “an estimated 3000 lobbying entities have an office in Brussels and
target European institutions to influence legislation.”998 One of the benefits that the lobbying
offers is access to the decision-making process of the institutions.999 As such, organizations and
media already have another venue to access documents of the EU institutions. This was
confirmed in the interview with Darbishire which admitted that access in the EU institutions is
also realized through other forms, such as participation in not only formal mechanisms, but also
engagement via public debate and via lobbying.1000 The Commission and the EP, are more
committed to transparency, and have a joint Transparency Register1001 for lobbying, launched in
20111002. This may explain the declining numbers of request to the EP and the Commission. The
numbers for the EP are lower due to the fact that the EP has been a long-standing advocate for
transparency in the EU.

8.5 Comparisons and conclusions

As argued above, the promotion and development of transparency and ATI right in Canada
and the EU owes a special recognition to the media and NGOs. The dynamics of ATI regime in
both jurisdictions cannot be understood without the role of these “social watchdogs” because as
they push for publicity, right to free press, and obtain information in the public interest. Stories
of these ATI users show another face of the ATI regime, one that is somehow different from that
depicted by public officials. These stories tell that there are problems with the ATI regimes in
both jurisdictions. In Canada, all persons I interviewed agreed that the ATIA law is in desperate
need for change, and that getting information through ATI requests has become more difficult. In
the EU, the recast of Regulation 1049 is still pending. But, as Darbishire explained, “it may not
be the best time for law reform” considering the economic crisis, the Greek crisis, the refugee
crisis, and lately the security threats in the EU. Otherwise, Darbishire contemplated that the EU
Transparency International, “EU lobbying”, online:
<http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/focus_areas/lobbying-the-eu/>.
999
See European Parliament, “Library Briefing: Lobbying the EU institutions”, 18.06.2013, online:
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130558/LDM_BRI(2013)130558_REV1_EN.
pdf>.
1000
Interview with Helen Darbishire, Executive Director of Access Info Europe, August 10, 2015.
1001
See Transparency Register, online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?redir=false&locale=en>.
1002
European Commission, Press Release, 23 June 2011, online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11773_en.htm?locale=en>.
998
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is “doing quite well in defending and even advancing transparency. Of course, Regulation
1049/2001 could be better, but …the key is the implementation, for which we fight by making a
noise about specific cases.”1003

As this chapter examined, NGOs and media have worked in many fronts to accomplish their
role of social watchdogs. It is fascinating to know that some of the biggest scandals in the
Canadian history, related to misuse of huge amounts of public funds, have been illuminated by
journalists using ATI requests. It is in this cases, that one understands the great value of ATI
rights, as ones that tear up the veil of secrecy, keep our government accountable and make for
active citizens. These cases open up spaces to think, get knowledge, shape ideas, break
monopolies of knowledge, control information and control through information. Habermas
contends that “civil society, through resonant and autonomous public spheres, develops impulses
with enough vitality to bring conflicts from the periphery into the center of the political
system.”1004 Through ATI, NGOs and media have drawn public’s attention to issues that really
matter for public life and created opportunities for developing ideas, debating and participating.
The mention in section 2(b) of the Charter of the “freedom of opinion” has led one Canadian
writer to suggest that the role of the press in opinion formation requires compulsory access to
government information,1005

It is interesting how the Canadian and European NGOs have come together in creating the
Global RTI Rating which is then adopted in Canada to create its Canadian version. In the EU
some of the work was focused on using ATI as a tool to assess other human rights. This strategy
was absent in Canada. Data gathered from institutions demonstrate some interesting trends. In
Canada, the numbers of requests from NGOs are falling and this is explained with the feeling of
“fatigue” due to the long delays and expensive process that most NGOs cannot afford. In the EU,
these numbers are increasing, but mostly those of requests submitted to the EU Council. This can
be due to the recasting process of Regulation 1049 which started in 2008 and has been in
deadlock from 2011.

1003

Interview with Helen Darbishire, August 10, 2015.
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 128 at 330.
1005
M. Manning, “Rights, Freedoms and the Courts: A practical analysis of the Constitution Act”, 1982, at 210
[Manning].
1004
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The EU is a step ahead of Canada when it comes to the status of the right of ATI. Canada
needs first a push for an upgrade the ATI law and then recognize ATI as a fundamental human
right. Almost all the NGOs working on ATI in Canada have recognized that “the foundational
attitude towards access to information as a human right ….is signally absent in Canada.”1006 The
CLD acknowledges that “It is time for Canadians and their government to recognise that the
right to access information held by public bodies is a human right. This now needs to be matched
by action, initially in terms of amending the ATIA.”1007 This is the reason why NGOs and media
in Canada were engaged in Law reform and litigation, to push for changes in ATI regime.
However, the commitment on this front has not generated any substantial results in Canada. The
way the federal system works in Canada gives too much power to the government. As a result,
even attempts to engage the Court system have not done much since they lack the legal
framework necessary to expand the meaning of access rights. CLD argued in this regard:

Unfortunately, neither global recognition of the fundamental importance of RTI as a human
right nor the Supreme Court’s ruling have had an impact on attitudes towards RTI in Canada,
where access systems remain stuck in the same rut they have occupied for decades. To break out
of this rut, Canada needs one jurisdiction that is prepared to think outside of the (Canadian) box
and be prepared to take bold steps to put in place a truly effective RTI regime. There is enormous
resistance to this, based largely on accumulated attitudes and biases.1008
However, using the Courts’ system, the NGOs have succeeded a partial achievement of the
ATI recognition as a human right - the interpretation of the Supreme Court that recognizes ATI
under freedom of expression – making ATI a Charter right1009, subject to some limitation. Of
course, this is an initial step towards the full recognition of ATI as a constitutional human right.

The EU NGOs have been more successful in their attempts to affect legislative or policy
changes. They have been active in pressuring government in important milestones of the rights to
Centre for Law and Democracy, “Response to the OIC Call for Dialogue: Recommendations for Improving the
Right to Information in Canada”, January 2013, at 4-5, online: <http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/Canada.RTI_.Jan13.pdf>.
1007
Ibid, at 16-17.
1008
Centre for Law and Democracy, “Submission to the Independent Review of the Newfoundland and Labrador
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act”, July 2014 at 4, online: <http://www.lawdemocracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Canada.Nfld_.RTI_.Jul14.pdf>.
1009
See Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970.
1006
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ATD such as the Treaty protection of these rights, the introduction Charter rights, or the
recasting process of Regulation 1049. This is in part due to the division of political power in the
EU, where the co-decision procedure has enabled the EU Parliament to block initiatives that
would endanger the future of the ATD in the EU. One could say that the NGOs in the EU have
been supported by the EU Parliament and the courts’ system. Courts have more leeway to favour
rights if they are also protected by legislation – and the European courts have certainly expanded
the meaning of ATD provisions with the intervention of some of the NGOs.
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CHAPTER 9: THE ROLE OF THE OVERSIGHT INSTITUTIONS: LOOKING AT
ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM AN ARBITER’S PERSPECTIVE

Information Commissioners and Ombudsmen are institutions that oversee the application of
the ATI laws in practice and offer valuable perspectives on upholding the public values of these
laws according to guiding democratic principles. There exist two models of ATI oversight, an
Information Commissioner model, and an Ombudsman model. Canada and the EU represent
each of them respectively. Within the first model, there are two variations, related to their powers
and scope. I use the case study of Ontario and Albania as an example of these variations.

Oversight institutions serve as arbiters between the government and the public. The purpose
of this chapter is to understand their rationale in conciliating the public interest in ATI with the
interest of institutions. I explore their work, their relationship with government and other actors,
and their influence in the development of an ATI rights regime in both jurisdictions. In doing so,
I identify the strengths and weaknesses of their control/overview system. Data, such as statistics,
annual reports, recommendations, legislative proposals, etc, will be visited to comprehend how
ATI is valued from their perspective. I analyze these data trying to make sense of the tensions
around cases of complaints, and the battles being fought every day to hold in place a dynamic
ATI system.

9.1 The role of the Information Commissioner of Canada as a watchdog on access to
information
A fundamental principle of the ATIA is that decisions on disclosure should be reviewed
independently of government. In the case of an access refusal, the Act sets out two levels of
independent review. The first review is carried out by the Information Commissioner of Canada
(ICC) and the second by the courts. The ICC was introduced with the ATIA in 1982 and the
Office was established in 1983. It assists individuals and organizations who believe that federal
institutions have not respected their rights under the ATIA. The Chief Justice McLachlin has
referred to the Commissioners as the “watchdogs of the fundamental rights” protected by
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the ATIA.1010 The Commissioner has established herself clearly as a guardian of ATI rights, and
has emphasized the importance of information in society. Legault, one the most influential ICCs
has stated that “information is the new source of wealth, power and influence. Those who have it
want to protect it. Those who don’t, want access to it. Never before has information - especially
government information - been so high on the public’s radar.”1011 This statement reveals a clear
dichotomy embedded in every ATI regime, the governments’s need for protecting information
and the public’s right to access it. This dichotomy informs a great deal about the importance of
information for controlling through power and influence, and goes to the core of my main
concern in this research - breaking up the information monopoly.

The ICC investigates complaints about how federal institutions handle ATI requests. The
Commissioner is appointed directly by the Parliament and reports to it by way of annual reports,
special reports and parliamentary appearances. Being an agent of the legislature allows the
Commissioner to be removed from the government of the day, and scrutinize the activities of
government. Commissioners have developed on the Ombudsman model - they have strong
investigative powers to assist them in mediating between dissatisfied information applicants and
government institutions. They may not order a complaint to be resolved in a particular way, but
can only recommend to government to act upon ATI requests. Thus, it is upon the institutions to
follow the ICC’s recommendations or not. When the Commissioner concludes that a complaint is
well founded and the institution does not act upon her formal recommendation to disclose
records, she may, with the complainant’s consent, seek judicial review by the Federal Court. A
complainant may also seek judicial review after receiving the results of the Commissioner’s
investigation. The ICC closely monitors all cases with potential ramifications on the right of ATI
and may seek leave to participate in proceedings with potential impact on the right.
The ICC uses a combination of individual investigations, systemic investigations and report
cards for the oversight on the state of compliance of the federal government with the ATIA. The
goal of these investigations is to maximize compliance with the Act while fostering disclosure of

McLachlin, “ATI”, supra note 228 at 6.
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public sector information. The ICC uses a full range of tools, activities and powers at her
disposal, from mediation to persuasion and litigation, as required. The working of the ICC Office
is supported by three branches. First, the Complaints Resolution and Compliance Branch carries
out investigations and dispute resolution efforts to resolve complaints. It also conducts systemic
investigations1012. Second, the Legal Services Branch provides legal advice on investigations, as
well as on legislative and administrative matters. It also represents the Commissioner in court
cases. Third, the Corporate Services mainly delivers administrative and management support.
In addition to the investigation of complaints received externally, the Commissioner has the
authority to initiate the investigation of complaints on her own motion when she is satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds to investigate a matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to
records under the Act. Another type of a self-initiated investigation is a systemic investigation
which the ICC undertakes when there are complaints of ongoing concern regarding certain issues
such as chronically late responses, misuse of time extensions, lack of resources, etc.1013

Furthermore, the ICC uses another tool to evaluate the institutional compliance under the
ATIA – the Report cards. They are a type of proactive commissioner-initiated assessment that
looks into assessing systemic issues such as chronically late responses, misuse of time
extensions, lack of resources, etc. As the name indicates, at the end of its investigation, the ICC
issues report evaluations with letter grades for each institution. Report cards allow for a
measurement in ATI compliance and a comparison between institutions’ performance.

The ICC has continuously been concerned with the level protection of ATI rights in Canada. It
has been engaged in many debates on the need to reform the ATI regime, and has been a key
opposition in many government initiatives affecting ATI. For instance, the ICC’s response to the
open government initiative was that although proactive disclosure is a good thing, it isn’t
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enough. The ICC argued “In order to promote trust in public institutions, there is not only a need
to increase the availability and the quality of information, but also to ensure access to that
information. Citizens want to be able to validate the information that is provided to them, or to
obtain more details about an issue of interest or simply know that the right is there for them to
exercise when needed.”1014

The ICC values the importance of ATI for two reasons. First, at the individual level ATI
affects the rights of all Canadians. The ICC Legault once said: “I am often asked to explain why
access to information is important to Canadians. In response, I point out that federal policies,
programs and laws touch so many aspects of everyday life—the regulation of health products,
international travel, mail delivery, transportation and food safety, to name just a few.”1015 This
statement shows the extent of which the use of ATI affects many human rights. Second, at a
more general level, ATI influences the way of governing, and makes it more inclusive and
participatory. ICC recognizes that ATI “is fundamental to Canada’s system of government, a key
tool that facilitates citizen engagement with the public policy process. When the access system
falters, not only is Canadians’ participation in government thwarted but ultimately, the health of
Canadian democracy is at stake.”1016 Because of the importance of ATI in the functioning of a
democratic system, the ICC has transformed itself in a resilient advocate for such a right.

As I have explained in previous chapters, the number of ATI requests has increased
progressively. This number has been reflected in a growing number of the complaints at the ICC.
As the table below shows, complaints about refusals of requests have increased significantly
from 2009, and that has had a significant effect on the total number. The numbers of the other
two categories, have slightly fluctuated over the years, but have stayed more or less at the same
level.
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Table 37: Number of the complaints at the ICC 2009-2015
Complaints

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14

2014-15

Refusal1017

864

996

1036

1040

1219

1102

Administrative1018 792

810

391

519

801

604

33

22

38

37

61

43

1689

1828

1465

1596

2081

1749

Cabinet
confidence
Total

Source: Table drawn by the author with data from the Office of the Information Commissioner, Annual Reports.
Online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr_ar-ra.aspx>.

Despite of the growing number of complaints, the ICC has been suffering from budget
constraints for a while. The Office has explained that significant and successive budget cuts have
placed the OIC at the limit of its financial and organizational flexibility. These combined factors
have a direct impact on the OIC’s ability to safeguard information rights under the ATIA.1019
Between 2011-12 and 2012-2013, overall complaints increased by 9 percent. Over that period,
missing record complaints increased by 51 percent. According to the annual report 2013-14, the
complaints have increased 30 percent, but the budget cuts were reduced by roughly 11 percent
since 2009.1020 Gogolek, the Executive Director of the BC FIPA analyzed the repercussions of
the ICC budget cuts. He explained that the cuts meant two things. First, without resources, there
will delays in the Commissioner's office, meaning that information requesters will have to wait
even longer to get their documents. Second, because of the two step complaint procedure, “if the
government digs in its heels, requesters can't even get their day in Federal Court until the
Commissioner's office finishes its review of the file.”1021 Budget constraints place a real burden
in the work of the ICC and weakens its position vis á vis to the government for the protection of
the ATI rights.
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9.1.1 Powers of the Information Commissioner of Canada
One of the most controversial issues in relation to the reform of Canada’s ATI legislation is
whether or not to grant order-making power to the ICC. Canada’s jurisdictions have adopted
different approaches on this issue. Oversight bodies in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba,
Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Quebec have the power to issue legally binding orders, while
oversight bodies in the other provinces and territories can only make recommendations. Rankin
argued that requesters and government officials in these six provinces consider the order-making
model to be very successful, due to a very robust mediation role played by Commissioners.1022 In
addition, Flaherty emphasized that Information and Privacy Commissioners in Ontario, B.C., and
Alberta are as successful as they are “because they are true regulators, even though they rarely
exercise actual order-making power on the privacy side of their mandate. It is the prospect of
their doing so that makes all parts of government pay attention to them.”1023

There are opposing perspectives on the issue of the order-making power. On the one hand, it
has been argued that order-making power serves to enhance the efficacy of the informal dispute
resolution process, as well as overall compliance. According to David Loukidelis, British
Columbia’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, speaking about his office said: “over the 16
years of our office’s experience, …order-making power has served, in fact, to encourage dispute
resolution. Using mediation, we consistently resolve some 85% to 90% of the access appeals that
come to our office.”1024
On the other hand, the opposing argument is that making the ICC’s orders legally binding
will turn the administrative appeal into a more cumbersome, procedurally rigorous and time
consuming process. Increasing the pressure on the administrative process by establishing an
administrative review procedure such as the one offered by the ICC is supposed to produce quick
and simple results. In this procedure, the involvement of review officers who become experts in
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dealing with ATI appeals, has been considered an advantage. These officers gain expertise in
determining whether or not information is being legitimately withheld. The ICC’s Overview of
the ATIA Investigative Procedure1025 makes it clear that the process is almost judicial in its
procedural rigour. For example, it includes opportunities for representation by the complainant,
the public authority’s access and privacy office, and other authority officials. Making the ICC
orders legally binding is feared that will make the complaint process more complex.

Departing from these two contrasting positions, the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, in 2009, recommended that the ICC be granted
order-making power over procedural matters (such as timelines and fees), but not over
substantive refusals (such as the application of exceptions). In 2002, the Review Task Force
supported the order-making model concluding that a quasi-judicial body with order-making
powers combined with a strong mediation function, would be the model most conducive to
achieving consistent compliance and a robust culture of access.1026
Many ATI proponents, especially the media, have long advocated for a change in the ICC’s
powers. For instance, the CNA has emphasized that the powers of the Commissioner need to be
strengthened.1027 The CJEF has boldly stated that the powers of the ICC should be transformed
from those of an ombudsman to those of an order-making tribunal.1028 Roberts has criticized the
current model by arguing that “the ombudsman model appears to have produced exactly the sort
of vices that it was intended to avoid: adversarialism, legalism and formality.”1029 He has
suggested that an effective ATI reform can be achieved by bolstering the authority of the ICC by
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giving him the power to order the disclosure of information, just as some provincial
Commissioners do.1030

Even the government has acknowledged the success of an order-making Information
Commissioner. In 2002, a report of the Treasury Board and the Department of Justice on ATIA
Reform stated that “in Canadian provinces where a full order-making model is in place,
requesters and government officials consider it to be very successful.”1031 The Conservative
Party promised in the 2006 election campaign to give the ICC the power to order the release of
information1032, a promise not kept.
However, nothing has changed in this regard. Canada’s problems with institutional
compliance and bureaucratic resistance to transparency are persistent and demonstrate that, as
Flaherty argued, the Commissioner over time “has become something of a toothless
watchdog.”1033 The same position was upheld in Heinz, a 2006 Supreme Court case on privacy
and ATI, which ruled that “the Privacy Commissioner and the Information Commissioner are of
little help because, with no power to make binding orders, they have no teeth.”1034 Although
there is no data to show how often, or in what circumstances, requesters choose not to complain
about access refusals, in a survey undertaken by the Public Policy Forum in 2001, many
requesters reported that they regarded the complaint process as “useless” and consequently did
not report problems of noncompliance.1035 This view reinforces the idea that an empowered
oversight body is essential to an effective ATI regime. As such, the order-making power has the
potential to enhance the status of the ICC and the compliance of public authorities with her
decisions, which could, in turn, enable her to put in place a much more rapid complaints
processing system.
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The ICC Office has held two different positions regarding the order-making power. Initially,
the ICC has been hesitant to accept that having binding power, its orders would be taken more
seriously by the government. Instead, the ICC resisted proposals by parliamentarians and nongovernmental organizations that he be given an “order power” comparable to that exercised by
provincial commissioners. Former ICC John Grace observed in 1994: “The virtue of the
ombudsman’s approach is… that it allows for a less adversarial, less legalistic, more informal
style. The test of a constructive relationship with government institutions is whether it results in
the release of more information than under a regime with the power to enforce orders.”1036 The
next Commissioner held the same position. In 1998, Commissioner Grace criticized the
proposals for order power, observing that it might lead “more to conflict and excessively
legalistic approaches than to more openness.”1037 Later, Commissioner Reid restated this
position, arguing that his office enjoys a remarkable success rate notwithstanding its lack of
order powers.1038

However, more recently, the Commissioner seems to have changed its position towards the
order-making power. Especially Commissioner Legault has been bold in her proposals to change
the ATIA including a change in the model of the ICC. She has continuously emphasized the
urgent need to modernize the ATI regime from a legislative perspective and to align it with more
progressive regimes both nationally and internationally.1039 This change in position was probably
caused by a deteriorating situation within the ATI regime in Canada and the increased noncompliance rates. The authority of the ICC has been corroding over the years, and her position
taken less seriously by the government. Against this trend, the ICC seems to be fighting a lonely
battle because of the lack of strong allies. The Office has openly acknowledged that there is no
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well-established advocacy group that specializes in ATI issues1040, leaving her without partners
in the battle for an ATI modernization.
The powers of the ICC, have also been subject of many court decisions which have usually
been favourable to the ICC. The Federal Court in Canada (Attorney General) v Canada
(Information Commissioner), paragraph 177 outlined the powers of the ICC. These powers, it is
argued, make the ICC much more flexible in dealing with ATI cases which sometimes require a
variety of legal rules of evidence and inquiry.

A. The Merger Project
As mentioned before, the only jurisdiction in Canada where the Information and the Privacy
Commissioners hold distinct offices is the federal level. This difference between the federal and
provincial models has enticed the interest of law practitioners and academics in Canada. There
has been ongoing debates on merging the two offices at the federal level and providing them
with order-making powers. Rankin argued that since the early 1990s, when the Mulroney
government announced its intention to merge the offices of the ICC and PCC under a single
commissioner, the pros and cons of such an initiative have been debated.1041 According to
Banisar, a primary government concern of having two bodies is that there could be conflict
between the two—and that could become messy, expensive, and embarrassing. There was also
concern that public bodies and the public will receive conflicting advice from the two
commissioners when they disagree.1042 As noted by the Canadian Access to Information Review
Task Force in 2002:

A situation can arise where the Information Commissioner advises the institution to disclose
personal information in the public interest, but the Privacy Commissioner advises the institution
to protect the information on the grounds that the public interest in the case does not clearly
outweigh the invasion of privacy that could result from disclosure. This puts the institution in the
difficult position of having conflicting recommendations from the two Commissioners.1043
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Banisar commented that the most significant benefit of having a single body is the shared
expertise and reduction of conflict. He explained that there is a strong interrelation between ATI
and privacy rights. Although they have some areas of conflict, there also are strong areas of
commonality. Having a single body can reduce the possibility of institutional conflict. For
Banisar, in practice, many requests for information under ATI legislation will relate to personal
information, and having this dual expertise will allow for better balancing.1044 In addition,
Banisar warns about an imbalance that could be especially problematic because one law has a
greater constitutional protection1045, referring to the Privacy Act. However, the Privacy
Commissioners have the opposite opinion on this view. According to them, the strongest
drawback to adopting a single-commission model is the danger that one interest may be stronger
or perceived as more powerful and that the bodies do not equally protect or balance both
interests. They worried that it would “diminish” or “dilute” the profile of privacy at a time when
there were profound privacy challenges.1046

To end the debate, and evaluate these pros and cons of the merger, in 2005, the government
appointed the Supreme Court Justice, the Honourable Gérard La Forest, to study the feasibility of
merging the two offices or of cross-appointing one single commissioner to both. The Canadian
Privacy Act allows for the appointment of the Information Commissioner as Privacy
Commissioner, but as Justice La Forest would comment after the review that this “option has
never been exercised, although the possibility of combining the two offices has received active
consideration.”1047 Justice La Forest conducted his review between July 22, 2005 (the date of his
appointment) and November 15, 2005 (the date of his report to the Minister of Justice).1048 His
report recommended against a full merger on the basis that it would be likely to have a
detrimental impact on the policy aims of the legislation.1049 La Forest suggested that having a
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single federal commissioner represent both ATI and privacy concerns would reduce the amount
of attention brought to either one of these areas. He further argued that a single Information and
Privacy Commissioner may be overburdened and unable to meet their obligations as well as they
currently do, due to the challenges that arise in both access and privacy regimes. La Forest was
of the opinion that potential gains, in terms of government transparency, from having only one
commissioner, would not be significant enough to go through with the merger.1050 In addition, he
concluded that the order-making model is not inconsistent with a very robust mediation role
played by these Commissioners.1051 Justice la Forest recommended, among other things, that
there should not be a full merger of the offices for policy reasons related to the ATIA, the Privacy
Act, and PIPEDA; the ATIA and the Privacy Act should be amended to specifically empower the
commissioners to comment on government programs affecting their spheres of jurisdiction, and
to recognize the role of the commissioners in educating the public and conducting research
relevant to their mandates.1052

The ICC John Reid, at first supported the idea of having a federal Commission based on the
provincial model, but after Justice La Forest’s report he no longer advocated the singlecommissioner model. Regarding the merger proposal, Reid expressed his opposition explaining
that “In the single-commissioner model, it is certainly possible that one value – openness or
privacy – would get preferential treatment.”1053 Considering the recommendations of the La
Forest Report and the other opposition faced by the Commissioners and other ATI advocates, the
government put the merger project on hold. After 10 years, it seems that this project is
abandoned since there have been no more discussions around the possibility of a merger.

9.1.2 Administration of complaints
The Office of the ICC investigates complaints about federal institutions’ handling of access
requests. The ICC has strong investigative powers to assist her in mediating between dissatisfied
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information applicants and government institutions. As an ombudsperson, the Commissioner
may not order a complaint to be resolved in a particular way, though she may refer a case to the
Federal Court for resolution. Whenever possible, the Commissioner relies on persuasion to solve
disputes, asking for a Federal Court review only if an individual has been improperly denied
access and a negotiated solution has proved impossible.

The Commissioner has no discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint. Complaints may allege
improper refusal to disclose requested records, undue delay in providing records, inadequate searches
for requested records, excessive fees, unreasonable time extensions, refusal to translate requested
records, or any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under the Act1054. In
addition to the investigation of complaints received externally, the Commissioner can initiate the
investigation of complaints on her own motion when she is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
to investigate a matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under the Act.

When the Office receives a complaint, it confidentially investigates the facts, allowing both
the complainant and the federal organization to present their cases. Jacobs argued that the ICC
“has understood its role as an ombudsman to mean that it should keep everything, including the
very fact of most cases occurring as confidential.”1055 This effort may require Office staff to
critically analyze and review policies, procedures, legislation and case law, as well as examine
government records. The Office obtains the information needed to examine the complaint
through meetings or correspondence with officials and the complainant. The law requires the
Commissioner to carry out “impartial, independent and non-partisan investigations.”1056 In
accordance with the information gathered through the investigation, the Commissioner makes a
finding which cannot be of civil or criminal liability. When the Commissioner finds that an
exception to the right of access has not been properly applied, she informs the head of the
institution that the complaint is well founded and formally recommends that the withheld
information be disclosed. On occasions, when the head of an institution does not agree to follow
this recommendation, the Commissioner may, with the consent of the complainant, ask the
1054
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Federal Court, under section 42 of the Act, to review the institution’s refusal to release the
information. In addition, a complainant is entitled to ask the Federal Court, under section 41 of
the Act, to review an institution’s refusal to disclose information. The referral to the federal court
concludes the formal investigation by the ICC.

In many cases complaints are resolved by mediation. In fact, experience suggests that
institutions may find the prospect of a formal investigation sufficiently distasteful that they
would prefer to cooperate informally with the OIC in developing and implementing compliance
plans1057. The ICC encourages federal institutions to disclose information as a matter of course
and to respect Canadians’ rights to request and receive information in the name of transparency
and accountability. However, the ICC advised that in the 30-plus year history, the Office has
“documented multiple challenges and deficiencies with the Act. The Act is applied to encourage
a culture of delay. The Act is applied to deny disclosure. It acts as a shield against transparency.
The interests of the government trump the interests of the public.”1058 This situation can be
explained with the commissioner’s approach of naming and shaming which may only have
limited effectiveness. The repetition of ATI shameful stories has normalized them and dulled the
shameful character of these stories. In response to this culture, the ICC has continuously pushed
the government to change its approach to ATI rights, modernize the legislation, and reflect a
culture change in its practices. The latest ICC proposal for a comprehensive modernization of the
ATIA was made in 2015 and included 85 recommendations. So far, no government action has
taken place in response to those recommendations.

A. Examples of types of requests
The ICC receives lots of complaints, but the number does not reflect all the dissatisfied
applicants, many of which decide not to bring their case to the ICC. This represents a major
difficulty in assessing the traditional approach to enforcement of the federal ATI law – it does
not operate unless complaints are made. As a result, there may be only a weak correlation
The Information Commissioner indicated in April 1998 that the OIC's work “had a sobering and motivating
effect” within these institutions, and that the actions which they had been prompted to take were likely to improve
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between complaint statistics and actual non-compliance. However, the numbers that are brought
to the ICC demonstrate to a certain extent the dynamics of the ATI regime in Canada.

The complaints to the ICC are diverse in nature, but many of them are on matters of national
security, international affairs and defence. Commissioner Legault launched a pilot project in
2011 to target files pertaining to these issues, which are often complex and time-consuming to
investigate. The files contained a variety of request. For example, an historian complained about
the heavily redacted records the Department of Justice Canada released relating to a law Canada
had passed in the late 1930s preventing Canadians from fighting in foreign wars.1059 Another
complaint was about the refusal by Library and Archives Canada (LAC) to release records
related to security at the 1976 Montréal and 1988 Calgary Olympics. Other complaints pertained
to important historical events such as the archival records about the demise of the constitutional
amendment proposed in the Meech Lake Accord in 1990.1060
Section 19 is the most often cited exemption in the Commissioner’s complaints. The OIC
office cannot access information subject of s.69 of the ATIA, but may ask the Privy Council
Office (PCO) to certify documents as Cabinet confidences. In 2013–2014, 45 percent of the new
complaints at the Commissioner involved issues relating to section 19.1061 While the ICC has not
been very successful in limiting the application of this section, in some cases it may convince the
institution to consider whether any of the conditions that would permit disclosure of personal
information apply. This may include determining whether the information is publicly available,
whether the person to whom the information relates might consent to the information’s release or
whether the information warrants being disclosed in the public interest.1062

Many complaints to the ICC are about missing records in the government agencies, which
according to the Office have increased substantially. For this reason, in 2012-2013 the ICC
conducted a systemic investigation into the use of text-based messaging in federal institutions.
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Eleven were selected for review. The Commissioner found that the use of instant messaging on
government-issued wireless devices to conduct government business is putting the right of ATI
at an unacceptable risk. In addition, she found that access to instant messages sent and received
by ministers’ office staff is at particular risk.1063

On September 11, 2015, the ICC filed a notice of application against the Prime Minister
pursuant to section 42 of the ATIA.1064 This case is in relation to an ATI request for any records
created between March 26, 2013 to August 22, 2013 related to Senators Mike Duffy, Mac Harb,
Patrick Brazeau and Pamela Wallin.1065 The case was commenced following an investigation by
the ICC’s office concerning PCO’s refusal to disclose records responsive to an ATI request. As a
result of this investigation, the Commissioner concluded that PCO was not justified when
refusing ATI, and recommended that the Prime Minister disclose a significant amount of
additional information. The PCO, on behalf of the Prime Minister, declined to implement the
recommendation. The court case challenged the Prime Minister’s decision, as head of PCO, to
refuse records responsive to the ATI request based on claimed exemptions for “personal
information” (s.19(1)), “advice and recommendations” (s.21(1)(a)) and “solicitor-client
privilege” (s.23). In the proceeding, the ICC maintained that the Prime Minister erred in relying
on these exemptions when refusing access to the requested information. The ICC also maintained
that where there was discretion to either disclose or withhold information, the Prime Minister
failed to demonstrate that this discretion was exercised in a reasonable manner bearing in mind
all relevant factors including the public interest in the information’s disclosure.1066

The above cases reflect some of the tensions that exist in the ATI regime in Canada, the
nature of the ATI requests, and their significance on Canadian constitutionalism, accountability
and governance. They also demonstrate a powerless but devoted advocate of ATI, who is
fighting back against the culture of secrecy in Canadian institutions.
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9.1.3 The interaction with other institutions
The ICC has continuously advocated for ATI rights by criticizing the effectiveness of the ATI
regime and engaging in many law reform initiatives. For decades Canadian Commissioners have
warned that the ATI system is in crisis and in need for repair. To address this crisis, the ICC
Office has worked in several fronts to fulfill its watchdog duties in keeping in place an effective
ATI regime in Canada. It has used several instruments to achieve this goal and engaged with
many institutions, such as the Parliament, the government and the courts. Since the
Commissioner is an independent agent of Parliament, she uses two principal reporting
instruments to inform Parliament on its activities, an annual report and special reports. The
annual reports provide an overview of the activities of the ICC for an entire fiscal year, while the
special reports are used to bring to the attention of Parliament any issues of urgency or
importance. For instance, a Special Report in 2008 identified several interconnected issues in the
ATI system: information management, time extensions, consultations, human resources and
training, and leadership. In 2009, another systemic issue affecting timely responses to access
requests revealed that it was to the delegation of authorities.1067

The ICC has been invited many times by the government to give recommendations on how to
improve the ATI system in Canada. For instance, in 2006, when the Prime Minister Harper came
to power with big promises on improving the ATI system, Commissioner Reid issued a set of
recommendations which aimed to address the weaknesses and enhance ATI rights. However,
instead of considering Reid’s recommendations, the government discharged him from the office.
Reid's successor, Marleau sounded the same dire alarm, calling the state of the ATI system
“grim”, and issued a widely praised report with a dozen specific recommendations to rescue the
access system. The Conservative government followed the same approach with the Marleau's
report – it ignored it until the Marleau quit in apparent frustration, as Weston argued.1068 The
next and current commissioner, Legault, continued the work of her predecessors in fighting a
battle to uphold ATI rights in Canada. This battle became tougher in the years of Legault’s term,
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to the point that she has continuously been warning that the public's ATI right is at risk of being
totally obliterated.

Another significant engagement of the ICC with the government, was during 2007, when she
was consulted about the future of the CAIRS as part of the TBS’s policy renewal initiative
pertaining to ATI. In October 2007, the ICC recommended to TBS that CAIRS be maintained
until an alternative could be found. However, in April 2008, TBS announced that that it was
discontinuing the requirement to update CAIRS. After this decision, the ICC received two
complaints and initiated an investigation. The Office consulted with a number of stakeholders
and obtained representations from them. The representations indicated that the information in
CAIRS provided real value to access requesters and the public in general. The lack of a
centralized source of information made the search process more time consuming, inefficient and
costly. As a result, the Office recommended that any alternate system should allow for quick,
inexpensive and easy searches of current and previous requests. TBS representations highlighted
various factors that were considered prior to the decision, such as the fact that the system was of
limited value to federal institutions and that the information was still available directly from
these institutions. The ICC argued that although CAIRS was not originally designed for public
use, the information contained in the database generated substantial and continued public
interest.1069 In addition, the ICC explained that abolishing the requirement to update the
information contained in CAIRS effectively eliminated a centralized source of information on
access requests received by federal institutions. However, since the information was still
available from institutions, the Office was unable to conclude that the policy change represented
a denial of access under the Act.1070

A. Problems with ATI administration
The everyday work of the ICC with the ATI complaints has revealed that there are significant
problems with the administration of ATIA in Canada.
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-

Frequent political interference

ICC John Reid often called for action because government continued to distrust and resist
the ATIA and the oversight of the ICC. He argued:

Governments claim to embrace openness but they act to exert political control over what is
disclosed and the timing of disclosure. If the right of access is to be meaningful, the legal
incentives for compliance must be strengthened, there must be a well-resourced and fiercely
independent watchdog and all members of Parliament must become engaged in monitoring the
manner in which Ministers and public servants discharge their obligations to be transparent.1071
In an investigation the ICC found a pattern of improper involvement by a small group of
ministerial staff members at Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) in
responding to requests under the ATIA. She noticed that “these staffers inserted themselves in
various ways into a process that was designed to be carried out in an objective manner by public
servants. Consequently, the rights conferred under the Act were compromised”1072. The ICC
investigation revealed that ministerial staff were involved in processing ATI requests; officials
delayed responding in order to obtain the approval of ministerial staff members who did not have
any delegated authority under the Act; ministerial staff exerted pressure over employees in the
ATIP Directorate where employees were instructed to preserve good relations with the
Minister’s Office at the expense of these employees’ responsibilities under the Act.1073 At the
conclusion of the investigation, the ICC made a number of recommendations to PWGSC to
prevent political interference from recurring. The Minister accepted all but one recommendation
and a number of measures were implemented by March 31, 2014.1074
One recent example of political interference in the administration of ATI relates to the longgun registry. All started when the ICC received an information request for Firearms Registry
database. The request was made on March 27, 2012, before the coming into force of the Ending
the Long-gun Registry Act (ELRA). On April 13, 2012, the ICC wrote to the then Minister of
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the Honourable Vic Toews, to inform him that any
John Reid, Information Commissioner of Canada, “A Commissioner’s Perspective: Then and Now”,
October 6, 2005, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/media_room-speeches-2005-october_6.aspx?>.
1072
Interference with Access to Information: Part 2 - Special report to Parliament by Suzanne Legault Information
Commissioner of Canada, April 2014, at 3, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/ingerence-dans-acces-al’information-partie-2-interference-with-access-to-information-part-2.aspx>
1073
Ibid, at 8-9.
1074
Ibid, at 3.
1071

291

records for which a request had been received under the Act were subject to the right of access
and could not be destroyed until a response had been provided. What happened was that between
October 25 and October 29, 2012, the RCMP destroyed all electronic records of non-restricted
firearms. Beeby explained that long-gun registry records were largely destroyed by Oct. 31,
2012.1075 After a long investigation, the ICC concluded that the RCMP illegally destroyed
records related to long-gun registry, while they were still under investigation, and thus there was
an obligation to preserve the records.

On May 7, 2015, the government introduced Bill C-59 in Parliament, entitled the Economic
Action Plan 2015 Act, No. 1. Two sections of the Bill C-59 amended the ELRA, sections 230
and 231. Section 230 of Bill C-59 amended section 29 of the ELRA to exclude the operation of
the ATIA retroactive to October 25, 2011, the date on which the ELRA was introduced in
Parliament. It ousted the application of the ATIA, in particular the provisions guaranteeing the
right of access (s.4), and complaint (s.30), and the Commissioner’s powers to investigative
(s.36), make recommendations (s.37), and seek judicial review (ss. 41, 42 and 46). It also
retroactively ousted the offence of obstructing the Commissioner in the performance of her
duties and functions (s.67) and the offence of obstructing the right of access, including by
destroying records (s.67.1). Section 230 also provided that the ELRA retroactively superseded
any other Act of Parliament in the event of any inconsistency, and that the destruction of the
records shall take place despite any requirements to retain the records or copies contained in any
other Act.

Section 231 of the Bill C-59 provided that no administrative, civil or criminal proceedings lie
against the Crown for the destruction of the records related to the Long-gun Registry from the
date the ELRA came into force, April 5, 2012. This section also provided that no administrative,
civil or criminal proceedings lie against the Crown for any act or omission done in purported
compliance with the Act between October 25, 2011 and the coming into force of section 231.
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Bill C-59 spurred the reaction of many ATI advocates and faced the strong opposition of the
ICC, whose role it ignored and dismissed. In a letter to the Senate, Commissioner Legault
depicted Bill C-59 as “a perilous precedent against Canadians’ quasi-constitutional right to
know.”1076 She openly expressed her opposition to the media that she had never seen anything
like this1077 and that she took the government to the Federal Court on May 14, 2015.1078 As a
response, the media supported this decision and accused the Harper government to retroactively
rewrite Canada's ATI law in order to prevent possible criminal charges against the RCMP.1079
Vallance-Jones described the Bill C-59 as “almost Orwellian. It seeks to rewrite history, to say
that lawful access to records that existed before didn't actually exist after all.”1080 What was more
striking in this story was the reaction of the government which considered the Legault's
investigation as merely finding a “loophole” in the law, one that the government would close
soon.”1081 A spokesman for Public Safety Minister, Steven Blaney would only say the retroactive
law would fix a “bureaucratic loophole” that allowed citizens to request heavily redacted copies
of the gun registry data while the legislation to destroy the data was before Parliament. 1082

This story demonstrates how creative the government can become on finding ways to cover
cases of abuse in the ATI regime, while exercising a strong political interference in ATI’s
administration. What is more salient in this case is the normalization of the government’s
disruptive behavior in managing ATI rights and the ease with which it tries to circumvent legal
obligations and responsibilities. Giving a retroactive effect to a legal act to cover the destruction
of registers, is indeed a dangerous precedent that ignores institutional accountability under ATI,
and dismisses an important right of Canadians, that of exercising control over their government.
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The political interference in the administration of the ATIA has surfaced as an ongoing
problem during many of the ICC’s investigations. It had interfered continuously with the work of
the people who deal everyday with ATI requests, namely the ATIP coordinators, a problem that I
have already mentioned in Chapter seven. During his mandate Commissioner Reid, expressed
that he was “frankly troubled by the profound pressures placed on coordinators by their superiors
to administer the access law as part of the departmental communications function and to avoid, at
all costs, embarrassing the minister. [and he was]…troubled by the absence of a comprehensive,
mandatory training strategy for ATIP offices, senior officials and exempt staff.”1083
-

Avoidance of record keeping

Various federal Information Commissioners have noted that ATI has no meaning when
government officials do not create records. Commissioner John Grace has noted:

The whole scheme of the Access to Information Act depends on records being created, properly
indexed and filed, readily retrievable, appropriately archived and carefully assessed before
destruction to ensure that valuable information is not lost. If records about particular subjects are
not created, or if they cannot be readily located and produced, the right of access is
meaningless.1084
Grace’s successor, Commissioner John Reid picked up the theme, and recommended the
establishment of a legal framework for information management which would, as a primary
feature, require federal departments, agencies and institutions to create and appropriately
maintain records that adequately document their organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, and essential transactions. He also suggested that ATI legislation include provisions
requiring the creation of records and a related offence for failure to do so with the intent to deny
a right of access.1085
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The Commissioner Legault has called for the ATIA to include a comprehensive legal duty to
document decision making, with appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. For example, in a
September 2013 speech, she included the duty to document among the amendments required to
modernize the Act, noting that this is particularly necessary in light of new technological
developments. She advised that “Unless a government official makes a conscious effort to record
that information elsewhere, it is lost to the public. This duty to record is one of the casualties of
the instant messaging environment.”1086

-

Time extensions and fees.

This has been an ongoing problem for some time, and has put a lot of frustration on the
applicants. Dragging responses for unlimited time, and high applicable fees have served as a
deterrent, and caused many requesters to abandon the requests. Time and money to track down
information requests are scarce resources and many people do not have. In addition, in many
cases information is time sensitive, and once is delayed it may become useless. Furthermore, as
mentioned above, a “toothless” watchdog like the ICC cannot not offer much to remedy the costs
of chasing information. All these things together have caused a decrease on the number of
complaints at the ICC.

Some of the investigation at the ICC have revealed extended delays in responses varying from
days to months, and even years. For instance, in the investigation of a complaint about Transport
Canada, the ICC discovered a 540-day time extension to respond to a request for records related
to the development of a joint Canada–U.S. declaration on security and competitiveness. The
investigation determined that Transport Canada’s extension was invalid.1087 In another case,
National Defence took a 1,100-day extension to respond to a request for information about the
sale of surplus military assets to Uruguay. At slightly more than three years, this extension was
one of the longest the ICC Office had seen in recent memory, 1088 although, there have been
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cases when the extension was even longer. One institution took an extension of more than three
years for responding to an access request.1089

In regards to the application fees, there have been instances when the fees have been so high
that they became unaffordable for the average person. Access fees are set out in the ATI
Regulations1090, but fee estimation is a complex process. Determining fee amounts and
processing fee payments adds more complexity to the administration of the ATI system and
results in delays for requesters. Fees are also inconsistently applied across institutions. In 2013–
2014, the ICC investigated a complaint against the Privy Council Office (PCO) about a $4,250
fee estimate. She learned that this estimate was not based in the Regulations, and the PCO was
advised to provide a new, reasonable fee estimate. As a result, the PCO decided to decrease the
fee to $119.80 to the requester.1091

Time extensions and fees are an inherited problem in the ATIA since there is no provision that
limits the time extensions and no provision on fees. Commissioner Marleau has argued that
“extensions have become the norm rather than the exception,”1092 contrary to the intention of the
Act. Since it is left to an institution to decide on how much time they need to answer to an
information request, any time can be legal. In addition, fees, especially related to search times,
depend on the quality and implementation of information management practices. This is
considered to be a loophole in the law that can only be fixed by legislative changes.

The ICC has tried in many ways to address the problems with the ATI administration. One the
tools she has used in this regard has been issuing reports cards with the aim that institutions will
self-reflect on the results, and change their behaviour towards ATI. The ICC first introduced the
report cards process in 1998 in order to determine what percentage of requests went beyond the
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statutory timelines, a measure known as the deemed refusal rate.1093 In 1999, the OIC issued
report cards that provided statistical analyses of performance in a small number of departments,
and assigned letter grades to each of those departments. The effectiveness of report cards
declined over time primarily because of the methodology used to assess performance, not the
real state of compliance within the institution which was dependent on many complex factors.1094
In 2007-2008 the ICC changed the report card system, by providing a broader picture of
institutional performance including a description of contextual factors. Institutions received a
score – ranging from one to five stars, instead of grade letters – according to their overall
performance.1095
B. Law reform
Considering the state of the ATIA many Information Commissioners have called for
legislative action to update and strengthen the law. These efforts have begun early in the life of
the ICC and have intensified through years, even though unsuccessfully. Commissioners Grace,
Reid, Marleau and Legault have all pushed for changes in the ATIA and came forward with
concrete recommendations for such change. In his tenth-year anniversary report, ICC John
Grace presented his case for reform. He recognized that “while the Act has served well in
enshrining the right to know, it has also come to express a single-request, often confrontational
approach to providing information – an approach which is too slow and cumbersome for an
information society.”1096 He issued forty-three recommendations for the renewal of the ATIA.
Grace’s successor, Commissioner Reid continuously criticized the effectiveness of the ATI
system and called for reforms. He has been one of the most active ICC. When the ATIA was
amended by the Terrorism Act in November 20011097, the amendments allowed the Attorney
General to issue a certificate to bar an investigation by the ICC regarding information obtained in
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confidence from a “foreign entity” or for protection of national security if the Commissioner has
ordered the release of information. Rankin argued that these changes “led to additional secrecy at
the federal level.”1098 The ICC described the review as “so limited as to be fruitless for any
objector and demeaning to the reviewing judge.”1099

Commissioner Reid followed closely the work of the Access to Information Review Task
Force created by the government in 2000 to inquire about options for access reform.1100 The Task
made 139 recommendations for legislative, administrative and cultural reform. In response to
this report ICC Reid tabled a special report in Parliament in October 2002.1101 However, nothing
came of this report. In the wake of the Sponsorship scandal, Reid introduced a report in
Parliament entitled “Blueprint for reform”. Some of the recommendations included that all
exemptions in the ATIA should contain an injury test and be discretionary; all exemptions should
be subject to a public interest override; a mandatory requirement for public officials to document
their actions and decisions; cabinet confidences to be brought within the coverage of the law and
the review jurisdiction of the ICC; the Act to be a complete code setting out the openness/secrecy
balance and section 24 of the ATIA, which sets out this open-ended, mandatory, class exemption,
to be abolished. Reid asked Justice Gomery, who was assigned to conduct the inquiry on the
Sponsorship Scandal, to look carefully at his blueprint and urged him to support his calls for
reform of the ATIA.1102

In response to the Gomery report and recommendations the Liberal Government released a
framework for revisions of the ATIA in 2005 and ICC released a draft bill.1103 The Bill, entitled
the Open Government Act, was tabled before the Standing Committee on Access to Information,
Privacy and Ethics at the request of this Committee. It proposed substantial changes to the access
law. A primary objective was to address concerns about a “culture of secrecy” within political

Rankin, “FOI in Canada”, supra note 243 at 5.
Remarks to Special Committee on Bill C-36, 6 December 2001.
1100
Department of Justice, “A Comprehensive Framework for Access to Information Reform: A discussion Paper”,
April 2005, at 3-4, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/atip-aiprp/ati-aai/ati-aai.pdf>.
1101
Douglas et al, supra note 291 at 5.
1102
John Reid, Information Commissioner of Canada, “A Commissioner’s Perspective: Then and Now
October 6, 2005”, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/media_room-speeches-2005-october_6.aspx>.
1103
See Information Commissioner of Canada, “Access to Information Act – Proposed Changes and Notes”, online:
<http://www.infocom.gc.ca/specialreports/2005reform-e.asp>.
1098
1099

298

and bureaucratic environments. The proposed Act was endorsed by Commissioner Gomery in his
Phase 2 report, Restoring Accountability.1104 Soon after, just before elections, in November 2005,
the Conservative Party pledged to pass some of the Reid’s proposals if elected, but that promise
was broken when they came to power.
Reid’s successor, Commissioner Marleau, did not give up on the hope for a law reform on
ATI. In February 2009, ICC Marleau released 12 recommendations for strengthening the ATIA
and its enforcement system. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Access, Privacy
and Ethics Committee endorsed some of these recommendations, in a report issued in June 2009.
However, the Conservative government rejected all of them in December 2009. At the same
year, Commissioner Legault took over the Office and made 12 recommendations to the Standing
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. She called for the Parliament to review
the ATIA every five years; the right of ATI to be extended to all persons; the ICC to be provided
with order-making power for administrative matters; the ATIA to provide the ICC with discretion
on whether to investigate complaints; the ICC to have a public education and research mandate
and an advisory mandate on proposed legislative initiatives; the ATIA to be extended to records
of the general administration of Parliament, the courts, and Cabinet confidences; a mandatory
approval by the ICC for all extensions beyond sixty days; to allow requesters the option of direct
recourse to the Federal Court for access refusals.1105 Many of these recommendations were part
of law reform introduced by other ICCs in the past, but that were disregarded by the government.

In November 2013, Legault appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Procedure and House Affairs as part of its review of the Board of Internal Economy, the
governing body of the House of Commons. In her remarks, the Commissioner again spoke in
favour of extending the coverage of the ATIA to the administration of Parliament. The committee
declined this request in its report in December 2013. Instead, the committee noted that the “level
of proactive disclosure already available is sufficient for the transparency and accountability of
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the House and its Members.”1106 This reaction was another one on the line of rejections the ICC
had previously faced, but coming from Parliament it demonstrated that all other institutions, not
just government, try to avoid having ATI apply into own home.

Despite this rejection, the ICC persistently continued to push for change in the ATI regime.
Only recently, in 2015, Commissioner Legault, issued 85 recommendations1107 for law reform in
her report to Parliament. Most of them were introduced before, such as extending the ATIA
coverage; establishing a comprehensive legal duty to document, with appropriate sanctions for
non-compliance; extending the right of access to all persons; eliminating all access fees;
adopting an order-making model for the ICC; introducing offences sanctioned by fines varying
from $5000-$250001108, among many other recommendations. They had the same fate as other
proposals – went unrecognized.

Another indirect strategy followed by the ICC to open up opportunities for modernizing the
ATI legal framework and strengthening government transparency were the calls for the
government to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP) as a global initiative to enhance the
way of governing. In September 2010, the federal and provincial Commissioners across Canada
issued a call for open government.1109 They also took advantage of this initiative to push for
legislative changes when the government was developing an Action Plan for the OGP initiative.
The Commissioners suggested that the Action Plan on OGP represented a missed opportunity for
comprehensive reform of the ATIA. In a January 2012 letter to Minister Clement on behalf of
Canada’s information and privacy commissioners, ICC Legault, offered to assist the government
in developing the Action Plan. The letter suggested the government recognize and support the
relationship between open government and a modernized ATIA.1110 However, this letter achieved
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no recognition by the government and no action for ATI reform was reflected in the OGP Action
Plan.

As mentioned above, all the Commissioners have tried more than once while they were in
office to push for change in the ATI legal framework. However, all of their attempts to influence
an ATI law reform seem to have failed to overcome institutional barriers, which are raised and
maintained to preserve the legal status quo in Canada. Cavoukian called these attempts
“Mayday” calls and cries that have gone unheeded.1111 This inability to make for a strong
opposition against the government regarding ATI demonstrates the nature of the ICC as a
“toothless watchdog”, as many scholars have described it. Several failed attempts for a law
reform has caused a lot of frustration on the ICC as an oversight institution and has left it
powerless in face of strong government opposition.

9.1.4 The case of Ontario
As explained above, the IPCO is different from the ICC in two ways, it has an order-making
power and the two commissioners are merged into one. The IPCO is argued to be one of the
most active commissioners in Canada which has left its footprint in ATI’s framework. In 2010,
Commissioner Ann Cavoukian “unveiled the concept Access by Design consisting of 7
Fundamental Principles that encourage public institutions to take a proactive approach to
releasing government records, making the disclosure of government-held information an
automatic process whenever possible.”1112 “Access by design” is a revolutionary idea that has the
potential to change the legal landscape and practice of ATI in Canada.

The appeal process at the IPCO goes through three stages: Intake, Mediation and
Adjudication. In the intake stage requests are screened and appeals may be dismissed, settled, or
go to mediation. In mediation the IPCO helps parties to either reach a full settlement or simplify
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the appeal1113. Mediation can succeed in settling some or all of the issues, reducing the number
of records in dispute, clarifying the issues and helping the parties to better understand the
legislation in place. The role of the mediator is to facilitate discussion and negotiation, and in the
majority of cases, mediation is successful. In situations where mediation is not completely
successful, the mediator prepares a report, which summarizes the case and identifies the issues
left unresolved. Then, the file is forwarded to the third stage, adjudication. In the adjudication, a
written inquiry is conducted and parties are notified about the issues that need to be addressed.
Parties are given an opportunity to submit written representations1114 emphasizing their position
on the issues, and they are generally shared between parties in the appeal, unless there are
confidentiality concerns. Once the adjudicator has considered all representations and reviewed
the records, a decision is made, and a written order is issued.

IPCP has been active beyond Ontario, and in the federal level. In her submission to the Task
Force in 2001, Cavoukian drew attention to the crisis in the federal level related to government
compliance with the legislation. She explained that “the failure of government institutions to
comply with …provisions can undermine legislation more than any other factor.”1115 Cavoukian
urged the Task Force to make improvements to the federal access scheme, including changes for
strengthening the ICC, such as giving it order-making powers, undertaking mediation and
conducting research, and public education.1116

Because the IPCO deals with both privacy and ATI issues, she has often urged to stop using
privacy as a shield against transparency, in cases when ATI refusals are justified with privacy
concerns. She criticized this practice by saying that “the reasoning behind this excuse is an effort
to play it safe, instead of gaining a proper understanding of what the options are for disclosure,
or in the worst cases, using it as a convenient diversion for inaction.”1117 The IPCO has
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advocated for a strong access system that strikes a careful balance between access and privacy
and advised governments to ensure the continued relevance of ATI, while still vigilantly
protecting the personal information of Canadians. In October 2014, the IPCO joined other
commissioners in urging governments to review and modernize information management
practices drawing in advancements in information technology. In a joint resolution1118, the
commissioners said the digital era has brought tremendous opportunities and new challenges for
access and privacy rights.

9.2 The role of the EU Ombudsman as a watchdog on access to documents
First established in Sweden, the ombudsman is traditionally a neutral decision-maker who
investigates allegations of maladministration in the executive branch of government and
judiciary.1119 In the EU, the creation of the European Ombudsman (EO) originates at the Treaty
of Maastricht in 1992,1120 so it was prior than the introduction of the ATI legislation in the EU.
The role of the EO is to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens living in Europe by ensuring
open and accountable administrations within the EU. In this capacity he has been a strong voice
for the protection of the right to ATD and is considered a prominent advocate of openness within
the EU architecture.

9.2.1 Powers of the EU Ombudsman
The EO deals with complaints regarding maladministration by the EU institutions and bodies
when they fail to act in accordance with the law. It means that the EO’s scope is much broader
than investigating complaints on refusals of ATD, as is it the case with the ICC. As Harden puts
it, “The essence of Ombudsman is not to check the lawfulness of administrative behavior, which
is the task and prerogative of the ECJ, but to control administrative behavior for compliance with
Protect and Promote Canadians’ Access and Privacy Rights in the Era of Digital Government Resolution of the
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administrative ethics.”1121 Even though the role of the EO is much broader than fostering
transparency in the EU, the protection of a right to ATD has been at the centre of his work. The
position is distinctive within the EU because it is filled entirely at the discretion of the EP.1122
Magnette argued that “the European Ombudsman is a new kind of ‘agent’, whose status and role
remain unclear. On the one hand, it is formally a parliamentary body, designed to strengthen the
control of EU institutions and administrations by MEPs; on the other hand, the proﬁle and role of
this organ is close to that of a court.”1123 However, just like the Commissioner in Canada, the EO
does not have order-making power. Only the Courts have power to give legally binding
judgments and to provide authoritative interpretations of the law. The EO can make proposals
and recommendations and, as a last resort, draw political attention to a case by making a special
report to the EP. The effectiveness of the EO thus depends on moral authority.

The ombudsman role is a Nordic innovation. Its first incumbent, Jacob Söderman, had
previously served as Finland's ombudsman, and he was elected as an EO on 12 July 1995 and
took office on 27 September 1995.1124 According to Birkinshaw, Söderman “attacked secrecy in
the EU with missionary zeal”1125 soon after coming to office. Harden emphasized the importance
of the EO by saying that “The European Ombudsman has been central to the development of
openness and transparency as broader principles of law.”1126 During the time as the EO
Söderman has been very active in promoting transparency and ATI as important values in the
EU. In fact, in 1996, the Ombudsman undertook an inquiry on its own initiative into the
provision of public ATD by all European institutions and bodies and dedicated his first ever
special report to the EP on precisely this topic in 1997. The inquiry involved fifteen Community
institutions other than the Council and Commission.1127 The reason for the inquiry was that the
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Ombudsman's office had received a number of complaints which seemed to suggest that the staff
of Community institutions and bodies were not always adequately instructed on how to deal with
requests for documents. Because an important part of the Ombudsman’s mission is to enhance
relations between Community institutions and bodies and European citizens, a more transparent
European administration is quite clearly a condition for achievements in this field. After an
exchange of views with the institutions and bodies in question, during which they all showed a
positive attitude to the initiative, the Ombudsman formally recommended to fourteen institutions
in December 1996 that they should come up with a common transparency regime, and adopt
rules on public access to documents.1128 The Treaty of Amsterdam was still under proposal at
that time, and it later included a right to ATD. Regulation 1049 was adopted five years later.
The EO seems to be a powerful institution in the EU. Magnette argued that “The powers of
the Ombudsman, limited as they are, give him the opportunity to combine the instruments of
parliamentary scrutiny and judicial control in an original way.”1129 The Annual Reports show
that the level of compliance from the institutions is high, about eighty per cent each year1130.
Given that there is no order-making powers assigned to the EO, the high compliance demonstrate
that EO has established a moral authority in the EU.

9.2.2 Administration of complaints
According to the Statute of the Ombudsman,1131 when the EO receives a complaint, he starts
an investigation. There are three steps that he may take in any case of complaint. First, he looks
for an amicable solution between the institution concerned and the complainant to remove the
maladministration and satisfy the complainant. Second, if no friendly solution can be reached,
the EO informs the institution concerned and, when appropriate, makes draft recommendations.
The institution must reply within three months. If the recommendations are not accepted and no
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other solution to eliminate the maladministration can be found, the EO sends a special report
with possible recommendations to the EP and to the institution concerned. This stage gives the
Parliament a possibility to look for a way to solve the matter. The EO has the obligation to
inform the appropriate national police if his inquiries reveal criminal activity, or to inform the
institution or body concerned about the need to initiate a disciplinary process. The Ombudsman's
office may launch investigations even with its own initiative, and follows the same procedure.
The involvement of Parliament in the investigation process is an interesting step which
provides the EO with a strong support and explains (although in part) why its recommendations
are followed. As such, the EP has become a strong ally of the EO.
As stated above, most of the complaints to the EO deal with cases of maladministration.
However, requests for ATD constitute a high volume of the general requests. According to the
EO, “for several years now, 20% to 30% of the complaints that the Ombudsman’s office
investigates have concerned transparency. The most common transparency issues raised are the
institutions’ refusal to grant access to documents and/or information.”1132 These numbers
demonstrate that EU citizens make substantive amounts of requests for ATD. Most of the
requests are made to the key institutions of the EU. Table 38 below shows that the European
Commission in 2014 has received almost 60 per cent of the total requests, with a huge difference
with other EU institutions and bodies. The Commission usually gets more than 50 per cent of the
total complaints. This is not surprising considering that the Commission has a crucial role in the
EU decision-making as the executive body of the EU, equivalent to the national government.
Most of the legislation in the EU originates in the Commission, so most of its activities draw the
attention of European public.
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Table 38: Inquiries conducted by the EO in 2014 according to institutions

Source: EU ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, online:
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreport.faces/en/59959/html.bookmark#hl3>.

The EO receives all sorts of complaints concerning different issues and institutions in the EU.
I am mentioning below a couple of very recent and important investigations she has been
engaged into. One of them relates to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),
which has lately drawn a lot of public and media attention. The TTIP, an EU-US trade
agreement, will create the largest free trade area in history with the aim of reducing the
regulatory barriers to trade. According to the EO “TTIP will shape future rules and standards in
areas such as food safety, cars, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, energy, the environment, and the
workplace.”1133The European Commission was negotiating the agreement on behalf of the EU,
on a mandate granted by the Council of the EU.1134 During the negotiations on the TTIP there
were major concerns about the closed process of these negotiations. For instance, Independent
argued that “the process has been secretive and undemocratic. This secrecy is on-going, with
nearly all information on negotiations coming from leaked documents and Freedom of
Information requests.”1135 To address these concerns the EO opened three strategic
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investigations, two of which on her own initiative in connection with the ongoing negotiations on
the TTIP.

The first complaint about TTIP started on 17 February 2014, when a group of European
NGOs1136 made a request to the Commission, under Regulation 1049 for access to documents
related to the agreement. After the Commission's negative reply in the confirmatory application,
the complainants turned to the EO, who decided on November 4, 2015 that the Commission had
failed to grant the documents conforming to Regulation 1049.1137
In addition to this complaint, the Ombudsman O’Reilly started two other investigations
related to TTIP on her own initiative. In July 2014, the EO began investigating the refusal by the
Council of the EU to release the directives that the EU was using to negotiate the TTIP. She also
started inquiring into the steps that the Commission was taking to ensure transparent and public
participation in TTIP negotiations.1138 Earlier, the Ombudsman had put forward, to the European
Commission, measures it could take to enable timely public access to TTIP documents, and
details of meetings with stakeholders. There were concerns over refusal to disclose documents,
unauthorized disclosure of documents, delays, and certain stakeholders apparently receiving
privileged access to TTIP documents.1139 Following the EO’s investigations, in October, the
Council published the directives in question. Shortly after, the Commission announced its plans
to increase transparency in lobbying, promising to grant broader access to other TTIP
documents.1140 In February 2015, the Commission published the texts of the agreements in its
webpage, including the text of the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA).1141
Another important inquiry Ombudsman O’Reilly that started in 2014 was on trilogues, which
are informal meetings between the Parliament, Commission and the Council of the EU. They are
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an important part of the EU legislative process, and have been a major concern for taking place
in secrecy. This inquiry was “as an effort to facilitate a discussion about how trilogues can be
made more transparent but also about where non-disclosure of documents needs to be
maintained.”1142 With this inquiry the EO was trying to address two main concerns: if increased
transparency concerning trilogues could actually prove harmful to the trilogue process, and if
there was a risk that greater transparency, at the wrong time, would provide greater lobbying
opportunities for well-resourced private interests to the detriment of the average citizen. In July
2016, the EO concluded the inquiry and proposed that the three institutions (the EP, Commission
and Council) make some information and documentation publicly available, such as: trilogue
dates, initial positions of the three institutions, general trilogue agendas, etc.1143
These examples demonstrate that the EO had developed a relatively good relationship with
the EU institutions. Especially as it regards the ATD requests, the EO’s practice shows that the
level of compliance is satisfactory even through there is no order-making power in place to
facilitate this compliance. This means that the EO has established its authority and credibility in
the EU as an institution that deserves attention and is taken seriously.

9.2.3 The interaction with other institutions
The EO is an impartial body, it takes no orders from any government or organization.
However, it maintains good relationships with other institutions in the EU. For instance, it has a
close relationship with the EP for which it produces two types of reports, annual and special
reports. The annual report summarizes the yearly activity of the EO while special reports are
submitted in cases when recommendations in an investigation are not accepted by institutions.
They require the EP to take appropriate action. The European Ombudsman places a great deal of
importance on relations with the EP. During 2014, the Ombudsman met with over 50 MEPs
across all main groups on a one-to-one basis on various issues of mutual concern.1144
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In addition, the EO appreciates its relationship with the Commission, given its size in the EU
administration and that it is the subject of the greatest number of complaints at the EO. The two
institutions maintain monthly meetings at the director level regularly. In 2014, O’Reilly praised
the new Commission for its efforts to improve the transparency of its work, especially in the
context of lobbying transparency. Relationship building is now one of the Ombudsman’s
priorities at all levels of the Commission. During 2014, the Ombudsman met with several
relevant Directors and Heads of Unit of the Commission.1145
Maintaining a good relationship with the main bodies in the EU, is one of the EO’s strategies
to influence a culture of good administration. This strategy includes upholding the values of
transparency and ATD as critical for a healthy democracy in the EU. In this context, the EO has
engaged in lobbying and law reform. The EO office lobbied for the inclusion of a commitment to
transparency in the Charter of fundamental rights adopted in 2000.1146 It is now a fact that the
Charter guarantees a fundamental principal of openness and a public right of ATD. Moreover,
the EO has provided leadership on ATD via the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour1147
which is endorsed by the Parliament and supervised by the EO. The Code not only offers a guide
to the EU institutions, but has also become a vital tool for citizens wishing to inform themselves
of their rights1148, including the right of ATD. Magnette argued that:

In 2000, he pleaded his case in front of the members of the Convention in charge of drafting the
Charter of Fundamental Rights… the code was incorporated in the Charter adopted at the Nice
Summit in December 2000. In less than ﬁve years, the Ombudsman managed to codify the
doctrine of good administrative behaviour and have it incorporated in a Charter which is the
expression of the Union’s fundamental values.1149
When the Commission announced the review of Regulation 1049, and proposed a draft for this
purpose, the EO got involved. On 2 June 2008, the EO, Diamandouros, criticised the draft law
and called upon the EP to defend the EU’s commitment to transparency and the citizens’ right of
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ATD in the EU. He asserted that the overall effect of the proposed revisions would be that the
Commission could share documents informally with a limited number of favoured external
recipients of its choice, without having to give public access to them.1150

As this involvement shows, the EO, even though not an institution specifically designed to
promote ATD and transparency, has influenced important developments of this right and
principle in the EU. It has acted as an ATI advocate from its inception and continually supported
its expansion through law and practice.
9.2.4 The case of Albania
The Commissioner of the Right to Information and Protection of Personal Data (CRIPPD) in
Albania is a relatively young institution. Until the end of 2014 its role was occupied by the
People’s Advocate, which is the equivalent of the Ombudsman in the EU. When the new law on
ATI1151 came into force in October 2014, it gave the powers of the Information Commissioner to
the Privacy Commissioner that already existed, merging the two bodies together. CRIPPD is
similar in nature and scope with the IPCO – it handles both privacy and ATI and its decisions are
binding. Both these powers were only introduced by the new law to strengthen its authority. In
the past, the People’s Advocate was a weak institution because of the limited legal remedies and
the inherited culture of non-compliance of the Albanian institutions.1152
Although the time is short to evaluate the work of the CRIPPD, it seems that it is establishing
a stronger position compared to the People’s Advocate. In just two months, from November to
December 2014 there have been 26 complaints to the CRIPPD. From those, only five have led to
investigations, and only two have led to decisions where the authorities were required to provide
the information requested.1153 The other ones were solved amicably with the mediation of the
CRIPPD. In 2015, there are 50 decisions published in the Commissioner’s website pertaining to
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complaints made by individuals and organizations. The decisions are scanned and posted on the
website, with names erased to maintain confidentiality.1154 These investigations have revealed
that the ATI law in Albania is mostly disregarded by the public administration which avoids to
fulfill the obligation under the law by dismissing requests for ATI by citizens.1155 This situation
has been the norm rather than the exception in Albania and it is inherited from the old law which
provided no safeguards for the protection of the right of ATI in cases when information was
denied.
The new law provides the CRIPPD with new powers which enhance its capacities to
supervise the activities of the institutions in compliance with the ATI legislation. For instance,
the law requires from the public authorities to implement institutional transparency programs, to
determine the information categories to be made public without request, and the disclosure
method of this information.1156 CRIPPD approves and distributes the model transparency
programs1157 and supervises their implementation. In addition, public authorities are required to
maintain public registers to document all ATI requests and their responses. The CRIPPD sets the
standards on the format and the content of the register.1158 Furthermore, the CRIPPD examines
periodically, in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, public fees/charges for ATI requests
and, where appropriate, orders their amendment.1159
These powers make the CRIPPD an institution that has the potential to change the culture of
non-compliance in the Albanian public administration. They give teeth to this oversight body, so
it can be taken seriously by the public officials. However, the CRIPPD’s success will depend
heavily on the will of the political leadership in Albania. As I argued in Chapter seven, the
implementation of the law, including the success of the oversight mechanisms depend on the will
of the government. In the Albanian case this is even more problematic since the government
controls all other institutions, including the courts.
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Comparing the oversight models in the EU and Canada with the CRIPPD, one can notice a
big difference in terms of mandate and power. Not only the CRIPPD has order-making power,
but its oversight extends to many activities of the institutions such as transparency programs,
public registers and fees. The EO and the ICC do not possess such powers, and their success
depends on the moral authority they succeed to establish their alliances with other institutions
and the support from the public.
9.3 Comparisons and Conclusions
Both Canada and the EU have an independent oversight and enforcement bodies to ensure that
public authorities comply with their duties in relation to transparency and ATI. Both of them are
creatures of Parliament, and both have limited powers of recommendation, investigation and
advice. While the ICC was created by the ATIA in 1982, in the EU, the creation of the EO
originates at the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, so it was prior than the introduction of the ATD
legislation in the EU. The comparison between Canada and the EU shows that these institutions
are very similar to each other. Although with limited powers they have engaged in many
initiatives for ATI reforms. However, is seems like the EU Ombudsman has gained more moral
grounds as an enforcement body.

The existence of an oversight body is important because it provides a channel for the citizens
to understand the actions of government through investigations and inquiries. This process
encourages the administration to explain to the citizens why it acts as it does and recognizing a
possible right of appeal. In this context, the existence of an ombudsman also improves the
general quality of government service by making officials prudent and avoid engaging in
careless procedures. However, the four models examined above have achieved different levels of
success in affecting government behaviour. The IPCO and the EO have been more successful,
than the ICC and the CRIPPD.

In addition, oversight bodies intervene more frequently in transparency issues, acting as a
“filter” to prevent the courts’ overload, but also reducing the time for the citizens to process a
request. Their mission is very different from a judicial one, they have extended powers of
investigation and can conduct inquiries but cannot impose any legal obligation, unless they have
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order-making power as it is the case in Ontario and Albania. The ICC and EO can only submit
draft recommendations, sometimes accompanied with “remarks” or “reform proposals”, to the
institutions suspected of maladministration but is not empowered to impose sanctions.
Notwithstanding, through their investigations they have produced general principles and
precedents that could be employed by government and the courts. In the case of the EO,
Magnette argued that through his “decisions”, the EO has gradually established a
“jurisprudence” based on a teleological philosophy of “good administrative practices” and even
“good governance”. Magnette explained that lack of power to make binding decisions may be a
weakness, but may also be a source of diffuse power.1160 Oversight bodies have the ultimate
privilege of being able to conduct inquiries on their own initiative, contrary to the judges.
Whereas Courts depend on cases brought to them to develop jurisprudence, oversight bodies are
free to determine their own priorities.

Furthermore, oversight bodies help improve legislation. Through the careful selection of cases
which they see as symbolically important, they establish themselves as a power of initiative and
pressure in the continuous reform of the Canadian and the EU governance. In the name of
transparency, which they are the guardian of, the oversight bodies empower themselves with the
right to suggest procedural reforms which aim to increase citizens’ participation in administrative
procedures. The EO has been more successful in this regard since it has had the support of the
EP. The involvement of Parliament in the investigation process is an interesting step which is not
present in Canada, and provides the EO with much more potential that its voice will be heard. As
such, the EP has become a strong ally of the EO. According to Magnette, the EO, “acting as a
parliamentary organ, and with the strong support of the EP, …used his powers of inquiry and
proposition to suggest wide-ranging reforms of European governance.”1161 This kind of support
is not provided to the ICC, and it seems that it is fighting a lonely battle because of the lack of
strong allies.

Table 39 below represents the models of the fours oversight bodies that I studied in this
chapter.
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Table 39: Comparison of Oversight Models
Canada
Information
Commissioner

Ontario
Information and
Privacy
Commissioner

mandate

-review
complaints
-investigate

-Review decisions
-conduct research
-advice on
proposed
legislation
-public education

powers

recommendatio Order-making
ns
5$
10$ personal
25$ other info
Within 60 days within 30 days

Model

Applicatio
n fee
Time of
complaint
Complaint
s steps

1162

To ICC first,
than the
Federal Court

To the IPCO first,
than the Court

EU
Ombudsman

Albania
Commissioner of the
right to information
and protection of
personal data
(CRIPPD)
-uncover cases
-investigate
of
complaints
maladministratio -review transparency
n
programs
-review
-conduct inquires
complaints
-public education
-conduct
inquiries
recommendation Order-making
s
Free
Free
3 calendar
months
To EO or court
after making a
confirmatory
application1162

Within 30 business
days
To CRIPPD first, than
the Court

It means that the persons to whom the request is denied, should apply to the institution asking for a review of the
decision and reasons of rejection, before going to the EO.
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CHAPTER 10: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION
JURISPRUDENCE
Court’s interpretation is critical in understanding how ATI laws are perceived, shaped and
implemented, and how they are balanced against other rights and interests. The jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) will be explored
to extrapolate on the nature and the value that the justice system assigns to the access laws. Some
decisions from the Federal Court of Canada (FCC) and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) will also be explored. These Courts’ decisions complement the legal framework on
ATI, they offer guidance to practitioners, and expand the legal understanding of the status of
access rights.

The purpose of this Chapter is to shed light in the legal discourse and jurisprudence. Court
interpretation is critical in understanding the design, the purpose and the objectives of ATI laws
and how they come into play in practice. A case law analysis of ATI rights provides a better
understanding of their status, and how a legislative scheme helps to define, frame, and value
access rights. The case law of the two highest courts offers a fruitful insight into the legal and
social debates around transparency and ATI.
The role of the courts in promoting human rights has always been very important. In the EU,
courts have shown to be essential in transforming ATI into a fundamental human right. In
Canada, access rights do not hold such status, and although the courts have not been very
influential in changing that status, they have certainly enhanced it with an expansive
interpretation of the rights.

10.1 Perspectives from the Canadian courts system
The tensions in the ATIA have been for several years facilitated by judicial interpretations.
McCamus argued about the importance of judicial interpretation saying that “judicial review is
the most attractive of the alternatives.”1163 Indeed, the case law is significant because it facilitates
the work of practitioners and public officials by providing guidance on how to decide on
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conflicting cases. As Kazmierski points out “ensuring that government officials properly exercise
their discretion pursuant to access legislation also depends on the role of the judiciary.”1164 ATI
has drawn a considerable amount of attention from both activists and citizens in Canada. Many
cases have ended up in courts establishing an important body of jurisprudence that guides
institutions in the application of the ATI legislation in everyday practice. In these cases access
rights have been interpreted creatively and new dimensions have been explored. However, the
courts have not been able to escape the legal restrictions that of the ATIA.

Although ATI is not a constitutional right in Canada, the SCC has recognized it as having a
quasi-constitutional status. As Dickson C.J. noted in Canada National Railway, writing in the
context of human rights legislation, a court's goal in interpreting quasi-constitutional statutes
should be to preserve the impact of the right. The Court recognized that “in the construction of
such legislation the words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally
important that the rights enunciated be given their full recognition and effect. We should not
search for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their proper impact.”1165

10.1.1 Access to information as a constitutional right
The quasi-constitutional status of access rights was upgraded in 2010 by Criminal Lawyers’
Association1166,a landmark case of the SCC in which the Court recognized a limited right to ATI
held by public authorities as part of the freedom of expression of the Charter.1167 The case was
brought by the Criminal Lawyers’ Liberties Association under Ontario’s FIPA1168 for documents
held by the Ontario Provincial Police which were denied. The case was put forward as a
constitutional claim and in turn, the Court recognized, for the first time that the right of ATI was
a “derivative right” of the freedom of expression. This case has a meaningful significance since it
provides a constitutional framework for access rights.

1164

Kazmierski, supra note 655 at 51.
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, at 1134
(emphasis added).
1166
Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970.
1167
Section 2(b)
1168
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31.
1165

317

The question before the Court was whether the Constitution recognized an ATI right. The
Court found that section 2(b) of the Charter protects a derivate right to ATI in certain
circumstances. According to Kazmierski, this case rightly garnered much attention because it
was the first decision in which a majority of the Court recognized that there was constitutional
protection for the right to ATI.1169 However, this protection did not apply in this case. The reason
for this partial recognition was that s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all documents in
government hands. Instead, it guarantees freedom of expression. According to the Court “Access
is a derivative right which may arise where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful
expression on the functioning of government.”1170 The Court questioned the application of s. 2(b)
in this case, and built on the methodology developed in previous cases. It used the framework set
in Irwin1171 which involved three inquiries: (1) Does the activity in question have expressive
content, thereby bringing it within the reach of s. 2 (b)? (2) Is there something in the method or
location of that expression that would remove that protection? (3) If the activity is protected,
does the state action infringe that protection, either in purpose or effect? Irwin established that to
demonstrate that there is expressive content in accessing such documents, the claimant must
establish that the denial of access effectively precludes meaningful commentary. If the claimant
could show this, there is a prima facie case for the production of the documents in question.

Considering the three level methodology in Irwin, the Supreme Court concluded that the
requirements for considering ATI as part of the s. 2(b) were not satisfied. The main question was
whether s. 2(b) was engaged at all. The court concluded that the scope of the s. 2(b) protection
included a right to ATI only in limited cases “where access is necessary to permit meaningful
discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and functional
constraints.”1172 The derivative right of access ties directly to core democratic values. As the
Supreme Court noted “access to information in the hands of public institutions can increase
transparency in government, contribute to an informed public, and enhance an open and
democratic society.”1173 The unanimous Court also stated there to be:
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A prima facie case that s. 2(b) may require disclosure of documents in government hands where
it is shown that, without the desired access, meaningful public discussion and criticism on
matters of public interest would be substantially impeded.… Open government requires that the
citizenry be granted access to government records when it is necessary to meaningful public
debate on the conduct of government institutions.1174
This position indicates that the Court values ATI as a right that contributes to the public
debates on issues of governance. In addition, there is a link established between open
government and public discussions on matters of public interest. ATI is part of this link and
serves as a catalyst that facilitates the relationship transparency-public debate. While the access
request in the case was not characterized as necessary to allow for meaningful discussion on a
matter of public interest, it is significant because it recognized that an underlying derivative right
potentially exists. Moreover, the Canadian Lawyers’ Association disputed the Respondent
Minister's contention that the requester's purpose in making a request is a relevant consideration
in the exercise of his discretion to disclose records. Generally, requesters need not even explain
why they are requesting the information to which they seek access. To the extent that the purpose
is known, it should only be considered where it would be a factor in favour of disclosure. Such
an approach is appropriate in light of the constitutional status of the right to ATI.
Although the Canadian Lawyers’ Association case does not have a general application, it is
still important because it is a reminder about the significance of an explicit public interest test
that should be employed in any ATI case. The Court’s ruling effectively required the public
interest to be taken into account whenever public authorities are evaluating the applicability of
discretionary exceptions.1175 The only explicit public interest test included in the ATIA applies to
the section 20, exception for third-party trade secrets. The scope of the public interest test was
effectively extended by this case, which held that the public interest must be taken into account
when deciding whether or not to apply discretionary exceptions1176. As a result, every
discretionary exception within the ATIA is now deemed to contain at least some form of public
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interest test, albeit a weak one. However, the ATIA contains many exceptions which are not
mandatory, and which therefore lack any form of public interest test.

10.1.2 Important cases from jurisprudence
A. Access to Information as important for democratic principles
In many cases the Supreme Court has described ATI as a pillar of our democracy, and as such
very important for the principles of accountability and participation. In 1997, in Dagg Justice La
Forest recognized that “The overarching purpose of access to information legislation is to
facilitate democracy by helping to ensure that citizens have the information required to
participate meaningfully in the democratic process and that politicians and bureaucrats remain
accountable to the citizenry.”1177 In addition, Justice La Forest looked at ATI as a right of the
citizens given by statute to exercise their responsibilities of citizenship more effectively. He
stated: “Parliament and the public cannot hope to call the government to account without an
adequate knowledge of what is going on; nor can they hope to participate in the decision-making
process and contribute their talents to the formation of policy and legislation if that process is
hidden from view.”1178 This position demonstrates that the Court acknowledges a direct
connection between ATI, knowledge, and participation. In this context, the access rights act as a
premise for knowledge gain, and that in turn may contribute to using that expertise to participate
in the decision-making process of public institutions.
More recently, in Merck1179 the Supreme Court stated that ATI is important for accountability.
It stated that “Broad rights of access to government information serve important public purposes.
They help to ensure accountability and ultimately, it is hoped, to strengthen democracy.
‘Sunlight’, as Louis Brandeis put it so well, ‘is said to be the best of disinfectants’…”1180 In
addition, the Court emphasized it is important that “Citizens have the information required to
participate meaningfully in the democratic process and that politicians and officials may be held
meaningfully to account to the public…. to facilitate one of the foundations of our society,
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democracy.”1181 In Merck the Court engaged in a broader interpretation of the ATIA and advised
that “legislation must be given a broad and purposive interpretation” by the courts.1182

In addition, as the Supreme Court noted in Minister of National Defence, when tasked with
interpreting words not defined in ATI legislation, that courts must give such words a broad and
liberal interpretation “in order to create a meaningful right of access to government
information.”1183 This approach is in line with the guidance for interpretation of quasiconstitutional legislation put forward by this Court.

B. Exemptions and exceptions under the Access to Information Act
As explained in the previous chapters, there is a lot of debate regarding the coverage of the
ATIA, which leaves out of its reach important public institutions, such as ministers’ offices,
Cabinet confidences, agents of Parliament, etc. Such issue is inherent in the Act, and many
proposals are made to change its coverage, however without success. The collective decisionmaking process has traditionally been protected by the rule of confidentiality, which upholds the
principle of collective responsibility and enables ministers to engage in full and free discussions
necessary for the effective functioning of a Cabinet system. In 2011, in Minister of National
Defence1184 the Supreme Court determined that the offices of the Prime Minister, Ministers of
the Crown, the RCMP and PCO are not institutions covered by the ATIA. A two-part test was
devised by the Supreme Court to determine whether records are “under the control” of an
institution and therefore accessible. The case arose out of complaints made to the Information
Commissioner about refusals to provide information in response to a number of requests. The
records requested were primarily agendas, notes and emails relating to these offices. The main
focus was on the daily agendas of the Prime Minister Chretien. The Court held that the agenda of
the former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in the possession of the RCMP and the PCO were under
the control of a “government institution”. However, they were not subject to disclosure
because section 19(1) of the ATIA prohibits the head of a government institution from releasing
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any record that contains personal information as defined in s. 3 of the Privacy Act. Section 3(j) of
the Privacy Act creates an exception by allowing for the disclosure of personal information
where such information pertains to an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a
government institution and where the information relates to the position or function of the
individual. Nevertheless, the court found that this exception did not apply as the Prime Minister
could not be viewed as an officer of a government institution.
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association intervened in these cases to argue for a large and
liberal interpretation of the ATIA, emphasizing the quasi-constitutional nature the Act1185 and
asking the Court to recognize this status. The Supreme Court found that the meaning of
“government institution” under the ATIA did not include ministerial offices and to expand the
scope of the Act in this way was an issue for Parliament and not the courts.1186 Indeed, the way
the Act is designed leaves little room to the courts to interpret the access right beyond the
exceptions threshold. The reasoning in this decision confirmed that the Courts can only go that
far in the interpretation of the access laws in Canada. Justice Kelen, J. argued that: “The question
for the Court is not whether the documents should be accessible to the public under Canada’s
‘freedom to information’ law, but whether the documents are currently accessible to the public
under Canada’s existing law. The Court does not legislate or change the law; it interprets the
existing law.”1187

This ruling was preceded by ten years of legal battle going through five levels of courts, and
every ruling was supported by each of the Prime Ministers of the day. The government and its
ministries enjoy a special protection in terms of information they produce and how it becomes
public. Other court cases in the past have supported this “special status” as something embedded
in the law and political tradition in Canada. For instance, in the case Canada (Attorney General)
v. Canada (Information Commissioner), one of the 25 institutions in the case stated “Canada's
form of democracy is responsible parliamentary government [and] public servants are not
accountable to the public; public servants are accountable to their ministers and ministers are
1185
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accountable in the House.”1188 This position is a strong demonstration of the fact that the
Canadian tradition requires government to conceal the discussions in its workings. This status
gives the government the legal right under the ATIA to be excluded from its application. In this
context, Rankin argued that “it is unlikely that case law will generate any judicial standards or
guidelines for the application of these exemptions. The Court cannot simply substitute its view
for that of the Minister as to whether the document is entitled to be released.”1189

Cabinet confidentiality also enjoys special treatment in the ATIA, which has often become
subject of judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court has sided with this special treatment in
many cases. A leading case in this regard is Babcock1190 where the Supreme Court recognized
that Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government because “The process of democratic
governance works best when Cabinet members charged with government policy and decisionmaking are free to express themselves around the Cabinet table unreservedly.”1191 The court
explained that the British democratic tradition which informs the Canadian tradition has long
affirmed the confidentiality of what is said in the Cabinet room, and documents and papers
prepared for Cabinet discussions. The idea is to provide some space for government to thinks
and discuss matters without public scrutiny, and that they express their ideas freely without
swaying to their genuine positions. If Cabinet members’ statements were subject to disclosure,
Cabinet members might censor their words, consciously or unconsciously. They might shy away
from stating unpopular positions, or from making comments that might be considered politically
incorrect. According to the Court, the process of democratic governance works best when
Cabinet members charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express
themselves around the Cabinet table unreservedly. In addition, to ensuring candour in Cabinet
discussions, the Supreme Court recognized another important reason for protecting Cabinet
documents, namely to avoid creating or fanning ill-informed or captious public or political
criticism. Ministers undertake by oath as Privy Councillors to maintain the secrecy of Cabinet
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deliberations and the House of Commons and the courts respect the confidentiality of Cabinet
decision-making.1192

To preserve the rule of confidentiality, section 69(1) of the ATIA provides that the Act does
not apply to confidences of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. This institution is responsible
for issuing certificates that validate information as confidential. In Babcock, the Supreme Court
noted that the Clerk of the Privy Council should determine two things for a certification: (1) that
the information is a Cabinet confidence within s. 39; and (2) that it is desirable that
confidentiality be retained taking into account the competing interests in disclosure and retaining
confidentiality.1193 The Court explained that sec. 39 of the ATIA permits the Clerk to certify
information as confidential, so it does not restrain voluntary disclosure of confidential
information if the Clerk decides to. The Court in Babcock also recognized that cabinet
confidences must be subject to consideration of the public interest, and noted that “At one time,
the common law viewed Cabinet confidentiality as absolute. However, over time the common
law has come to recognize that the public interest in Cabinet confidences must be balanced
against the public interest in disclosure, to which it might sometimes be required to yield.”1194 In
cases when the public interest is not taken into account, under ss. 37 and 38, a judge balances the
competing public interests in protection and disclosure of information, while under s. 39, by
contrast, the Clerk or minister balances the competing interests. If the Clerk or minister validly
certifies information as confidential, a judge or tribunal must refuse any application for
disclosure, without examining the information.1195
Although the Supreme Court has recognized a public interest balancing test in cases of
Cabinet confidences, it has also agreed that this common law balancing can be vitiated by clear
legislative language.1196 Nonetheless, the erosion of an absolute common law protection for
Cabinet confidences demonstrates the importance of limiting the protection offered in other
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contexts as well.1197 This limitation offers a venue of access in cases where public interest is
predominant. As such, it serves as an important tool in keeping the government accountable.
The ATIA also excludes draft legislation1198 from the application of the Act. This provision
relates to any drafts of legislation proposed by the Government. It is not relevant whether the
legislation was ever introduced into the House of Commons or the Senate, it still remains a
Cabinet confidence. Draft legislation remains a confidence even after the final version is
introduced in the House of Commons or the Senate. In Quinn1199, the Federal Court concluded
that draft regulations examined by the Clerk of the Privy Council Office are excluded from the
Act as such an examination is part of the regulatory process.
In a recent case, John Doe1200 the Supreme Court interpreted and decided on an exception to
Ontario’s provincial access regime for “advice or recommendations” of a public servant. The
Canadian Civil Liberties Association intervened in the case to argue that the “advice or
recommendations” exception should be interpreted narrowly and records should not be shielded
from disclosure. Shielding a broader range of records from disclosure hinders the rights of
Canadians to have informed public debate and discussion about government policy choices. The
Association also argued that the interpretation of the legislation should respect the values
enshrined in the Charter and the global trend towards greater transparency in government. These
arguments before the court opened up discussions about the amount of government information
that are labelled as “policy option” and therefore inaccessible by the public. The negative
decision of the Court demonstrates the justice’s system inability to circumvent legislative
provisions, and confirms advocates’ concerns about a broken system that needs to be changed.

C. Solicitor-client privilege
Another exemption that may apply to the ATIA gives the head of a government institution
who receives an access request the discretion to invoke the solicitor-client privilege.1201 There
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are two types of decisions to be made in relation to s. 23, (1) a factual decision: Is the requested
information subject to solicitor-client privilege?, (2) a discretionary decision: Should the
information nevertheless be disclosed? This requires a balancing of the reasons for non-release
of privileged information against reasonable factors in favour of release, followed by an exercise
of discretion. For s. 23 to apply, the heads of institutions do not have to demonstrate prejudice,
nor give reasons for the refusal to disclose. In Blank1202, the Federal Court of Appeal indicated
that the permissive nature of s. 23 reflects the fact that the solicitor-client privilege may be
waived by or on behalf of the client. It can be assumed that, by asserting the solicitor-client
privilege, the client or a party acting on the client's behalf has decided that waiver would not be
in the public interest. There is no legal duty on the minister to expressly explain why the
privilege is not being waived. However, the Court found that partial disclosure of information is
allowed and “the disclosure of portions of the solicitors' accounts does not constitute waiver of
solicitor-client privilege.”1203 In addition, the Court ruled that “Documents released to the
applicant under the prosecution's disclosure obligations in the criminal proceedings do not lose
their privileged character by that reason alone. Partial disclosure of a record does not render the
entire record accessible.”1204 The reasoning is based on the severity principle in the ATIA which
allows for partial disclosure of information. This principle becomes significant especially in
circumstances when a piece of accessible information is to be found in a documents which is
exempted from the application of the Act.

D. Time limits
As argued in the previous chapters, one of the major problems in the implementation of the
Access to Information Act is the unlimited time extensions. The Act sets a limit of 30 days to
respond to access requests, but also allows for an unlimited extension of that limit. This
weakness in the Act has been used extensively by the federal institutions causing elongated
delays. However, in National Defence, a fairly recent case of Federal Court of Appeal,1205 dealt
with the time limits set out in the Act. The case relates to a request that was made to National
Defence on February 3, 2011 for records relating to the sale of certain military assets. National
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Defence advised the requester that it would extend the time limit by 1,110 days. With the
requester’s consent, the Commissioner applied for a declaration from the Federal Court that the
Minister of National Defence had failed to give access to the records requested under the Act
within the time limits set out in the Act and was, therefore, deemed to have refused to give
access to the requested information. About one month before the hearing of the application,
National Defence gave the requester access to the requested records. The Federal Court agreed to
hear the matter even though the dispute had become moot. The Federal Court of Appeal held that
the correct interpretation for time extensions was the construction offered by the Information
Commissioner.1206 A government institution may avail itself of the power to extend the time to
respond to an access request, as provided by section 9 of the Act, but only when the required
conditions are met. The Court added: “One such condition is that the period taken be reasonable
when regard is had to the circumstances set out in paragraph 9(1)(a) and/or 9(1)(b). If this
condition is not satisfied, the time is not validly extended with the result that the 30-day time
limit imposed by operation of section 7 remains the applicable limit.”1207 The Court concluded
that “a deemed refusal arises whenever the initial 30-day time limit has expired without access
being given, in circumstances where no legally valid extension has been taken.”1208 The decision
sets standards to institutions in terms of how they must justify the use and length of extensions.
The case is expected to have a positive impact on timeliness and access rights.
E. Personal information: individuals vs corporations
Chapter six has made a detailed analysis of the relationship between privacy and ATI,
emphasizing that privacy is one of common reasons used by the government for denying
information, as a mandatory exception under the ATIA. Courts have interpreted access and
privacy provisions to improve the institutions’ ability to deal with various cases. Considering the
nature of the cases that have made their way up to the justice system, Onyshko argues “The
court’s interpretation of the definition (of personal privacy) has been the deciding factor in most
personal information cases. In general, the cases consider two separate but related issues:
whether information falls within the definition and whether personal information falls within one
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of the definition’s exclusions.”1209 Indeed, most of the time cases before courts deal with
uncertainty of whether information is private or public and whether it is exempted or not.
Section 19 of the ATIA provides that information about an “identifiable individual”
constitutes personal information as regards to an individual human being, not a corporate entity.
A corporation would therefore not qualify as an identifiable individual, and s. 19 could not be
applied to exempt information about a corporation. However, in Janssen-Ortho Inc1210 the
Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the names of employees of a corporation (who are identifiable
individuals) qualified as personal information. The exemption applied because none of the
employees consented to the release of their names or to the disclosure that they were employed
by the corporation. Similar decision was made in SNC Lavalin1211 where the Federal Court of
Appeal ruled that the views or opinions of employees while acting as representatives of a
corporation also qualify as personal information.
In another case, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration1212 the Federal Court of Appeal
ruled that the same information can be “personal” to more than one individual. In this case,
employees had made statements about their manager during interviews in the context of a
workplace assessment. The Court said that the names of persons interviewed were the personal
information of both the interviewees and the manager. After balancing the private interests of the
interviewees, the private interests of the manager and the public interest in disclosure and nondisclosure, the Court determined that the manager’s interest in the information should prevail the manager had a right to know under the ATIA both what was said about him and who said it.
In Heinz1213, the Supreme Court decided to grant the personal privacy exemptions to third
parties (Heinz) by engaging in a broader interpretation of “personal information”, as an
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exemption found in s.19 of the ATIA. The Court decided that this information included
businesses information as well. The Court reestablished that where there is a conflict between the
right to privacy (of Heinz) and the right of access (of the requester), it is the right to privacy
which takes precedence over access. In its analysis, the Court emphasized several times that “the
protection of the privacy of individuals is paramount over the right of access.”1214 The Court’s
reasoning of the case is based on a careful analysis of balancing the two rights while taking a
modern approach: “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act,
and the intention of Parliament.”1215
The Supreme Court has left an important trail of judicial decisions regarding personal
information of individual persons. In two landmark decisions, Dagg1216 and the RCMP1217, the
Court extensively engaged in an analysis of what constitutes “personal information”. In both
cases, the Court first examined whether the information requested was personal, and second,
whether it fell under the exemptions of s. 3 of the Privacy Act. In Dagg, Michael Dagg1218, the
appellant1219, filed a request with the Department of Finance for copies of logs with the names,
identification numbers and signatures of employees entering and leaving the workplace on
weekends. The issue here was whether the information in the logs constituted “personal
information” within the meaning of s. 3 of the Privacy Act, and whether the Minister failed to
exercise his discretion properly in refusing to disclose the requested information pursuant to
section 19(2)(c) of the ATIA and s. 8(2)(m)(i) of the Privacy Act. The appeal was allowed, but
with a narrow split, five to four. Justice Cory J. argued that the requested information was related
to the “responsibilities of the position held by the individual” and fell under the specific
exception set out at s. 3(j)(iii) of the Privacy Act. In this case, since the information was related
to the position, not to the individual, the majority of the Court decided that it is not personal
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information and should be released. For the determination of what constitutes “personal
information” the court engaged in a process of balancing the competing values of access and
privacy going through several steps.
First, it analyzed the meaning of “personal information”. Justice La Forest accepted that
“Privacy is a broad and somewhat evanescent concept.”1220 For this reason he looked at the
“reasonable expectation of privacy”1221 and concluded that the expectation applied in this case.
Second, the Court recognized the value of access stating that “The overarching purpose of access
to information legislation …is to facilitate democracy. It does so in two related ways. It helps to
ensure first, that citizens have the information required to participate meaningfully in the
democratic process, and secondly, that politicians and bureaucrats remain accountable to the
citizenry.”1222 Third, the court emphasized that privacy is paramount over access, encompassed
by the definition of “personal information” in s.3 of the Privacy Act. La Forest mentioned that
when the Bill (C-43) was introduced for third reading in 1982, the Minister of Communications
made the following comments: “the principle that the right to privacy takes precedence over the
general right of access has been clearly recognized.”1223 and thus “Parliament did not intend
access to be given preeminence over privacy.”1224

The analysis made in Dagg demonstrated that deciding on cases where access and privacy
rights come into conflict is a very complex and challenging process. The case reveals that
concerns of conceptualization of privacy have played a significant role in the aggravation of this
complexity. Justice La Forest admitted that one of the main challenges for the Court was the
broad definition of privacy.1225 The fact that the split of Justices in Dagg was very narrow
exhibits uncertainty on the issues. This is observed by Onyshko who argued that “a basic
problem in the access jurisprudence is that judges adopt conflicting positions without
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distinguishing relevant case law.”1226 Indeed, the Justices in Dagg take different approaches even
when they use the same legal sources.
Similarly, in RCMP1227, the Court examined whether the information requested constituted
“personal information” as defined in s. 3 of the Privacy Act, and whether the information fell
within the exception set out in section 3(j) of the Privacy Act.1228 The Court agreed that the
information requested fell within the definition of “personal information”. The next step was
whether it was also encompassed by one of the specific, non-exhaustive examples set out in
paragraphs (a) to (i) of s. 3 of the Act. The Court agreed that, although this was indeed personal
information, it was associated with the general characteristics of a federal employee position, and
it was, in effect, information about the position, not about the person. The Court was able to
draw a line between government employee information which may be accessed by the public on
the one side (which relates to the general characteristics associated with the position or function),
and employee information which should be withheld in the interests of privacy on the other side
(which relates to the competence or characteristics of an individual employee.1229) The analysis
in the RCMP validates that distinguishing when information is public or private is not a matter of
choosing between black and white, but instead, choosing between different tones of grey. It
involves an extensive analysis, which in my view, only a court is capable of conducting. Because
the information of the four RCMP officers in this case is considered both private (it belongs to
the officers) and public (has a public interest as officers are public employees), concealing or
disclosing that information had to go through a careful, detailed examination.
Some of the cases in the Canadian jurisprudence reveal that the legislative weaknesses of a
system cannot be addressed through judicial battles. However, they also demonstrate the

Onyshko, “The FC & ATIA”, supra note 244 at 142.
The case involves an individual who requested certain information from the RCMP pertaining to four of its
officers. The RCMP refused to disclose the information on the grounds that the records contained “personal
information”, as defined by section 3 of the Privacy Act. The case went to the ICC, Federal Court and the Court of
Appeal, all of which held that the request is not “personal information” and must be released. The appeal in the
Supreme Court was also allowed.
1228
RCMP, supra note 656 at para 12.
1229
Ibid at para 39. The list of the RCMP members’ historical postings, their status and date; (2) the list of ranks,
and the dates they achieved those ranks; (3) their years of service; and (4) their anniversary dates of service, are all
elements that relate to the general characteristics associated with the position or functions of an RCMP member.
1226
1227

331

potential of the courts to protect and enhance ATI rights in cases of accountability, conformity
with democratic principles, exemptions and exceptions, privacy, confidentiality and time limits.
10.2 Perspectives from the European Union courts

10.2.1 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
The CJEU is the court of the EU and interprets the EU legislation. The Court has established
numerous principles of European administrative law that have significantly transformed
operational concepts and methods in European public administration. The Court has played an
important role as a force for openness. The Court’s judgments have helped to entrench the right
access to documents (ATD) in popular consciousness. It has consistently applied a presumption
of openness in disputes about the interpretation of EU policies on ATD.1230 Curtin has called the
process of acknowledging the right of ATD as a basic democratic right as a “creeping
constitutionalization”1231 of this right.

Three years before the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, Advocate-General Giuseppe
Tesauro argued that the Court should acknowledge that the right to information was implied in
the terms of the Treaty on European Union.1232 The opinion of Advocate-General Phillipe Leger
also pushed for a stronger protection for the right to ATD.1233 The decisions of the Court served
as precursors to the Regulation 1049. For instance, in Huatala1234, the Court found that the
Council had erred on not conferring the information to the Member of Parliament Huatala.
However, the case recognized only a limited right to ATD as the Court avoided ruling on a
“breach of the fundamental principle” of Community law that citizens of the EU must be given
the widest and fullest possible ATD of the Community institutions.1235 After the entering into
force of Regulation 1049, its broad definitions and provisions required the engagement of the
CJEU to clarify many legal ambiguities in the general phrasing of Regulation, which according
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to Curtin “heralded a period of relatively intensive litigation, enhancing in this area the
phenomenon of ‘judge-made law’.”1236 It is important to note that the Court practice to date
demonstrates that it interprets the right of access very broadly, with very few exceptions.

There are a number of cases from the CJEU jurisprudence that have made history for
transforming ATD in meaningful ways. Some cases stand out in this regards.

A. Accountability of Institutions
In the landmark case Access Info1237, Acces Info Europe submitted a request to the Council
for a copy of the report which contained information on the Member States’ reactions to the
Commission’s proposal for the reform of Regulation 1049. The Council only granted Access
Info partial ATD by providing the content of discussions, but erasing the names of the states
making proposals. Access Info appealed the case to the CJEU to clarify the obligation for
transparency on the EU isntitutions in the course of a legislative procedure.

The CJEU emphasized that Regulation 1049 echoed the intention of Article 1(2) TEU for
creating an ever closer union in which decisions were taken as openly as possible and as closely
as possible to the citizen. Hence, the Court held that the right of ATD was related to the
democratic nature of the European institutions. Although the Court recognized that this right is
subject to certain limitations (such as information in the course of a legislative procedure), these
limitations should be interpreted and applied strictly. The Court found that if the Council decided
to refuse the request of Access Info, it should have satisfied two conditions. First, explain how
disclosure could undermine the interest protected by the exception upon which it was relying (in
this case Article 4(3) of the Regulation). Second, the risk of the interest being undermined should
have been reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical. The Court carefully balanced the
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principle of transparency with the preservation of the effectiveness of the Council’s decisionmaking process. It reiterated that the protection of effectiveness of the Council was not enough to
justify refusing ATD. Instead, the Council should have explained how ATD requested by Access
Info undermined its decision-making. The Council was not entitled to automatically refuse
access by relying on a presumption based on the considerations concerning the need to protect
the delegation’s room for manœuvre during preliminary discussions of the Commission’s
legislative proposal.

Access Info Europe is a landmark case that puts ongoing legislative proposals under public
scrutiny. The case becomes even more significant considering that the documents requested
aimed to disclose information regarding important changes of the EU Regulation on ATD. These
changes had the potential to affect the citizens’ rights of access and weaken the accountability of
EU institutions. Hence, the case sets an important precedent because it demonstrates the power
of using the right of ATD in holding European institutions accountable even in ongoing
conversations during the course of a legislative procedure, which falls under the exemptions of
the Regulation 1049. The case will certainly affect issues of accountability and democratic nature
of the EU representatives.1238

B. Member states right of veto
The CJEU has offered excellent guidance to the institutions by deciding on cases that deal
with information that comes from the Member States, but are on the possession of the Union
institutions and are requested on the basis of Regulation 1049. One of such cases is Kingdom of
Sweden,1239 a leading case, because it sets new rules for the Member States regarding their ATD
regime. The case establishes that Member States do not have a right of veto over their
documents. It is up to the institution to have the final say on whether or not the document will be
released as they are the ones that are legally liable for that decision before the Court. The
Member State must explain how and why that document is covered by one of the exceptions
found in Regulation 1049 and they cannot simply refer to their national law on ATI. The Court
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acknowledged that Member States do not have “an unconditional right of veto”, but they can
object to the disclosure of documents, only if it gives proper reasons grounded on the exceptions
set out in the Regulation.

This case sets new grounds for the relations between Member States rules and the EU rules of
ATD. Concerning Member State documents in the possession of the EU institutions, the CJEU
has restricted the Member State’s discretion in rejecting their disclosure. The Member State is
mandated to give reasons for its refusal, and, more essentially, these reasons should be able to
fall under the exceptions outlined in Article 4(1)-(3) of the Regulation 1049 or relate to the
specific protection accorded to sensitive documents.1240

In another case before the European Court, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH, a
German animal rights’ NGO asked the Commission for access to certain documents which the
Commission had received from Germany. The request asked for documents regarding a
procedure in which the Commission gave an opinion favorable to the carrying out of an
industrial project. The Commission refused its request and the case went to the Court of First
Instance which ruled1241 that the Commission had acted properly since the German authorities
were opposed to the disclosure of those documents under Article 4(5) of Regulation 1049. The
case then went to the CJEU (appealed by Sweden1242) which decided that the Court of First
Instance has erred at looking at s. 4(5) of Regulation 1049 as conferring on Member States a
right of absolute veto, without the need to state any reasons, on the disclosure of documents
originating from it.1243 This case epitomises “new grounds for the relations between Member
States rules and the EU rules of access to documents.”1244
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C. International Relations
In In ’t Veld1245, the CJEU instructed the European Commission to be more transparent about
negotiations of the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership1246). The case engaged
a Member of the European Parliament, Sophie in’t Veld who asked from the Commission ATD
regarding the TTIP. The Commission rejected the access reasoning that it will affect ongoing
trade negotiations and hence international relations.
In this case, the Court indicated that ATD related to international agreements should be
ensured, unless it would undermine the conduct of negotiations. Although the Court did not
impose disclosure as the rule, it set out a certain number of conditions which must be met for the
documents to remain undisclosed. First, the risk for negotiations should be specific and
foreseeable. Hypothetical concerns about the possible impact of transparency on the negotiating
power of the EU will not suffice to refuse ATD. The EU institutions will now have to provide
clear reasons and explain to the general public why denial of access to negotiating documents
will harm the position of the EU. The CJEU recognized that invoking the mere existence of a
threat to the EU’s interests in the field of international relations does not in itself satisfy the
requirement. Second, the European Commission will need to make an assessment between the
public interest in ATD and the need to protect the international relations of the EU. In making
this assessment, the Commission will also have to consider the advantages of increased
openness, including the possibility for EU citizens to participate more closely in the decisionmaking process and to guarantee that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy. Third, any
exception to the general principle of ATD must be interpreted and applied strictly. Regulation
1049 requires a right to ATD as wide as possible, hence any restriction must be exceptional and
duly justified.
Although the CJEU has played a significant role in the interpretation of the right of ATD in
the EU, another court has also made a meaningful contribution to the concepts of access and
transparency as principles guiding the European Human Rights legislation. This is the European
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which, although it is not a EU Court, it is important to ensure
respect for the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

10.2.2 The contribution of the European Court of Human Rights
This Court has gradually developed an expansive reading of the Article 10 of the Convention
of Human Rights. According to McDonagh, the path to recognition by the ECtHR of a right to
information as part of the right to freedom of expression has been long and tortuous.1247 Initially,
it held that the freedom to receive information as guaranteed by Article 10 could not be
construed as imposing on a state positive obligation to disseminate information or to disclose
information to the public. Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides
that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.” The conventional view was that the right to receive
information under Article 10 did not entail a corresponding right of access to official
information. This was the case for instance in Leander1248 where the applicant sought
confidential government information so he could bring a claim arising out of an unsuccessful job
application. This case was unsuccessful.

However, in subsequent decisions, the ECtHR recognized that there can be a right to ATI.
Initially, this was done by reference to Article 8 of the Convention through means of personal
information as in Gaskin1249 or McGinley and Egan1250. Most recently, in Haralambie1251 the
Court reiterated the vital interest for individuals who were the subject of personal files held by
the public authorities to be able to have access to them. The Court emphasized that the
authorities had a duty to provide an effective procedure for obtaining access to such information
and that their failure to provide for an effective and accessible procedure to enable the applicant
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to obtain access to his personal security files within a reasonable time constituted a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention.

In the recent case law, however, a different approach has emerged. The Court began to accept
that the refusal to give access to administrative documents is to be considered as interference in
the applicant’s right to receive information. Therefore, Article 10 of the Convention may imply a
right of ATD held by public bodies. This right was confirmed in Társaság1252 where the Court
recognized for the first time that it had “recently advanced towards a broader interpretation of the
notion of ‘freedom to receive information’ …and thereby towards the recognition of a right of
access to information.”1253 In addition, the Court acknowledged that ATD is essential for civil
society to play its “social watchdog” role and that states have an obligation to eliminate barriers
to access information where “such barriers exist solely because of an information monopoly held
by the authorities.”1254Article 10 was central to the Court’s reasoning in this case where the
Court found a violation of this Article when the Hungarian domestic courts had refused access to
a complaint which sought constitutional scrutiny of certain amendments to the Hungarian
Criminal Code. The decision of the Hungarian courts denying access to the details of a
parliamentarian’s complaint pending before the Constitutional Court had amounted to a breach
of the right to have ATI of public interest1255. The Court characterized the applicant, a Hungarian
NGO, as a “watch dog” which status warrants Convention protection1256. It concluded that
obstacles created in order to hinder ATI of public interest might discourage the media and other
public interest organizations from pursuing their vital role as “public watchdogs”.

In later cases, the ECtHR established that Article 10 of the Convention includes a right of
ATD as part of the freedom of expression. For instance, in its judgment in Youth Initiative for
Human Rights1257, the Court recognised more explicitly than ever before the right of ATD held
by public authorities, based on Article 10 of the Convention. The judgment emphasized the role
of NGOs protecting the public interest. The Court reiterated in robust terms that “when a non1252
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governmental organisation is involved in matters of public interest…., it is exercising a role as a
public watchdog of similar importance to that of the press.”1258 The applicant, a Serbian NGO,
requested the Serbian Intelligence Agency to provide some factual information concerning the
use of electronic surveillance measures by that agency in 2005. The agency first refused the
request, relying thereby on the statutory provision applicable to secret information. After an
order by the Information Commissioner that the information at issue be nevertheless disclosed
under the Serbian Freedom of Information Act 20041259, the Intelligence Agency notified the
applicant that it did not hold that information. Youth Initiative for Human Rights complained to
the Court, under Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, about the refusal of access to the requested
information held by the intelligence agency, notwithstanding a final and binding decision of the
Information Commissioner in its favour. The ECtHR engaged in an interpretative exercise of the
right of ATD, and argued that “the notion of ‘freedom to receive information’ embraces a right
of access to information.”1260 The decision urged the Serbian Surveillance Agency to release the
information requested.

In OVESSG, the Court was especially supportive for requests by journalists and NGOs to
have ATD.1261 The judgment recognized the role of information and the NGOs in society and
echoed previous decisions when stated that ‘the function of creating forums for public debate is
not limited to the press. That function may also be exercised by non-governmental organisations,
the activities of which are an essential element of informed public debate. The Court has
therefore accepted that non-governmental organisations, like the press, may be characterised as
social “watchdogs”’1262. The applicant in this case, OVESSG - an Environmental Austrian
Association - aimed to research the impact of transfers of ownership of agricultural and forest
land on society in order to give opinions on draft laws. In 2005, the Association twice requested
to have access to the decisions of the Tyrol Real Property Transaction Commission, which is
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responsible for approving agricultural and forest land transactions. The Association only
requested decisions issued over a certain period of time in anonymized form, and indicated that it
would reimburse the resulting costs. The requests were refused on the ground that they did not
fall within the scope of the Tyrol Access to Information Act. Moreover, even if the request did
fall within its scope, pursuant to the Act an authority did not have the duty to provide the
requested information if doing so would require so many resources that would affect its
functioning, and would jeopardise the fulfilment of the Commission’s other tasks. The
applicant’s complaints to the Austrian Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court were
rejected. The OVESSG complained in the ECtHR about a violation of its right to receive
information, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The Court emphasised that the most
careful scrutiny on its part is called for when measures taken by the national authorities may
potentially discourage the participation of the public, and society’s “watchdogs”. NGOs are
characterized with such an important status, since they are involved in the legitimate gathering of
information of public interest1263 and therefore, their activities warrant similar Convention
protection to that afforded to the press.1264
The recognition of a human right to ATD by the ECtHR is significant because it has created a
body of case-law on the right to ATD as being enshrined in the Convention of Human Rights.
This line of reasoning of the Court has extended the recognition of the freedom of expression, as
including a right of ATD. Through an interpretative exercise the Court has gradually
accommodated an access right under Article 10 of the Convention, and as such has enriched the
European legal framework. This framework has influenced the developments of jurisprudence of
the CJEU and the activism of the NGOs in the area of transparency and ATI. The ECtHR has
distinguished the civil society’s important contribution to the discussion of public affairs.1265
10.3 Comparisons and conclusions
The role of the courts in transparency and ATI is important in two ways. First, courts are
critical in protecting citizens’ rights of access and serving as a remedy against any abuse of such
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rights by the government. Second, the role of the courts becomes exceptional when they act as
reformers in transforming access rights from a statutory right into a fundamental right.

The first role of the courts relates to the traditional way courts make justice - courts are
considered to be mechanisms that uphold the rule of law and resolve disputes. In this role, the
courts interpret the laws written by the legislature. A more creative role of the court is when they
create law through an interpretative exercise. This is particularly true in a common law system
such as Canada, where case law constitutes a source of law. But even in most European countries
where most of the legislation is codified, courts play a significant role. The fact that the public’s
right to know amounts to a fundamental right in EU law, and it is considered a quasiconstitutional right in the Canadian law is, in part, attributed to the courts. This role makes the
judiciary a very powerful institution which protects citizens when all other measures have failed.
In any case, whether cases are won or not, the public can benefit from the very nature of legal
proceedings for they allow for scrutiny of public policies and practices. In this context, litigation
can be used to obtain practical advantages on transparency, raising public consciousness of the
merits of a case and building up political pressure in support of it. According to Article 19,
litigation has an added value since it can attempt to reassert constitutional priorities and to
maintain and influence policy formulation when other channels of communication are being
closed.1266

The examples from the EU and Canada show that courts have the potential not only to
safeguard citizens’ rights but also to raise the status of transparency and ATI to a higher level. In
the EU, the Court of Justice (CJEU) has retained a significant role in the interpretation of the
right of ATD, and the Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has made a meaningful contribution to
the concepts of access and transparency as principles guiding the European human rights
legislation. According to Birkinshaw, “the case law of the EU courts has been supportive of
transparency and openness and there have been some very important decisions.”1267
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When looking at the European way of judicial interpretation of the right of ATD, the Canadian
courts can take an example. But, how can the Canadian judiciary act in a creative way to raise
the access rights to a constitutional level, when the law limits to a certain extent the power of the
courts to intervene? As some of the judgments have acknowledged, the intervention asked from
the courts is better suited for the legislature. The reasoning in some of the Supreme Court’s
decisions confirm that the courts can only go that far in the interpretation of the access laws in
Canada. In Minister of National Defence, Justice Kelen, J. argued that the Supreme Court is
often faced with the reality that some documents are not currently accessible under the existing
law, which makes the question “should they be?” invalid. He emphasizes that the Court does not
legislate or change the law; it interprets the existing law1268. However, the Supreme Court
experience has demonstrated that in many cases the Court has engaged with questions of how the
law should be, not just how it is.
There is a remedy invoked in some cases by the Supreme Court - the “reading in”. This
remedy has been very controversial among lawyers and scholars because of the significant power
it gives to the Supreme Court to change the Charter and control legislature by creating its own
constitutional provisions. Many scholars argue that the “reading in” marks a dramatic shift in the
once clear delineation of the separation of powers in the Canadian constitutional democracy. It
also signals a dramatic shift away from the traditional principle of judicial deference. The power
to “read in” is relatively new in the Canadian jurisprudence, having been enunciated for the first
time by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1992 in Schachter1269, and then used in Vriend1270 in
1998. The question for this research is whether the Supreme Court can read-in at the Canadian
Charter of Rights and interpret any of its provisions as including a right of ATI. The Court has
already found a right of ATI under s. 2(b) freedom of expression of the Charter, but that
provision has limited application. The Court can push further in this provision to accommodate
access rights.
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The power of “reading in” is an exception for the Court rather than the rule because the
responsibility of enacting legislation that accords with the rights guaranteed by the Charter rests
with the legislature. The rule is that except in the clearest of cases, the court should not dictate
how the under inclusive legislation must be amended. However, it is apparent that even if the
ATIA is reformed fundamentally, access rights will still remain at the statutory level, and will
not be shaped by the government of the day, as Chapter 7 demonstrates. In addition, as the
practice of the Supreme Court indicates the traditional notion of restricting the “reading in”
remedy to the “clearest of cases” is no longer the threshold for intruding into the legislative
sphere. Despite of the controversy around the “reading in” power of the Supreme Court its
jurisprudence has shown many examples when the use of this power has made significant
changes (as in Schacter and Vriend) . Especially in the Canadian context, making use of the
“reading in” power could be the only way to raise the right of ATI at the status of a constitutional
right. Considering that Canadian federalism hinders any constitutional amendment that requires
provincial consent, the process of reading-in the Charter takes essential importance.

343

PART IV
THE VALUE OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION

CHAPTER 11: DEVELOPING A TYPOLOGY OF INFORMATION, MODELS OF
TRANSPARENCY AND A PERSPECTIVE OF ACESS TO INFORMATION AS A
HUMAN RIGHT
This chapter reflects on the issues surrounding transparency and ATI in the jurisdictions of
study. It develops a typology of information access and a typology of information delivery. The
chapter explains transparency as a process taking place in three jurisdictions (Canada, the EU
and Albania) drawing from experiences in these jurisdictions, and develops three models of
transparency. In addition, the chapter introduces new definitions for transparency and the right of
ATI based on the typology of information. Furthermore, the chapter advances a perspective of
ATI as a human right based on the Habermas’s discursive theory of law and Pateman’s
democratic participation theory.

The purpose of the chapter is to make a case for the recognition of ATI as a constitutional
right in Canada drawing from the EU experience and international advancements in transparency
and access rights.

11.1 Developing a typology of information and models of transparency

11.1.1 Challenges and tensions of transparency
Transparency is regarded as central to a democratic polity1271 and has attained a “quasireligious significance.”1272 It is often presented as a solution to problems and inequalities of
power, such as those concerning access and participation, and as a form of control that will solve
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problems of illicit conduct and corruption in government. However, not everyone agrees that
transparency is a panacea to such problems. Recent research has argued that the effects of
transparency are not only overrated, but also poorly understood. Transparency is a slippery
concept, but important enough that it should be handled with some degree of precision. As such,
to calibrate an optimal practice of open government, transparency theory must abandon equating
the best government with one that is the most transparent according to its formal commitments.

The liberal constitutional democracy is founded on the idea of limiting the powers of
government and entrenching the basic individual rights.1273 However, what we have today is a
disparity in power between governments and its citizens. Information sharing can improve such
disparity, and Justice McLachlin warns that “unless the public…. is informed about the workings
of government and government agencies, democratic debate will be stifled.”1274 Considering the
amount of information that government owns, there certainly exists an information asymmetry
which, according to Stiglitz “may give rise to a disparity between, … the actions of those
governing and those they are supposed to serve”1275 and “allows government officials the
discretion to pursue policies that are more in their interests than in the interest of citizenry.”1276

The evolution in information technology has tremendously benefited transparency and the
dissemination of information. However, it has produced a false perception that technology will
put an end to secrecy. Roberts argued that “the claim that ‘the 2010 WikiLeaks disclosures mark
‘the end of secrecy’…[is] overstated,…the simple logic of radical transparency….can be
defeated in practice. WikiLeaks only created the illusion of a new era in transparency.”1277 The
commercial and political considerations routinely compromise the free flow of information now,
just as they did before Internet. WikiLeaks released a vast amount of information and a large set
of confidential documents into the public domain.1278 What happened next was that many
companies, like Amazon, Apple, MasterCard, PayPal, etc, withdrew their services from
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Wikileaks.1279 Even more surprising was the public’s reaction that was mute. The release failed
to generate “universal outrage and pressure for reform.”1280 On the contrary, many people turned
on WikiLeaks accusing that it had manipulated the video to bolster its allegations of military
misconduct. “This strategy for stirring up public interest was a mistake”, Domscheit-Berg
agreed. “A lot of people [felt] . . . that they were being led around by the nose.”1281 Indeed, the
more WikiLeaks disclosed in 2010, the more American public opinion hardened against it. In
August, 42 percent of respondents to an ABC News poll were prepared to say that WikiLeaks’
releases served the public interest. By December, this had dropped to 29 percent.1282

The American public reaction to Wikileaks gives the impression that the public does not care
about information. However, this reaction more than an expression of apathy demonstrates the
inability of the common citizen to digest a huge, unstructured amount of information. The data of
the Wikileaks was just raw data, released in huge quantity, which made it harder for the public to
understand it, and even less react to it. Instead, just a few people could make sense of it.
Referring to the WikiLeaks, John Lanchester observed that the release of information was
unprecedented, but the data needed to be interpreted, studied, made into a story.1283 The
Wikileaks is a good example to respond to claims of governments that they are being more
transparent when they release more data to the public. Of course, the public perception on the
data will depend on how complex is the information released to the common citizen.
Another problem that technology has created is the phenomenon of the “empty archives”. As
I explained in Chapter seven, tight rules on government transparency have created an adverse
effect – institutions not recording documents, or not keeping archives on the records. The socalled “empty archives” phenomenon has been noticed in the EU1284 and Canada as well. One
study found that in 2002 Canada’s 150,000 federal public servants exchanged about 6 million e-
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mails every working day.1285 About a decade later, in 2013, Canada’s Information Commissioner
expressed concern that the use of around 98,000 Blackberry phones by Canadian public officials
was putting information out of the reach of the Freedom of Information Act.1286

A. Transparency and participation
Academic debates on transparency are made around the idea that transparency and ATI
include a right to participation in the decision-making process. For instance, Debbasch
distinguishes three dimensions of freedom of information, and participation is one of them.1287 In
addition, Braibant has described the concept of “transparence administrative” as comprised by
seven pillars, possibilities of participation being among them.1288 Although transparency and ATI
may lead logically, but not necessarily to participation, participation is clearly distinct from
them. Participation means that a public authority gives to citizens the possibility to express their
views on a decision that has to be taken, and makes it possible by giving sufficient information
on time. It also means that the administrative body takes knowledge of the expressed views and
gives them a role in the balancing of interests in the decision making process.

Open government laws do not automatically produce the presumed product of transparency,
an informed, participatory democracy, because they do not necessarily create venues for the
participation of citizens, the presumed user and beneficiary of open government. Transparency
laws are not designed to promote participation – they are mainly focused on maximizing the
release of “government information”, a technical concept that, even if the laws prove successful
in forcing disclosure, still leaves unmet the normative and utilitarian goals of better, more
democratic government1289 As such, transparency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
increasing participation and the nature of institutional arrangements actually militates against
citizen engagement. In the EU case, Ciborra argued that the complexity of navigating the EU’s
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“labyrinths of information”1290 requires a degree of commitment and an understanding of the
sometimes complicated processes enjoyed only by those familiar with EU working practices.
Hence, transparency measures may result in scrutiny being delegated to groups acting on behalf
of EU citizens to police the activities of policy-makers. To avoid the capturing of transparency
by specific groups with specialized knowledge on institutional processes, the right of ATI should
be recognized. This right would give everyone a venue to gain knowledge on the working of the
government, and possibly affect it by means of participation.

Arnstein offered a ladder of citizens participation, which can be applied to transparency.
Employing this ladder, guideline information by the government enables powerholders to
“educate” or “cure” citizens.1291 Informing citizens about some details of decision-making
process, which, according to Arnstein, is the third ladder, does not really lead to participation,
but only allows for citizens to hear and be heard. At this stage, these hearings do not have any
consequences in decision-making. This is only a “one-way flow of information” - from officials
to citizens - with no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation. Under these
conditions, particularly when information is provided at a late stage, people have little
opportunity to influence programs.1292 Only at the sixth, seventh and eighth level, meaningful
participation occurs and citizens become partners in making decisions. Arnstein ladder of citizen
participation serves as a conceptual framework for me to develop the typology of information.

11.1.2 Developing a typology of information
Many scholars have attempted to describe transparency schematically in order to simplify its
understanding. Florini looked at transparency as one end of a long continuum of behavior1293 total transparency is at one end, and total secrecy at the other. The aim should be to move closer
to the transparency end of the spectrum. However, this is a rather simple description which does
not account for other factors that influence transparency.
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Other scholars have described transparency as a value, as an instrument, as an attitude, etc.
First, it has a democratic value - it is a goal in itself, as its public nature is seen as one of
democracy’s essential characteristics. Second, transparency has an instrumental function - it is
used by government to control information, and used by the public to hold government
accountable. Third, transparency has an attitudinal function – it indicates an openness to public
input from outside, and a readiness to listen. According to these functions of transparency,
transparency does not by itself enable people to do anything with information.

Based on what I observed regarding the behaviour of insiders and outsiders in the process of
transparency, I develop two typologies. From an outsider’s perspective I introduce a “typology
of information access” – this is a seeking-receiving-reflecting-engaging process. Citizens might
seek information using ATI, or if information is already available, they may simply access it.
This second stage depends on many factors which can be subjective (previous knowledge,
education, interests, beliefs, culture, etc) or objective (economic status, time available, format of
information, etc). At the third stage, citizens process information – a psychological process that
helps in organizing and understanding information. It leads to a process of reflection, followed
by forming opinions and drawing conclusions based on what citizens have processed. This stage
constitutes a real access since only at this point citizens have clearer ideas about what the
information is about, its value and connect the information with broader themes. This process is
mainly individual, and subjective and objective factors play an even bigger role here. At the
fourth stage, citizens make a decision to engage with others, in a process of exchanging opinions
and participating in open debates. In this process citizens are exposed to other views and they
may constantly change their ideas or those of the others. This is the highest form of access in
which citizens may find themselves repeatedly involved with information seeking and receiving,
which opens up new windows of engagement with government of other actors interested in
public matters. Up to stage three citizens fit the profile of someone seeking information for
private interests (although public interests are not excluded). Only at stage four citizens have the
potential to become experts on issues of public importance, gain consciousness of their status as
citizens, and develop the wisdom to apply their knowledge in being active participants in
democratic processes.
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From an insider’s perspective, I develop a “purposive typology of information delivery”- a
collecting-staging-framing-steering process. Governments are the institutions that either produce
or collect information that are object of ATI laws. They may decide to disclose raw information
as a means of strategic political advertising, and setting the stage for information absorption.
This usually happens when governments want to spread the good news on their achievements
and successes. Governments may also disclose information selectively with the purpose of
instilling ideas in political debates, and thus framing certain issues according to their preferences.
In this case, information is manipulated in a way that reveals certain aspects of information, but
not others, thus creating illusions of how certain matters should be understood. Lastly,
governments may use information as a source of power and control, and thus steering the
outcome of certain issues by controlling the amount of information available publically.

11.1.3 Developing models of transparency
Studying all cases in this research, I have noticed certain behaviours that characterize
respective jurisdictions. I have come up with models to describe transparency in each case.
Discussed in the context of a value driven approach, Canada (federal) follows what I call “an
individualistic elitist approach to transparency” – individuals or groups want to know about
government working for their own individual interests and benefits. However, because they have
to pay for the service the system has become elitist since not everybody can afford it. This
explains the data in Chapter seven where most requests came from business. There is not much
discussion of transparency as a public value, and not many organizations are dedicated entirely
to transparency and ATI, because as John Hinds put it, it has become too expensive for most of
the small organizations.1294
Looking at the degree of information control, Canada follows what I call “a paternalistic
model of transparency” - where government chooses what to disclose, and when to do so. This
has caused the legal framework in Canada (federal) to be wearing out. Because of the double
standards used to disclose information, which is, at times, dependent on who requests
information, I visualise the Canadian ATI regime as a process of “Nuanced access” - where
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requesters are considered as clients, as opposed to citizens, and therefore do not have equal
access.

From a value driven perspective, discussed in the context of human rights, ATD follows a
“fundamental right’s approach”, based on transparency by design. This type of transparency
considers citizens as stakeholders in the democratic process. The EU seems to follow, what I call
“a public ethical approach of transparency” – used as a participatory tool to affect governance,
and address the democratic deficit. The European model is constitutionally embedded and
originated in the need to close the disconnection between the EU and its citizens - it is related to
the right of citizenship and it has some moral grounds.
From a value driven perspective ATI in Albania follows a “hollow right’s approach” where
access rights exist in paper, but are not properly enforced and not taken seriously by the public
institutions. Regarding institutional attitudes, the Albanian case follows, what I call “a
Mimicking approach of transparency”, which follows what others have done, but not substantiate
its value in the everyday use of the principle of transparency or access rights. This type of
transparency is utilized as a tool to achieve other goals and has been pressured by outside
political actors, mainly the EU. This type of behaviour has brought what I call a “Trophy
transparency competition” with Albania having an advanced new law on ATI, which is praised
internationally, but only serves as a facade to cover the troubled practice in transparency and
ATI. This has caused pressured access in some cases, and a transparency shut-down in others.
Citizens are considered outsiders in this process, with little to no opportunity to actively
participate in institutional processes. This has been the situation, at least until lately. The new
law may bring changes in the institutional culture because of the high sanctions and the new
oversight commissioner with order-making powers.

These differences between models demonstrate how transparency and ATI are perceived and
practiced in different jurisdictions, even if they are guided by similar rules and laws. Studying
these models informs a lot about the factors influencing the ATI regimes and especially how the
political and cultural institutional environment shape the responses to transparency demands.
Although the EU and Albania have similar legal provisions on transparency and both recognize a
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constitutional status of access rights, the status of these rights in Albania is much further behind
than that of the EU. The letters of the law have had little bearing in the Albanian institutions, but
this situation could be explained with the short experience of these institutions with democratic
governance in the last twenty years.

Comparing transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU, despite many differences in the legal
framework, I noticed one thing in common. There are trends on both jurisdictions towards a
deterioration in upholding a transparency principle. Because of the pressure on transparency
requirements in both jurisdictions I call this situation a “transparency depreciation” or a
“transparency fatigue”. This has been demonstrated on the resistance for law improvement in
Canada, and the freezing of the review process of Regulation 1049 in the EU. This fatigue speaks
a lot about the limited level of empathy that transparency enjoys among governments across
jurisdictions. This is expectable, because as Birkinshaw puts it “FOI laws will always be
unpopular with governments in power and some of the officials who serve them. That is
probably the true test of their importance.”1295 As this research has demonstrated transparency
and access laws in the two jurisdictions have come into life through political struggles, and the
political influence has accompanied them throughout their life. Political leaders will not be active
promoters of these laws because it is not in their interest. Hence, it is not surprising that these
trends exist. However, the success of access laws depends on how the rest of the society reacts to
the political moves on transparency, how much citizens, media, organizations and other groups
of civil society engage in protecting their rights against the interests of their governments. I
would say, that the societal response to political control is the true test of success for
transparency and access laws.

Departing from these typologies and models I have come up with new definitions of
transparency and aATI which I introduce below.

1295

Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 217.

352

A. Definitions of transparency and ATI
As I have explained in the first and second chapter of this research, transparency exists in a
conceptual muddle. ATI is also affected by the uncertainty that exists in the field. At this point,
this research gives me enough background information to contribute to the literature with another
definition on the two terms. These definitions consider the two typologies of information that I
developed in the previous section and focus on the right of access as a source of knowledge and
ideas that shape the public space.

I define transparency as a process through which governments, either proactively or by
request enable the dissemination of information in the public domain, where it can be picked,
administered, or utilized by various actors as a means of exercising control over government, and
expanding knowledge, shaping ideas or exercising rights in the name of private or public
interests.
In addition, I define ATI as the public’s legal right to request legally releasable governmentheld information in order to enable the realization of other rights or simply as a self-standing
right which helps protect private or public interests while facilitating the exchange, shape or
advancement of ideas in the public domain.

11.2 A perspective of Access to information as a human right
Generally, the value of rights can be defended from either an instrumental or intrinsic
approach. On the instrumental account, rights are morally derivative from other values, while on
the intrinsic account rights represent fundamental values. Below, I provide arguments that ATI
should be considered a human right from both perspectives.

11.2.1 An instrumental perspective of a right of access to information
Many advocates defend access rights on the basis of their instrumental value. Accountability,
democratic governance and government effectiveness are some of the arguments used for
considering ATI a human right. Florini argued for a right of access deriving from the recognition
of democratic rights in instrumentalist terms saying that “a broad right of access to information is
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fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of representative democracy
is informed consent, which requires that information about political practices and policies be
disclosed.”1296 Others argue that access rights can assist improve lives in many ways. Susman
explained: “We need to know about air and water pollution, new drugs and medical technologies,
floods and storms, tainted meat and faulty tires.”1297 In many occasions, this information could
only be provided by making use of ATI. NGOs like Access Info Europe, have developed their
activity based on the philosophy that ATI is an instrumental right which should play a key role in
modern democracies. They promote ATI in order to defend other human rights, to hold
governments to account.”1298

The case for an ATI right is made mostly in correlation with political rights. One of the rights
that an access right has been more associated with is the freedom of expression, considering an
access right as an adjunct of this freedom. According to Roberts, this association is more evident
in some cases. When government agencies have exclusive control over critical information
required for intelligent discussion of the policy, if no right of access is recognized, the right to
free expression is hollowed out. Citizens will have the right to say what they think, but what they
think will not count for much, precisely because it is known to be grossly uninformed.1299 The
same opinion is shared by the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression which advocates that
“without ATI, freedom of expression is a hollow freedom.”1300 Other arguments support that
freedom of speech and press also includes a right of ATI.1301 This is based on the proposition that
if the purpose of the freedom of speech and press is to have an informed democracy, the purpose
cannot be fulfilled unless the press, the primary medium of information about government, has
ATI about government.1302
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The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has now recognized a right of ATD as closely associated with
the freedom of expression. However, an explicit recognition of a positive obligation to disclose
information within the right to freedom of expression was proposed and rejected by governments
during the drafting of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.1303 The ECtHR early
attempts to read a right of ATD into the Convention's guarantee of freedom of expression, could
only be successful in 2009.

There is also an association between ATI and the right to life. In the EU, if there is a causal
relationship between the right to life and the failure of the state to provide information, this could
result in a breach or article 10 of the Charter. However this link is difficult to establish. In
Öneryildiz, the European Court of Human Right pointed out that “the positive obligation to take
all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the purposes of Article 2 entails above all a primary
duty on the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.”1304 The case was about the failure to
provide the appropriate information to the population of an affected area. The Court found that it
was a violation of their right to life by not providing the slums inhabitants with information
enabling them to assess the risks they might run as a result of the choices they had made.1305

In addition, an ATI right can also be established as a corollary of other basic rights, not just
political. Indeed, empirical work done by Hazell, Worthy and Glover on the use of FOI n in the
UK, showed that the UK FOI Act is put to a variety of uses and that it is used “as much a tool for
‘non-political’ activity or personal activity as it is for political activity.”1306 It would be unusual
if the case for ATI was not made and the same logic was not applied in the treatment of other
equally fundamental interests. Barber argued that rules to assure access then become part of the
institutional arrangements - the “civic architecture”1307- that must be built and maintained by
government so that individuals have the capacity to fulfil their rights. The rights that may
1303
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demand the recognition of a positive obligation to provide ATI include privacy and personal
data, personal safety, economic security, the right to a fair trial, to a healthy environment, the
right to health and education, and the right to the security of the person.
In Guerra and Others1308the ECtHR held that not providing information that would have
allowed residents to assess the risks of living near a chemical plant was a violation of Article 8 of
the European Convention, which protects the right to privacy and family life. In addition, the
Court has ruled in Gaskin that governments have a positive obligation to establish procedures
allowing reasonable ATI contained in foster care files, arguing that individuals are entitled “to
know and to understand their childhood and early development.”1309.

In Ontario, in Doe the court found that the police force was under an obligation to provide
information regarding threats to public safety under the right to security of the person1310.
Canada's Federal Court of Appeal has recently ruled in Ruby that constitutional guarantees
against unjustified invasions of personal privacy imply “a corollary right of access” to personal
information collected by government, so that citizens can check its accuracy.1311

The EU Data Protection Directive (Article 12) gives people a right to access their personal
data and how their data are processed. In Sison the CJEU did not deny the possibility that Sison
had an individual right of ATI. However, making a request for access based on Regulation 1049
was not the appropriate way to realize this right. According to the Court, individuals should have
a right of access to personal information held by public or private organizations because
individuals have a property right in this information and should consequently be entitled to
control its use. The same recognition is acknowledged in Canada in relation to personal
information, according to which “Everyone is the rightful owner of their personal information,
no matter where it is held, and this right is inalienable.”1312
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Rights of education and health are also facilitated by ATI. If a citizen wishes to know if the
State is developing policies to counter discrimination in access to education, it is necessary to
have access to certain information related to those policies. For example, to evaluate the extent to
which the right to education is realized, it is necessary to have access to literacy rates, enrollment
rates, commuting times, dropout rates, and budgets, not only in the aggregate but disaggregated
by gender, social class, geographic centers (urban, rural), religion and ethnicity.1313 In relation to
health, in order to know if the government is developing a campaign that aims to prevent certain
illnesses, it is necessary to know how public health policies are being implemented.1314
Information about pricing policies on drugs, or the nutrition of children is important for the
enjoyment of a right to health.

Information is important for learning about the existence and protection of social rights.
Individuals should know about public policies and measures that the government has taken in
relation to these rights, in order to control the development of policies. Without information
about the scope and content of their rights to housing or work (information about wages and
benefits), social security (right to welfare or other government benefits) citizens are unable to
determine whether their rights are being respected. They should also be aware of the content of
said policies, so as to analyse how measures are considered in the budget and how budgetary
commitments are delivered.1315

ATI may also assist in the enforcement of equality rights. In Canada, in advocating for
substantive equality rights for the poor, Bruce Porter, Director of the Social Rights Advocacy
Centre, stressed that concreteness is critical. If welfare benefits are being cut, activists should
bring specific evidence demonstrating families’ financial inflow and outflow and how many
homes will be lost as a result.1316
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All these examples demonstrate that ATI is essential for the realization of both political and
social rights, and as such, it is important that governments recognize access rights instrumentally.
However, this recognition should not be limited to the instrumental approach, but stretched to the
extent that includes an intrinsic approach as well.

11.2.2 An intrinsic perspective of a right of access to information
It has been argued many times in this research that ATI is a pre-condition for public
participation. Arnstein advised that “Informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and
options can be the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation.”1317 In this
sense, access allows citizens to get informed, so they can participate on a more equal footing in
public decision-making. This democratising function of the right to ATI is recognized by the
United Nations as “essential for persons to realize their basic right to participate in the governing
of their country and live under a system built on informed consent of the citizenry.”1318

It is widely acknowledged that participation depends on information, and there exists an
information asymmetry in the public domain. Transparency reduces this asymmetry between the
participants in public debates. Access Info Europe has emphasized that “Assuring the
fundamental right of all persons to access information is essential to prevent discrimination and
reduce information disparities.”1319 However, many argue that information benefits some
dominant actors more than others, which could exacerbate the information asymmetry, instead of
reducing it. This argument cannot be used as an excuse to limit the exercise of access rights. The
opposite can be argued instead - the lack of information, like any form of artificially created
scarcity, gives rise to rents. Public officials have an incentive to create secrets, which earns them
rents. Secrecy raises the price of information - in effect, it induces more citizens, who may not
have special interests in particular information, not to participate actively, thus, leaving the field
more to those with special interests. According to Access Info Europe, it is not only that special
interests exercise their nefarious activities under the cloak of secrecy, but that the secrecy itself

Arnstein, “A Ladder”, supra note 134 at 219.
See Articles 19 and 21 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
1319
Access Info Europe, “Open Government Standards: Transparency Standards” at 2, online: <http://www.accessinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/Transparency_Standards12072013.pdf>.
1317
1318

358

discourages others from providing an effective check on the special interests through informed
voting.1320 Susman goes even further in his argument by raising the ownership question of
government information. He considers information produced, gathered, and processed by public
officials as intellectual property, no less than a patentable innovation would be.1321 These
property rights belong to citizens, and as such, there is no excuse to protect secrecy and hide
information.

Availability of information, which is facilitated by access rights enables people to access
knowledge on processes of governance. Elias and Alkadry recognized that “The ability of
citizens to participate is contingent on their access to a participation venue and their knowledge
of the issues at hand.”1322 Government officials possess knowledge that citizens do not have. As
such, it is essential that public officials, who are privy to technical knowledge, and citizens, who
are privy to experiential knowledge of problems at the local level, make sense of shared concerns
and resolve them as a whole.1323 Dahl has characterized modern democracy as the specialization
of the technical steering knowledge used in policymaking and administration. Such
specialization keeps citizens from taking advantage of politically necessary expertise in forming
their own opinions. This creates a type of paternalism grounded in the monopolization of
knowledge. Privileged access to the sources of relevant knowledge makes possible an
inconspicuous domination over the colonized public of citizens cut off from these sources and
placated with symbolic politics.1324 Possession of knowledge, as I have described in the typology
of information access, makes citizens more politically and socially conscious about issues of
public matters, enables to form opinions and exchange ideas in the public space. Public opinion
that is shaped by information and knowledge in the public domain represents political potentials
that can be used for influencing parliamentary bodies, administrative agencies, and courts.
Habermas argued that political influence supported by public opinion is converted into political
power.1325 Public opinion is often developed from acts of participation. However, Sossin
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explained that “the mere act of participation does not assure engagement.”1326 He differentiated
between the two acts and looked at their potential. According to Sossin, “For there to be the
capacity to engage, there must be a public sphere in which people can interact, communicate and
recognize each other as citizens, and additionally as members of diverse….communities.”1327 I
build on this argument and argue that the “public sphere”, to which Sossin is referring to, is
informed by ATI and transparency, since both of them are essential to the process of information
exchange. According to Pasquier and Villeneuve “transparency is a tool that encourages the
involvement of the people in the development and implementation of public policies.”1328
Habermas recognized the potential of the political public sphere as it “can fulfill its function of
perceiving and thematizing encompassing social problems only insofar as it develops out of the
communication taking place among those who are potentially affected.”1329

Following this logic, information leads to knowledge, which influences the shaping of ideas,
which encourages participation, which enables more control on public issues, which, in turn,
translates into more power over these issues. This chain of reactions validates the old expression
that information is power. Democracy depends on a knowledgeable citizenry whose access to a
broad range of information enables them to participate fully in public life.1330 Amartya Sen
argued that the relationship between information and power is profound, and that inequality in
ATI is a form of poverty. Without knowledge, you cannot act.1331 For citizens, especially the
poor, it is a chance to reclaim ground in their struggle for a more just existence [and] greater
power.1332 Other scholars have emphasized the link between transparency and power. Florini
looked at transparency as a tool for the empowerment of ordinary citizens.1333 Nagel emphasised
the need for a recognition of ATI institutionally or conventionally “in order to provide
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individuals with the security and discretion over the conduct of their own lives necessary for
them to flourish, and in order to protect against the abuse of governmental and collective
power.”1334

As argued above, the main argument for an intrinsic value of ATI is based on the idea of
exercising power which relates to the key normative question on whether transparency
strengthens or undermines our constitutional democracies. Three core value clusters are pertinent
in this regard, according to Bovens, Schillemans, and Hart,1335 the democratic perspective, the
constitutional perspective, and the social learning perspective. In the democratic perspective, a
key issue is whether transparency arrangements strengthen the informational position of citizens.
The position of citizens refers to their electoral role but also to their direct engagement in
political agenda-setting, policy deliberation, and decision making. Information enhances citizens’
position and opens up opportunities of engagement. In the constitutional perspective,1336 the key
issue is whether transparency strengthens or undermines institutional checks and balances. Good
governance arises from a dynamic equilibrium between the various powers within the state.
Transparency is needed to curtail the abuse of executive power, and transferring some of that
power to the citizens. In the social learning perspective, the key issue is whether transparency
strengthens the quality of public debate and collective problem-solving capacity.1337 This
perspective is very important for this research. As I have explained above in the typology of
information ATI enables the acquirement of knowledge which contributes to the shaping of ideas
and a dynamic public discourse. The enriched public debate makes citizens more aware of the
problems present in the public space, cultivates skills for solving those problems, and equips
them with expertise in certain issues.

The first two of the above perspectives point to the correlation between information and
power which is enabled through processes of transparency and ATI. Cain, Egan and Fabbrini
refer to this correlation, as the “information game” arguing that FOI laws introduce citizens as
Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space” (1995) 24(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 83-107, at 86
[Nagel, “Personal Rights”].
1335
M. Bovens, T. Schillemans &,P. ’t Hart, “Does public accountability work? An assessment tool” (2008) 86
Public Administration 225-242 [Bovens, Schillemans & Hart]
1336
Ibid, at 231.
1337
Ibid.
1334

361

players in this game.1338 From this point of view, citizens are not spectators, but players that can
influence the outcome of the information game. However, in this game, bureaucracy has an
“information advantage” which, according to Weber, enables bureaucratic power.1339 If this
power is not counterbalanced, Birkinshaw argues that it can “easily lead to an abuse of power, as
in any one-sided relationship.”1340 He explains that power asymmetry leads to inequality, and
suggests that ATI helps achieve greater equality.1341 This can viewed in two ways: equal
protection under the law, and the right for equal opportunities.

The UN Declaration considers the right of ATI as an instrument for discouraging arbitrary
state action and protecting the basic right to due process and equal protection of the law.1342
Calland and Tilley push the equality argument even further by arguing that ATI is a pro-active
right that serves our common pursuit of social, political, and economic equality.1343 Indeed, if
one looks at the information as a source of power, lack of it will lead to power imbalances.
Hence, without information, it is nearly impossible to exhort inclusion and equality.

11.2.3 The instrumental vs the intrinsic perspective
Different authors have been part of the debate which values access rights either from an
instrumental or intrinsic perspective. Kamm suggested that intrinsically valuable rights are
status-based while utilitarian rights are interest-based1344. Bentham justified instrumentalism with
an utilitarian approach to rights which concentrates on maximising overall happiness.1345
However, this approach has been criticised as paying insufficient attention to individuals. For
instance, Rawls argued that “utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between
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persons.”1346 As such, the instrumental view of rights cannot reasonably account for the strength
of individual rights.

One of the opponents of the instrumental view, Nagel, described the instrumental account of
rights as assuming that rights are morally derivative from other more fundamental values: the
good of happiness, self-realisation, knowledge, ignorance, repression and cruelty.1347 From this
perspective, rights are important because they nurture those other goods, but they are not
themselves fundamental. Nagel contrasts the instrumental and intrinsic accounts of rights arguing
that in the latter rights are a non-derivative element of morality.1348 He supports the intrinsic
view of rights, which is associated with individualism.1349 Referring to the freedom of expression
Nagel favours the intrinsic account of this right on the basis that it confers a form of inviolability
on everyone, “not as an effect but in itself in virtue of its normative essence.”1350 This approach,
he suggests, “becomes important if we wish to extend the justification of free expression
substantially beyond the domain of political advocacy, where its instrumental value is
clearest.”1351

Wenar, explained the two perspectives by arguing that they approach rights from opposite
directions. A status-based (intrinsic) reasoning begins with the nature of the right-holder and
arrives immediately at the right, without paying much attention to the negative effect that
respecting the right may have on others’ interests. The instrumental approach starts with the
desired consequences (like maximum utility) and works backwards to see which right-ascriptions
will produce those consequences.1352 If we take the freedom of speech as an example, the
intrinsic approach to rights views freedom of speech as content-neutral. Wenar described Nagel’s
account of speech rights as flowing immediately from the nature of persons as reasoner beings,
and not from the interests that people may have in speaking on particular topics or in listening to
others speak on particular topics.1353 However, an instrumental account of speech rights will not
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be content-neutral because “people have very different interests in speaking and in hearing
speech on different topics.”1354 Despite the shortcomings of the instrumental approach in coming
to terms with individual rights, Wenar leaned more towards this account explaining the right to
freedom of expression.

An instrumental account of ATI is in many cases based on the right to take part in public
affairs, which is justified with a well-functioning democracy that requires an informed electorate.
Stiglitz argued that “meaningful participation in democratic processes requires informed
participants.”1355 Florini supported a right to ATI deriving from the recognition of democratic
rights in instrumentalist terms when she says that “a broad right of access to information is
fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of representative democracy
is informed consent, which requires that information about political practices and policies be
disclosed.”1356 Roberts favoured this rationale for the recognition of a right to ATI over one
based solely on the right to freedom of expression. He argued that “the logic suggests that access
right is better understood as a corollary of basic political participation rights, rather than the right
to freedom of expression alone.”1357 Roberts recognised an instrumentalist basis for a right to
ATI suggesting that political participation rights “have little meaning if government’s
information monopoly is not regulated.”1358 Article 19 also supported the idea that “The right to
access public information about one’s economic, social and cultural rights is not only related to
these rights, it is a precondition for their realisation.”1359

Another group of scholars support the intrinsic ground for the recognition of access rights. For
instance, Florini argued that ATI is not only a necessary concomitant of the realization of all
other rights but is also a fundamental human right.1360 The idea of control and power to justify
access rights on an intrinsic ground was highlighted by Curtin who referred to a “general right of
access for citizens to public documents as facilitating the citizens’ control of the actions and
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inactions of public bodies.”1361 Bovens also acknowledged the role of information rights in
enhancing social control and linked ATI to a broader conception of citizenship which
“concern[s] first and foremost the social functioning of citizens, not only in relation to the public
authorities, but also in their mutual relations and their relations with private legal entities.”1362 In
this context, Boven introduced a revolutionary idea about a fourth group of citizens’ rights:
information rights on top of civil, political and social rights to achieve the citizenship ideal.
According to him, this right should be constitutionalized. However, he refers mainly to the
digitalization of information which aspires to provide another set of citizenship rights. Boven
argued that “information rights are not only important because they support the traditional
process of democratic steering and accountability, but because they can serve as a tool in helping
to expand the reflexive nature of democracy.”1363 In addition, Boven also argued that information
plays a role not only between public authorities and citizens, but also between citizens. He
noticed that “those without access to information …generally wield very little political and
administrative influence, run the risk of social exclusion, of losing ground on the labour market,
and of encountering hindrances in their personal development.”1364 Boven calls the current rules
on open government mainly a question of public hygiene. But I suggest that information rights
are much more than that – they are an element of citizenship that allows for social functioning of
citizens. Boven categorized the right of access to government information as “primary
information rights.”1365 He looked at the citizen as a subject (information is thus necessary to
establish the legal position of the citizen – knowing the legal rules); as a citoyen (important to
have knowledge on different public policies); and as a member of society (information can assist
to bolster the socio-economic position).1366

Although both the instrumental and the intrinsic approaches on ATI are recognized, I argue
that an intrinsic approach serves as a better justification for its recognition. An intrinsic approach
would remove the requirement to link access rights with other existing rights, which can limit the
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scope of the right to ATI, and can bring possible unforeseen negative consequences. For
instance, McDonagh anticipated that linking the right to ATI to other rights may stretch the
scope of those right beyond their appropriate limits.1367 This stretch may cause the distortion of
all the rights involved, altering their very nature and purpose. Furthermore, focusing on the right
to ATI intrinsically moves this right away from the failure of the instrumentalist approach to pay
sufficient attention to individuals who are frequent invokers of the right to ATI for personal
purposes, and not necessarily for a public interest. Restraining access rights to the realm of
public interest contexts gives rise to complications. Conceptually, such a limitation does not
account for one of the basic principles of information access laws: that access rights accrue to
everyone, regardless of their capacity to establish any particular interest in accessing the
requested information.1368 This principle is expressly protected in ATO legislation in all
jurisdictions at study. Requesters may use the right to ATI to get information in situations where
the broad public interest might not be evident, but it is nonetheless very important to them
personally, but also to others who may find themselves in a similar position. The use of access
rights motivated by personal concerns, does not mean that they cannot bring benefits to the wider
community - for example, through enabling individuals to use the information in a way that sets
a precedent for the treatment of others with similar concerns in the future. According to statistics
on the categories of requesters (i.e statistic tables at Chapter seven) reveal that not all requesters
use ATI in the name of a public good, and less of them qualify as “social watchdogs”. Hence, an
intrinsic approach would expand the recognition of access rights for public and private interests.
11.2.4 Arguments against the value of access to information
There are many arguments that are used against the recognition of a right to ATI. One of the
main assertions is that people do not make a good use of access rights – indicating that access
rights are non-effective or have little practical application. Hence, answering the question “why
people do not make ATI requests?” is of great interest. The answer may include several factors.
It may be simply because people do not have enough knowledge that such right exists, or they do
not know the information is there to be requested, or they consider refusal an inevitable
conclusion, or they consider the risk of official revenge too high, and so on. These problems are
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acknowledged by both ATI opponents and advocates. The lack of awareness on the existence of
ATI rights is often a major problem contributing to the low numbers of access requests. Roberts
argued that “One of the most substantial [barriers to the more frequent use of the right to
information] is a simple lack of awareness about rights.”1369 In addition, the idea of knowledge
often surfaces on discussions around access rights’ limited use by the general public. Roberts
admitted that “making a request requires knowledge about the bureaucratic routine....also
requires a strong sense of political efficacy and persistence….and may require money.”1370
Curtin and Meijer observed that as a matter of practice only those citizens with expert knowledge
of the policy subject make use of the possibility to read information about policy, the process and
the policy actors. Most people are missing that kind of knowledge.1371 Curtin and Meijer warned
about the danger that the opportunities created by ATI mechanisms be hijacked by the more
educated and skilled sectors of society, in detriment of the less well off.

Other authors argue that the lack of knowledge is exacerbated by the lack of skills or
capacities to navigate a highly complex legal environment, such as that created by access rights.
Mooseburger, Tolbert and Stansbury used the notion of “information literacy” to describe one’s
ability to recognize when information can solve a problem or fill a need and effectively employ
information resources. According to them, individuals differ in their ability to notice, absorb,
retain and integrate information.1372 Therefore, to make open government information relevant, it
is critical to move one step forward from making information available to making information
understandable and applicable. In addition, Khagram, Fung and De Renzio argued that peoples’
access and responses to information may be different according to their cognitive capacities, and
availability of information means nothing for those who do not have the skills needed to find,
understand and elaborate it.1373 Fenster went a step further by establishing a link between
knowledge and social frames. He noted that the public’s pre-existing knowledge and capacity to
understand information is limited, and the public in turn understands information within existing
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cultural and social frames, meaning that individual social and cognitive structures of
understanding are in part determined by race, class, gender, educational background, and the
like.1374 Zaller makes the case that knowledge is influenced by the level of education and the
higher the level of education, it can be assumed, the stronger the capacity of people both to
access and process information.1375 While it is true that access rights highly depend on the
knowledge, capacities, education and social frames of the requesters, this should not be used as
an argument against a recognition of a fundamental right of ATI. The same argument can be
used for other human rights that have a recognized fundamental status in the Canadian Charter,
such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly or association.

Some of the concerns regarding the limited use of access rights can be addressed by
employing the participatory democratic theory of Pateman which emphasizes the need to
participate in the democratic process in a repetitive way. The idiom “people learn to participate
by participating” is a great lesson to be learned by all actors in the public domain. Only by
participating citizens will learn how to navigate complex information and better participate in
future discussions. They will gain the knowledge necessary, will acquire the capacities required
to put that knowledge into practice and overcome the obstacles of social barriers.

Another argument against the value of access rights is that they are used for private reasons,
rather than for the public good. Banisar noted that ATI laws are not primarily designed to help
protect individual rights.1376 Research suggest, however, that most requests are concerned with
access that has some personal relevance to the applicant rather than with the promotion of
democracy and accountability.1377 Critics argue that since applicants who require information for
private purposes do not contribute to the public debate, these requests do not add to the
realisation of the goals underlying the legislation. In other words, they are a waste of public
resources.1378 This position is based on an instrumentalist approach, and as I argued above it falls
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short of explaining a status-based right of ATI. Not always a public interest in ATI should be
established, and even when it is not, it may ultimately serve to some public interest, because it
may constitute a precedent to be used for future cases with similar circumstances.

Another reason against ATI relates to the strain it puts to the government and its resources.
Maintaining an access rights’ regime is expensive. However, if we consider ATI as a human
right, then a human rights based approach accepts that the importance of realising human rights
justifies sometimes significant disadvantages to government. In this regards, sacrifices are made
in the name of protection of individual rights. Governments are required to respect the
obligations associated with human rights, despite the fact that might not be advantageous, and at
times even disastrous for them.
In the final lines of his book “Blacked out” Roberts asks: “Do we have a right to
information?” His response is “Certainly. But we also have a responsibility to act on it.”1379 Two
arguments can be made out of this response. First, access right exists even if no one uses it, so
that any claim against its value based on its frequency, is weak based on an intrinsic approach of
rights. The same argument can be made for other human rights as well, people may choose to use
them or not, but their action does not affect their status. The potential of every right, including
ATI, is revealed at the moment of their use, otherwise they will be dormant until practically
applied. Second, access rights need action, they depend on the will of the people to give them life
in their roles as private individuals or responsible citizens. Florini argued about transparency that
“does little good if no one cares to do anything with the information.”1380 However, the situation
is totally different if people do care. In that case, the conception of transparency is performative
and a source of power. Indeed, information is power, and keeping information secret only serves
to keep power in the hands of a few.1381
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Should access to information be considered a constitutional human right in Canada?

A positivist theory cannot respond to such question since neither the Canadian law, nor the
jurisprudence recognize such right. However, I argue that the importance of ATI rights based on
its use and its value demand a constitutional recognition. While discussing about ATI in public
and private sector, Roberts asked a basic question: In what circumstances is it desirable to
expand recognition of a right to information?1382 He answered this question by referring to the
harms that may be caused when ATI is denied. I have a similar concern in this research: Why is
it important to recognize the right of ATI as a constitutional right in Canada? Certainly, a
constitutional recognition is important since “Constitutional norms are not only higher order
rules; they are prior organic rules; they constitute a given political community.”1383 The
importance of having an ATI constitutional right has to be balanced against the consequences of
not having it. Taking this approach requires a departure from the inflexible grounds of
positivism.

In the following paragraphs I will not be looking at the benefits of having access rights
considered a human right in Canada, but the harm of not having it, particularly the harm to the
citizen's fundamental interests. Following this logic two questions are important. First, whether
there is a significant interest at risk of harm if access rights are not guaranteed, and second,
whether the risk of harm is substantial. In some cases, the connection between access rights and
the fundamental interests of citizens is obvious. For example, we recognize a fundamental right
to security of the person and, by implication, a right of ATI about potential threats to personal
safety. This logic was recently adopted in Doe when the Court ruled that police forces have a
positive obligation to provide information about threats to safety, an obligation rooted in the
constitutionally recognized right to security of the person.1384 The ECtHR adopted similar
reasoning in its Guerra decision. It concluded that the Italian government unjustifiably violated
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the “physical integrity” of the residents of Manfredonia by withholding information about toxic
emissions from a chemical factory in their community.1385
In addition, we guarantee a freedom of expression, as one of the fundamental freedoms that
enhances the exchange of ideas in the public space. However, this freedom alone is not enough
to guarantee a fruitful public debate. To engage in a meaningful exchange about public matters,
there is need for information. Therefore, the right to impart and receive information is widely
recognized as being part of the right to freedom of expression.1386 The Supreme Court in Canada
(in Criminal Lawyers’ Association) and the ECtHR1387 have interpreted that freedom of
expression includes a right of ATI. Since the government holds a significant amount of
information access rights are necessary for an informed debate about public matters, and as such
the recognition of these rights gains prominence. Although, the Supreme Court in Canada has
recognised a right to ATI, its application is limited to certain cases.

Furthermore, ATI facilitates the realisation of other individual rights. Information helps in
accomplishing basic rights such as the right to food, health, employments, education, etc. We
need information in matters of employment (i.e investigations or selection process in hiring), tax
purposes (i.e tax deductions), health rights (i.e introduction of new drugs), conviction charges
and prosecution (i.e. prosecution's disclosure obligations in the criminal proceedings), access to
personal information, etc. The realization of these basic rights through ATI follows an
instrumental approach to rights. From this perspective, ATI is essential for personal autonomy –
hence, lack of information hampers one’s ability to pursue goals, whether faced with criminal
prosecution or life threatening pollution in one’s backyard. Because of the importance that ATI
has for the realization of other rights, every limitation on access rights, will impinge on a
significant interest, and hence will pose a risk of harm to the individuals. This harm could
become substantial if implicates rights such as the right to life and security of the person, right to
health, employment and so on. As such, ATI is an individual right. The Information
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Commissioner John Reid has recognized the right as the “Parliament’s gift of power to each and
every citizen and person in Canada.”1388

If one wants to draw parallels between an individual and a public perspective to ATI, one can
say that access contributes to the realization of individual rights in the same way in which it
contributes to the realization of democracy in general. In both cases, information is needed to
facilitate decision-making, either by citizens as a collective body or by individuals. In fact, in
many cases, it is not possible to make a difference between a person as a citizen and as a private
person or between a special interest and a public interest. A right to ATI is necessary in both
dimensions of human life, public and private. As explained by Birkinshaw, ATI enables us to
fulfill our potential as humans.1389As such, a characterization of ATI as a human right derives
from its human nature, which can be understood as having a private as well as a public
dimension. According to Weinberger, human liberty can be considered from two sides, first, as
personal liberty or the freedom to choose the way of life, and second, as political liberty or the
freedom to choose the way of governing public affairs. The realm of political liberty concerns
the participation of the citizen in public matters, while personal liberty is an element that
postulates political liberty.1390 Both of these sides require information to achieve full potential.
From this perspective, we see two sides in each person, an individual being and a social being.
Both of these qualities of humans necessitate information to make decisions, either at the
individual level, or at social/political level.

Looking at ATI from a public perspective, the need for a recognition of a constitutional status
of this right becomes necessary, since not doing so extends the risk of harm to a much broader
platform, that of a public space. ATI proponents argue that this right “produces an informed
public, a responsive government, and as a result, a functional society.”1391 The lack of
information, on the other hand, produces an ignorant, passive society and a secretive
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government, which are premises for authoritarian regimes. For example, the inherited culture of
secrecy in Albanian governance today is due to the long history of communism in which
accessing government information was a taboo, and even punishable by law. Keeping
information secret from the public, gave the government a strong tool to keep society under total
control for fifty years, and guaranteed political power and ruling for half a century. The secretive
culture created a passive society and secretive bureaucracy which still considers government
information its own property, even today, twenty six years after the regime change. Albania is a
perfect example to demonstrate that not recognizing access rights may cause substantial damage
and be detrimental to a democratic society. The risk of harm in this scenario multiplies and
produces not only apathetic individuals, but a lethargic society, which is certainly not the spirit
of a dynamic vital democracy. For this reason, ATI has been recognized as a fundamental human
right in the EU, Albania, and many other jurisdictions across the world.

The ATIA in Canada is recognized to have a quasi-constitutional nature. It receives this
characterization because it protects values central to the preservation of a free and democratic
society. Its quasi-constitutional status is also highlighted by the section 4 paramountcy clause of
the Act which guarantees that the right of access exists “notwithstanding any other acts of
Parliament.”1392 Section 4 provides that the right to ATI prevails over conflicting legislation.1393
The quasi-constitutional status is recognized by the Crown1394 and has been repeatedly affirmed
by the Federal Court, including the Courts below.

Because the ATIA is quasi-constitutional, the object and purpose of the Act are the principal
factors that courts consider when interpreting its provisions. As such, the courts should always
adopt the interpretation of the Act that is most consistent with its objective that “government
information should be available to the public.”1395 This means that access should be the norm,
and not the exception when applying the provisions of this Act. Any ambiguity around the access
1392
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right must be resolved in favour of advancing the aims of the Act. The Supreme Court has
recognized that ATI is one of the cornerstones of our democratic system, it is essential to
ensuring information necessary for participation and accountability.1396 The Supreme Court also
acknowledged the necessity of access to permit meaningful discussion on a matter of public
importance.1397

From this perspective, ATI can be considered as a window of participation, or a ticket that
allows for participation. If one can draw comparisons I would compare ATI with a ticket to a
sport game. Just like a ticket to a game match, it will only give you the information you need to
watch the game, the when, where, and what. It also offers an opportunity to enter the facility
where the game with be played. The ticket will only get you inside the stadium, but how much
you pay attention and engage with the match, how passionate you are, and how your emotions
play out - these reactions are subjective and will vary a lot from person to person. The reactions
will depend on the past experiences, affections, feelings and previous knowledge about the game.
Some people will cheer loudly when the favourite team scores, some will laugh and some others
even cry, while others will watch indifferently, without engaging a lot with the environment.
This is, in fact, the human nature, so diverse and with lots of variations. Just because people do
not cheer, or laugh, or cry, the stadium cannot deny them the ticket to the game. Only by
watching a game, people will understand the rules and why players do certain moves. Only if
they watch the game for several times, they will understand better. The more they watch it, the
more experts they become, and if they like the game enough, they will be interested to play it.
Some will even become so interested that they will become professional players. But, it all starts
with first getting the ticket to the stadium, and then watching and understanding the rules of the
game. Depending on many factors, from human capacity, to interests and objective factors, some
people will stop at the first match; some will watch several times, some will become players, and
some will join sport teams.

Just like the game, the Pateman participatory democratic theory explains that the more people
participate in the decision-making process, the more they will be willing to participate. The more
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people know (either by accessing information available from the governments, or by filing
access requests) about the decision-making process, the more they understand, and the more they
will be willing to become active players in this process. As Pateman puts it, people will learn to
participate by participating. If I were to draw comparisons with the game, the responsibility is
two folded, on the government to provide venues of participation, and on the people to take
advantage of opportunities made available to them. In this context Fenster argued that
transparency does not just occur as a natural consequence of a democratic system: is requires
championing, support, organization, and imposition.1398 Meijer, Curtin and Hillebrandt described
this support in terms of “vision and voice”. They conducted an analysis of the relationship
between vision and voice, and found that “Vision and voice come together in the idea of
informed debate: participants can voice their opinions on the basis of knowledge about decisionmaking processes.”1399 Hence, people first have to get informed, then have a voice in how
decisions are made.

The importance of participation stands on the opportunities it creates for introducing, shaping
and pushing ideas in the public space. Weinberger argued that participation in public affairs is
not restricted to formal principles of democracy, like voting in elections. The efficiency and
reasonableness of democratic rule depend essentially on discursive processes institutionalized in
society.1400 Weinberger links these processes with democracy and human liberty claiming that
they “can flourish only if the frame for an open society is established. Formal democracy is not
sufficient. We need a discursive mind, tolerance, and room for free discussion.”1401 What
Weinberger emphasized is the importance of transparency and information for public discourse.
Now, let’s turn again to the question of the constitutional recognition of access rights in
Canada. As I discussed in Chapter ten, the Canadian common law has traditionally not been
concerned with giving access rights to individuals, except in very special circumstances of
litigation. Mainly, the common law was concerned with the publication of law and with legal
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certainty, setting limits to arbitrary actions that undermined individual security.1402 In Canada,
constitutional arguments for a right of access are based either on the freedom of speech or the
freedom of the press. The Québec Commission d’Accès à l’Information released an excellent
report in 2002 entitled “Choosing Transparency” where then-President, Jennifer Stoddart
recognized the right to know as a basis and a prerequisite for the exercise of other rights in a
democracy.1403 Around the same time the Supreme Court recognized the right to ATI as quasiconstitutional. In 2010 this Court acknowledged (in Criminal Lawyers’ Association) a limited
constitutional right of ATI under the freedom of expression. This trend shows signs of maturity
of the Canadian law towards the status of ATI. However, this limited constitutional recognition
is not enough considering that many jurisdictions have gone a long way in this direction.
As I stated at the beginning of this section positivism cannot be used for advancing a human
right argument of ATI in Canada. It is a fact that a legislative reform of the ATIA has been
lingering for so many years in parliamentary committees. This puts into question the validity of a
legality argument for human rights in the Canadian case. According to the positive theory of law,
legality is conferred only to formal process of positively enacting law via certain procedures –
only those are believed to be legitimate in an existing political regime. Following this logic,
human rights can only gain their legitimacy if they are guaranteed by norms of the positive law,
meaning that they are transformed into positive law. That is the case if they are taken up as
binding law into the catalogue of basic rights of a constitution. Referring to the right to ATI, this
is clearly a difficult case to make in Canada, where this right cannot be directly inserted in the
Constitution as a stand-alone human right because of complex amendment processes. To address
this dilemma, I look at the two perspectives on human rights offered by Alexy. In justifying the
human rights Alexy distinguishes between a problem of form and a problem of substance. The
problem of substance is concerned with the question of which human rights are necessary. The
problem of form is concerned with the necessity of transforming this concept into positive
law.1404 In the Canadian context, I see no problem of substance related to an ATI right – the
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analysis that I have made in Chapter ten (Jurisprudence) and in this Chapter provides
considerable explanations for the recognition of the right of ATI as necessary from both a private
and public perspective. What remains to be established for access rights is a problem of form –
how can we incorporate this fundamental right into the constitutional fabric of the country?

It is evident, as I have argued in other chapters, that there is a lack of political will in Canada
to enhance the status of ATI rights. The ATIA is weak, and the constitutional protection is limited
or absent, which has caused serious violations of access rights in Canada, as evidenced in
Chapters seven, eight and nine. Sen has a very compelling argument in this regard. He argued
that if a government is accused of violating some human rights that accusation cannot really be
answered simply by pointing out that there are no legally established rules in that country
guaranteeing those rights. What might be at issue it is not whether the established legal rights
have been violated, but whether we should not go beyond the scope of the established legal
rights to encompass the demands in question.1405 So, the question that one might ask is if the law
is exactly what the political legislator enacts as law. The Habermas’s discursive theory of law
serves as a good theoretical explanation on why and how to make the move to the transition of
ATI to a fundamental human right in Canada.

Habermas challenged the idea that law is what legislator enacts, and argued that the belief in
legality does not per se legitimize.1406 He rejected any attempt to reduce law to politics and
advised that “as soon as legitimation is presented as the exclusive achievement of politics, we
have to abandon our concepts of law and politics.”1407 Instead, Habermas suggested that the
legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement: as participants in
rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to examine whether a contested norm
meets with, or could meet with, the agreement of all those possibly affected.1408 That is done
through open informed public discussions that offer many venues of participation.
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The most intriguing idea in Habermas’s theory for the purpose of this research is the
explanation of how human rights become part of the constitutional fabric of a country. He used
claims of communicative freedom in the form of freedoms of opinion and information which
make their way to the legal system slowly over time. Habermas extrapolated that the system of
rights “is not given to the framers of a constitution in advance as a natural law. Only in a
particular constitutional interpretation do these rights first enter into consciousness at all....every
constitution is a living project that can endure only as an ongoing interpretation continually
carried forward at all levels of the production of law.”1409. On the same argument Habermas
disputed that “the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure but a delicate and
sensitive-above all fallible and revisable-enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of
rights anew in changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights better, to
institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically.”1410
So, if law is not exactly what the legislator enacts as law, and the law should not be reduced to
politics, which is the opposite of what has happened in the Canadian case (ATI has been reduced
at what the legislator has enacted, and especially what the government has dictated), we have a
scenario in which two branches of the government (executive and legislature) are less likely to
bring changes in the ATI rights. What is left is the Canadian judiciary, which in order to achieve
true success in recognizing a constitutional status of access rights, should think outside the box,
and beyond what law and politics offer. According to Habermas, courts should review the
procedures of constitutional democracy, since it is natural for them to carry out this function.
First, they have special competencies for maintaining legal coherence among a complex system
of legal norms while interpreting and applying abstract norms - including constitutional norms
and rights. Second, the judiciary - precisely because it is not directly accountable democratically
– is able to police impartially the very procedures of democracy which legitimate laws in the first
place.1411 According to Zurn, constitutional courts should be concerned to foster democratic
procedures: namely, the openness, full inclusion, deliberation and wide dialogue and
communicative exchange that are necessary ingredients of a healthy system of deliberative
1409
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constitutional democracy.1412 In addition, Kazmierski argued about the role of the courts in
controlling the discretion of public officials while dealing with ATI requests, stating that
“ensuring that government officials properly exercise their discretion pursuant to access
legislation also depends on the role of the judiciary”1413.

The recognition of a stand-alone fundamental right to ATI in Canada certainly depends on the
existence of the political will. However, this has not happened for many years, and I doubt it will
happen any time soon. Birkinshaw advised that “FOI laws will always be unpopular with
governments in power and some of the officials who serve them. That is probably the true test of
their importance. FOI deserves constitutional protection”1414. However, to achieve such
protection, access rights should either be organically added to the Constitution or indirectly
inserted through judicial interpretation. Amending the Canadian Charter to include a right of ATI
is unlikely for the foreseeable future because of the tough requirements for such procedure to
occur. The general amending formula1415 requires the consent of two-thirds of the provinces with
at least fifty percent of Canada’s population, and an approval of the Parliament and the Senate
for any changes in the Canadian Constitution. As such, it raises a very high bar that is very
difficult to meet. Nevertheless, such an unlikelihood should not detract from the hope that
changes could be made. The common law in Canada has given signs that it is incrementally
recognizing such rights, and limited success has already been achieved. However, there is need
for a greater push towards a constitutional recognition. The continuous growing
acknowledgement of the right to ATI as a constitutional right in the international level should
render the establishment of such status attractive to the Canadian jurisprudence. The Canadian
courts should respond to such developments, especially prompted by the jurisprudence of the
CJEU or the ECtHR.

The experience in the EU demonstrated that the right of ATD has advanced a long way, from a
voluntary right left on the hands of bureaucracy, to a fundamental right. The jurisprudence of the
CJEU and the ECtHR have substantially influenced such advancement with an expansive
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interpretation of the right to ATD found under the freedom of expression, and as a stand-alone
right. This consideration of access rights may be of value for Canadian courts which may follow
the same path in the future by accommodating a constitutional right of ATI through an
interpretative exercise. Hence, the EU legal framework and especially the way it came into
being, may serve as a good example for Canadian future developments in transparency and ATI.
Canada could benefit from knowledge on the developments in the EU and incorporating them
into its own system.
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CHAPTER 12: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

12.1 Summary of the findings
This dissertation has examined the nature and value of transparency as a principle of
governance and ATI as an individual right through a comparative analysis of Canada and the EU.
It provided some level of comprehensibility to the conceptual and practical use of the two terms,
and offered a framework for the recognition of ATI as a constitutional right in Canada. It
addressed the conceptual muddle of the concepts of transparency and information, and offered a
definition and models of transparency, and a definition and typologies of information.
In addition, this dissertation focused on the way transparency and ATI is perceived and
applied. The research demonstrated that the approach towards transparency and ATI is grounded
on their perceptions as political, social and cultural constructs. It found that the value assigned to
ATI socially and politically informed and prescribed its level of legal protection and application.
To arrive to such conclusion I analyzed how access laws developed historically, how they were
perceived and valued politically, how they were handled administratively, how they were applied
practically, how they were supervised institutionally and how they were interpreted judicially.
Furthermore, the dissertation examined the protection of the right of ATI in Canada and the
EU, and argued for a constitutional status of ATI in Canada. In order to do so, I engaged in
doctrinal research, used a comparative exercise, using the EU legal framework, and employed
two theories of democracy, the deliberative theory of Habermas and the participation theory of
Pateman. They provide standards against which the rhetoric of transparency and ATI can be
measured. The dissertation thus makes a claim for a constitutional right of ATI in Canada by
looking at the value it upholds in a modern democracy and by drawing a connection between
information and knowledge. This relationship creates better capacities, opportunities and venues
for the citizens to exercise their rights, participating in public discussions and ultimately
exercising control of government decision-making.
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This research found that the political and institutional culture of the government and historical
traditions in Canada and the EU had a major influence in their approaches towards transparency.
The timing of the ATI legislation was dependent not only on government inspired policies, but
also on other forces outside the government. The comparison showed that these forces were
different in the two jurisdictions. Also, the ATI laws were guided by different principles, the EU
an expansive access regime, and Canada a narrow complementary regime. The study of the legal
framework of ATI revealed that the bureaucratic practices in all jurisdictions circumvent legal
requirements by giving life to new rules of access. The questionnaire sent to some of the federal
agencies in Canada, and some of the EU institutions revealed remarkable trends about how
institutional culture shapes the rules of an access regime. In Canada, the very low number of
responses and the way they were handled exposed a centralized system where decisions about
information requests had to be approved at the upper levels of the government.
The data on the users of ATI gathered for Canada and the EU showed that the access rights
are expansively used by the public in Canada and the EU, but in the EU they were surpassed by
academia, and in Canada by business. Also, media requests were not significant in both
jurisdictions. However, research demonstrated that some of the biggest scandals in the Canadian
history, have been illuminated by journalists. Regarding other actors, this research showed that
the EU NGOs have been more active and successful in their attempts to affect legislative or
policy changes. The interviews I had with some of the groups in Canada revealed that media and
NGOs found the system elitist, time-consuming, frustrating and expensive, which made it
inaccessible for many small organizations, with little support and resources available.
The study of the oversight bodies in Canada and the EU displayed that although both had only
the power to make recommendation, the European Ombudsman has been more successful
because of the moral authority it has established and the support from the European Parliament.
The involvement of Parliament in the investigation process of the Ombudsman is an interesting
difference compared to the Information Commissioner in Canada, where such support has been
missing. The authority of the Commissioner has continuously declined over the years, because
her authority has been taken less seriously by the government. The Commissioner seems to be
fighting a lonely battle because of the lack of strong allies in the mission for the protection and
modernization of the access regime in Canada.
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This dissertation also examined the jurisprudence of the main courts in Canada and the EU as
it pertains to ATI cases. On the one side, in Europe, the CJEU has retained a significant role in
the interpretation of the right of access, and the ECtHRs has made a meaningful contribution to
the advancements of the access rights and transparency. On the other side, in Canada, the Federal
Court and the Supreme Court have facilitated some advancements on the right of ATI, raising it
to the quasi-constitutional status, and providing some limited applicability for a constitutional
recognition. However, the Canadian judiciary has moved carefully towards an expansive
interpretation of the ATIA because of the limitations posed in the Act for such interpretation.
When compared to the European approach of judicial interpretation of the right of ATD, the
Canadian courts can learn how to accommodate access rights into the Canadian Charter by the
stretching the existing legal provisions though an expansive interpretation.

12.2 Limitations of the research
One of the main concerns in this research has been the recognition of a constitutional right of
ATI in Canada. The research showed that access rights are surrounded by political controversy.
Chapter five demonstrated that the administrative practices in the EU and Canada revealed a
similar trend – there is recently a tendency towards a restriction of the right of ATI. These results
demonstrate that beside the recognition of a constitutional right of ATI (as it is the case of the
EU), it still remains a highly contested area which heavily depends on government politics. That
means that a constitutional recognition would not be a panacea for the problems with the access
rights’ regime in Canada. Nonetheless, this reasoning should not serve as a deterrent for not
pushing towards this recognition. Of course, the constitutional status gives the access rights a
whole new level of protection which will require a careful reasoning for every case when these
rights will be limited. Constitutional rights get a different level of attention from an institutional
and judicial perspective which would potentially change how access rights are perceived,
discussed and applied by all branches of the government, and would alter future trajectories.
As explained in Chapter five, it would be best that the ATIA be modernized. This change
would also allow the Supreme Court to expand the recognition of access rights towards a
constitutional status. Certainly, better laws make a better start, but they do not guarantee a
successful access rights regime in and on themselves. Sometimes the gap between law and
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practice, as this research demonstrates, is surprisingly much wider than expected, and deeply
affects law implementation. The practices in all jurisdictions in this study exposed how everyday
operations of public administration are continuously trying to circumvent legal requirements.
However, having a good access law in place is the first step to building an effective access
regime because it institutionalizes both the principle of transparency and the right of ATI.
It has been established that the right of ATI is important for many reasons, both from an
individual interest and a public interest perspective. However, it is also undeniable that they can
also bring unintended consequences, like the “empty files” phenomenon or constraints for
government operations. While it is true that access rights might cause some burden to the
government, this argument could be made for many other human rights, such as the right to
health or education. The costs they are associated with cannot be a convincible argument when
compared to their value. One should think beyond the principles of good governance to
appreciate the importance of transparency and ATI in the public and private sphere. One should
look at their value from a human rights perspective, which is an approach little explored in the
literature but hardly contestable from any group of both advocates and academics. This approach
is appealing and only a rights-based transparency and ATI regime would justify their normative
value.

12.3 Recommendations for future research
While it is undisputed that transparency is better than secrecy and ATI is an important tool to
ensure government accountability and democratic participation, more research is needed to shed
light into the relationship between access rights and accountability and participation. There is a
necessity for a systematic empirical investigation of how these legal principles interact with each
other, and what the role of access rights in facilitating those principles is.
In addition, it has come up in this research that frequent users of ATI rights complain that
neglect and adversarialism have become more serious problems within the federal government.
This evidence of deteriorating compliance suggests that a reassessment of the methods used to
enforce the ATIA is necessary.
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Furthermore, this dissertation has argued about a human right approach to ATI departing from
the value it holds in the private and public sphere. To arrive in such conclusion this study
engaged in a doctrinal research of ATI. However, a more analytical examination is necessary to
untangle the real value of information in public sphere in Canada. A further and comprehensive
study would reveal how ATI is used by individuals or groups for personal interests or public
interests. This dissertation could not engage in further research for lack of time and resources.

12.4 Conclusions
This dissertation, through the study of two jurisdictions, Canada and the EU, has provided
some basis for the legal conceptualization of the principle of transparency and ATI, and some
practical understanding on how they work in practice. It also offered some standards against
which the rhetoric of transparency and access are measured – it did so departing from a valuebased perspective. The dissertation made a case for a recognition of a constitutional right of ATI
in Canada as time is ripe to move forward towards such recognition. Indeed, we are well beyond
the point at which it can disputed that a properly defined right of ATI is essential to our system
of constitutional rights. The time has passed that one could downgrade access rights to a lesser
status.
There are many reasons why governments resist the idea of ATI - power and control are two
of the most prevailing incentives for such resistance. As Cain et al put it “Controlling
information, governments have learned, is an effective way to manage public opinion.”1416
Exactly for this reason access rights should be protected, in order to equalize the balance of
power between government and citizens. As such, access rights become a powerful tool for
providing a rich public space which enables individuals to become citizens and to exercise their
rights in debating, shaping and steering the direction of their government. The ATI use for
private interests and realization of personal rights will then allow the individuals to use their
rights for the good of the entire society. According to this logic, a person who has been denied
his own rights, will not be capable to engage his public rights and duties as a citizen - he will be
a dormant citizen. The idea of information as knowledge carries the potential to create capacities

1416

Cain et al, supra note 377 at 116.
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for rational judgment, and thus engagement in public space, and further participation in public
affairs.
However, transparency and ATI do not just occur as a natural consequence of a democratic
system. As Fenster suggests, it requires championing, support, organization, and imposition.1417
Hence, democracy has to involve the responsibility of the public to act upon the information it
apparently has a right to.1418 Pateman advised that “people learn to participate by participating,
and that feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be developed in a participatory
environment.”1419
Considering the evolution of democracy and the system of citizens’ rights in Canada, rights
are always in evolution. Just like the right to vote which did not belong to all Canadians in the
60s (like aboriginals) in Canada, but evolved to a constitutional right, access rights could evolve
to having a constitutional status. The time is ripe that this level of protection is not any more an
extraordinary idea, but a practical and necessary one.

Canada has all the potential to establish a strong ATI right, it has a long experience with
democracy, but it seems to resist the idea. It looks like it is staying true to its Westminster
traditions of secrecy. However, the situation has changed so much at the international sphere.
The growing recognition of the right to ATI both domestic and international level should render
the establishment of a constitutional access right difficult to resist. Ninety eight countries now
have laws which recognize a right of ATI, and of these over fifty have constitutional provisions
confirming this right as a fundamental right. Hence, Canada has to revisit its position to the
approach towards ATI, and re-evaluate its potentials to raise its status to a constitutional one.

Fenster, “The Opacity”, supra note 50 at 895-902.
Roberts, Blacked Out, supra note 84 at 238.
1419
Ibid, at 105.
1417
1418

APPENDIX 1: ATIP QUESTIONNAIRE

Confidential
Questionnaire on Transparency and Access to Information (ATI).
There are thirteen questions in this questionnaire. Please answer them to the best of your knowledge. Click at the square(s) (to activate them)
for the answer that applies. You may choose more than one in some occasions. If you have comments for questions, use the comment box at the
bottom of each question.
Thank you in advance for completing the questionnaire!

Part I. Government transparency (4 questions)
1. Proactive disclosure is considered to be important for government transparency. To what extent do you agree or disagree to the
statements below:
Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree Neither disagree or agree Don’t know
Proactive disclosure ensures that the
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
public is more informed about decisions
that affect them.
Early proactive disclosure1420 allows and ☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
encourages public participation in
decision-making.
Early proactive disclosure sparks
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
fruitful debate in the public sphere.
Early proactive disclosure ensures a
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
better understanding of the rationale
behind decision making.
Early proactive disclosure establishes
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
more public trust to our institution.
1420

Note: Early proactive disclosure refers to the disclosure at the early stages of decision-making, not just the final decisions.
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Early proactive disclosure leads
to a public information overload.
Early proactive disclosure increases the
workload & expenses of our institution.
Early proactive disclosure doesn`t allow
for a space to think for public officials.
Early proactive disclosure contributes to
more public confusion about choices in
decision-making.
Comment: Click here to enter text.

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

2. When providing information proactively my agency/unit:

Takes into account the public needs when providing information.
Specifically highlights the positive elements in the information to
facilitate the public’s understanding.
Provides information, even if it is damaging to our organization.
Organizes information in ways that are easy to digest by the general
public.
Leaves out information details if that information is controversial.
Provides lots of information which is not adequately organized to
conceal certain issues.
Frames information in certain ways which are beneficial to the
institutional interests.
Chooses a technical language that needs a certain level of education
to make sense of.
Comment: Click here to enter text.

Never
☐
☐

Sometimes
☐
☐

Depending on the issue
☐
☐

Often
☐
☐

Always
☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

3. The following statements refer to the proactive disclosure policies in the agency/department where I work. How do you respond to the
following statements:
Strongly disagree

Disagree Agree Strongly agree

Neither agree or disagree

Don’t know
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My agency's management values making
information proactively available.
My agency makes information widely
available if there are many ATI requests.
There are regulations & policies in place
to stimulate proactive disclosure.
My agency's management invites my unit
to propose or join in initiatives for
proactive disclosure.
There is a sufficient number of people in
my unit dedicated to transparency
There is sufficient funding allocated in my
agency's budget to transparency.
Comment: Click here to enter text.

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

4. The following statements refer to the proactive disclosure daily activities in the agency/department where I work. How do you respond
to the following statements:

We announce information available proactively through the press.
We proactively place information on the agency's website.
We make information available proactively through public information
campaigns.
We make information available proactively through social media
e.g. Facebook, Twitter and blogs.
We make information available proactively through traditional media
e.g. brochures, radio, televison.
We make information available proactively through open meetings.
We ask feedback from the public about the quality of the information
provided using the above sources.
Comment: Click here to enter text.
Part II: Access to Information (6 questions)

Never
☐
☐
☐

Rarely
☐
☐
☐

Sometimes
☐
☐
☐

Often
☐
☐
☐

Very often
☐
☐
☐

Always
☐
☐
☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐
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1. It is established that ATI is significant for the functioning of democratic institutions. How to you respond to the following statements
regarding the value of ATI from your agency/unit’s perspective?

My agency's management values ATI as
central to democratic governance.
There are regulations & policies in my
agency for the administration of ATI
requests.
My agency/unit provides information in
a timely fashion.
ATI requests help us in decision-making
by providing important public input.
My agency provides sufficient guidance
to my unit to deal with ATI requests.
There is a sufficient number of people
in my unit dedicated to ATI.
There is sufficient funding allocated in
my agency's budget to ATI.
Comment: Click here to enter text.

Strongly disagree
☐

Disagree Agree
☐
☐

Strongly agree
☐

Neither agree or disagree
☐

Don’t know
☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

2. How would you categorize the purpose of the ATI requests made to your institution?
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Journalistic (making headlines in the media)
☐
☐
☐
Protecting human rights (Mobility, legal,
☐
☐
☐
democratic rights, or other Charter Rights)
Making an institution accountable
☐
☐
☐
Participating in decision making
☐
☐
☐
Stimulating more transparency
☐
☐
☐
Preventing/fighting corruption
☐
☐
☐
Furthering business interests
☐
☐
☐

Often
☐
☐

Very Often
☐
☐

Always
☐
☐

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
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Furthering political interests
Embarrassing government
Comment: Click here to enter text.

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

☐
☐

3. How would you consider the interaction between your institution and these categories of requesters1421:
Adversarial
Brittle
Functional
Friendly
Close
Depends on the information requested
Media
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Academia
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Private sector
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Organizations
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Public
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Comment: Click here to enter text.
4.

Based on your experience with ATI requesters, what do you think of their knowledge on ATI legal framework?
They don’t know
They have some basic
They have a strong
They are experts
Can`t say
much
knowledge
knowledge
Media
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Academia
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Private Sector ☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Organizations ☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Public
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
Comment: Click here to enter text.
5. Please indicate, from your experience, to what degree you agree with the following statements regarding ATI requests.
Never
Rarely
Sometimes Often
Very Often
Always
Depends on the
type of requests
Responding needs consultation with
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
superiors
I find myself in trouble when trying to
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
respond to sensitive requests

1421

Note: This categorization is used by the Treasury Board Secretariat in its Annual Reports.
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Releasing information leads to
embarrassment of my institution
Information requested benefits certain
groups rather than the general public
Requests lead to making information
proactively available
Information helps requesters advance
some other human rights
Requests keep our institution accountable
to the public
Requests help improve our relationship
with groups of requesters & gain their trust
Comment: Click here to enter text.

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

☐

6. Who would you seek advice from when you are in doubt regarding ATI requests? (Choose three that apply the most).
a) Nobody, I use my discretion
b) A colleague in your office
c) The head of your office
d) A colleague in your department
e) The head of your department
f) Someone in your institution
g) The head of your institution
h) The minister
i) Another ATIP coordinator outside your institution
Comment: Click here to enter text.

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

PART III: General questions (3 questions)
1. How long have you been working for the current agency:
a) less than a year
☐
b) 1-3 years
☐
c) 3-5 years
☐
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d) 5-10 years
☐
e) more than 10 years ☐
Comment: Click here to enter text.
2. How many hours of training do you get on a yearly basis on how to deal with ATI requests? (Consider the last three years)
a) None
☐
b) 1-5 hours
☐
c) 5-10 hours
☐
d) 11-15 hours
☐
e) 16-20 hours
☐
f) Over 20 hours ☐
Comment: Click here to enter text.
3. How many persons are assigned to deal with ATI requests exclusively in your office?
a) none
☐
b) 1
☐
c) 2-3
☐
d) 4-5
☐
e) Over 5
☐
Comment: Click here to enter text.
4. Do you have any comments you would like to share pertaining to your experience with the administration of ATI requests at your
agency? Please feel free to share any information you deem useful and appropriate.
Comment: Click here to enter text.

APPENDIX 2: TABLES

Table 3: Comparison between the ATIA and Regulation 1049
Elements
Canada
Act was passed 1982
in
Existence of
no
recitals

Ontario
1988

EU
2001

Albania
1999, 2014

No

Yes (17 recitals)

No

Number of
articles
Purpose of the
act

77

70

19

28

to extend the present laws
of Canada to provide a
right to ATI in records
under the control of a
government institution1422

- to provide a right of access to
information under the control
of institutions
- to protect the privacy of
individuals1423

To give the fullest possible
effect to the right of public
ATD1424and ensure the
widest possible access to
documents1425

Principles

Government information
should be available to the
public,..necessary
exceptions to the right of
access should be limited
and specific and decisions

- information should be
available
- necessary exemptions should
be limited and specific

Principle of openness to
create an ever closer union
among the peoples of
Europe, in which decisions
are taken as openly as
possible and as closely as

to guarantee the recognition
of a public’s right to
information, in the framework
of exercising the rights and
freedoms of individuals in
practice, and the formation of
ideas on the state of the
country and the society”1426.
To promote integrity,
transparency and
accountability of public
authorities1430

1422

Article 2(1) of ATIA, RSC, 1985, c.A-1
Section 1 of the FIPPA
1424
Recital (4) of Regulation 1049/2001, Official Journal of the European Communities, L.145/43
1425
Article 1(a) of Regulation 1049/2001
1426
Article 1 (b) of Law 119/2014
1430
Article 1(3) of Law 119/2014
1423
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Institutions
covered

Meaning of
documents

1427

on the disclosure of
government information
should be reviews
independently of
government1427
Any department or
ministry of state of the
Government of Canada and
parent Crown corporations

- decisions should be reviewed
independently of
government1428

“record” –any
documentary material
regardless of medium or
form1433

any record of information
however recorded, whether in
printed form, on film, by
electronic means or
otherwise1434

government ministries, most
public agencies, boards,
commissions and advisory
bodies, colleges and
universities, some publicly
funded organizations

Article 2(1) in ATIA
Section 1 of the FIPPA
1429
Recitals (1) &(2) of the Regulation 1049/2001
1431
Court of Justice of the European Union
1432
European Central Bank
1433
Article 3 of ATIA “Definitions”
1434
Section 2 of FIPPA
1435
Article 3(a) of Regulation 1049/2001 “Definitions”
1436
Article 2.2 of Law 119/2014
1428

possible to the citizen.
Openness enables citizens to
participate more closely in
the decision-making
process…1429
The EP, the Council, the
Commission, CJEU1431 &
ECB1432 when acting in their
administrative capacities,
and all EU agencies

“document”- any content
whatever its medium(written
in paper or stored in
electronic form or as a
sound, visual or audiovisual
recording)1435

any administrative body
provided for in the current
legislation on administrative
procedures, legislative bodies,
legislative, judicial and
prosecution bodies at any
level, local government units
at any level, state authorities
and public entities, created by
the Constitution or by law
“public information”-any data
recorded in any form or
format, during discharge of
the public function, whether
or not prepared by a public
authority1436.
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Subjects

Every person who is a
Canadian citizen or
permanent resident1437

every person has a right of
access to a record1438

Times for
handling
requests
Extensions of
time limits
Exemptions

30 days after the request is
received1441

30 days after the request is
received1442

Not limited (reasonable
period of time1445
Laid down in Articles 1324;
Cabinet confidences (s.69)
court records,
intergovernmental
relations, personal
information, third party
information,

for a period of time that is
reasonable1446
Listed in section 12-22 of the
Act
-excludes Cabinet confidences
(s.12)
court records, certain law
enforcement information,
intergovernmental relations,
personal information, third
party information, most labour
relations records

1437

Article 4(1) of ATIA “Access to government records”
Section 10(1) of FIPPA
1439
Article 2 of the Regulation 1049/2001 “Beneficiaries and scope”
1440
Article 2.3 of Law 119/2014
1441
Article 7 of ATIA
1442
Section 26 of FIPPA
1443
Article 7(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001
1444
Article 15.1
1445
Article 9(1) of ATIA
1446
Section 27(1) of FIPPA
1447
Article 7(3) of the Regulation 1049/2001
1448
Article 15.3
1438

Any citizen of the Union,
and any natural or legal
person residing or having its
registered office in a
Member State1439
15 working days from
registration1443

any natural or legal person,
local or foreign, as well as any
stateless persons1440.

15 working days1447

5 working days1448

Clearly listed in Article 4.
Paragraphs 2,3,4 of Article 4
are assessed against an
overriding public interest
(balance test required)

Restrictions all laid out in
Article 17, all tested against a
public interest override

10 working days from the day
of submission1444
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Overview
bodies

Costs for
requests

1449

Information
Commissioner, exclusively
to ATIA (power of
recommendations)
Application fee not
exceeding $25. Currently
$5 application fee set by
regulations+ payment for
every hour in excess of 5
hours of searching1449

Article 11 (1) & (2) of ATIA
Section 57 (1) and (3) of FIPPA
1451
Article 10(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001
1452
Article 13.1 of Law 119/2014
1450

Information and Privacy
Commissioner

$5 application fee set by
regulations +several costs1450

Ombudsman, broadly
responsible for good
administration in the EU
(power of recommendations)
No application fee; Copies of
less than 20 pg A4 are free of
charge (over that costs of
producing and sending
documents may be
charged)1451

Commissioner for the FOI
and Protection of Personal
Data
No application fee
-cost for the reproduction of
the information request and,
where appropriate, the cost of
delivery1452
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Table 6: Source of ATI requests received
2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006
41,641
35,154
34,041
31,487
29,182
27,269
18,477
17,047
14,958
13,202
12,868
13,360
(44.4%)
(48.5%)
(43.9%)
(41.9%)
(44.1%)
(49%)
23,723
22,274
16,893
15,673
12,387
11,656
10,762
9,461
9,108
Public
(37.6%)
(35.2%)
(34.2%)
(34.2%)
(32.4%)
(33.4%)
8,421
8,
321
5,133
5,
234
3,
693
4,804
4,411
3,617
2,451
Media
(14%)
(13%)
(9%)
(12.6%)
(10.5%)
(14.1%)
(14%)
(12.4%)
(9%)
2,898
2, 415
1, 946
1, 706
1, 559
2,097
2, 850
2,932
1,980
Organization
(4.8%)
(3.8%)
(3.7%)
(4.1%)
(4.4%)
(6.2%)
(9.1%)
(10%)
(7.3%)
1,934
893
574
551 (1.3%) 468 (1.3%) 526 (1.6%) 262 (0.8%) 304 (1%)
370 (1.4%)
Academia
Source: Table drawn by author using data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Available at http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp
Total requests
Business

2013-2014
60,105
23,129

2012-2013
55,145
21,242

2011-2012
43,194
18,648

Categories of ATI requests in Canada 2005-2014
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2004-05

2005-06

2006-07
Business

2007-08
Public

2008-09
Media

2009-10
Organizations

2010-11
Academia

2011-12
Total

2012-13

2013-14

2004-2005
25,207
11,910
(47.2%)
8,213
(47.2%)
2,680
(10.6%)
2,107
(8.4%)
297 (1.2%)
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Table 7: Number of ATI requests processed
Requests
received
Requests closed
All disclosed
Disclosed in part
All exempted
All excluded

2013-2014
60,105

2012-2013
55,145

2011-2012
43,194

2010-2011
41,641

2009-2010
35,154

2008-2009
34,041

2007-2008
31,487

2006-2007
29,182

2005-2006
27,269

2004-2005
25,207

58,475
15,684
(26.8)
29,250
(50%)
679 (1.2%)
521 (0.9%)

53,993
11,681
(21.6)
25,534
(52.8%)
602 (1.1%)
278 (0.5%)

43,6641453
9,272
(21.2%)
23,468
(53.7%)
636 (1.5%)
346 (0.8%)

40,616
7,955
(19.6%)
22,848
(56.3%)
589 (1.4%)
311 (0.8%)

35,427
5,597
(15.8%)
21,810
(61.6%)
570 (1.6%)
263 (0.7%)

33,284
5,976
(18%)
18,726
(56.2%)
640 (1.9%)
307 (0.9%)

30,530
5,430
(17.8%)
16,915
(55.4%)
633 (2.1%)
264 (0.9%)

29,473
6,808
(23.1%)
14,650
(49.7%)
395 (1.3%)
151 (0.5%)

26,621
7,569
(28.4%)
12,311
(46.2%)
435 (1.6%)
184 (0.7%)

24,709
6,696
(27.1%)
10,667
(43.2%)
612 (2.5%)
154 (0.6%)

Number of ATI requests processed in Canada 2005-2014
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2004-05

2005-06
Closed

1453

2006-07
All disclosed

2007-08

2008-09
Disclosed in part

2009-10

2010-11

All exempted

2011-12
All excluded

2012-13

2013-14

Total

Note that the number reflects requests received in the given year and outstanding requests from previous reporting period. Every time that the number of
requests completed is bigger than those received, it reflects outstanding requests being processed.
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Table 8: Time of reply
Replied on time
(30 days)

2013-2014
35,653
(61%)

2012-2013
34,997
(64.8%)

2011-2012
24,128
(55.3%)

2010-2011
23,107
(56.9%)

2009-2010
19,874
(56.1%)

2008-2009
18,991
(57.1%)

ATI requests replied on time
70,000

60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Total requests

Replied on time

2007-2008
17,476
57.2%

2006-2007
17,028
(57.8%)

2005-2006
15,877
(59.6%)

2004-2005
15,254
(61.7%)
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Table 9: Exemptions applied under the ATIA
Exemptions
Information
obtained in
confidence
(sec.13)
FederalProvincial
Affairs (sec.14)
International
Affairs and
Defence (sec.15)
Law
Enforcement
and
Investigations
(sec.16)
Safety of
Individuals
(sec.17)
Economic
Interests of
Canada (sec.18)
Personal
Information
(sec.19)
Third Party
information
(sec.20)
Operations of
government
(sec.21)
Testing
Procedures, tests
& Audits (sec.22)
Solicitor-Client
Privilege (sec.23)

2013-2014
2,474

2012-2013
1,945

2011-2012
1,687

2010-2011
1,875
(3.7%)

2009-2010
1,744
(3.6%)

2008-2009
1,733
(3.9%)

2007-2008
1,686
(4.1%)

2006-2007
1,582
(4.4%)

2005-2006
1,455
(4.9%)

2004-2005
1,193
(4.5%)

991

687

657

715
(1.4%)

487
(1%)

820
(1.8%)

1,063
(2.6%)

921
(2.6%)

593
(1.9%)

543
(2.1%)

11,136

10,669

8,722

7,773
(15.4%)

10,724
(22%)

9,080
(20.2%)

8,365
(20.4%)

5,158
(14.5%)

3,563
(11.9%)

2,020
(7.6%)

7,946

7,079

6,490

6,752
(13.4%)

5,896
(12.1%)

5,720
(12.8%)

4,924
(12%)

4,160
(11.7%)

3,729
(12.5%)

3,351
(12.7%)

169

176

109

143
(0.3%)

140
(0.3%)

119
(0.3%)

96
(0.2%)

79
(0.2%)

108
(0.4%)

79
(0.3%)

1,327

1,248

852

820
(1.6%)

842
(1.7%)

900
(2%)

619
(1.5%)

657
(1.8%)

535
(1.8%)

540
(2%)

20,702

20,797

18,665

18,392
(36.5%)

16,544
(34%)

13,985
(31.2%)

12,119
(29.5%)

10,755
(30.2%)

9,098
(30.5%)

8,499
(32.1%)

5,308

4,914

3,862

3,934
(7.8%)

3,961
(8.1%)

3,786
(8.4%)

3,790
(9.2%)

4,374
(12.3%)

3,962
(13.3%)

4,099
(15.5%)

9,991

8,157

6,556

6,465
(12.8%)

5,740
(11.7%)

6,062
(13.5%)

5,685
(13.8%)

5,297
(14.9%)

4,682
(15.7%)

4,259
(16.1%)

364

388

347

318
(0.6%)

250
(0.5%)

283
(0.6%)

221
(0.5%)

171
(0.5%)

141
(0.5%)

140
(0.5%)

2,248

2,082

1,822

1,811
(3.6%)

1,464
(3%)

1,465
(3.3%)

1,381
(3.4%)

1,398
(3.9%)

1,271
(4.3%)

1,111
(4.2%)
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Statutory
prohibitions
(sec.24)
Information to
be published
(sec.26)

2,019

1,963

1,592

1,275
(2.5%)

877
(1.8%)

820
(1.8%)

1,005
(2.5%)

1,009
(2.8%)

634
(2.1%)

568
(2.1%)

128

123

81

98
(0.2%)

84
(0.2%)

95
(0.2%)

97
(0.2%)

97
(0.3%)

81
(0.3%)

69
(0.3%)

Exemptions applied over years
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14

Obtained in confidence

Fed-prov. Affairs

Int affairs & defence

Law enforcement

Safety

Economic interest

Privacy

Third Party info

Gov operations

Tests & audits

Solicitor-client priv

Statutory prohibitions

Info to be published
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Table 10: Exclusions applied under ATIA
Exclusions
Non-application
to certain
materials
(sec.68)
Cabinet
confidences
(sec.69)

2013-2014
769

2012-2013
484

2011-2012
378

2010-2011
626

2009-2010
376

2008-2009
398

2007-2008
269

2006-2007
222

2005-2006
230

2004-2005
211

3,168

2,158

1,842

1,575

1,719

2,237

2,115

2,063

1,661

1,405

Exclusions applied over years
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08

Non-application

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

Cabinet confidendences

2011-12
Total

2012-13

2013-14
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Table 11: Institutions that received most ATI requests
Most
requests
Total
requests
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

2013-2014

2012-2013

2011-2012

2010-2011

2009-2010

2008-2009

2007-2008

2006-2007

2005-2006

2004-2005

60,105

55,145

51,332

41,641

35,154

34,041

31,487

29,182

27,269

25,207

Citizenship and
Immigration (CI)
29,281 (48.8%)
Canada Border
Services Agency
(CBSA)
4,671 (7.8%)
Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA)
2,751 (4.6%)
National Defence
(ND)
2,231 (3.7%)
Royal Canadian
Mounted Police
(RCMP)
1,730 (2.9%)
Health Canada
(HC) 1,563 (2.6%)

CI
25,010
(45.3%)
CBSA
3,147
(6%)

CI
20,575
(47.6%)
CRA
2,237
(5.2)

CI
18,862
(45.3%)
CRA
2,589
(6.2%)

CI
16,647
(47.3%)
CRA
1,798
(5.1)

CI
14,034
(41.2%)
RCMP
2,009
(5.9%)

CI
11,434
(36.9%)
CRA
1,903
(6.1%)

CI
10,497
(35.9%)
ND
1,808
(6.2%)

CI
10,309
(37.8%)
HC
1,842
(6.8%)

CI
9,034
(35.8%)
CRA
1,861
(7.4%)

CRA
3,137
(5.6%)
TC
197
(4%)
ND
2,044
(3.7%)

CBSA
1,866
(4.3%)
HC
1,763
(4.1%)
ND
1,645
(3.8%)

RCMP
1,657
(4%)
CBSA
1,607
(3.9%)
HC
1,602
(3.8%)

RCMP
1,547
(4.4%)
HC
1,481
(4.2%)
CBSA
1,292
(3.7%)

CRA
1,770
(5.2%)
ND
1,669
(4.9%)
HC
1,158
(3.4%)

ND
1,779
(5.7%)
RCMP
1,662
(5.4%)
TC
1,217
(3.9%)

CRA
1,604
(5.5%)
HC
1,442
(4.9%)
TC
1,298
(4.5%)

CRA
1,772
(6.5%)
ND
1,131
(4.2%)
RCMP
924
(3.4%)

HC
1,363
(5.4%)
ND
1,284
(5.1%)
RCMP
1,085
(4.3%)

RCMP
1,434
(3.3%)
EC
1,421
(3.3%)

ND
1,483
(3.6%)
EC
1,128
(2.7%)

ND
1,142
(3.3%)
EC
890
(2.5%)

CBSA
1,155
(3.4%)
TC
1,069
(3.1%)

HC
1,147
(3.7%)
CBSA
1,030
3.3%)

CBSA
945
(3.2%)
RCMP
911
(3.1%)

TC
901
(3.3%)
PWGS
832
(3.1%)

PWGS
876
(3.5%)
TC
779
(3.1%)

FAIT
892
(2.1%)
LAC
821
(1.9%)

LAC
907
(2.2%)
PWGS
798
(2.1%)

LAC
761
(2.2%)
PWGS
724
(2.1%)

EC
892
(2.6%)
FAIT
665
(2%)

FAIT
736
(2.4%)
PCO
688
(2.2%)

PWGS
869
(3%)
EC
851
(2.9%)

LAC
745
(2.7%)
EC
728
(2.7%)

EC
653
(2.6%)
LAC
629
(2.5%)

7.

Environment
Canada (EC)
1,459 (2.4%)

EC
1,827
(3.3%)
HC
1,765
(3.2%)

8.

Transport Canada
(TC)
1,091 (1.8%)
Privy Council
Office (PCO)
907 (1.5%)

RCMP
1.218
(2.2%)
FAIT
1,148
(2.1%)

6.

9.
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FATDC1454
904
(1.5%)

10

LAC1455
900
(1.6%)

PWGS1456
736
(1.7%)

FAITC1457
798
(1.9%)

FAIT
638
(1.8%)

Industry
Canada
(IC) 660
1.9%)

EC
659
(2.1%)

LAC
744
(2.6)

CBSA
670
(2.5%)

CSC1458
613
(2.4%)

Table 12: Fees and costs of operations of the ATIA
Cost of
Operations
Fees Collected

2013-2014
62,585,847

2012-2013
58,658,040

2011-2012
58,929,246

2010-2011
52,633,834

2009-2010
47,196,030

2008-2009
48,891,400

2007-2008
43,910,746

2006-2007
33,947,815

2005-2006
32,305,312

2004-2005
26,365,457

331,782

314,205

319,000

326,869

286,996

305,684

404,209

296,827

305,155

265,382

Costs and fees of operations of the ATIA 2005-2014
70,000,000
60,000,000
50,000,000
40,000,000
30,000,000

20,000,000
10,000,000
0
2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08

2008-09

Costs of operations

1454 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada
1455 Library and Archives Canada
1456 Public Works and Government Services Canada
1458 Correctional Services Canada

2009-10

2010-11

Fees collected

2011-12

2012-13

2013-14
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Table 13:

Source: Treasury Board Secretariat, Info Source Bulletin Number 36B – Statistical Reporting. Online:
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/bulletin/2013/b/bulletin36b02-eng.asp#s2>.
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Table 14: Responses to ATI requests 1983-2014

Source: Treasury Board Secretariat, Info Source Bulletin Number 37B – Statistical Reporting, online:
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/bulletin/2014/b/bulletin37b02-eng.asp#aia>.
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Table 15: Requests to the European Commission according to the social and occupational profile of requesters (%)
Years
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
6227
6,525
6,014
6,477
6,361
5,055
5,197
4,196
3,841
3,396
Total
22.08
22.70
25.73
23.24
21.29
31.03
31.85
32.08
10.49
Academic 19.80
18.30
14.46
13.58
11.30
10.69
10.24
11.01
9.69
10.43
11
Lawyers
6
4.58
4.81
3.25
3.35
2.02
2.46
2.90
1.14
1.07
Journal.
16.04
16.62
10.32
8.59
8.18
9.85
18.26
17.77
17.27
29.44
Civil
Society1459
8.23
8.24
7.12
8.20
13.56
7.33
14.19
15.69
15.67
12.32
Public
authority
8.76
7.64
8.15
8.32
3.77
6.3
6.75
6.85
3.78
Other EU 12.80
institute.
18.83
25.26
33.83
34.78
32.68
45.5
16.75
15.33
16.55
31.89
Not
specified
Source: Chart drawn by the author using data from the European Commission, Access to Documents. Online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/reports_en.htm>.

Requests to the EU Commission 2005-2014
50
40

30
20
10
0
2005

1459

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Academics

Lawyers

Journalists

Public authorities

Other EU institutions

Not specified

2012

2013

2014

Civil society

Civil Society here includes: Interest groups, industry, NGOs, etc. online: <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/docs/rapport_2013/com-2014619_en.pdf>.
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Table 16: EU Commission requests processed (%)
Access refused
Partial access
Full Access

2014
11.87
15.36
72.77

2013
14.45
10.68
73.43

2012
16.91
8.61
74.48

2011
12.18
7.62
80.20

2010
12.47
5.37
82.16

2009
11.65
4.11
84.23

EU Commission requests processed 2005-2014
100
80
60
40
20
0
2005

2006

2007

2008

Full access

2009

2010

Partial access

2011

2012

Refused access

2013

2014

2008
13.99
3.33
82.68

2007
23.40
3.88
72.71

2006
23.22
2.94
73.83

2005
31.92
3.65
64.43
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Table 17: EU Commission refusals by exceptions applied (%)
Exceptions
Public security
Defence and
security
International
relations
Financial, ec and
monetary policy
Privacy and
integrity of
Individuals
Commercial
Interests
Court
proceeding and
legal advice
Inspection,
investigations
and audits
Decision-making
process (no dec
taken)
Decision-making
process (dec
taken, opinions)

2014
0
2.84

2013
0.92
3.69

2012
1.31
0.65

2011
1.33
2

2010
2.67
0

2009
2.55
0

2008
0.42
0.42

2007
1.19
2.23

2006
1.53
0.60

2005
0.28
0.21

0.71

0

7.19

4.67

6.67

4.38

5.91

10.98

7.06

4.17

4.61

7.37

0

3.34

3.33

3.28

0.84

1.26

1.19

2.55

18.09

16.13

10.46

20.67

9.33

14.23

5.06

5.04

4.85

3.68

15.96

11.98

11.76

14.66

16.67

17.52

24.89

10.79

8.94

7.78

10.28

6.91

7.84

1.33

10

5.47

3.8

6.08

7.49

8.63

32.98

36.87

45.10

32.68

32

25.91

27.85

23.48

30.72

41.80

11.35

10.60

6.54

15.33

11.33

12.77

17.3

12.02

14.30

12.73

3.19

5.53

9.15

4

8

13.87

12.24

19.29

19.06

14.36
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EU Commission refusals 2005-2014
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Commercial interests

Court proceedings
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Decision-making(no dec)
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Table 18: EU Council personal profile of the requesters (%)
Years
Total1460
Civil Society
Journalists
Lawyers
Academics
Public
Authorities
MEP
Others
Undeclared

2014
10,839
28.5
4.5
10.3
31.7
3.8

2013
7,565
29.4
1.8
10
29.2
4.4

2012
6,166
25.8
2.8
9.8
33.4
4

2011
9,641
25.8
3.3
10
37.6
5.4

2010
8188
27.9
2.6
10.1
33.7
5.6

2009
8,444
17.2
2.7
11.4
33.7
4.1

2008
10,732
18.3
2.8
9.5
33.7
7.6

2007
7,809
14.2
2.9
8.8
40
6.1

2006
11,353
17.6
2.3
9.1
34.5
6.9

2005
9,457
17.2
2.3
10.2
32.3
6.2

0.4
6
14.8

0.6
5.8
18.8

1
6.6
16.5

0.9
5.3
13.5

1.1
9.4
13.3

1.4
15.9
12.6

1.8
14.7
10.9

1.3
13.3
13.2

1.5
14.5
13.6

2.4
12.6
16.8

Source: Table drawn by author using data from the Council of European Union, Access to Documents Annual Reports. Available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/search/?q=access+to+documents+annual+reports

EU Council profile of requesters 2005-2015
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15
10
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Public authorities

MEP

Other

Undeclared

Note that the total number is not expressed in percentage.

2014
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Table 19: EU Council requests access
Requests
received
Access refused
Partial access
Full Access

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

1,875
776
8,188

1,613
867
5,084

1,308
998
3,860

1,135
1,103
7,403

1,341
1,369
6,478

1,991
1,117
5,336

1,607
1,540
7,675

1,686
945
5,178

1,747
1,105
8,451

1.922
1,254
6,281

EU Council requests access
12000

10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2005

2006

2007
Full Access

2008

2009

Partial access

2010

2011

Refused access

2012
Total

2013

2014
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Table 20: EU Council refusals by exceptions applied (%)
Exceptions
Public security
Defence and
military
International
relations
Financial, ec and
monetary policy
Privacy and
integrity of
Individuals
Commercial
Interests
Court
proceeding and
legal advice
Inspection,
investigations
and audits
Decision-making
process
Other reasons
Not held by
Council

2014
2
0.2

2013
3.8
0.6

2012
5.8
1.6

2011
8.9
1.4

2010
7
1.9

2009
5.6
3.5

2008
6.4
2.4

2007
13.3
2.3

2006
17.1
4.5

2005
15.8
6.4

25.8

24.7

20.5

21.2

24.2

22.9

27.7

15.1

12.3

20.6

0

0.3

0

1.1

0.5

0

0

0

0.1

0.8

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.2

0.3

0.2

0

0.1

0

0

0

0

0

0.1

0

0

0.7

0.5

0.6

1

0.8

0.4

1.5

0.5

2

1.8

0

0

0

0

0.3

0

0.1

0

0.3

0

21.5

36.7

41.3

40.9

33.1

39.1

35.9

38

43.2

48.3

49.4
0.2

33.2
0

30
0

25.3
0

31.7
0.1

28.2
0

25.4
0.1

30.2
0

20.2
0

6.1
0
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EU Council refusals by category 2005-2014
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Table 21: EP professional profile of applicants (%)
Years
Total
Civil
society
Journal.
Lawyers
University
research
Library
research
Public
authority
MEP
Others

2014
532
-1461

2013
610
18

2012
777
16.95

2011
1,161
10.36

2010
1,139
20.47

2009
1,260
21.75

2008
1,300
54.06

2007
1,865
21.95

2006
1,917
21.39

2005
1,814
20.59

-

5
9
43

3
11.16
33.48

5.84
9.60
45.39

7.12
15.93
38.47

3.35
13.11
41.36

0.11
0.43
27.41

2.86
6.49
36.69

2.88
6.48
39.39

6.47
4.04
34.60

-

2

2.36

1.69

2.33

1.42

2.28

4.03

3.49

2.79

-

7

6.44

1.13

8.81

13.62

8.88

4.61

5.10

4.27

-

1
15

0
26.61

2.07
23.16

1.55
5.31

1.52
3.86

1.41
5.42

1.30
22.08

1.33
19.94

1.84
25.40

Source: Table Drawn by the author using data from European Parliament, Register of Documents: Annual Report. Online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/information/report.htm>.

1461

Numbers here are not available in the Annual Report.
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EP profile of requesters
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Table 22: EP refusals by exceptions applied (%)
Exceptions
Public security
Privacy
Commercial
Interests
Legal advice
Audits
Decision-making

2014
6
39
17

2013
0
50
0

2012
15.8
31.6
10.5

2011
25.4
16.3
3.6

2010
12.5
25
8.3

2009
5.26
26.31
2.63

2008
2.08
21.88
1.04

2007
6.25
39.58
10.42

2006
24.44
8.88

2005
77.78
1.85

6
6
28

0
0
50

10.5
10.5
21

14.5
5.4
34.5

12.5
4
37.5

10.52
15.78
39.47

2.08
15.63
57.29

8.33
2.08
33.33

24.44
40

12.96
1.85
5.56

EP refusals by category 2005-2014
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